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This thesis takes a language-oriented constructivist perspective contending that language 
has a shaping or constructing role in creating patterns and norms in a relationship as 
language and social realities are mutually constitutive. It seeks to examine the challenges in 
contemporary China-EU relations through engaging the official discourse (1994 to 2019) 
between China and the EU. Apart from understanding and examining the factors and their 
interrelationship behind the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations with a 
comprehensive analytical framework bridging constructivist and realist approaches, it 
endeavours to test the potential of the multidisciplinary methodology which combines corpus-
driven discourse analysis and international relations (IR) studies.  
China-EU relations have witnessed an overall positive development with promising 
prospects over the last twenty-five years since the EU issued its first Asia policy paper in 
1994 with a primary focus on China (Commission of the European Communities, 1994). 
Nonetheless, the relationship is not without challenges. Issues range from disputes in 
specific areas such as trade disputes and human rights disputes to unresolved, persisting 
issues such as the recognition of China’s market economy status (MES), the EU's arms 
embargo on China, as well as questions and misunderstandings from the EU about China's 
global visions and initiatives. In terms of longitudinal development patterns, there have also 
been re-occurring down-turns in the relationship, signalling its volatility in the last two 
decades. This thesis departs from the existing space between the high expectations of the 
bilateral relationship and the status-quo, thus attempt to understand the dimensions of the 
factors and their interrelations behind challenges in contemporary China-EU relations based 
on a corpus-driven discourse analysis of their official discourse across twenty-five years.  
The volatility and uncertainty in the relationship suggest that the challenges in China-EU 
relations have multidimensional driving forces. So far, realist approaches in China-EU 
relations focus on the impacts of materialist factors between China and the EU, such as 
economic and military power, in terms of the relationship. Liberal approaches focus on 
economic and trade issues, often considering the roles of global institutions. The differences 
between the languages, identities, visions, and norms of China and the EU have not been 
thoroughly addressed in these two approaches. Existing constructivist research on China-EU 
relations mostly focuses on China and the EU's conceptual differences and their influence on 
the relationship. Although traditional constructivist factors such as identities, cultures and 
ideologies have been discussed, the relationship between these factors, how they interact 
with discourse and materialist perspectives and how these interactions have impacted 
China-EU relations over the years have not been discussed from a comprehensive, 
longitudinal perspective. This gap exists not only because challenges in China-EU relations 
 
iv   
take place at multiple levels and are caused by multiple factors against the background of a 
constantly changing global environment but also due to the lack of an integrated data 
platform which covers the topics in China-EU relations longitudinally.  
This research fills this gap by analysing the official discourse between China and the EU. It 
establishes and engages the machine-readable corpora of the official discourse between 
China and the EU covering twenty-five years. Informed by grounded theory, the thesis 
carries out a corpus-driven discourse analysis and generates findings related to mismatches 
in the priorities, visions, identities as well as the normative and strategic approaches of 
China and the EU despite their substantial common ground and shared interests.  
This research contributes to current China-EU studies empirically, theoretically, and 
methodologically: 
Empirically, it enhances the understanding of factors and their dynamics behind the 
challenges in China-EU relations through emergent themes and data from the corpora. It 
enhances the arguments in the existing literature on the mismatches between China and the 
EU in terms of priorities, identities and visions despite the shared interests and common 
ground between the two. It extends the arguments in the field by pointing out that 
mismatches and gaps not only exist in their understandings of the international order, 
expectations of the other but also in areas where they have shared discourse and interests. 
These include their common topics of economy and trade, their self-perception and 
perception of the other, and their normative power approaches which are impacted by their 
shifting economic power in the world. These findings specify the mismatches and point out 
the longitudinal changes of the mismatches over the study period, which offers China-EU 
studies empirical evidence for targeted, specified mismatches from multiple aspects for 
further policy analysis and decision-making based on China-EU studies especially in terms 
of expectation management and other strategic choices.  
Theoretically, it bridges the constructivist approach and realist approach with the introduction 
of the paradigm of discourse and economic power as the boundary objects linking 
constructivist and realist approaches as well as the discipline of corpus-linguistics and 
international relations (IR) studies. It also complements the existing constructivist approach 
on the mismatches between China-EU relations by establishing the framework of 
Multidimensional Dynamic Mismatches for analysing the challenges in China-EU relations 
and potentially the challenges in other bilateral relations and beyond with a comprehensive 
and longitudinal perspective.  
Methodologically, it explores and extends the potential of a synthesised approach with 
corpus-driven discourse analysis applied in bilateral relations studies. It establishes the 
linkage between the methods of word frequency, connotations and concordance searches 




identity and vision analysis, and between assertive, directive and commissive discourse, 
both in the form of phrases and in terms of sentence structure, and the analysis of normative 
power. The thesis offers a possible methodological structure for further rule and norm-










This thesis examines the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations through engaging 
machine-readable corpora consisting of official discourse in China-EU relations from 1994 to 
2019.  
Previous studies taking a constructivist approach on China-EU relations have mostly focused 
on specific aspects of the relationship such as human rights issues, trades disputes or 
China’s and the EU's conceptual differences on certain concepts such as sovereignty, 
human rights and international orders. However, the challenges in China-EU relations are 
wide ranging, and the relationship has shown volatility despite the positive trend and the 
common ground between the two. The traditional approaches did not offer a framework in 
which the longitudinal conceptual and materialist factors as well as the connections between 
them are discussed and reviewed. Plus, they do not coordinate the relations of different 
levels of mismatches, which gives the impression that these factors may be parallel (which 
may not be the case).  
A corpus-driven discourse analysis offers a chance to put these aspects onto the same 
platform and provides an opportunity to understand the relations between these aspects thus 
providing a fuller picture of them and of where China and the EU converge and diverge. It 
also makes it possible to review the changes in policies from a longitudinal perspective 
which is otherwise impossible without the involvement of longitudinal, systematic corpora.  
The aim and contribution of this research are threefold. First, it explores the possibilities of 
integrating corpus-driven discourse analysis with constructivist analysis in China-EU studies. 
Second, through this integrated methodology, the research highlights the long-standing 
factors which have influenced the relationship as well as the way they interact with each 
other and impact China-EU relations. This helps to understand the challenges in China-EU 
relations. Third, the thesis proposes an analytical framework which links these aspects and 
points out their interrelations from a longitudinal perspective which can potentially be applied 
in and beyond bilateral relations analysis in International Relations studies. A few cases 
studies, including the trade issues between China and the EU, persisting issues such as the 
recognition of China's Market Economy Status and the EU's arms embargo on China, as well 
as questions raised by the EU member states on China's international initiatives and projects 
have been included and allow this framework to be applied to understand the challenges in 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This introductory chapter presents the background of contemporary China-EU relations with 
two challenges emphasised in China-EU relations and the development of the official 
discourse between China and the EU from 1994 to 2019. Based on these, it reviews the 
existing approaches in China-EU studies on understanding the challenges between China 
and the EU over the researched period while highlighting the development of the discourse-
oriented approach in understanding China-EU relations. These justify the rationale behind 
examining the challenges in China-EU relations through a combination of a constructivist 
perspective and a Corpus-Driven Discourse Analysis.   
This chapter contains six sections: 
Section 1.1 reviews the phases in the development of China-EU relations between 1994 and 
2019 and categorises the challenges in China-EU relations. This provides the context for the 
research questions of this thesis. It also categorises the challenges in contemporary China-
EU relations into three groups, namely the longitudinal ups and downs, or the volatility of 
China-EU relations, the issues in specific policy areas, and structural challenges. This paves 
the way for responding to the research questions through the analytical framework 
developed in this thesis.  
Section 1.2 reviews the development of China-EU official discourse since the establishment 
of their diplomatic relations with a focus on China-EU interactions after 1994 when the EU 
issued its first Asia strategy policy paper “Towards A New Asia Strategy” of which its China 
strategy makes up a large proportion (Commission of the European Communities, 1994). 
This introduces the existing mechanism of discourse interactions in China-EU relations, 
highlighting the role it has been playing in China-EU relations.  
Section 1.3 reviews the existing literature both on the general trends and scopes in China-
EU scholarship but also specifically about the existing approaches in examining and 
understanding the challenges in China-EU relations. It also presents the theoretical 
approaches in understanding challenges between China and the EU with an emphasis on 
constructivist discourse analysis. The section also observes a few differences in the Chinese 
language literature and English language literature on China-EU relations.  
Section 1.4 presents the research aims and questions, namely its endeavours in examining 
and understanding the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations, both empirically, 
theoretically and methodologically.  
Section 1.5 presents the structure of the thesis.   
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1.1 The Challenges in Contemporary China-EU 
Relations 
The existing literature on contemporary China-EU relations studies has argued that several 
positive factors set the foundation for a successful bilateral relationship between China and 
the EU. These positive factors can be categorised into four main aspects. First, there are no 
direct military or territorial disputes between the two. The relationship enjoys the “absence of 
serious impediments and frictions” (Shambaugh, 2004). Second, the economy and market of 
China and the EU are mutually beneficial and complementary to each other. China and the 
EU are large export and import markets for each other and they have transferrable 
technologies for each other. When China was applying to join the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), the EU supported quick access for China to join it (Eglin, 1997). Third, both China 
and the EU do not appreciate hegemony and prefer a more balanced power structure in the 
international arena. Finally, China and the EU promote peace and development of both 
themselves and the international environment (Zhou, 2003).  
Despite major efforts and high expectations, this thesis takes the stance that challenges in a 
few aspects have appeared over the last thirty years in China-EU relations and should be 
examined so that future development of the relations can be geared towards and supported 
with an understanding of the challenges in mind.  
In order to examine the challenges with a systemic approach, it is necessary to review and 
categorise the challenges since the thesis does not plan to focus on each individual case, 
but the common elements behind cases of a similar nature from the constructivist framework 
developed. The coming sections review and summarise the challenges in China-EU relations 
in the last twenty-five years from three perspectives. Section 1.1.1 categorises the 
challenges from a chronological perspective, reviewing the longitudinal ups and downs in 
China-EU relations in the last two decades. Section 1.1.2 reviews the challenges in China-
EU relations in specific policy areas. Section 1.1.3 reviews the structural challenges in 
China-EU relations, namely the disputable imbalances between political and economic 
interactions and the tension and imbalances along with the power transitions going on 
between China and the EU in the international arena.  
1.1.1 Ups and Downs in China-EU Relations 
The first category of challenges between China and the EU from a longitudinal perspective is 
the volatility in the relationship despite its overall positive developmental trend. There have 
been recurrences of disputes and cooling-down periods despite the generally positive trend 
of the relations. This cycle, although not completely regular, is a source of instability and 
uncertainty in the bilateral relations.  
The first downward plunge in China-EU relations came when the European Commission 




initiated sanctions against China including an arms embargo. In 1990 the European Council 
and the European Parliament gradually restored their interactions with China. The European 
Commission resumed its diplomatic relations with China two years later, but the arms 
embargo has remained in place since then (Europe China Culture and Economy 
Commission, 2015). 
Since 1994, China-EU relations, in the opinion of the writer of this thesis, have undergone 
four stages of development: a honeymoon period  (Shambaugh, 2007: 263; Caira, 2010; Li 
et al., 2017), a cooled-down phase, a phase of adjustment, and currently, progression with a 
promising trend despite the uncertainty on the international arena including Brexit and the 
trade war between China and the US.  
The period between 1994 and 2005 in China-EU relations is commonly referred to by China-
EU researchers as the “honeymoon” period although opinions differ about when exactly the 
honeymoon started and whether or when it ended  (Shambaugh, 2007: 263; Caira, 2010; Li 
et al., 2017). In 1996, the first Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was held in Bangkok, Thailand 
and both China and the EU participated. In 2001, China entered the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and became its 143rd member (Europe China Culture and Economy 
Commission, 2015) with the EU being supportive of China’s application (Eglin, 1997). Since 
then, the economic benefits have tied the two together more tightly than ever, with the 
interactions between China and the EU extending from trade to a wider range of political, 
cultural and social aspects. Both parties became major trading partners with each other, with 
the EU becoming China’s second-largest export market in 2003 and the EU expansion in 
2004, making it China’s largest trading partner. China became the EU’s second-largest 
trading partner after the US in 2003 (Commission of the European Communities, 2005). In 
2008, bilateral trade between China and the EU reached 420 billion US dollars, ten times 
that of 1994 (Chen, 2009).  
The “honeymoon”, however, cooled down after a few years. In September 2007, German 
Chancellor Merkel met the Dalai Lama in a private talk. This was followed by a steep drop in 
the trade between China and Germany. In December 2007, former German Minister of 
Finance Peer Steinbrück’s visit to Beijing was cancelled. This tension between Germany and 
China has also caused internal disputes between Merkel and the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (SPD) where Former Minister Peer Steinbrück was a member. The SPD regarded 
Merkel as moving away from the previous SDP’s more prudent diplomacy with China 
(Xinhua News, 2014). In 2008, Merkel started to adopt a value-based diplomatic approach 
with more critical views on China (Xiong, 2008). 
At the end of 2007, the then French President Sarkozy visited China and made deals worth 
many millions. In 2008, he drastically changed his approach to China and met the Dalai 
Lama in Poland under the title of both the French President and the rotating Chair of the 
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European Union. In the same year, there had been clashes in Paris during the torch relay for 
the Beijing Olympic Games. Several French protesters interfered with the relay by attempting 
to seize the torch from one of the torch holders who was in a wheelchair (Xinhua News, 
2014).   
In 2012, the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, met the Dalai Lama 
despite the objection of China. This was followed by an ice-age for business trade between 
China and the UK. Cameron finally travelled to China at the end of 2013, after showing a 
willingness to visit Beijing several times (Xinhua News, 2014). Political and social disputes 
increased the tension and distrust between China and the EU member states, which also 
affected trade.  
In 2013, the EU enacted anti-dumping and anti-subsidies policies towards Chinese 
photovoltaic (PV) products. This enforced an 11.8% duty on the imports of Chinese PV 
products and it was intended to raise it to 47.6% until the solution of a “floor price”, a 
minimum price for Chinese PV products in European markets, was proposed and passed 
(Schroeder, 2013; Morris, 2013).  
In 2016, China and the EU went through a period where the two had tensions in terms of 
recognising China’s Market Economy Status (MES). China assumed that MES could be 
automatically granted according to the agreements of the WTO (World Trade Organisation, 
1994), but the EU had different interpretations of the rules and its own decision procedures. 
The case has been pending and unresolved until today.  
1.1.2 Issues in Specific Policy Areas  
Challenges also exist in specific areas of cooperation, including the economy and trade, 
political interactions, and communications. Although the economy is the primary focus of 
China-EU relations, this does not mean that economic cooperation and trade between China 
and the EU are necessarily free of problems. There are several trade issues which have had 
major negative impacts on the relationship. The most prominent issues are the EU’s trade 
deficit with China (Godement & Fox, 2009: 11), the EU’s accusation of China with regard to 
photovoltaic dumping and the refusal of the EU to grant China MES (Crookes, 2013: 646), as 
well as the tension about the access to the Chinese market as well as other trade disputes 
and frictions in the context of trade protectionism.  
Regarding political aspects, there are quite a few areas where China and the EU have 
tension, including human rights and territorial issues, among others. However, there are a 
few issues which bear a persistent, or sticky nature, including the EU’s arms embargo to 
China (Caira, 2010: 268) and the EU’s recognition of China’s MES. Although this thesis does 
not have the scope to discuss all of them, it will address issues related to MES and the arms 




analysis with the analytical framework developed in the persistence of these issues can be 
explored. 
Regarding communication between the governments, China tends to turn to the EU member 
states rather than to the EU for negotiations (Godement & Fox, 2009: 36). Regarding the 
attitudes towards communication, the contrast between the interdependent economic 
development and the lack of trust between China and the EU is sharp. There is an 
“increasing absence of trust” and “growing acrimony” in the major policy domains in China-
EU relations (Crookes, 2013: 641). 
1.1.3 Structural Challenges  
Structural challenges or challenges involving multiple international and domestic factors are 
also features of other problem areas in China-EU relations. As defined by the official 
discourse of China and the EU, China and the EU are aiming for ‘comprehensive strategic 
partnership’ (World Trade Organisation, 1994). Structural challenges manifest in two senses 
in the contemporary China-EU relations.  
First, existing literature has discussed the possible imbalances between economic 
cooperation and political interactions between China and the EU (Jan van der Harst & 
Tjalling Halbertsma, 2017).  
Second, as the rise of China has taken place both economically and politically, the economic 
power balance between China and the EU are shifting as the EU is a traditionally strong 
economic entity whereas China is a strong emerging economy. This power shift and the 
related changes represent another dynamic going on in China-EU relations.  
Recent years have witnessed more uncertainties prevailing in China-EU relations as well as 
the wider context of the international arena. Within the EU, structural changes have been 
taking place for years. Brexit marks the first case where a Member State (MS) has signalled 
its intention to withdraw from the Union, leading to a series of unresolved issues. For China, 
external and internal pressure accompanies the fact that China is gradually playing a more 
critical role in the international order. Internationally, China faces pressure, especially from 
the West, related to its political and social conditions as well as the EU’s protectionism 
precautions and policies in business and trade. Internally, China has to deal with the social 
and environmental problems related to its traditional labour-intensive industry and the 
imbalanced economic structure. In terms of the international environment, China-US 
relations and US politics have been going through tensions both economically and politically, 
which have also impacted China-EU relations. 
Increasing globalisation has led to a new level of interdependency among countries and has 
made uncertainties a ‘new normal’ in international affairs. These challenges are calling for 
more comprehensive, dynamic, and creative problem-solving.  
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1.2 Official Discourse in Contemporary China-EU 
Relations 
This thesis examines contemporary China-EU relations, especially in terms of the challenges 
and trying periods, through a comparative analysis of the official discourse between China 
and the EU. This section, while introducing the background of China-EU relations in the 
timeframe set by this research (1994-2019) and that of the official discourse development 
between China and the EU, addresses the importance and necessity of taking official 
discourse on board when exploring China-EU relations. 
China and the European Economic Community (EEC) established formal diplomatic relations 
in 1975. The year 2019 marks the forty-fourth anniversary of China-EU relations. Over the 
years, the development of China-EU relations has been accompanied by the signing of 
agreements and issuing of official policy papers. China-EU relations started by focusing on 
trade and economic cooperation partly because back then, the EEC was very different from 
the EU today which encompasses comprehensive functions and roles extending to all areas 
of the European economy, politics, culture and many more aspects. This is reflected in the 
scopes of the early official discourse between China and the EU. 
In 1978, the signing of the “China-EC Trade Agreement” between China and the European 
Community (EC) set the legal basis for bilateral economic and trade relations (Kong, 2012: 
8; Europe China Culture and Economy Commission, 2015) between the two. In 1985, the 
“Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic 
Community and the People’s Republic of China” (The Council of the European Communities, 
1985)  expanded the partnership to a wider scope (Europe China Culture and Economy 
Commission, 2015; Kong, 2012).  
Although the China-EU relationship started off as economy- and trade-oriented, the last two 
decades have seen expanding communication between China and the EU as reflected in 
their extensive official discourse including policy papers, dialogues and communications 
between the two. The significant volume of official discourse between China and the EU is 
what makes a corpus-driven discourse analysis possible. The European Union External 
Action Service (EEAS) lists the framework of the political dialogue between China and the 
EU up until December 2016. The existing levels of China-EU political dialogue under this 
framework are shown in Table Apx 1 (see Appendix, Section A.1) and Table Apx 2 
(Appendix, Section A.1).  
The summits, top-level dialogues, ministerial dialogues as well as sectoral dialogues on all 
sectors between China and the EU have been expanded greatly over the last two decades 
and have provided China-EU relations with the mechanism for long-term communication. 
The development of dialogue between China and the EU facilitate the political relationship 




Partnership’ and have subsequently established three high-level dialogue tracks, including 
high-level strategic dialogue, high-level economic and trade dialogue and high-level people-
to-people and cultural exchange dialogue (Zhao, 2014). Since 2010, China and the EU 
started the China-Europe high-level forum of political parties. China’s National People’s 
Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) have 
also established regular exchange mechanisms with the European Parliament and the 
European Economic and Social Council. There are also regular meetings between Chinese 
foreign ministers, and the EU’s high representative on common foreign and security affairs 
(Zhao, 2014). Up to 2015, the number of discussions and dialogue mechanisms between 
China and Europe have reached over seventy (Liu, 2015). The expanding political dialogues 
show that China and the EU are determined to develop in-depth relations for the long-term 
and expand the bilateral relations to more areas.  
The most prominent official discourse block, which plays the role of guiding papers for China 
and the EU in their policies towards the other, is one consisting of the EU’s official policy 
papers on China and vice versa. Table Apx 6 (see Appendix) shows the list of the EU’s 
policy papers on China and China’s policy papers on the EU from 1994 to 2019. 
In 1994, the European Commission issued its first policy paper on Asia “Towards a New Asia 
Strategy” (Commission of the European Communities, 1994) which marks one of the EU’s 
earliest strategy documents in the East Asia region in which China strategy plays a large 
role. In the following year, the EU framed its vision of China-EU relations as a “long term 
relationship” in its first China-specific policy paper where the EU proposed to develop 
political, economic and trade relations with China and to make China-EU relations a founding 
stone for the EU’s interactions and policies with Asia (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1995). In 1998, this upgraded to the “Comprehensive Partnership” through the 
EU’s second China policy paper “Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1998). Since then, the EU has issued a 
constant stream of new policy papers with regard to China which demonstrates the 
importance the EU has placed in its relations with China.  
China has so far issued three policy papers on the EU in October 2003, April 2014 and 
December 2018 respectively (People.cn, 2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2014; Xinhua, 2018). Until 2019, thirteen China-specific policy papers 
from the EU have been issued. This means that, on average, the EU updates its China 
policies and strategies and publishes them in the form of official policy papers every one or 
two years. On the Chinese side, although the number of policy papers is lower compared to 
the EU’s China policy papers, its EU policy papers play an important role in China-EU 
relations as they set the goals and the guidelines for policymaking and implementation of 
China-EU relations for the coming years. The 2003 policy paper was the very first policy 
paper China issued dealing with a foreign entity (Shi, 2003) in which China advocated that 
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the EU should lift its arms embargo on China. The issuing of the policy paper to the EU 
demonstrated China’s awareness of the importance of its relations with the EU, the necessity 
to respond to the EU’s official discourse on China and the potential functions of issuing 
policy papers aligning domestic policies with those policies towards China at different levels 
of administration.  
Nevertheless, the official documents are important not only because of the volume and the 
fact that they are becoming a regular phenomenon in China-EU relations but more 
importantly because they convey key information signposting the visions of both sides of the 
relationship. For example, the key phrases and terms framing China-EU relations have been 
developing along with the enhancement of China-EU relations. In 2003, China and the EU 
launched the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2003; People.cn, 2003) and the term was confirmed in the EU’s 2006 policy 
paper to China (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a). Despite the critiques in 
the existing literature that the extent and scope of this partnership have not been sufficient in 
practice (Holslag, 2011; Richard, 2012), the changes in relationship defining terms from “A 
Long-term Relationship” as stated in the 1995 (Commission of the European Communities, 
1995) EU policy paper to China, to a “Comprehensive Partnership” as defined in the 1998 
EU policy paper on China (Commission of the European Communities, 1998), and finally to a 
“Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” in China’s second EU policy paper (Mission of the 
People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2014) demonstrate the aspirations of 
both the EU and China to bring the relationship to the next level.   
The framing of words is just one example of the information offered by the official discourse 
on China-EU relations. There are many more changes at a lexical level which indicate 
changes in policies and attitudes from both the side of China and the EU. This goes far 
beyond the lexical level, of course. The sentence patterns, figures of speeches, alignment of 
paragraphs and coherent devices can all indicate changes in the relationship of the 
discourse makers. However, without systematic organisation and the assistance of corpus 
linguistics, the information in the official documents is fragmented, selective and could be 
biased. With the participation of corpus linguistic methods, these official documents can act 
as a living resource for discourse analysis on all levels and in terms of all aspects of the 
discourse, i.e. the lexical usage, paragraph, figure of speech, coherence, emotions, etc. 
Moreover, official discourse not only signposts changes in China-EU relations, but also 
interacts with major events and activities in China-EU relations. Many political dialogues and 
the annual EU-China summits have produced regularly issued keynote speeches and press 
releases which summarise the main points in China-EU interactions. The issuing of keynote 
speeches, dialogues, agreements after meetings and press releases forms an important part 




chance to look at the relations between discourse and actual interactions between China and 
the EU.   
The documents released with the official dialogues exemplify the role discourse plays in 
relation to the events in China-EU relations. These discourses between China and the EU 
also consist of a large source of official discourse apart from the regular issue of policy 
papers. The political dialogues between China and the EU started in 1994 in the form of 
structured dialogues discussing issues of common concern, such as trade and investment as 
well as issues related to sovereignty. In 1998, this evolved into the EU-China Summit, which 
has been held almost annually1 (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016b),  where 
leaders of China and the EU exchange opinions on a range of issues (Delegation of the 
European Union to China, 2016b). In 2002, China and the EU agreed to establish a formal 
exchange of letters which set the legal basis for China-EU political dialogue (Delegation of 
the European Union to China, 2016b). In 2010, the High-level Dialogue on Strategic and 
Foreign Policy was launched between the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy and her Chinese counterpart in order to create channels between officers on both 
sides to exchange ideas in a more direct way (Delegation of the European Union to China, 
2016b). More recently, the “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation”, issued in 
2013  (European Commission, 2013), marks that the relationship between China and the 
European Union has developed from an economic partnership to a partnership covering a 
wide range of topics including peace and security, education, science and technology, 
environmental sustainability and many more areas. These official discourses have been 
milestones of China-EU relations witnessing the important moments and changes.  
In sum, official discourse shapes and signposts the direction of development in China-EU 
relations. It also provides the bilateral communication with a framework or mechanism to 
operate in a structured, regular way. Most important of all, while events in bilateral relations 
can happen in a sporadic manner, the regularly released official documents and dialogues, 
especially in the increasingly matured dialogue mechanism between China and the EU in 
recent years, provides a resource to study the interactions between China and the EU in a 
more systematic, organised way with computer-assisted corpus-driven discourse analysis. 
This offers a way to look at China-EU relations with reduced bias and a longitudinal 
perspective.  
1.2.1 China as an International Actor and Discourse Maker 
With the rapid development of China’s comprehensive national power, China’s status and 
responsibility in the world have also increased. Under the Xi-Li administration, China has 
 
1 It has been held annually apart from in 2008 when it was cancelled as the then UK Prime Minister David Cameron 
and German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy arranged meetings with the 
Dalai Lama (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016b).  
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been working on improving China’s discourse power on the international stage. The 
advocation of  “telling Chinese story well” (Ouyang, 2019) has been put forward.  
According to the political structure of China, the top leaders of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) and country play a key role in official discourse making in China, setting the direction 
and tone of the official discourse at all levels of administration. In this sense, as compared 
with the EU’s official discourse, the Chinese official discourse is more unified and mostly 
offers undivided messages while the EU’s official discourse, especially when taking into 
account the officers’ speeches, contains a higher level of diverse opinions. Therefore in this 
thesis, both Chinese policy papers and the leaders’ (at presidential, prime ministerial, 
ministerial and ambassador's level) speeches are counted as core discourse. 
In terms of China’s official discourse to the EU, China issues policy papers to the EU not on 
an annual basis but every couple of years. So far, China has issued three official policy 
papers to the EU in the year 2003, 2014 and 2018. Although the numbers of key policy 
papers are small, each of the policy papers plays an important role in defining and setting 
out the vision for China-EU relations for the coming years.  
In terms of the official language, Mandarin is the official language Chinese official discourses 
are issued in. When it comes to translated versions, only some of the documents, mostly the 
official’s speeches in international summits and forums, are issued with English translations. 
These translations are usually made through China’s Central Compilation and Translation 
Bureau (CCTB), or the China International Publishing Group (CIPG) and are available on 
major state media such as Xinhua, People.cn, or China Daily.   
1.2.2 The EU as an International Actor and Discourse Maker 
This section pays special attention to justifying taking the EU as an integrated discourse 
maker as multiple institutions at different levels are involved in the discourse making. This 
involves addressing the nature of the EU as an actor, the roles of its different institutions in 
its foreign policy discourse making and the changes that have taken places over the 
timeframe of analysis in the EU’s discourse making on China with an emphasis on the 
changes after the Lisbon Treaty, which brought up institutional changes in the EU.   
This thesis takes the EU as an entity or counterpart of China in the context of official 
discourse making in the bilateral relationship. This is for the sake of making a comparison 
between China’s discourse on the EU and the EU’s discourse on China possible. This also 
makes it possible to examine the changes in the EU’s priorities and strategies in this thesis. 
However, the integrity of the EU’s official discourse about China is a controversial issue. 
Since the EU contains twenty-eight member states (up to the completion of this thesis) and 
multiple institutions on a different level, and given that it has been going through constant 




international actor and discourse maker involves complications in terms of policymaking and 
its integration of voices towards China.   
The EU’s discourse on China takes multiple forms including official journals, speeches of EU 
officials at different levels, country summaries and fact sheets, trade records, meeting 
minutes as well as live meetings. Taking all these discourses into account in this thesis 
would be unrealistic. In order to make the research possible, especially in terms of 
comparing the EU’s official discourse on China and China’s official discourse on the EU, the 
thesis only selects the key documents and speech which are overarching and 
comprehensive, including key policy papers and speeches.  
Official documents of the EU, in general, are issued by fourteen main institutions and bodies: 
the Official Journal of the European Union, European Parliament, European Council, Council 
of the European Union, European Commission, Court of Justice of the European Union, 
European Central Bank, European Court of Auditors, European External Action Service 
(EEAS), European Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, European 
Investment Bank, European Ombudsman, European Data Protection Supervisor, European 
Union agencies and other bodies (Europa.eu, 2016a). Some of these institutes mainly 
produce discourse relating to a specific area in the context of China-EU relations. For 
example, the European Central Bank (ECB) is the main EU financial institution which takes 
charge of issues related to the euro and EU economic & monetary policy.2  
Regarding the languages, the EU has twenty-four official languages. According to the current 
EU language policy, all the legislation and key political documents, such as the China policy 
papers issued by the European Commission, are published in all twenty-four official 
languages. Other official documents which are not legally binding are usually available in at 
least English, French and German (Europa.eu, 2016b).  
1.2.2.1 The EU’s Discourse Making on China 
The institutes which issue more China-related documents directing China-EU relations are 
the European Parliament, European Council, European Commission, EEAS and the EU’s 
delegation in China. Among these, the European Commission (EC) stays at the forefront in 
terms of issuing the EU’s policy papers on China. The European Commission oversees 
implementing decisions, proposing legislation, and other day-to-day business of the EU. It 
 
2 The ECB publishes working papers and research articles and reports on topics such as finance and business in 
China. However, most of the time, these reports do not reflect the ECB’s official stances. Instead, they only reflect 
the personal views of the researchers and are therefore not categorised as official discourse in this thesis. Plus, the 
thesis only focuses on the official discourse which offers over-arching guidance or reviews of China-EU policies 
instead of their relations in specific areas; therefore, institutional discourse such as the ECB’s official discourse are 
not included in the primary data applied in the thesis. The same standards apply to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, European Court of Auditors, European Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the 
Regions, European Investment Bank, European Ombudsman, European Data Protection Supervisor, to name a 
few.  
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works as a cabinet government, currently with 28 commissioners, one from each member 
state. Most of the EU’s policy papers on China are published by the European Commission.3 
The EU’s delegation in Beijing carries out local demarches to the Chinese authorities apart 
from consular issues. It is a long-term institution representing the EU in China (Delegation of 
the European Union to China, 2016c). The delegation was established in 1988 and is the 
main institution in charge of official relations between China and the EU, which works as a 
bridge or connecting point between China and the EU. The delegation keeps close relations 
with delegations of other EU member states as well as the EU rotating chair country.  
1.2.2.2 The Impacts of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU’s Discourse-making on China  
The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL), or Lisbon Treaty, was signed on 13 December 2007 and came 
into force on 1 December 2009. The goal of the treaty is to create more coherence and 
efficiency within the EU as well as increasing the EU’s global impact (Marques, 2016: 2). The 
Lisbon Treaty amended the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and the Treaty of Rome (1957) and 
has brought a series of institutional changes to the EU. Three main institutional changes 
include: first, establishing the role of the President of the European Council and the role of 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP); 
second, expanded applicable areas of the majority effective voting system and an 
introduction of the system of ‘double majority voting system’; third, reforming the European 
Committee, European Parliament and European judicial institutions with the aim of improving 
the EU’s decision power and efficiency  (Zhang, 2009).  
Although whether the Lisbon Treaty has achieved its due purpose has been under debate, 
overall, the post-Lisbon era has seen the EU with more coherence in regard to its external 
policies. These changes have centralised the internal structures of the EU and enhanced the 
EU’s policymaking efficiencies both with the EU and in terms of its external policies.  
The political dialogue between China and the EU after the Lisbon Treaty have been more 
conducted by EU representatives including the president of the European Council and the 
High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (EU HR/VP). Previously, the 
country of the rotating EU Presidency was in charge of holding meetings with China together 
with the European Commission and the upcoming presidency (Delegation of the European 
Union to China, 2016c). This means more consistency and centralisation in the 
representatives of the EU who talk to Beijing, which provides promising improvements in 
terms of the EU’s discourse on China.  
This institutional change in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty also resulted in easier tracking of 
the EU’s discourse to China. After 2010, the President of the European Council, the 
 
3 Before the Lisbon Treaty came into effect in 2009, the policy papers on China were published by the European 




President of the European Commission as well as the High Representative’s Speeches and 
Remarks have been available on the websites of EU institutions such as EEAS.com and 
Eur-lex, which contributes to the document collection and corpora establishment for this 
thesis. In the Corpus EU PPSP established in this thesis, which consists of the EU’s key 
official documents and keynote speeches on China, the numbers of speeches made by the 
President of the European Council, for example, President Barroso’s Remarks at the 
Opening Ceremony of the First EU-China High-Level Cultural Forum in 2010 (José Manuel 
Durão Barroso, 2010), the President of the European Commission, for example, Remarks by 
Herman Van Rompuy President of the European Council’s Speech to the EU-China 
Business Summit in 2012 (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 
2014b) and HR/VP’s speeches have increased since 2010. Timewise, this is consistent with 
the time when the Lisbon Treaty came into effect.  
In sum, despite the EU’s complications due to the nature of the organisation and the on-
going uncertainties, its integrity and coherence has reached a status that in many aspects, 
such as its international representation in the global arena, is comparable to a nation. After 
the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has seen more coordinated and better representations of its 
external relations with China. This makes it possible to take the EU and China as 
comparative actors in China-EU relations in the context of foreign policy discourse making. 
Plus, the fact that the European Commission remains main institution issuing EU policy 
papers on China before and after Lisbon also supports the choices made in this thesis to 
take the EU as a discourse producer, or a counterpart of China when it comes to official 
discourse interactions between the two.  
The political dialogue between China and the EU has expanded in scope over the last ten 
years, especially in the high-level official dialogue between China and the EU as well as the 
person-to-person dialogue in the relationship. On the EU’s side, discourse on China started 
in 1995 and expanded on a regular and consistent level in a steady and consistent manner 
over the last two decades. The EU has shown high-level consistency and regularity in 
issuing its official discourse on China. The EU’s official on China has a clear hierarchy 
consisting of goals, strategies, policies, action plans and reviews. On the Chinese side, it is 
only in recent years that these official documents generated from the meetings have become 
available via open-source access resources. The discourse material of China comes from 
the websites of Chinese state media, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs China as well as the 
Commission of the EU Delegation of China. There has been a lack of application of these 
official discourses in terms of analysing China-EU relations which forms one gap which this 
thesis strives to fill.  
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1.3 Explaining the Challenges in China-EU Relations 
As this research is interdisciplinary, the literature review focuses on discussing the existing 
approaches and explanations for the challenges in China-EU relations and identifying the 
gaps in research. Section 3.1 in Chapter 3 will review the literature on methodology, 
especially in terms of constructivist discourse analysis and foreign policy analysis in 
International Relations as well as China-EU studies.  
The volatility in China-EU relations has challenged the high expectations of China-EU 
relations and stimulated discussion of the driving force behind the problems and challenges 
in China-EU relations. Explanations of these problems follow three main perspectives: the 
triangle dynamics among China, the EU and the US, the structural imbalances between 
economic development and political interactions, and the conceptual and ideological 
differences between China and the EU.  
1.3.1 The Constructivist vs Realist and Liberal Approaches 
As there are no face-to-face, direct clashes, for example, territorial disputes, between China 
and the EU member states, realist studies from a bilateral perspective are not the 
mainstream approach in China-EU studies. A lot of the realists' research has incorporated 
elements of other theoretical approaches in their work as a realist framework alone ends up 
insufficiently explaining the challenges in China-EU relations. 
1.3.1.1 Realist Approaches 
One of the most prominent primarily realist approaches in China-EU studies positions China-
EU relations in the context of the balance of power among the US, EU and China (Wang, 
Yuping, 2000; Xiao, 2000; Shambaugh, 2004, 2005; Narramore, 2008; Ross, Tunsjø & 
Tuosheng, 2010; Chen, 2010). Most of this research attempts to address the on-going 
discussions. This approach takes the position that the US is an essential and trend-changing 
factor. One opinion is that US-EU ties are more durable than EU-China ties, and therefore 
the former poses a threat to the latter. Due to similar culture and value as well their historical 
linkage, the EU tends to partner more with the US rather than China in terms of strategic 
arrangements, and this is more evident when the EU or China-EU relations face a crisis (Cui, 
2018). 
Another argument is that US-EU ties are not all negative for China-EU relations and part of 
the reason why China and the EU has a high potential for strategic partnership is that they 
are both against US hegemony (Shambaugh, 2004, 2005). Plus, the US and the EU 
envisage different international orders after the Cold War. The US prefers a “vertical” world 
order in which it stands at the top of the hierarchical system  (Chen, 2003: 1). The EU, on the 
other hand, considers that the EU must be one “regional pole” (Graham & Buchan, 2003) in 
the new international order (Chen, 2003: 1). From this perspective, the EU and China share 




A third view is that the EU-US tie is a double-edged sword for EU-China relations. A recent 
report issued by Fudan University, “A Report of the EU and EU Member State’s Policies on 
China”, in 2017, the first and so far the only systematic report4 on the EU and Member 
States’ policies on China issued by a Chinese institution, has pointed out that on the one 
hand, the EU has “dropped” the discourse of building a “strategic partnership” with China 
and turned to the US for consolidation of the existing system of international rules. On the 
other hand, due to the changes in US policies on climate, especially the fact that it left the 
Paris Treaty, among other issues such as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the EU 
has realised that it is a mistake to turning to the US and risk estranging China. The EU is, 
therefore, taking a double-sided policy towards its dilemma on China (Long et al., 2017).  
Others have looked at the dynamic propensities of China-EU-US triangle relations. China 
needs the US in terms of capital and technology. Plus, the US has been prioritised in China’s 
foreign policy (Wang, 2000). The EU needs the US for political influence. Meanwhile, the US 
needs the EU to keep expanding its influence. Although the EU also has disputes with the 
US, these disputes are not confrontational in nature due to the broad common interests 
between the EU and the US in terms of politics, the economy and security areas and their 
cultural and ideological ties. In certain circumstances, for example, after the 1989 political 
incident in China, the EU and the US joined forces, trying to coerce China by putting 
sanctions on China (Wang, 2000). As Huntington has argued, the US is a lonely superpower 
in a system which is a mixture of a unipolar and multipolar world structure which he termed a 
“uni-multipolar system”.  A healthy US-European relationship will reduce the loneliness of the 
situation where the US is a lonely superpower (Huntington, 1999: 36). A few studies which 
have taken this perspective have been methodology-driven and have been based on the 
classic model of the Strategic Triangle as defined by Lowell (Dittmer, 1981) and its advanced 
versions.  
These approaches, however, do not give full credit for the autonomy in China-EU bilateral 
relations. It sees the EU as switching between having a good relationship with the US and 
coercing China or having a less satisfying relationship with the US and turning to more 
coalition with China. Also, this approach does not consider the impacts of the conceptual and 
ideological differences between China and the EU in shaping the bilateral relationship. It 
tends to simplify these into the overgeneralised argument that the EU shares more 
ideologies and values with the US and is, therefore, more likely to be friendly towards the 
US.  
 
4 It is a report on the EU and EU member states policies on China in 2017. It is sponsored by the International 
Relations Research Centre of Fudan University and Shanghai Institute for European Studies, written mostly by 
Chinese (with one non-Chinese author) China-EU relations specialists. 
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Methodologically, the framework of game theory or the strategic triangle theory does offer 
useful tools for the analysis of China-EU-US relations. However, these approaches bear the 
risk of being over-mechanical when it comes to analysing the possibilities in China-EU 
relations regardless of the uncertainties. In an age when uncertainties are becoming an 
indispensable feature of international politics, an approach with a more comprehensive 
perspective which has more resilience in its analytical framework is useful. 
1.3.1.2 Neo-liberal Approaches 
Neo-liberal approaches are also adopted widely in China-EU scholarship, especially in the 
form of case analysis of economy and trades. Robert O. Keohane’s and Joseph S. Nye’s 
theory of complex interdependence which entails concepts such as sensitivity and 
vulnerability of states was applied by some scholars in analysing the structural, economic, 
political and diplomatic aspects in China-EU relations (Nie, 2009: 38; Mikusevic, 2012). 
These scholars observed that China-EU relations fit the precondition of relations in complex 
interdependency: military competition is not the primary concern in China-EU relations; the 
communication passages between China and the EU is on multiple levels; neither China nor 
the EU is superior to  the other regarding disputed issues (Nie, 2009: 38; Mikusevic, 2012).  
Efforts merging a liberal approach and a constructivist approach have also been made. 
Balducci, for example, proposed a liberal constructivist approach merging state-centred 
liberalism and sociological institutionalism in analysing the deficiencies of the EU’s normative 
approach to Asia regarding human rights issues (Balducci, 2010: 36). Three factors, namely 
the member state’s material and ideational interests, the role of the EU institutions in 
creating a community of shared values and the interactions between these two factors in 
EU’s foreign policymaking (Balducci, 2010: 37–39) are considered. The advantage of 
incorporating the constructivist approach into liberalism is that more focus can be given to 
the role of the agents’ wills and their interactions. The rationale behind Balducci’s design of 
the theoretical framework informs the synthesised theoretical framework of this thesis: the 
agent’s ability to influence and constitute the structure should receive its due attention.   
1.3.2 Conceptual Gaps between China and the EU 
Unlike the realist or liberal approaches in international relations, the constructivist approach 
brings people’s attention to categories including discourse, culture, mentality and identity, 
which were neglected in traditional theories. This approach to China-EU studies has been 
welcomed and applied in recent years in Chinese academia.  
A significant number of studies, mostly in the Chinese language, attribute the difficulties in 
China-EU relations to a lack of shared knowledge and different understandings of concepts 
between China and the EU in aspects including human rights, sovereignty, democracy and 
soft power (Zhu & Zhang, 2002; Pan, 2010; Men, 2011; Zhou, 2011a; Zhang, 2012a; Weil & 




One of the most comprehensive works on this topic is the book “Conceptual Gaps in China-
EU Relations”, edited by Pan Zhongqi, which covers a wide range of conceptual gaps 
between China and the EU (Pan, 2012b). The contributors mostly reach a consensus that 
cognitive gaps are a significant source of the disagreements in China-EU relations and have 
a negative impact on the overall development of the relationship (Zhang, 2012a, 2008a; Shi, 
2007; Dong, 2012) although some do recognise the positive effect of these cognitive 
differences as China and the EU have pushed each other to revise their understandings, 
address their weakness and improve themselves (Liu & Heathcote, 2000; Shi, 2007).  
Existing studies on conceptual gaps between China and the EU have pointed out a few 
specific differences between the Chinese political view and European notions of human 
rights. The first is that the Chinese government attaches more importance to collective rights 
than an individual’s rights (Zhang, 2008a, 2012a; Liu & Heathcote, 2000; Wang, 2006). The 
second is that traditionally human rights is regarded as a domestic issue in China while 
international society is seeing an increase in humanitarian intervention approved by the 
United Nations despite the non-interference principle. These studies argue that in terms of 
human rights, Taiwan and Tibetan issues have been made use of by the EU as leverage to 
interfere with China’s domestic issues when China-EU relations do not go in the direction the 
EU wishes (Men, 2011; Dong, 2012). Third, while the EU commonly agrees on the 
universalism of human rights, the Chinese understanding of human rights bears more 
Chinese cultural, religious and local developmental factors (Men, 2011; Zhang, 2008a, 
2012a; Wang, 2006; Liu & Heathcote, 2000).  
Current studies have also pointed out the conceptual differences between China and the EU 
on sovereignty. First, while the Chinese government as well as most Chinese people see 
sovereignty as entitled rights or directly related to a nation’s security, independence and 
dignity, the EU sees sovereignty more as a “responsibility to protect” (Bills, 2008) rather than 
rights (Pan, 2012c). Second, China sees sovereignty as an inseparable and non-transferable 
character of a state. The EU is established on the idea that sovereignty can be shared and 
pooled (Pan, 2012c). Therefore, the EU is not as particular on the unitality of sovereignty 
(Risse, 2003). Third, China takes sovereignty as one of the guiding principles of international 
relations as well as of China’s foreign policymaking. The EU regards that the role of 
sovereignty as a guiding principle is declining (Pan, 2012c). These differences in 
understanding sovereignty can explain some of the issues between China and the EU. The 
conceptual gaps in human rights and sovereignty also help to explain the decline in China-
EU relations in 2008 when opinions on Tibetan issues differed between some of the member 
states of the EU and China. The EU tends to define the Tibetan issue as one of human rights 
whereas China regards it as absolutely an issue of sovereignty (Pan & Gao, 2011). 
Apart from different understandings of human rights and sovereignty, a significant amount of 
discussion has been held on China and the EU’s different political ideologies, especially the 
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concept of democracy (Zhu, 2013; Shi, 2007; Pan & Yang, 2013). Some argue that the 
disputes on human rights and challenges in different sectors in China-EU relations are a 
result of discrepancies in political ideologies, which is a more fundamental dispute between 
China and the EU (Shi, 2007). A standard view of democracy among Chinese academia 
argues that Western democracy is a product of the West based on a series of social, legal 
and ideological conditions which is connected to private ownership, the focus on individuals, 
the multiparty system with general elections as well as the correspondent ideology. It may be 
suitable for Western societies but does not fit the Chinese environment. If China adopts the 
capitalist form of democracy, there is a high risk of explosive social and political turmoil (Shi, 
2007). In other words, the highest level of democracy is not necessarily the best democracy. 
Only a feasible form of it, which can be localised to the economic, cultural conditions and 
accepted by the majority of the local people, can be the effective democracy (Shi, 2007, 11). 
Besides, Chinese political ideology is a socialist ideology where Chinese democracy refers 
to socialist democracy instead of capitalist democracy (Shi, 2007). Some Chinese studies 
have pointed out that the EU, despite recognising the economic success China has 
achieved, views China as belonging to “the other side” of the world and should be “educated” 
by the West (Shi, 2007; Dong, 2012). Others have pointed out that the EU is experiencing a 
democracy deficit along with other problems of the EU such as its identity dilemma and the 
European debt crisis. The EU, instead of projecting the European version of democracy on 
other countries, should focus on improving its own structural efficiency.  
Literature has also pointed out that cognitive gaps exist among political leaders, the media, 
academia, business industries, as well as the public in both China and the EU. It is, 
therefore, essential to distinguish between the public’s understanding and the government’s 
will (Tian, 2009; Zhou, 2011a; Shi, Yi & Li, 2016).  
In terms of solutions, the literature has pointed out that it is unlikely that China and the EU 
will be able to agree with each other on some uncompromisable political concepts. Reducing 
and mitigating the cognitive differences and enlarging shared ideas are inevitable processes 
in the development of China-EU relations, although enhancing shared ideas might not be 
enough to solve the disputes between China and the EU fundamentally. Both China and the 
EU should focus more on their points in common despite all the existing conceptual gaps 
(Pan & Zhu, 2011). On the bright side, the Chinese literature has reached a consensus that 
managing the differences is possible as the two do agree on some aspects of these 
concepts such as the importance of mutual respect and recognising the legal status of the 
United Nations in dealing with disputes (Pan, 2010; Pan & Gao, 2011; Pan & Zhu, 2011; 
Pan, 2012c). 
These studies mostly focus on specific aspects of the conceptual gaps between China, such 
as human rights or democracy. The advantage of this is that the conceptual differences in 




conceptual gaps and the overall policy priorities, strategies and diplomatic approaches in 
China-EU relations are not discussed. There is a lack of systematic perspective in the 
research, which makes the current research findings on conceptual gaps fragmented and 
segmented without a thread which could link these gaps together. The conceptual gaps 
between China and the EU on human rights, democracy and sovereignty, are interrelated. 
Research aiming at conceptual gaps on individual aspects in China-EU relations does not 
probe the commonality behind these gaps.  
Plus, existing studies tend to apply a synchronic rather than a diachronic, longitudinal 
perspective. This is because diachronic research requires a more systematic review of the 
change of concepts over time which requires the involvement of discourse review. A more 
comprehensive study on the conceptual gaps between China and the EU needs to consider 
a more extensive scale of discourse materials, a longitudinal view and a structural 
perspective.  
1.3.3 Visions and Perceptions 
Within the constructivist approach in China-EU studies, a group of scholars has observed the 
differences in the Chinese government and the EU’s vision of the world they desire. 
Shambaugh pointed out that China and the EU share a narrative of building a multipolar and 
multilateral world and this makes it possible for the two to form a new axis in the world 
(Shambaugh, 2004, 2005). On the other hand, several studies have pointed out that China 
lays more emphasis on multipolarity while the EU stresses multilateralism more (Messner, 
2007; Scott, 2007b; Narramore, 2008; Clegg, 2009; Hooft, 2010; Van Langenhove, 2010; 
Geeraerts, 2011; Makarychev & Morozov, 2011; Wade, 2011; Scott, 2012; Zhang, 2012b; 
Baeck, 2013; Scott, 2013; Ngeow, 2014; Scott, 2014a; Z. Chen, 2016). Some have also 
argued a step further: China’s world vision is a more realist-based and state-oriented outlook 
than that of the EU since China is a fully sovereign state while the EU is considered a 
supranational or intergovernmental organisation whose vision is more procedure-focused. It 
emphasises multilateralism as the underlying world order and institutional cooperation as the 
primary manner for entities to deal with international affairs (Baeck, 2013; Scott, 2013, 
2014a; Z. Chen, 2016).  
These studies have pointed out the possible different focuses of China and the EU in their 
future visions. However, the studies fail to contextualise how these two terms are used in the 
official discourse. The question of whether and to what extent the Chinese government and 
the EU interpret and apply these two terms, in the same way, is not responded to. There is 
also a lack of focus on China’s increasing discourse of multilateralism and its interpretations 
of multilateralism. This thesis fills this gap by exploring what China and the EU are referring 
to when they mention multipolarity or multilateralism, what they lay emphasis on with these 
terms and how this facilitates the political tension between them.   
 
46   
1.3.3.1 Identities  
China and the EU’s views on each other have been discussed in the current literature as one 
factor affecting China-EU relations. On China’s perception of the EU, the Chinese literature 
has argued that China treats its relations with the EU as equal to its relations with a “big 
power” or a “big nation” and in China’s foreign diplomacy, Europe is often viewed as 
paralleling significant powers in the world such as the US (Feng, 2009: 61). On the other 
hand, the literature has also pointed out that China tends to interact with individual member 
states when it comes to specific cooperation projects (Godement & Fox, 2009; Otero-lglesias 
et al., 2015). The literature has also pointed out that the EU’s perceptions of China have 
undergone a significant change in 2006. Before 2006, the EU saw China as a potential 
partner who could be influenced ideologically and socially by the EU. After 2006, the EU 
started to view China more as a competitor as the EU realised that China did not become a 
large enough market for the EU, whereas the EU has become one of China’s most essential 
markets abroad. The year 2006 also saw the EU’s change in its political attitudes to China as 
it recognised that China would not like to be affected in terms of policy system and ideology 
(Zhang, 2007).  
Current studies have not discussed China and the EU’s perceptions of each other using 
corpus-based discourse analysis. Most of the existing research is based on texts selected in 
an unsystematic manner, which leaves space for systematic discourse analysis on the 
perceptions of China and the EU.  
On China’s perceptions of European integration, a consensus in Chinese literature is that 
China overall holds an optimistic view on this and does not see the setbacks in European 
integration, such as the constitutional crises, as signs that the vision of European integration 
is wrong (Chen, 2005; Zhou, 2011b). Due to its cultural background and experiences of 
reform, China tends to take a more long-term, historical view when it comes to unification 
and the Chinese perspective may provide the EU with some inspiration in dealing with 
European integration (Moncada, 2010). 
The EU’s perception of China, as argued by some, is the driving force of the political 
disputes between China and the EU such as the cancellation of EU-China summit in 2008 
due to former French Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama while he 
was the rotating chairman of the EU in 2008 (Tian, 2009).  
1.3.4 Strategies and Approaches 
Although challenges exist in China-EU relations at many levels and in many forms, one topic 
which binds the challenges together is the “comprehensive strategic partnership”. Since this 
term envisions all-around cooperation between China and the EU with a long-term vision, it 




The ‘all-round strategic partnership’ (Quanmian Zhanlue Huoban Guanxi) was put forward 
first in 2003 jointly by former Chinese President Jiang Zemin and French President Chirac on 
their visions on multipolarity as the world order. Later in the same year, the European 
security strategy stated that China is the EU’s strategic partner (Holslag, 2011). In 2004, 
Premier Wen Jiabao stated that China and Europe should aim for comprehensive strategic 
partnership (Wen, 2004). The Joint Press Statement of the Seventh Summit between China 
and the EU confirmed that the partnership was growing and maturing rapidly (Council of the 
European Union, 2004).  
Even though quite a lot literature remains optimistic about the overall positivity of the 
partnership (Scott, 2007a; Men, 2014), an extensive body of literature argues that the 
comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the EU has been insufficient and 
needs improvement (Commission of the European Communities, 2001; Cameron & Zheng, 
2007; Scott, 2007a; Caira, 2010; Holslag, 2011; Men, 2014; Zhou, 2016; Berkofsky, 2017; 
Michalski, 2017). 
A significant number of scholars believe that the current challenges are a result of the 
different engagement styles of the Chinese government and the EU (Narramore, 2008; 
Feng, 2009; Crookes, 2013; Youngs, 2015). One strong stream of opinion is that the EU’s 
normative approach to China has not been as successful as it could be. The complications of 
EU bureaucracy have affected its policy integrity on China and the EU  (Godement & Fox, 
2009; Balducci, 2010; Holslag, 2011; Mattlin, 2012; Otero-lglesias et al., 2015). Therefore, a 
prominent suggestion is that the EU should address these internal problems before trying to 
convert other countries according to European norms and values (Balducci, 2010; Holslag, 
2011; Mattlin, 2012).  
Furthermore, China-EU relations should shift from a value-based, normative approach, or 
the “unconditional engagement”, to an interest-based approach.  With an interests-based 
approach, the EU should require more benefits from China other than offering China 
favourable conditions, with the anticipation that China will behave or evolve as the EU 
wishes (Godement & Fox, 2009; Wang Yiwei, 2009; Holslag, 2010; Freeman & Geeraerts, 
2011; Crookes, 2013). Another stream of opinion holds that, for the EU, a pragmatic 
approach to China will be more beneficial with the rationale that more engaged and 
disrupted economic cooperation will have spill-over effects on other areas in China such as 
social and political spheres which have been, or at least were part of the EU’s early goals in 
interacting with China (Islam & Diaz, 2014).  
Some others, however, maintain that the EU should keep its normative approach to China. 
Mattlin, for example, calls for a ‘defensive’ normative approach to China (Mattlin, 2010). 
Waegemans holds the view that the EU should not give up its values-based approach to 
China as its normative power is one major resource of the EU if it wants to remain one of the 
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“poles” in a multipolar world (Waegemans, 2014). He argues that the EU could develop on 
its military power but subject to the EU’s budget available for defence, the EU army could not 
be large enough to sustain the EU as a strong hard power (Waegemans, 2014).  
There is also a significant amount of the scholarship in China-EU studies which recognises 
that there is a trend for a so-called “Strong Economy, Weak Politics”, namely there are 
strong economic ties between China and the EU, yet the political consensus between China 
and the EU is comparatively less abundant. Although opinions differ when it comes to 
whether this imbalance exists and whether this constitutes a challenge and as the Chinese 
government may have different expectations compared to the EU on what constitutes 
political cooperation and whether they are desired in China-EU relations (Hammond & Jing, 
2016), the topic stands as an on-going debate in China-EU relations.  
A stream of literature argues that compared to the achievements in economy and trade, 
China-EU relations have not yet reached their potential in areas like political cooperation, 
security engagements and social development projects (Chen, 2003; Caira, 2010; Crookes, 
2013; Gaenssmantel & Feng, 2016; Silja, 2016). The literature has also pointed out that this 
gap could be a result of China’s approach of de-politicisation in order to secure China’s core 
interests and minimise the EU’s influence on Chinese issues beyond the redline of the 
Chinese government such as political ideology and sovereignty related issues (Hammond & 
Jing, 2016).  
This approach addresses the gaps between economic and political interactions in China-EU 
relations; it can be pointed out that the possible reason behind the imbalance is the 
unmatched core interests. The advantage of this approach is that it notices the dynamics 
between the economy and politics in China-EU relations and how these two influence each 
other. The weakness of this approach, however, is that it focuses on the phenomenon of the 
possibly imbalanced economic and political cooperation without challenging its existence too 
much, or in other words, whether China and the EU had the same depth and range in 
political interactions when they agreed on developing a “comprehensive strategic 
partnership”. Although the literature has looked at the connections between the differences 
in priorities and interests between China and the EU that challenge political interactions 
(Hammond & Jing, 2016), it does not offer a clear picture of the priorities of China and the 
EU and where mismatches exist, nor does it explore the reasons behind the unmatched 
priories. The main theoretical framework of this approach remains within the frames of the 
realist approach in international relations where the economic power changes between 
China and the EU have been regarded as the main cause; this leaves the findings 
incomplete as constructive factors such as differences in goals, concepts, culture and 




1.3.5 Differences in Chinese and English Literature  
1.3.5.1 On the Application Theoretical Approach  
Not all the literature on China-EU relations has an explicit theoretical framework. A 
significant number of publications in Chinese do not have a theoretical framework explicitly 
stated. In most cases, one of the following situations applies: either the research is primarily 
a statistical report with some policy analysis, or it specifically focuses on one issue in China-
EU relations, mostly trade or law issues, or it applies a realist approach, but the ontological 
stance is implicit. A lot of literature on China-EU relations is future-oriented and contains 
predictions for the relationship based on experience. Most Chinese scholars hold an 
optimistic view of the relations between China and Europe. They argue that interactions 
between the two will be positive and stable. Others regard the relationship as full of potential 
challenges and difficulties. Feng and Li pointed out that the relations will involve both 
cooperation and competition and both sides, especially Europe which has enjoyed a higher 
degree of development than China traditionally, have to adapt and adjust (Feng, 2009: 59–
67; Li, 2008: 10). 
This can be since a lot of interactions between China and the EU are presented and 
summarised in the form of economic data. However, the fact that topics on China’s human 
rights, China’s territorial disputes with other Asian countries, China’s trade and 
environmental problems are more frequently discussed in literature written by European 
authors shows that subconsciously, most European scholars still have a realist mindset in 
discussing China-Europe relations while realist theories do not have to be the explicit 
theoretical framework of their writings. 
1.3.5.2 Case-specific Analysis  
Overall, in China-EU studies, the number of case studies and policy analyses outweigh the 
studies taking a macro-perspective which take the structural, global or third-party factors into 
account. This is mostly due to the large amount of research focusing on the trade issues 
between China and the EU, as topics about trade are in the majority in terms of the numbers 
of publications. This feature manifests in the Chinese literature more. The positive side of 
this is that the trade issues, among other cases where disputes exist between the two, have 
been discussed in-depth and from multiple angles. The downside is that interactions 
involving economic cooperation and social-political relations and the structural factors such 
as power transitions in the world system have not been taken into consideration enough. 
Plus, most efforts have been made to address the difficulties in specific cases without 
investigating the underlying common forces behind these problems. This has made the 
findings in China-EU relations fragmented and increased the difficulties of talking to the 
public in a straight-forward manner about the major problem going on between China and 
the EU.  
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1.3.5.3 The Concept of Europe and the EU  
In the Chinese and Western literature on China-Europe relations, the connotation of Europe 
differs. In fact, when many scholars talk about “Europe” in general in the themes of their 
articles, what they actually take as actors are EU member states such as in Baker’s article 
(Baker, 2002: 45). The Chinese literature contains more vagueness on this since both 
“China-EU relations” and “China-Europe relations” can be translated into “Zhongou Guanxi”. 
Thus, it is sometimes hard to tell from a mere title of a Chinese article whether the author is 
talking about China-EU or China-Europe relations. This vagueness in expression is also 
related to the fact that the EU, as the super-national institution of the European countries, 
cannot always stand for the individual countries’ interests and voices.  
In dealing with specific issues, China prefers dealing with member states directly more than 
confronting the EU as an agent. Theoretically, however, China is trying to balance its focus 
on the EU and the core member states. Ni mentioned that China would keep learning to deal 
with not only the EU as a whole but also the 28 EU member states as individual countries 
(Ni, 2013). 
According to Feng, on the one hand, China treats its relations with the EU as equal to its 
relations with a “big power” or a “big nation”, and in China’s foreign diplomacy, Europe is 
often treated as a whole, paralleling the US, Russia and Japan. This is because the 
emphasis of China’s diplomacy includes its relations with peripheral countries, big powers, 
developing countries and multilateral-organisations. On the other hand, there are two levels 
for the connotation of “Europe” for Chinese decision-makers and scholars. The first level for 
“Europe” refers to the traditional developed European countries, including the UK, France, 
and Germany, who play important roles in international organisations such as the UN 
Security Council or G8. The second level refers to the EU (Feng, 2009: 61). To guarantee 
the analysis of this thesis is focused and in-depth, within EU member states, the UK, France 
and Germany will be given more focus, as these countries traditionally have more 
interactions with China. The choice of countries is also made based on the availability of 
discourse materials.  
1.3.5.4 Perspectives  
An interesting phenomenon in China-EU studies is that scholars with European and Chinese 
perspectives often have different approaches, methodologies, and conclusions on the same 
issue. Some authors, especially European authors, intentionally emphasise that they are 
taking a European perspective. For example, Baker stated that his article “is not written from 
the point of view of a detached observer” (Baker, 2002: 45). In another example, Edmonds 
states in the preview for an edited collection that the volume only contains articles which are 
written from a European perspective (Edmonds, 2002). This suggests that the perspective 




objectivity in their works, it is undeniable that social science is never value-free, and the 
author’s personal perspective could have an impact on their work.   
1.3.6  Reviewing the Gaps in the Existing Literature  
Based on categorising the existing approaches and explanations of the challenges in China-
EU relations, a few gaps in the existing literature are identified, which will be addressed 
across the thesis.   
Empirically, the literature review identifies four gaps:  
First, official discourse in China-EU relations has been under-valued and under-explored. 
Although Snyder has compiled the key official discourse between China and the EU between 
1949 and 2008 (Snyder, 2009), more recent official discourse has not been included. Plus, 
his work was more for compilation purposes rather than analytical. The lack of application of 
official discourse as primary data is due to a few reasons: first, official discourse is perceived 
as dry and sometimes void; second, there are arguments about whether official discourse 
could reflect the real intentions of governments in the first place; third, the volume of 
discourse between China and the EU is large, and there are multiple institutions which issue 
official discourse leading to difficulties in bringing all the sources and documents together to 
organise and compile them in an organised manner. The complicated hierarchies make it 
hard to bring them together.  
Second, the existing literature has not explained why disputes and frictions exist in areas 
where China and the EU share strong common interests such as economy and trade. This 
thesis will address China and the EU’s different connotations in their shared interest areas 
and when they apply the same discourse.  
Third, in terms of perspective taken and the entities involved, the approaches focusing on 
the role of the US in China-EU relations, or on the triangle relationship of China-EU-US, 
does not give due credit to the autonomy between China and the EU. A focus on the bilateral 
relations of China and the EU helps to provide an understanding of the tension going on 
between the two with or without the US influence.  
Fourth, China’s normative power has not been discussed in the context of China-EU 
relations with the involvement of China’s normative discourse. Although the literature on the 
EU as a normative power and its effectiveness in its external relations has been extensive, 
the changes in its normative power, especially its linkage with the changes in its normative 
discourse, has not been observed. Neither has the potential of China as a normative power 
in this bilateral relationship been paid due attention.  
Theoretically, the main gap is that there is a lack of a comprehensive framework which 
brings together the conceptual gaps on different topics and at different levels as well as their 
relationship with the political-economic changes in the international system. Although the 
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existing literature has covered the gaps between China and the EU’s identity, their visions of 
the future world order, their conceptual gaps on political concepts including human rights, 
democracy and sovereignty, the relationship among these aspects and their interrelations 
with the changing economic power and normative power between China and the EU have 
not been discussed under a comprehensive framework. This thesis develops a synthesised 
theoretical framework which binds the concept of discourse, normative power and economic 
power together, bridging rule and norm-constructivist theories, corpus linguistics and 
international political economy (IPE). Under this theoretical development, it also puts forward 
the Model of Dynamic Dimensional Mismatches, which offers a possible framework to 
discuss the interrelated aspects of mismatches in China-EU relations and their impact on the 
challenges in the bilateral relationship in an integrated, systematic, structured manner with a 
longitudinal perspective.   
Regarding literature in the Chinese language, one of the features of much Chinese research 
on EU-China relations is that a lot of research in the Chinese language does not explicitly 
point out the theoretical bases or approaches taken. The lack of enough theoretical 
illustration is, in fact, a common phenomenon in Chinese social science research. Professor 
Zhu Liqun has addressed the need to fill in some of these gaps. She proposed a three-nexus 
framework for China-EU relations studies which combines a social constructivist departure 
point, a future-oriented approach accommodating a strategic perspective, and considerations 
of the roles of China and the EU in the international system in China-EU studies. A 
combination of these perspectives would contribute to looking at China-EU relations with 
long-term benefits in mind instead of short-term interests (Zhu, 2007). So far, systemic 
studies incorporating this three-nexus approach have not appeared in solid forms. The 
involvement of a diachronic perspective of the official discourse interactions between China 
and the EU for analytical purposes is a missing link in the existing methodologies in China-
EU studies.  
1.4 Research Aims and Questions 
This thesis, based on a diachronic review of the official discourse between China and the EU 
from 1994 to 2019, aims to examine the challenges in China-EU relations which are hard to 
find without the involvement of a longitudinal study of official discourse.  
The aim of this thesis is three-fold. First, the thesis aims to extend the existing understanding 
of the challenges in China-EU relations. The departure points taken by this thesis on China-
EU relations is that although China-EU relations are on a positive track, they could be better 
if challenges are further understood, addressed, and dealt with. The intention is not to 
undermine the degree of success and achievement in China-EU relations, but to address the 




Second, the thesis introduces an alternative methodology for the analysis of China-EU 
relations which applies comparative corpus-driven discourse analysis to China-EU studies.  
Third, the thesis aims to establish an analytical framework, underpinned by constructivist 
theoretical assumptions in combination with methods of corpus-driven discourse analysis, 
presenting the multidimensional mismatches between China and the EU and the 
interrelations among them with a longitudinal perspective.  
The time range of this thesis is set from 1994 to 2019. The year 1994 is chosen as the 
starting point of the time range as it was the year when the European Commission issued 
the policy paper “Towards a New Asia Strategy” which states its aspirations to engage with 
Asia in general and which framed the direction of the EU’s China approach as well 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1994). These years have increased 
engagement between China and the EU. These twenty-five years also witness the problems 
and challenges in contemporary China-EU relations. The discourse data goes up to the year 
2019 to make sure the data output results are up to date.   
One thing to note is that although this thesis chooses to focus on the challenges and 
problems in China-EU relations, overall improvements in the relationship have been 
constant, especially in the economic area, even in difficult periods. For example, despite the 
trade issues and political disagreements, up to 2015, China and the US were almost 
identical in terms of the total volume of trade in goods for the EU, with the US peaking at 
EUR 3622 billion, only 61 billion more than China (Eurostat, 2017). The point of discussing 
challenges is to address challenges and reduce the gaps between China and the EU for 
better prospects.  
To achieve the research aims, the main research question leading the analysis of this thesis 
is: 
• How does a corpus-driven discourse analysis, underpinned by constructivist 
assumptions and based on the corpora of the official discourse between 
China and the EU (1994 to 2019), help to examine and explain the challenges in 
contemporary China-EU relations?  
A few sub-questions will be explored through the chapters in order to respond 
comprehensively step-by-step to the main research question.  
In terms of the context and official discourse in China-EU relations, the thesis will discuss the 
following questions: 
• What characterises the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations?  
 




54   
Through the empirical chapters, the following questions will be addressed in order to 
understand the challenges in China-EU relations: 
 
• In what aspects do misunderstandings and mismatches exist in China-EU 
relations? How do these mismatches and misunderstandings relate to each 
other? 
 
• How and to what extent do these mismatches explain the challenges in China-
EU relations? 
 
Methodologically, the following questions will lead the assessment of the methodological 
framework: 
 
• What does the corpora established in this thesis (Corpus China PPSP, Corpus 
EU PPSP, Corpus EU Internal, Corpus China Domestic) offer to understand the 
levels and aspects where challenges exist in China-EU relations?  
 
• How could the constructivist approach in IR be combined with the ontological 
and epistemological approaches behind corpus-driven discourse analysis? What 
are the strengths and limitations of this synthesised, multidisciplinary approach? 
 
Theoretically, the thesis will address:  
 
• What elements of constructivist theories contribute to a corpus-driven discourse 
analysis approach to China-EU relations?  
 
The main research question and the sub-questions will lead the analysis of this thesis. The 
response to these questions will provide the components for the contribution and conclusion 
of the thesis.  
1.5 Chapter Organisation 
Chapter 4 to Chapter 8 present the core analysis of this thesis. Each chapter discusses one 
aspect where mismatches or misunderstandings manifest through discourse analysis in 
China-EU relations and respond to the sub-questions of the main research question, which 
ultimately contribute to a response to the main questions and the contribution of the thesis.  
There is parallel underlying logic behind the organisation of the chapters, empirically and 
linguistically. The organisation is based on the nature of the empirical findings and their 
correspondence to the research questions. Since the findings include priorities, identities and 
perceptions, visions of the world structure, and normative and strategic approaches, the 
chapter arrangements show the elements impacting China-EU relations from direct 
manifestations to internal or domestic aspects, followed by external aspects with interactive 
elements. In other words, the bilateral relations are regarded as an interactive developmental 
procedure of two entities moving towards the directions they aspire to. The questions leading 
the organisation of the chapters include: 





• Who do China and the EU want to be and want each other to be?  
• Where do China and the EU want themselves to be in the future world?  
• How, or by what means, do they plan to reach their goals and destinations?  
Specifically, Chapter 4 looks at the differences between the hot topic coverage, collocations 
of key concepts as well as the correlations among some of the hot topics. This deals with the 
mismatches manifested through the lexical level of the discourse.  
Chapter 5 discusses how Europe and China each view themselves and each other as 
revealed in their official discourse and to what extent these perceptions influence China-EU 
relations. This is about the internal drives of China and the EU in terms of how they regard 
themselves and the other.  
Chapter 6 discusses the similarities and differences between China and the EU’s vision for 
future world structure and their positions in the future world as manifested through their 
official discourse. This is about their destinations and where they want to be in the future 
world.  
Chapter 7 looks at the dynamics of normative and strategic approaches between China and 
the EU. It explores the EU’s normative approaches to China as revealed by its normative 
discourse in the past two decades, reviews the changes in China’s normative patterns to the 
EU and explores the possibility that China is transitioning from a norm-follower to a norm-
maker. It also discusses convergence and divergence regarding China and the EU’s 
strategies and engagement styles with each other. It takes a chronological view and reviews 
the compatibility and synchronisation of China and the EU’s approaches to each other over 
time. This is about the means, and manners China and the EU take to achieve their 
destinations and realise their visions for the future.  
Chapter 8 presents the analytical framework, the Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches, 
which combines the aspects of mismatch discussed in the previous sections together. This 
offers a framework to discuss the interrelations among these aspects as well as the 
dynamics in this context. The framework follows the underlying synthesised theoretical 
framework demonstrated in Chapter 3, which considers the interactions among discourse, 
economic power and normative power.  
Chapter 8 also includes case studies, which are categorised into three groups, namely trade 
issues, persisting issues and cross-continent projects, to apply and assess the effectiveness 
of the analytical framework developed. Specifically, the cases of trade deficits, anti-dumping 
disputes, MES, the arms embargo and the EU’s questions on China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative will be discussed. This analysis explores the boundaries of the explanatory power of 
the analytical framework.  
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Chapter 9 summarises the findings and arguments of the chapters and responds to the 
research questions. It also discusses the contribution of this research to the existing 
literature empirically, theoretically, and methodologically. It will discuss how the findings 
contribute to the literature in Chinese and English. The chapter then reviews the advantages 
and disadvantages of the methodological approach of this thesis. It also reviews the 
contribution of the thesis, suggests potential policy implications and sets a possible agenda 




Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework 
This chapter discusses the theoretical approaches which have inspired the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. This thesis is inspired by linguistic relativity (LR), rule-oriented 
constructivism (ROC) and norm-oriented constructivism (NOC), and constructivist 
international political economy (CIPE). The conceptual framework of normative power 
Europe (NPE) will also be presented with its applications in China-EU studies. NPE belongs 
to the constructivist paradigm, but it has a distinct conceptual framework. It is regarded as 
one of the theories which informed the synthesised theoretical framework of this chapter. 
As the analysis of this thesis follows a mixed theoretical framework, it is necessary to 
illustrate what theories have inspired and informed the thesis and how. The concepts and 
elements of each relevant theory will be discussed, as well as the relationship among these 
elements. This chapter paves the way for the methodological design of this thesis which will 
be further introduced in the next chapter. 
Structure-wise, the chapter is divided into four sections: 
The chapter consists of four sections: 
Section 2.1 introduces the premises of linguistic relativity and sets the ontological status of 
language, or more specifically, discourse, in this research and sets the assumption that 
discourse and social relations are mutually constructive.  
Section 2.2 introduces the two main constructivism theories which have informed the 
perspectives of this thesis: norm-oriented constructivism and rule-oriented constructivism. 
Instead of presenting the theories in full, the section focuses on the elements of these 
theories which are relevant to this thesis including the role of culture, shared ideas, identities, 
states’ interests, discourse, rules and rule in constructivist theories. Section 2.2.1 and 
Section 2.2.2 review the key premises and concepts in norm-oriented constructivism and 
rule-oriented constructivism, respectively. Instead of the theories in full spectrum, the section 
focuses on the elements of these theories which are relevant to this thesis as the thesis is 
primarily empirical research.  
Section 2.3 reviews Ian Manner’s concept of normative power Europe, which is the concept 
applied in Chapter 7. It also reviews the application of NPE in China-EU studies, especially 
the discussions on the effectiveness of the EU’s normative power to China and the 
possibilities of China as a normative power.  
Section 2.4 aims at combining the core elements of the theories applied and presents the 
synthesised theoretical framework.  
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2.1 Discourse vs Ideas: Linguistic Relativity 
The concept of Language Relativity should be mentioned to understand one of the driving 
forces of this thesis and the gap it tries to fill in China-EU relations. In 1929, Benjamin Lee 
Whorf and Edward Sapir put forward the idea that the way people think is strongly affected 
by their native language. There are specific thoughts in one language which can hardly be 
comprehended by people who speak another language. Sapir argued that human beings do 
not live in an objective world, but they live through the lens of their language, which is the 
medium of expression for the world they experience. It is impossible for one to respond and 
adjust to society without the use of language. Language is not a mere tool of communication 
but has substance on which the world is largely built (Sapir, 1929: 209).  
In 1940, Whorf further argued that: people understand nature “along lines laid down by our 
native languages” and the world is presented in an impression which is organised by the 
linguistic systems in people’s minds (Whorf, 1940: 213–214).  
These arguments feature the core of what is referred to in Linguistics as the Sapir-Whorf 
Hypothesis, alternatively linguistic relativity (LR), or in its radical form, Linguistic 
Determinism. LR takes the stance that structural differences between languages are 
accompanied by non-linguistic cognitive differences. The structure of the language itself 
affects cognition. For example, the number of words describing basic colours decides how 
the speaker sees the rainbow (Kay Paul & Kempton Willett, 1984). Research on linguistics 
has evidenced some degree of LR by pointing out that people of different native languages 
which contains different words and concepts in terms of spatial relations and colour 
recognition have different spatial awareness and perceptions of colour categorisation5 
(Comrie, 2012). 
The hypothesis of LR became popular in the 1950s despite the controversies it caused. The 
followers of Noam Chomsky have offered strong criticism of the hypothesis in the following 
decades as language is only one factor that influences cognition and behaviour (Comrie, 
2012). Meanwhile the extreme (“Weltanschauung”) version of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, 
often referred to as linguistic determinism, regards that all thoughts are constrained by 
language, and language structure strongly influences or determines the speaker’s world view 
has been mostly became marginalised in research in recent decades; the opposite extreme 
that language does not influence thought at all is also widely considered to be false. Most 
linguistic experts nowadays, however, believe in the weak version of this hypothesis: that 
language can have some effects on thought (Kay Paul & Kempton Willett, 1984).  
 
5 See Stephen C. Levinson’s experiment at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen, The 




This thesis takes the stance that language influences the world view in the sense that world 
view is expressed through a series of words based on thoughts developed over time. 
Cognitive decisions are constantly made when we speak, and language as a medium of 
communication sets the framework that the ideas pass through.  
However, this thesis does not take the stance that language decides the world view single-
handedly. It is through a combination of social, historical, economic as well as linguistic 
forces that world views come into being. In this sense, language offers one important way to 
understand world views and the diachronic change of world views based on the change of 
language as world views form into shapes through the vessel of language.  
Figure 2-1 Language and Thoughts: Mutually Constitutive  
 
Figure 2-1 presents the stance taken by LR on the relationship between Language and 
Ideas. Language and thoughts are interrelated and mutually enforced. Thoughts in this 
sense are related to several categories of human intelligence. For example, systematic 
thoughts related to certain social-political perceptions can evolve into social-political 
ideology. Thoughts can also lead to expressions which, over time, reveal a relatively 
consistent tendency or understandings, forming values. The relation between language and 
human cognition, therefore, is not only tied to the formation of world views which Sapir and 
Whorf emphasised. The real value of language relativity, instead of exacerbating the 
differences in languages, should be that it opens new doors for understanding the relations 
between human languages and human thoughts. It offers one possible to way observe the 
immaterial aspects of human society empirically, namely by looking at the evidence in 
language to understand the development of values, ideologies, identities, among other 
things consisting of human thoughts.  
Figure 2-2 Mutual Construction between Discourse and Ideas/Thoughts  
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Figure 2-2 presents the relationship shown in Figure 2-1 in the context of this thesis on 
China-EU relations. Here language is substituted by discourse as discourse refers to a set of 
texts, namely the official discourse between China and the EU in the context of this research. 
Thoughts are expanded to ideas and/or thoughts that ideas are a term utilised by IR scholars 
to refer to how entities in IR conceptualise terms related to international relations. The 
concept of ideas will be further explained in Section 2.3 on material power and ideas.  
This thesis also assumes that the differences in language structure, lexical features as well 
as the conceptual references do contain some degree of un-translatability. There will be 
some part of the meaning which gets lost in translation. In official discourse, the loss of 
meaning could be caused by not only the translations but also intrinsic features of difference 
source languages with different levels of vagueness and diversity of connotations. The point 
of bringing up this aspect in understanding China-EU relations is not to say there are 
unconquerable problems in communication but to say there may have been 
misunderstandings between China and the EU created by the different nature of Chinese 
language and the languages in which the EU documents are issued. The role of official 
discourse has been largely overlooked and undervalued, and this aspect has not received 
due attention in the existing research. The hope is that China and the EU could enhance 
coordination of their communication and policies with a better knowledge of the context and 
connotations of the other’s official discourse manifesting their priorities, visions, strategies 
and approaches through their official discourse.  
2.2 Discourse vs Norms: Norm and Rule-Oriented 
Constructivism  
Constructivism, or social constructivism, arose in the 1980s when the world underwent 
political divisions and diverse political approaches taken by countries. The ideological and 
civilisational clashes led to challenges beyond the explanatory power of traditional IR 
theories. constructivism opened up a horizon and provided an alternative approach to look at 
the clashes in the world (Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert, 1998).  
Ontologically, constructivism deviates from traditional IR theories. Realism and liberalism 
take the “matter over mind” stance and the presupposition of rationalism. They view the 
international world as one of anarchy. Materials and resources regulate the rationalism of the 
states and determine the structure and social outcomes and human actions are caused 
by “measurable structural variables” and are predictable and involuntary (Kubalkova, Onuf & 
Kowert, 1998: xi). Constructivists, instead of taking an entirely “mind over matter” point of 
view, often take a dialectical view of mind and matter. They conceive that human actions and 
social structures are  “inseparable, simultaneous” and “co-constituted” (Kubalkova, Onuf & 
Kowert, 1998). Unlike the realist or the liberal approaches, the constructivist approach 




material objective power is insufficient to define the international system. National interests, 
power politics as other essentials of realist theories are socially constructed and are 
therefore subject to changes given the dynamics of human society (Wendt, 1992, 1999).  
The constructivist approach has been increasingly applied in international relations studies. 
The Chinese literature on China-EU studies in the recent decade has shown a tendency to 
consider more social-cultural and ideological factors rather than traditional factors from 
realist perspectives, such as the economy and national interests. The studies on the 
cognitive gaps between China and the EU mentioned in the review mostly apply the 
underlying rationale of constructivism.  
Kurt Burch categorises constructivism in IR into three approaches: rule-oriented 
constructivism (Onuf and Miami Group), structure-oriented constructivism (Alexandra Wendt) 
and norm-oriented constructivism (Kubalkova, 2001b). Mainstream constructivism or 
structure-oriented constructivism represented by the Wendtian approach provides a 
framework to shift the stress from either the power of states, or the power distribution in the 
international structure, but to the identities of states. As explained by Kubálková, "this means 
a shift from what states can do because of their position in a structure, to what they want to 
do because of how they see themselves in relation to others"  (Kubálková, 2001a: 33). 
Mainstream constructivists argue that identities, instead of capabilities, are harnessed to 
interests (Kubálková, 2001a).  
A significant number of Chinese scholars adopt Alexandra Wendt’s version of constructivism 
as the theoretical assumption in their studies on China-Europe and China-EU relations, as 
mentioned in the literature review section in Chapter 1. Although the Wendtian constructivist 
approach has been applied with significant effort in existing literature, the current literature 
has not yet adopted NOC and ROC as the frameworks of analysis in China-EU studies. This 
thesis fills in this gap by applying the less mainstream constructivist theoretical approaches 
in analysing China-EU relations through applying them to the developed corpora. This 
bridges discourse studies with IR studies. Therefore, NOC and ROC will be the focus of the 
theoretical discussion of this chapter.  
2.2.1 Norm-Oriented Constructivism  
NOC argues that norms matter since state interests are not intrinsic but constructed by 
social interactions and shaped by norms and values. Norms can change states’ interests and 
behaviours and shift patterns of international relations (Green, 2002). The actor’s interests 
are endogenous and socially constructed instead of exogenous and given (Ruggie, 1998).   
2.2.1.1 Identity & Culture 
One of the definitions of identity proposed by Katzenstein is that it is a “shorthand label for 
varying constructions of nation and statehood. The process of construction typically is 
explicitly political and pits conflicting actors against each other” (Katzenstein, 1996: 3). For 
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constructivists, identity, sometimes referred to as “collective distinctiveness” and purpose, 
are “variations across countries in the statehood that is enacted domestically and projected 
internationally” (Katzenstein, 1996: 3). He emphasises that the identities of states “emerge 
from their interactions with different social environments, both domestic and international” 
(Katzenstein, 1996: 11). In other words, “international and domestic environments shape 
state identities” (Katzenstein, 1996: 12).  
For norm-oriented constructivists, culture, as defined by Katzenstein, is: 
A broad label that denotes collective models of nation-state 
authority or identity, carried by custom or law. Culture refers to 
both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and 
a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define 
what social actors exist in a system, how they operate, and how 
they relate to one another (Katzenstein, 1996: 4). 
The NOC concept of culture focuses more on the role of norms and rules. For Onuf, culture 
is constituted by consciousness and the rules internalised by people’s mind. Culture, in this 
sense, is a mixture of correlative rules and consciousness (Onuf, 1989). Dr Feng Xiao 
elaborated the definition of culture, stating that “culture can be understood within the 
interactive context where the consciousness of agents affects the constitution of rules and 
social arrangement” (Feng, 2004: 169). Katzenstein also uses the expression “collectively 
shared expectations”. He argues that collective expectations can lead to strong causal 
effects and therefore deserve careful scrutiny (Katzenstein, 1996: 4).  
2.2.1.2 Norms  
According to Katzenstein, the norm as a concept is applied by norm-oriented constructivists 
to describe “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity” 
(Katzenstein, 1996: 3). He further illustrates that there are two ways norms constitute 
identities. First, norms can be rules which define the actor’s identity and specify the actor’s 
actions which leads to the actor being recognised by others by a particular identity. Second, 
norms can be standards which regulate the proper implementation of a previously defined 
identity. In the first case, the norms have “constitutive effects” while in the latter case, they 
have “regulative” effects. These two procedures can coexist in some cases (Katzenstein, 
1996: 3). 
2.2.2 Rule-oriented Constructivism  
ROC was initiated by Nicolas Onuf and developed by the Miami International Relations 
Group (Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert, 1998: x–xi). The ontological stance of ROC is based on a 
lineage of interdisciplinary approaches in social sciences, including language philosophy and 
sociology in the 20th century. ROC treats language as the primary matter which constructs 
social reality and takes discourse analysis as the main form of analysis. The point of 




the related institutions. Although the Wendtian constructivist approach has been applied 
extensively, the current literature has not yet adopted ROC as the framework of analysis in 
China-EU studies.   
The core of ROC can be summarised by two main arguments. The first is “saying is doing”, 
or treating speech at acts (Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert, 1998: xi).  Specifically, different types 
of discourse shape different forms of relationship (Onuf, 1989). The second core argument is 
“rules make the rule” (Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert, 1998: xi). 
2.2.2.1 Speech Acts  
ROC gives language an ontological position. Based on 
the speech act theory, Onuf categorised the three patterns of speech acts according to the 
way they achieve social effects:  
• Assertive speech acts: We may assert something about 
the world that others will accept (or reject, qualify, etc.). 
• Directive speech acts: We may demand that others do 
what we say. 
• Commissive speech acts: We can make promises that 
have consequences for us if 
others accept them (Kubalkova, 2001a: 66). 
Table 2-1 Discourse Patterns and their Correspondent Sentence Structure (Onuf, 1989) 
 
 
Table 2-1 presents the three basic discourse patterns regarded by Onuf. It explains what 
each discourse pattern refers to and the typical sentence structure through which they are 
expressed. As shown in the table, Onuf classifies speech acts, or in the term applied in this 
thesis, discourse, into three types: assertive discourse, directives and commissive discourse. 
Assertive discourse usually appears when the speaker hopes the receiver will accept what 
has been stated. One of the typical sentence types is “X counts as Y”. Directive discourse 
can be simply understood as discourse giving directions, and the typical sentence structure 
can be “X person must do Y”. In producing directive discourse, the speaker focuses more on 
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the receiver’s actions rather than that in uttering an assertive discourse. Commissive 
discourse usually consists of commitments or promises. Sentences such as “I state I will do 
Y” generate commissive discourse. Table 2-1 offers semantic and lexical features of each 
discourse type.  
2.2.2.2 Rules Make Rule  
The second core argument is “rules make the rule” (Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert, 1998: xi). 
The concept of rules and rule should be distinguished here as they will be applied in the 
analysis of this thesis. In ROC, “rules” refer to social rules instead of logic, laws or principles 
of nature (Onuf, 1989: 79). They are “stated or stable” instructions which can lead to or can 
regulate human actions. They are often formed through words such as “I must; must not; 
may, need not; should, and should not” (Max Black cited in (Onuf, 1989: 79)). Rules are 
generated through repeated speech acts. Rules then determine the distribution of resources 
and yield rule (Kubalkova, 2001a: 69). The rule refers to the pattern of political society (Onuf, 
1989: 196). The three basic types of “rule” identified by Onuf are hegemony, hierarchy, and 
heteronomy (Kubalkova, 2001a: 66). Table 2-26 shows the correlations among discourse, 
rules and rule as well as the typical phrases, cultural formations and social-political systems 
matching each type of discourse.  
Table 2-2 Correlations of Discourse, Rules and Rule 
 
Adapted from the “Constructivist Synoptic Table” by (Kubálková, 2001b: 67–69) 
As Table 2-2 presents, assertive discourse is commonly expressed through phrases such as 
I “state, affirm, report, insist, declare”. This type of discourse generates instructive-rules and 
leads to the rule of hegemony. Assertive discourse pattern is the pervasive discourse pattern 
in pre-modern political systems, religions, and totalitarian societies. One of the common 
 




features of these social systems is that the ideological idea plays an important role in ruling 
the society (Kubálková, 2001b). 
Directive discourse generates directive rules through phrases like “I ask, command, demand, 
permit”. This type of discourse produces the rule of hierarchy which entails a “chain of 
command”. According to Onuf, the rule of the hierarchy is the distinguishing feature of 
warrior-type societies, occupations, military organisations, positivist social sciences and in 
cultures where dread and fear are dominating features (Kubálková, 2001b).  
Commissive discourse generates commitment-rules which are often associated with phrases 
such as “I promise” and “I offer”. The rule produced by commissive discourse is termed as 
heteronomy. In the rule of heteronomy, the actors' roles are defined by each other. In other 
words, the actors are influenced, balanced and even determined by each other’s role. Onuf 
pointed out that the rule of heteronomy is the defining ruling feature of Western capitalist 
countries with democratic systems. It is also pervasive in other forms of liberal culture as well 
as cultures in which the sense of guilt and shame, responsibility and reputations play an 
important role (Kubálková, 2001b). 
Table 2-2 makes up one of the analytic tools in this thesis. The correlations in the tables 
make it possible to identify lexical features and sentence patterns consistent with the types in 
the table and inferences about the type of rules, rule and social culture related to the 
discourse. For example, if a society is a Western democratic society, one can anticipate that 
its natural dominating discourse type should be commissive discourse and the rules 
generated will be commitment-rules with the major ruling pattern being heteronomy.  
While ROC offers an analytical tool which can be applied in analysing texts, bridging the gap 
between the abstract nature of ideas and the discourse on paper, it also entails large 
numbers of controversies and critiques as the correlations between discourse, rules and rule 
seem to be too simplified compared with the complexity of language and the connotations 
behind them. Plus, the classifications of discourse type, which can generate certain types of 
rule are not exhaustive. The analysis of this thesis will apply this framework with a critical 
perspective towards the types of discourse as, in practice, ambiguity exists in discourse and 
the formation of certain types of rules and rule may not conform exactly to what has been 
presented in Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 There may not be clear cut divisions between 
assertive, directive and commissive discourse, and each type can transform into another 
under certain circumstances. Therefore, ROC has been applied in the discourse analysis 
under the guidance but not completely restricted by the framework offered above. 
2.2.3 Normative Power Europe  
Ian Manners introduced the concept of normative power in his paper in 2002 “Normative 
Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”. Manners constructed this concept through first 
reviewing the debates between Hedley Bull, the `English School' Writer, who argued that in 
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the 1980s the civilian power of the EU was subject to the military power of the states (Bull, 
1982), and writers including François Duchêne who claimed that civilian power was taking 
over traditional military power in the international arena (Duchêne, 1973). Contributing to this 
debate, Manners argued that since the 1990s, the EU had been showing a supplemental 
power which is the ability to define what activities are passed as “normal” in international 
relations. He argues that this power to define what is normal is the greatest power of all. 
Normative power, in this sense, is not a term in contradiction. In fact, being able to shape 
what is norm is the biggest power. The EU's normative power lies not only in what the EU 
does, but what the EU is (Manners, 2002: 253).  
Since then, Manners developed this concept through years of critical reviews of it. In his 
2006 paper “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: beyond the Crossroads”, he 
reconsiders the relationship between military power, civilian power and the normative power 
of Europe. Responding to the literature at the time arguing that the EU should enhance its 
defence and crisis management through increasing its military power, Manners argues that 
military power does not have to affect the normative power of the EU if it's carried out with 
critical reflections rather than the pursuit of being a great power. However, military power 
beyond the EU's crossroads defined by the European security strategy is weakening the 
normative claims of the EU (Manners, 2006).  
In 2009, Manners clarified his conceptualisation of normative power in his paper “The 
Concept of Normative Power in World Politics” by further explaining the dimensions 
consisting of normative power including ideational aspects, principles, actions, impact and 
consequences. He also introduces four possible criteria to judge the EU's impact: clarity, 
simplicity, partnership and timescale (sustainability) (Manners, 2009a). These criteria provide 
a way not only to understand the EU as a normative power but also to explore the potential 
of other entities, such as China, being a normative power.  
The core of his concept roots from his vision of a future world not merely regulated by 
material power only but by the power of ideas, culture, and visions. This, again, is related to 
the creation of the European Union to make wars in Europe unthinkable mind-wise and 
impossible material-wise. Manners believes that by exercising normative power, the EU can 
contribute to this future of world politics (Manners, 2009a).   
Manners pointed out in 2009 that normative power as a concept emphasises holistic thinking 
and practices which can be justified. The concept also helps promote the respect of both 
material power and the power of the idea in the world which, according to Manners, 
contributes to “a more sustainable world politics” (Manners, 2009a: 4). From this perspective, 
Manners, without undervaluing the power of materials, has a vision of a world respecting the 
power of ideas. This vision stands behind the creation of this concept and its dimensions. 




in China as China bears a culture which has deep roots and the power of Chinese traditional 
ideas penetrates all areas of Chinese society, including the government’s policymaking. 
Manners argues that the EU is a normative power as it creates new norms and standards 
which differ from the traditional state-centrality in international politics, although he retains 
doubts about whether the EU has been acting ethically to reach the true standards of being 
normative (Manners, 2008). The major source of the EU’s normative power is its values and 
rules. The EU’s fundamental values include the protection of human rights, the rule of law 
and democracy. As the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty states, the member states of the EU: 
 (...)draw(ing) inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal 
values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, 
freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law (The European 
Union, 2008). 
The EU feels responsible for impacting the world with its norms. As former High 
Representative Javier Solana commented:   
The EU has the responsibility to work for the ‘global common 
good’. That is a fitting way of describing the EU’s global role and 
ambition (Aggestam, 2008: 6). 
According to Manners, the EU has aimed at “prosperity in Europe and beyond” since it was 
established (Manners, 2009a: 22). In this sense extending its values to other parts of the 
world is one of the EU’s intrinsic features or the foundation it is built on. Referring to EU 
official discourse, the primary normative goals and principles are stated in the Treaty on 
European Union: 
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by 
the principles which have inspired its own creation, development 
and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: 
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human 
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (The 
European Union, 2008) 
This part titled “general provisions on the Union’s external action” confirms that promoting 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, equality and solidarity and respect for the UN 
charter are the prioritised goals of the EU’s normative practices.  
2.2.4 Application and Debates in China-EU Studies  
Although the EU claims to work to promote “the common good in international society” 
(Aggestam, 2009), there are many voices against the legitimacy of its ambition. Is the EU an 
eligible normative power? While the EU tries to promote its values, do these values sound 
attractive to other countries? Manners is critical about the ethics of the EU as a normative 
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power. In his article “The Normative Ethics of the European Union”, he argues that the EU is 
a normative power but that it does not necessarily act in a normative, or an ethical way 
(Manners, 2008). 
Similarly, the legitimacy or the justification of the EU’s normative power has been viewed 
critically by both Western and Chinese scholars. For the EU, one of the central themes is the 
EU as a normative power and how this would affect its approach to China.  Although the EU 
as a normative power has been widely accepted since Ian Manners put forward the concept, 
the legitimacy, or the justification of the EU’s normative power has been viewed critically by 
both Western and Chinese scholars. Despite the EU’s claims to work to promote “the 
common good in international society” (Aggestam, 2009), there are voices against the 
legitimacy of this ambition. On this, Manners himself is critical about the ethics of the EU as 
a normative power. In his article “The Normative Ethics of the European Union”, he argues 
that the EU is a normative power but does not necessarily act in a normative, or an ethical 
way (Manners, 2008). Many other Western scholars point out that the universality of the 
EU’s norms is problematic. Gerrits pointed out that Europe has misplaced a sense of 
universalism (Gerrits, 2009). Aggestam, while recognising part of the eligibility of the EU 
norms as they are derived from the United Nations, does raise questions about whether the 
EU can force other actors to change and whether the norms are attractive to developing 
countries (Aggestam, 2009).  
In terms of the universality of the EU’s values, Chinese scholars are, in general, critical, 
although most of them do recognise the good intentions of the EU. Song Lilei recognises that 
the EU, as a normative power, bears a sense of responsibility and a historical perspective. 
Due to its experience in the war, the EU feels obliged to promotes the values of peace, 
democracy and the structural model of itself (Song, 2008). Wang Yiwei doubts the legitimacy 
of the EU’s “responsibility”. He takes the position that while the EU represents a small 
population in the world who live in a post-modern society with post-modern values, most 
countries in the rest of the world are not in post-modern stages. There is a gap between the 
EU’s idealism and the realities of other countries. Particularly, he emphasised that China-EU 
relations should not be mistaken for “teacher-student” relations (Wang Yiwei, 2009). Others 
argue that it is not so much about which norms are universal, but whether the promoters of 
the norms are in the power centre of the world’s politics. The normative power is just the 
pursuit of self-interest and real political power under another name (Cui, 2007; Wang, 2015).  
Kavalski draws attention to the potential growing significance of normative powers in Asia, 
including China, India, and Japan. He argues that normative power is the one which is 
deemed as such by others. He argues that in Manner's theoretical system on normative 
power, one of the core criteria is that a normative power can "shape what can be ‘normal’ in 




with others. One essential of being a normative power, therefore, is to be recognised by 
others as one (Kavalski, 2013). 
Kavalski found that most Asian scholars apply the framework of soft power in defining these 
powers instead of normative power. The reasons, according to him, could be that the Asian 
scholars are "disinterested in engaging with the propositions and concepts of European IR" 
due to the complexity of the EU. He also pointed out that "European international relations 
scholars have expended little effort to translate the applicability of their terminology to non-
EU actors and contexts (both because of the all-persuasive nature of the EU and also 
because of the positioning of Asian Studies outside the international relations curriculum)" 
(Kavalski, 2013: 248). Besides, he noticed that both European and Asian IR scholars tend to 
apply the US IR view which leads to a further rift between Asian and European IR 
approaches instead of bridging the differences between the two groups (Kavalski, 2013). 
Guo, Wang and Yang argue that China’s normative power in Central Asia is embodied in 
three well-received principles: first, the independent sovereignty; second, mutually beneficial 
peaceful development; third, harmonious world seeking common grounds and keeping 
differences. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) is the platform where China’s normative power in 
central power mostly shows (Guo, Wang & Yang, 2016). They have been very positive about 
China being a normative power and have stated that: 
Normative power is a goal many countries pursue. Although due to 
power relations between big countries, regional regulations, 
competitions among organisations and self-constraints, the space 
and scope of China’s normative power in central Asia is limited. 
However, it is certain that rising China will become a normative 
power. (Guo, Wang & Yang, 2016: 85). 
Wang Zhengxu considers that China’s current strategy is to transfer part of the power in the 
previous European and American centred international order to emerging countries 
represented by China as well as other developing countries. He names this strategy 
“Incremental Inter-Continentalism” (Wang Zhengxu, 2015). He thinks that the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), BRICS cooperation mechanism, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Free Trade Area of the Asia 
Pacific (FTAAP) as well as Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) are 
all manifestations of Incremental Inter-Continentalism. They all aim to open new fields and 
platforms in international cooperation without challenging the existing platforms of 
international cooperation and global governance (Wang Zhengxu, 2015).  
What would be the values, or norms China holds for this Incremental Inter-Continentalism? 
Wang argues that Peace and Development are two central values of this strategy. Peace 
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and Development, according to Wang, guide both China’s domestic development and its 
global diplomacy. 
On this, Wang Zhengxu and Zheng Yongnian have similar views on that the rise of China 
which has brought the world the value of peace, openness, and an inclusive developmental 
style (Zheng cited in Wang, 2015). They argue that China’s value behind its global strategy 
is different from the US value and the European. Peace and development are also what the 
world needs, especially among developing countries as well as countries suffering from 
economic recession such as developed countries in Europe (Wang, 2015). In this sense, 
China’s rise has an apparent normative impact. The rise of China is not only a rise 
geopolitically and geoeconomically but the rise of Peace and Development as two values 
(Wang, 2015).   
2.3 Constructivist IPE: Material Power vs Ideas  
International political economy (IPE) traditionally discusses how the economy works in the 
international system. Throughout the years, Constructivist IPE, or CIPE, has arisen and 
developed to integrate considerations of the power of ideas and thought within the 
international political-economic system.  
Nowadays, most IPE scholars have adopted more or less a consensus that some 
constructivist understandings of IPE are necessary. The main assumptions of constructivist 
IPE include the idea that interests are not predetermined but constructed through identities; 
ideas have some causal efficacy; values are constituted through social principles, and 
human actions are influenced continuously by their reflections on the actions. The 
methodological approach is in line with this is that hermeneutics, instead of purely data, 
should be integrated into social science. The constructivist perspective gives IPE the 
conceptual framework through which institutional facts are constructed and bear the features 
of being observer-dependent (Martijn Konings, 2015).  
The earlier version of constructivist IPE was closely associated Robert Cox’s historical 
materialism, especially the Gramscian-inspired version. Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) has 
been one crucial source of inspiration for the British school of IPE (Leysens, 2008). Cox, in 
his paper “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, 
put forward the model of the Three Categories in Historical Structure in order to capture the 




Table 2-3 Cox's Historical Structure of International Political Economy (Cox, 1981) 
 
Cox argues that in this structure, material capabilities are both productive and destructive 
and they exist in the form of technological and organisational capabilities as well as natural 
resources, equipment and wealth (Cox, 1981). In this system, ideas exist in two forms: one is 
intersubjective meanings, or as Cox puts in, the “shared notions of the nature of social 
relations which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behaviour”. In practice, these 
include the rules and norms regulated by states and other political entities. Another form of 
ideas is a historical structure which is “collective images of social order” such as the meaning 
of justice and public good (Cox, 1981: 136).  
Although Cox’s model has wide meanings, the element particularly contributing to the 
theoretical framework of this thesis is the mutually constitutive relationship between material 
capabilities and ideas. Figure 2-3 takes this element out and presents this mutual 
construction between material power and ideas/thoughts.  
Figure 2-3 Mutual Construction between Material Power and Ideas/Thoughts  
 
Now if we combine Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3, we can get a triangle relationship: the mutual 
construction among ideas/thoughts, material power and discourse power as shown in Figure 
2-4.  
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Figure 2-4 Mutual Construction Among Ideas/Thoughts, Material Power and Discourse 
Power (Source: own work) 
 
Figure 2-4 demonstrates three sets of mutual constitution: between ideas/thoughts and 
discourse power, between ideas/thoughts and material power and between material power 
and discourse power. The first two sets are derived from Cox’s constructivist IPE, and the 
second set is derived from ROC, especially the part about speech acts. This synthesis of 
theoretical approaches paves the way for the next step of theoretical framework 
development as the framework is developed in a manner that the relationship between 
elements is discussed set by set and at last, leads to the final model as will be shown in 
Figure 2-5.  
This thesis takes the position that there are dialectic relations between market and society. 
Apart from Cox, this dialectic relationship is also close to Karl Polanyi’s arguments of the 
double movements between national societies and the international economy. In his book 
The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time published in the 
1940s, sampling on how the unregulated market threatened society and people’s lives in 
England in the 19th century, Polanyi argues that market is embedded in the society and 
there has been a dialectical process of marketisation and social-cultural trends to protect 
against the changes.  
On the one hand, the development of market institutions leads to the social culture of free 
trade as laissez-faire reformers, who believed that the market is self-regulated and 
attempted what Polanyi has called a “market society” where everything is commodified. On 
the other hand, marketisation led to a countermovement where social protectionist actions 
such as the creation of labour laws and tariffs arose (Polanyi, 1944).   
Despite the age of Polanyi’s book, his critiques of market liberalism, especially on the idea 
that the self-regulating market is the organising force behind both national societies and 




global situations today. The idea of Double Movement is applied in this thesis as a link 
between social factors and the international economic system. The commonness of CCT, 
Neo-Gramscian School and Polanyi’s Double Movement theory is that ontologically and 
epistemologically, they hold on to dialectic views instead of the traditional empirically-
oriented approach as in realist and liberalist theories of IPE (Bai, 2011).  
The thesis is taking this dialectic historical constructivist view that social realities are the 
result of interactions between discourse, human cognition, cultures and those of the material 
resources in the world. The analysis in this thesis, therefore, will be based on the empirical 
data which arises from the discourse materials. However, these data will be considered in 
the context of the changing economic status of China and the EU in the world system and 
the cultural and ideological dynamics which come with the economic changes.  
2.4 Synthesised Theoretical Framework: Discourse, 
Normative and Economic Power 
This thesis takes a theoretical approach which considers the interactions among these three 
aspects in understanding the challenges in China-EU relations. Official discourse is taken as 
the primary source consisting of discourse between China and the EU, constituted by 
thoughts and constituting thoughts and ideas, and then shaping norms and in the meantime 
being shaped by norms in China-EU relations.  
A synthesised theoretical framework is demonstrated in Figure 2-5. This framework is an 
original theoretical device for this thesis and will guide the data code, theme-searching and 
data analysis of this thesis.  
Figure 2-5 Mutual Construction among Normative Power, Material Power and Discourse 
Power (Source: own work) 
 
The theories informing the thesis originate from multiple disciplines, including Linguistics, IR 
and IPE. Three essential elements, namely normative power, material power, and discourse 
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power, form the elements of this triangle relationship where all elements construct each 
other. The rationale of this framework is based on the step-by-step development of the 
mutual constructive relationship between norms and discourse, material power and 
ideas/thoughts, and languages and ideas/thoughts as illustrated in previous sections of the 
chapter.   
The framework binds Linguistics, IR and IPE through NOC and ROC which treat languages 
as having an ontological status. The premises of NOC and ROC inform the mutual 
constitution between normative power and discourse power. ROC argues that speeches are 
actions, and they shape rules, which then have the potential to evolve into rule. Rule is a 
form of political paradigm in a society such as the rule of hegemony, heteronomy and 
hierarchy. Such rule, or social structures, are formed by collective norms. In this sense, 
discourse and norms are also mutually constructive.  
The mutual construction between material power and discourse power is an extension of the 
assumptions of CIPE and especially its earlier inspiration from Robert Cox’s historical 
materialism, which incorporates and role of ideas and thoughts in the formation of social, 
political-economic structures.  
These two sets of mutual construction with the common element of discourse power leads to 
the mutual constructive relationship between normative power and material power, thus 
creating the full triangle of relations among the three elements which are mutually 
constructive.  
This synthesised theoretical framework, informed by NOC and ROC, IPE, and the linguistic 
philosophy of Language Relativity bridges multiple disciplines and is one of the original 
creations of this thesis. The analysis in the empirical chapters will be carried out within this 







Chapter 3 Methodology 
The thesis develops a machine-readable specialised corpus and carries out corpus-driven 
discourse analysis on China-EU challenges. The establishment and application of the 
corpora make the thesis methodological driven. It is interdisciplinary research combining 
international relations (IR) studies, discourse analysis and corpora linguistics. The 
techniques of corpora linguistics have assisted the discourse analysis of the official 
discourse between China and the EU, contributing to examining and understanding the 
challenges in China-EU relations from a discursive perspective.  
This chapter consists of five sections. 
Section 3.1 reviews the constructivist discourse analysis in IR studies in general and the 
application of this approach in China-EU relations. It then presents the definitions of 
discourse as applied in this thesis. 
Section  3.2 reviews the existing foreign policy analysis in China-EU studies with a special 
focus on the research incorporating discourse and norm-oriented foreign policy analysis.  
Section 3.3 presents the research design, including the ontological and epistemological 
stances, and decision making about the time scope covered by the thesis.  
Section 3.4 introduces the research methods applied in this thesis and the approaches for 
data analysis. These include the grounded theory-informed constructivist discourse analysis 
and the specific research methods applied in the thesis, including corpus-driven discourse 
analysis, content analysis and critical discourse analysis. It also presents the methodological 
framework, which combines different aspects of mismatches with the levels of discourse.  
Section 3.5 introduces the steps of corpora establishment in this research, including the 
selection of materials, handling translations and versions, the structure of the corpora as well 
as the selection of software to assist data organisation and analysis.  
3.1 Constructivist Discourse Analysis  
Discourse analysis is not only a research method but also entails an ontology which endows 
human language with primary importance in creating social realities. Discourse analysis can 
be viewed as both a theory and a method as it is one of the approaches where research 
methods are closely intertwined with theoretical and methodological bases (Cameron, 2001; 
Jorgensen & J.Philips, 2002). It can focus on both the formal and functional aspects of 
discourse (Cameron, 2001; Jorgensen & J.Philips, 2002). Discourse analysis in IR studies 
has developed for more than thirty years since it emerged in the 1980s. Although different 
approaches have been taken by scholars, the common ontological stance of the discourse-
oriented approach in IR studies remains the same: discourse is deemed not only as the 
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reflection of the real world but also a creating and shaping power for social facts. Discourse 
analysis in IR illustrates how texts and social process are interconnected and explores the 
implications of the double movements between discourse and facts in specific cases in 
international relations (George, 1994: 191).  
3.1.1 Discourse: Definition and Application  
While discourse can simply refer to “the general domain of all statements” (Foucault, 1972: 
80), or “the language in use” (Brown & Yule, 1983), the definition of discourse taken in this 
thesis emphasises the social functions of discourse. The connotations of discourse in this 
thesis are close to those given, respectively, by Foucault, Fairclough and Yule. George Yule 
defines discourse as “language beyond the sentences”, and discourse analysis is the study 
of language in texts and conversations (Yule, 2010). According to Foucault, discourse is:  
 [A] Group of statements which provide a language for talking 
about a way of representing the knowledge about a particular topic 
at a particular historical moment: discourse is about the production 
of knowledge through language. However, since all social practices 
entail meaning, and meaning shapes and influences what we do — 
our conduct — all practices have a discursive aspect (Foucault 
cited in Hall, 1997: 44). 
Fairclough distinguishes the definitions of discourse as an abstract noun and as a countable 
noun: 
Discourse (as an abstract noun) is “language use conceived as 
social practise” (Fairclough, 2013: 135).  
Discourse (as a countable noun) is a “way of signifying experience 
from a particular perspective” (Fairclough, 2013: 135). 
These definitions of discourse emphasise the social function and constructive power of 
discourse. This is compatible with Nicolas Onuf’s language-oriented constructivist 
assumptions that discourse constructs social realities: discourse shapes people’s conduct 
and the social world. Social nature is the defining feature of the discourse in this thesis. 
Therefore, instead of taking discourse as simply arbitrary human signs, in this thesis, I take 
discourse as purposeful social activities expressed through human language. 
Discourse analysis is the main method applied throughout the thesis. While the thesis does 
not reject that social interactions can also shape language, in turn, as the constructive 
process between language and social realities can be mutual, most chapters focus on the 
constitutive power of discourse instead of the other way around since corpus-driven 
discourse analysis contributes more to the former than the latter. Chapter 8, however, 
incorporates discussion on the double-direction interactions between economic power and 




3.1.2 The Constructivist Discourse Analysis in IR  
Traditionally, discourse analysis is not what mainstream IR scholars would do to interpret 
problems. However, since the 1980s, more and more people have started to shift their 
attention from military clashes, security issues and other material variants to the role of 
languages, cultures, and softer variants in IR. Many scholars have, consciously or 
unconsciously, adopted methods of discourse analysis in their works. 
Discourse analysis, in combination with the constructivist approach in international relations 
and foreign policy analysis, has been adopted by an increasing number of scholars in IR 
studies, especially in the last decade. constructivism and discourse analysis share similar 
ontological and epistemological considerations regarding the constructive power of 
language. constructivist discourse analysis entails an ontology which endows human 
language with primary importance in creating social realities. Individuals efforts (Li, 2006; 
Scott, 2007b; Pickering, 2014; Holslag, 2010; Zhang L., 2016) have been testing various 
ways to merge discourse analysis and constructivist theories as mentioned in the last 
section. Despite the existing efforts, some challenges in a discourse-oriented constructivist 
analysis of China-EU relations stand out. It is hard to tell how significant the existing records 
and documents on China-EU diplomatic relations are since a lot of official EU papers merely 
present expectations rather than specific plans for action. Furthermore, when some Chinese 
scholars discuss the relationship between China and Europe, they fail to define whether it is 
the EU, or the EU member states they are working on. In addition, there is a lack of 
integrated policies towards the EU as China tends to interact with individual member states 
quite actively and the policies towards the EU are sometimes mingled with policies towards 
Europe and EU member states (Chen, 2003).  
3.1.3 Discourse Analysis in China-EU Studies  
In China-EU studies, discourse analysis has developed significantly in the last decade. In 
2009, Professor Snyder published the book The European Union and China, 1949-2008: 
Basic Documents and Commentary (Snyder, 2009) which is a refined, well-balanced 
combination of the key documents with observations by Snyder based on his cumulative 
research work over the years (Zeng, 2011). The document list on “EU and China Policy 
Papers” in this masterpiece (Snyder, 2009: 311) provides the selection criteria for the 
documents analysed in this paper. As this book is primarily a collection of all the essential 
official document in EU-China relations, the commentaries are sometimes brief. The analysis 
of the documents is based on the author’s understanding of the policymaking instead of on 
contents and policies conveyed in the documents. It is more of an encyclopaedia-like 
collection on China-EU official documents rather than an argumentative book. It offers a 
valuable resource for building the specialised corpus in this thesis, especially for the Corpus 
on the EU’s discourse on China.  
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A few pieces of work have adopted discourse analysis as a primary method in analysing 
China-EU bilateral relations (Li, 2006; Scott, 2007b; Pickering, 2014). Although this approach 
has not been the mainstream in China-EU studies, the past decade has witnessed a 
significant improvement in the application of discourse analysis in China-EU studies. One 
significant attempt has been made by Holslag who worked on the proportion of the clauses 
on four different topics in the EU’s agreements, statements, and sectorial dialogues with 
BRICS countries in order to explore the EU’s policy preferences with the emerging powers. 
The sentence patterns, more specifically, the themes of the clauses were counted and 
organised with the findings presented (Holslag, 2010). This piece of work offers an 
alternative look at the policy priorities from a semantic perspective, which shares some 
similarities with the methodology of this paper. However, this attempt does not involve 
corpus establishment, or computer-assisted analysis as the number of documents was small 
(only four official EU documents). In a more recent attempt taking a discourse analysis 
approach on EU-China relations, Dr. Zhang carried out an analysis of media discourse on 
the profile of the EU and that of EU-China relations based on several sets of discourse data, 
in turn based on Chinese news articles published by the Chinese state-media (Zhang 2016). 
This study is data-bounded and takes a longitudinal perspective to observe the evolution of 
China’s perceptions of the EU over the years. However, official policy papers were not used 
as part of the materials (Zhang L., 2016).  
In some other pieces of work, discourse analysis has been adopted as a supporting method 
in analysing conceptual differences (Zhu & Zhang, 2002; Zhang, 2008b, 2008a; Men, 2011; 
Zhou, 2011a; Chen & Song, 2012) and strategic divergences (Scott, 2007a; Murray, 2010; 
Caira, 2010; Mattlin, 2012) between China and the EU. 
Although quite a few studies have applied discourse analysis, there is a lack of systematic 
discourse analysis based on official documents and speeches which take a comparative and 
temporal perspective. Official discourse has been undervalued as it is commonly regarded 
as dry, vague and sometimes empty. Established corpora of China-EU official discourse in 
combination with domestic official discourse of China and the EU’s foreign policy discourse 
do not yet exist. Understanding challenges in China-EU relations from a discursive point of 
view based on such a corpus offers an alternative way to look at the interactions between 
discourse construction and the ups and downs in China-EU relations from a dynamic, 
diachronic perspective. This is what this thesis strives for: exploring the potential of the large 
numbers of official discourse papers, which are considerably undervalued, so as to 
understand the problems and tensions between China and the EU and offer findings, or 
explanations to the puzzle, in ways which are hard to achieve without the involvement of 
official discourse. 
Modifiers set the directions and reflect the motivations of the speakers. Regarding 




One example is the modification of ‘engagement’ in China-EU relations. While the notion of 
“reciprocal engagement” emphasising a mutual-beneficial approach was raised by EU think 
tanks (Godement & Fox, 2009), in contrast, the Chinese side raised the notion “constructive 
engagement” which was result-oriented (Feng, 2009: 67). The connotation of engagement, 
according to Caira, is that as China’s economic ability increases, the EU started to regard 
China as important source of solutions to global problems. The EU expects China to make 
more contributions to global governance (Caira, 2010: 265). It is also said that from the EU’s 
perspective, “engagement implies opposing containment, especially in the mind of the 
Chinese leaders, and it underlines the different European, and the US approaches China’s 
rising role in the world” (Caira, 2010: 265). However, this connotation of engagement is 
based on the EU’s perspective on China’s role in the world and is likely to be interpreted in 
another way again by the Chinese authority. The future policy guiding China-EU relations 
might, therefore, have to be a combination of the proposals from both the EU and Chinese 
perspective to make sure the cognition of both sides remains consistent.  
Another thing to notice is that the EU contains complications as a discourse producer. Each 
of the EU’s member states has its own discourse towards China. The discourse patterns 
produced by states diverge, and the EU cannot always represent their member states’ 
voices. Regarding EU institutions, the European Mission, the European Council and the 
Parliament have played different, sometimes contradictory roles in carrying EU’s China 
policy which makes China confused. Furthermore, member states of the EU have different 
China policies which increase the difficulties for China to respond coherently (Caira, 2010).  
3.2 Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis  
Methodologically, there has been a demarcation between IR analysis and foreign policy 
analysis (FPA) in IR studies. While IR focuses more on structure, FPA focuses on agents. 
Discussing FPA is helpful for understanding the methodological design of this thesis in terms 
of the methodological gaps it fills.  
This part, therefore, reviews the literature on constructivist FPA with a focus on the pieces 
applying discourse analysis in their FPA regarding the EU’s external policies and the foreign 
policy-making styles in China-EU relations.  
Among the FPAs in China-EU relations, the increasing autonomy of China-EU relations as a 
bilateral relationship has often been undermined. The role of the US is often involved in the 
discussion as proved in some scholarly research. While the US position does have a strong 
impact on China-EU relations, particularly on the EU’s attitudes to China, the autonomy of 
China-EU relations as bilateral relations and the dynamics between the two as two large 
entities in the world should be addressed. 
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3.2.1 Level of Analysis: Structure vs Agent 
Methodologically, efforts have been made to synthesise discourse analysis with IR theories 
and create an analytical model like that of Nikola Tomic (Tomic, 2013). Nikola Tomic put 
forward a discursive, institutional model for analysing EU foreign policies. He mentioned that, 
as shown in the table below, traditionally discourse analysis in FPA is in line with the 
structure-oriented approach, while cognitive and psychological approaches and other micro 
and mid-level analysis are agency-oriented. 
Table 3-1 Positioning Discourse Analysis in Foreign Policy Analysis Based on Tomic 
(2013: 224). 
Tomic tries to merge the traditionally structure-oriented discourse analysis with the agent-
oriented approach since a micro analysis from an institutional perspective is more suitable 
for analysing EU foreign policies. It is natural that macro analysis of China-EU relations 
starts with the overall structure, but considering the complications going on among the EU 
member states and the drastic changes and reforms going on inside China, a bottom-up 
analysis which incorporates domestic policy analysis could contribute to the weak links in the 
existing big-picture research on China-EU relations.  
3.2.2 The EU’s External Policymaking on China 
The literature on the EU’s foreign policy on China includes two general focuses: one that 
focuses on the decision-making with the EU and one that focuses on the engagement style 
between China and the EU.  
There is less literature in the former group, perhaps due to the complexities of the EU’s 
policymaking in the first place and the context of China-EU relations creates more 
challenges for researchers who are experts in European studies. A remarkable effort is 
made by Stumbaum, who provided an analytical framework for understanding the variables 
in the EU’s policymaking when it comes to China. She highlighted four independent variables 
(IV) in the EU’s policy-making on China, which include the role of parliaments, public opinion 
and media reports, business lobbies and external actors (Stumbaum, 2009). Later in 2012, 
she extended the scope from the EU’s internal policymaking to the conceptual gaps between 
China and the EU which takes a constructivist perspective which is closer to the second type 
of approach (Stumbaum & Xiong, 2012).  
Orientations  Structure-oriented Agent-oriented 
Level of analysis  Macro analysis  Micro and/or mid-level analysis 
Approaches  Discursive analysis Cognitive and psychological approach 




A significant number of scholars took the second approach and have argued that the 
problems in the China-EU relationship are a result of the different engagement styles of the 
Chinese government and the EU. One of their proposals is that the EU should take a 
benefits-oriented approach in its relations with China rather than the “unconditional 
engagement” or “value-based” approach which is adopted. They think the EU should require 
more benefit from China other than offering China favourable conditions and expecting 
China to behave as the EU anticipates (Godement & Fox, 2009: 1–2).  
In A Power Audit of EU-China Relations, Godement and Fox categorise the 27 EU member 
states into four groups, namely: “Assertive Industrialists”, “Ideological Free-traders”, 
“Accommodating Mercantilists” and “European Followers” based on their approaches to deal 
with a rising China (Godement & Fox, 2009: 3–5). Following a similar logic of categorisation, 
Mattlin, in studying the EU’s normative policy toward China, tried to put EU-China policies 
into the wider context of the EU’s foreign policies with all other nations. Based on the 
different forms the EU’s normative policy takes, he put the “target countries” of the EU into 
four groups, namely: “prospective accession countries”, “small developing countries”, 
“established democratic countries” and “major non-democratic countries” (Mattlin, 2012: 
184).  
Mattlin further pointed out that for different blocks of countries, the EU has different 
leverages and the leverage for the first group is the biggest. The second group mainly refers 
to African countries, and the third includes the US, Japan, Canada and Australia. China sits 
in the fourth and most interesting group since countries in these groups have distinct cultures 
and values compared to those of the EU (Mattlin, 2012: 184).  
3.2.3 Discourse and Norm-oriented Foreign Policy Analysis   
These efforts, although not explicit discourse analysis, can be viewed as efforts to categorise 
the discourse type of the EU member states in their relations with China and vice versa. 
Regarding my thesis, it will be interesting to discuss how a discourse producer, facing a 
different type of partner, applies a different type of discourse pattern. There can be 
arguments that discourse pattern is influenced by the power of the participators in the 
dialogue. This also leads to the question of assessing China’s power and globalisation. 
Holslag combined discourse analysis with quantitative analysis. He incorporated the analysis 
of sample quotations in investigating the effects of the EU’s normative approach in its 
relations with BRICS countries (Holslag, 2010: 4–7). He calculated the agreements and 
protocols made between the EU and the BRICS counties from 2003 to 2010 and found out 
that only 3 of the 24 related to international political and security issues. All the rest were 
about trade matters. He then made a quantitative analysis of the EU’s articles, sections, 
clauses, sectorial dialogues and working groups with the BRICS countries and got similar 
results: most cooperation between the EU and the BRICS were in the field of trade rather 
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than on issues of international order, politics and security (Holslag, 2010: 1). This does not 
match the EU’s ambition which is to develop “a stronger international society, well function 
international institutions and a rule-based international order” (Council of the European 
Union, 2003: 9).  
Mattlin’s and Holslag’s approaches incorporate features of discourse analysis. After all, 
norms and values are soft powers which have to be expressed through language. What they 
did is to generalise the ideas of the documents based on their experiences and 
understanding. In other words, they take their generalisation of the EU’s normative power for 
granted without proving it. This thesis tries to fill this gap by collecting actual discourse 
materials and investigating the discourse patterns of these documents by the application of 
words, sentences, the figure of speech, rhetorical devices and other indicators of discourse 
patterns.  
Murray has compared the EU’s goal of engaging with East Asia as a “regional interlocutor” 
with East Asia (Murray, 2010: 253). This ambition has met both opportunities and 
challenges. On the one hand, there are increasing meetings and dialogues between the EU 
and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), such as the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM). Besides, the EU has been taken by some East Asian countries as a model 
regarding regional integration (Murray, 2010: 255). On the other hand, however, the EU’s 
approach to and experiences with regionalisation are different to what the East Asian 
countries want. It, therefore, has to be cautious when approaching East Asia and properly 
handle the clashes between some Asian countries such as that between China and Japan 
(Murray, 2010: 260). Despite these difficulties, the EU’s determination to become a regional 
interlocutor with East Asia will not change (Murray, 2010: 260). 
Scott also incorporates discourse analysis, though not completely, in his investigation of the 
difficulties and possibilities of China-EU relations by looking into some key concepts and 
official terms of both sides. He regards that the concept and the formation of the “strategic 
dialogue” mechanism between China and EU in 2005 ironically reflects the ineffectiveness of 
the existing “strategic partnership”, a term applied since the 2003 EU-China summit (Scott, 
2007b: 13). He also discusses the ambiguities and paradoxes reflected by the term “peaceful 
rise”, which was adopted by the Chinese government in 2003 and revised into “peaceful 
development” in 2004 (Scott, 2007b: 21–23). Furthermore, he looks into the official Chinese 
concept of “multi-polarity” and quotes many related Chinese official discourses including 
Tang Jiaxuan, Zhu Rongji and Hu Jintao’s speeches as well as the illustrations in Beijing 
Review (Scott 2007: 28–33). Scott pays special attention to when and where terms came 
into usage. While Scott does not highlight that he was taking a discursive approach, there 




Caira gives credit to the role of discourse between China and the EU and the interrelations 
between official discourse and cooperation projects. She identified that the years between 
1998 and 2006 formed a period when China and the EU had a “peer approach to issues” in 
terms of the pattern of the relationship. In this period, political dialogues, sector dialogues 
and cooperation projects are the main components of the China-EU relationship. She 
observed that many EU documents towards China were issued in this period. She further 
pointed out this pattern of dialogue has proved to be effective since the three elements, 
namely the sector discourse, the political dialogues and the cooperation projects, are 
interrelated. While sector discourse, playing the role of a “conveyor belt”, enhances the 
overall political dialogues and facilitates the progression of cooperation projects, the overall 
political dialogues and cooperation projects are mutually enhancing as well. The policies and 
guidelines were implemented through dialogues and embodied as projects (Caira, 2010: 
265). 
Some others, being critical about the EU’s normative approach to China, argue that the 
problems in China-EU relations have resulted from the complications and incompetency of 
the EU itself and therefore he EU should address its internal problems first instead of trying 
to convert other countries to European norms and values (Balducci, 2010; Mattlin, 2012; 
Holslag, 2010). Balducci, for example, considers that the EU and its member states have 
different norms which lead to a disunited and disintegrated norm of the EU. This incoherence 
in normative contents can be a “normative trap” in bilateral relations (Balducci, 2010).  
A common focus of the above arguments is the EU’s normative approach, and norms and 
values play essential roles in the ideology of the EU. The notion of NPE was raised by Ian 
Manners in 2002. He introduces this notion to explain Europe’s approach from another 
perspective other than the previous “Civilian Power Europe” and “Military Power Europe” 
(Manners, 2002). For him, “normative” means the “ability to shape conceptions of normal” 
(Manners, 2002: 240). He also pointed out that the basis of normative Europe includes the 
centrality of peace, the idea of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights (Manners, 2002: 242).  
Although these scholars have noticed the disjunction between a normative EU and a realist 
China, they do not fundamentally oppose the normative nature of the EU. Their emphasis is 
that the EU should reserve its normative nature to itself rather than regarding exporting it to 
China as the priority (Holslag, 2010: 2). What is more, while norms are the focus of these 
two approaches and both consider non-material facts such as the power of values and 
norms, the approaches mentioned above do not take constructivism as their theoretical 
framework. The first approach is, in fact, closer to a realist approach while the second 
reflects liberal ideas about the development of the EU.  
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Furthermore, although authors of the policy analysis approach noticed the influence of the 
different engagement styles of China and the EU in their mutual relations, how the 
engagement styles were shaped was not sufficiently researched. The intentions and values 
of the policymakers were neglected. This may be due to the language barriers between 
China and the EU since Chinese is the only official language while the EU countries can 
adopt English as a common language when necessary. Carrying out a discourse-based 
constructivist approach may contribute to the understanding of the underlying intentions of 
the policymakers of the two sides and promote mutual understanding between China and the 
EU. 
3.3 Research Design 
The research design of this thesis is to analyse the official discourse of China and the EU 
from 1994 to 2019 via constructivist discourse analysis. More specifically, corpus-driven 
content analysis (CCA) in combination with critical discourse analysis (CDA) are applied in 
the thesis as the methods for implementing constructivist discourse analysis.   
For the sake of consistency, the overall research method adopted in the thesis can be 
referred to as a corpus-driven content analysis. Each element of the methods involved, 
including corpus linguistics (CL), content analysis (CA), and critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
plays a role in this synthesised methodological approach. CL provides guidance in 
establishing and coding the discourse database, or corpora, and offers a top-down 
perspective of the discourse content in terms of the consistency of certain content and the 
changes in the topic priorities and some terms over the years. One thing to note is that 
although machine-reading forms a large part of corpus linguistic analysis and corpus-
linguistics tools such as Nvivo and Lancsbox are involved in the analysis of the discourse, it 
would be wrong to assume that this does not involve human effort as the design of queries 
(specific searches of discourse) is entirely up to the design of the researcher, and using the 
tools wisely to get meaningful results forms a separate task in the thesis. CA selects relevant 
discourse on certain themes and reads them in-depth with a comparative perspective so that 
the gist of China and the EU’s thoughts and goals can be understood. This part does not 
involve machine-reading and is done purely through human effort in selecting and 
categorising discourse on different topics and themes based on the themes and aspects that 
stand out in the top-down computer-assisted corpus linguistic analysis. CA also 
complements the top-down approach of the Corpus Linguistic analysis with a bottom-up 
approach, so the macro-perspective of the discourse with a longitudinal view (studying the 
discourse over time) is supplemented by human reading and analysis. CDA is used to 
support the CA as it takes the discourse’s contexts, authors and audiences into 
consideration when analysing the aims of the discourse and the underlying implications 




The thesis takes this approach for three reasons. Firstly, as the literature review on the 
existing methodologies on China-EU point out, currently there has not been a systematic 
study on the content and the role of the official discourse between China and the EU. 
Existing discourse analysis on China-EU relations is mostly based on sporadic pieces of 
discourse instead of organised and selected discourse made into corpora which is machine-
readable. The thesis explores the hypothesis that discourse plays a constructive role in 
shaping and influencing China-EU relations as well as reflecting the challenges in China-EU 
relations based on the relations between language and social realities as discussed in the 
theoretical assumptions in the last chapter. The thesis aims to explore whether and to what 
degree the hypothesis stands. Second, the author’s background in translation studies 
(Chinese-English translation) and IR makes an interdisciplinary approach as well as the 
reading and comparison of the Chinese and English documents possible. Third, the field of 
study is seeing transformational changes caused by technological involvement in social 
science, especially the development of big data as artificial intelligence. The author believes 
that combining computer-assisted methods in discourse analysis offers a chance to reveal 
facts and trends in the discourse, which are otherwise impossible if based solely on human 
reading. However, the difficult point of this interdisciplinary effort would be how corpus 
linguistic analysis tools and methods should be applied in analysing a specific case in IR, 
namely what themes and aspects are worth exploring and what techniques should be 
applied in investigating the potential areas. The thesis explores the possible ways to conduct 
computer-assisted discourse analysis through applying it to China-EU relations and extends 
the findings through trial and error so that further research taking this approach can learn 
from the experience and the lessons of this thesis.  
3.3.1 Ontology and Epistemology 
Ontologically, Constructivism brings intersubjectivity into the international structure. Wendt 
argues that "Anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992: 395). By this, he argues that 
anarchy is not an intrinsic nature of states which objectively exist but the result of 
intersubjective agreements among them. In this way, intersubjectivity becomes a feature of 
the international structure (Kubálková, 2001a).  
The ontological stance taken by the thesis is in line with constructivism which takes the 
position that human cognition and interpretation play a large part in constructing social 
realities. Constructivists hold that the social world is under continuous creation and revision 
by social actors. Knowledge and the “truth” are always presented by certain social actors in 
specific ways and subject to different interpretations and are, therefore, indeterminate and 
relative (Bryman, 2012: 33).  
The thesis does not, however, reject the idea that materials play an important role in the 
human world. Unlike radical materialism or constructivism which either argues matter over 
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mind or mind over matter, this thesis takes the interactions between mind and matter as 
being continuous: realities are shaped in the manner of a pendulum swinging between 
human constructions and materials. Discourse, as a result, is both a constructive force of 
social realities but also a reflection as well as a form of social interaction. The thesis also 
takes the position that there are constant interactions between national societies and the 
international economic system which impact on the relationships between entities in the 
world.  
Interpretivism is the epistemological basis of this thesis. A hermeneutical perspective, one 
that focuses on interpreting human actions (Bryman, 2012: 28) which in this case refers to 
the values, ideologies and ideas behind discourse, is taken to explain and understand the 
role of official discourse in explaining the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations. As 
economic factors will also be considered, interpretations of the economic figures will be 
incorporated in places of need. The perspective this thesis takes will also be an ahistorical 
and systemic one which considers the changes in discourse over time and the economic 
factors within the context of the international political-economic system.  
This epistemological approach is taken due to two reasons. First, interpretivism is in line with 
constructivism in terms of regarding that the world’s truths are not “fixed” but subject to 
different interpretations and the influence of constructivist forces. Second, the existing 
approach in China-EU relations has not integrated the development of official discourse as 
part of the changes in China-EU relations. It has neither pointed to the constructivist forces 
of the discourse on China-EU relations nor taken the differences and the changes in the 
discourse as a way to study the issues in China-EU relations. The interpretivist approach 
offers a chance to consider fully the role of official discourse in China-EU relations, in terms 
of being both a constructing force and a reflector of the relations. Finally, the changes in the 
positions of China and the EU in the international economic system offers the perspective to 
view the changes in the discourse in a broader context, or within a structure. In this way, it 
avoids the trap of viewing only the internal intentions of China and the EU without 
considering the wider context between the two.  
3.3.2 Scope of Time  
There are three reasons behind the selection of the time range of this thesis which is set 
between 1994 and 2019. First, it was during this period that major challenges appeared in 
China-EU relations, including the EU’s arms embargo on China and the trade disputes took 
place. Second, this is the period when the greatest amount of official discourse and 
documents from China and the EU were published. For example, in 1994, the EU issued its 
first policy paper on Asia (Commission of the European Communities, 1994) in which China 




as well as policy reviews on China on a more regular basis7. The increasing volume of the 
official discourse between China and the EU makes it now possible, resource-wise, to take 
official discourse as the primary source and establish corpora specialised in China-EU 
relations. Third, this is the period when the speed and scale of China and the EU’s 
development boosted the prospects of cooperation between China and the EU. China’s 
economy started to surge, and its international status began to rise as a result of its 
economic and social reforms. The EU, founded in 1992 through the Maastricht Treaty, has 
expanded since then from an economic organisation to an intergovernmental community 
which issues broader policies regarding the economy, politics, security and other social 
aspects concerning China (Snyder, 2009). The period starting from the 1990s has seen the 
EU with more capabilities and integrated external actions (Snyder, 2009). The year 2019 has 
been chosen as this is the year this research finished and the year 2019 has also seen some 
important speeches containing some evolution in terms of the discourse between China and 
the EU.  
The longitudinal perspective in this thesis is supported by both corpus-driven discourse 
analysis and content analysis. For example, when searching for the frequency of a word or a 
term, the trend in the frequency over the searched period will be shown. This is mostly 
applied in Chapter 4 when topic coverage over the 25 years is searched, and trends are 
analysed when relevant. For the content analysis, discourse is chosen from discourse 
blocks, or themes arising from the corpus. In these cases, the discourse is more focused on 
recent years partly due to greater amount of discourse available especially on the Chinese 
side in recent years and familiarisation of more recent years’ discourse and trends for both 
China and the EU.  
In Chapter 6, when discussing China and the EU’s vision for the world, longitudinal changes 
in the terms “multipolarity” and “multilateralism” have been considered. This is to show the 
changes in the application of these terms, and the chapter found that China has been 
applying “multilateralism” more in recent years.  
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 8, discussing identity, perception and normative differences, the 
analyses focus more on recent discourse when content analysis is applied. This is primarily 
because, in these aspects, the focus is on more recent mismatches between China and the 
EU, which connect to current, up-to-date challenges and therefore there is more potential for 
policy implications. This is also since the analyse is corpus-driven and combines content 
analysis. Therefore, content analysis, which is more relevant to the scope and focus of the 
chapters, is carried out. In addition, the selection of the discourse for content analysis, for 
example, in discussing China and the EU’s identities and their perceptions of the other, are 
selected to represent the more distinctive mismatches between the two and the focus is on 
 
7 On average every one or two years. 
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categorising the aspects of their identities, especially in terms of China’s identity, when the 
official discourse describes identities. In other words, the selection of the discourse for 
content analysis is based on aspects which arise from across the corpus regarding themes 
of each chapter based on human reading as well as computer-assisted searches. Thus, not 
all chapters are able to include the full range of longitudinal analysis. 
Chapter 8 again includes more longitudinal analysis of China and the EU’s normative 
engagement styles to each other over the researched period, applying primarily content 
analysis focusing on the terms framing China-EU relations as well as their approaches to 
each other.   
3.3.3 Methodological Framework: Constructivist Corpus-
driven Analysis 
Figure 3-1 Correlations between Chapter Aspects and Discourse Levels 
(Source: own work) 
  
Figure 3-1 shows the methodological framework applied in the analysis of this thesis. 
Constructivist discourse analysis, more specifically, corpus-driven content analysis with a 
comparative perspective are the main methods of analysis of the data, although elements of 
critical discourse analysis are also incorporated. Comparisons exist between China’s official 
discourse on the EU and the EU’s official discourse on China and between China’s EU 
discourse and China’s domestic discourse. The themes arising from the open coding, 
theoretical assumptions and literature review form the subjects of the chapters: the 
mismatched priorities, visions, identities and goals, norms and strategic approaches between 




and the EU, provide additional information and an alternative approach in understanding the 
challenges in China-EU relations. 
The methodological framework developed through the thesis shown in Figure 3-1 follows two 
logic orders: linguistic-wise, it focuses on the lexical levels of the corpora first, then the 
context of the words used, or collocations of words and phrases, and then goes on to 
analyse contents and context around certain concepts and themes, and after that, tones and 
sentence patterns of the texts. Content-wise, it starts with discussing the potential 
convergence and divergence of China and the EU indicated by their official discourse and 
goes on to their potential differences when talking about the same terms and concepts which 
suggests their different goals for development, and then their identity and expectations for 
the self and the other, and finally their normative patterns in their interactions. Overall, the 
analyses follow from specifics to abstracts, and from searches with a low level of context to 
searches with a high level of context.  
3.4 Research Methods 
The rationale behind the data analysis is informed by grounded theory which proposes open 
coding of empirical data and conceptualisation or theorisation based on the themes that 
arose from the data as well as the findings based on the relations between themes 
(Charmaz, 2006a, 2008). As the analysis applies corpus-driven discourse analysis, 
qualitative analysis will be the main approach with quantitative analysis providing relevant 
data on the features of the corpora such as word frequency and collocation.  
3.4.1 Grounded Theory  
Published in 1967 by Glaser and Strauss (Glaser & Strauss, 2009), grounded theory (GT) 
starts from the analysis of data and arrives at the construction of theories (Faggiolani, 2011).  
It was designed to generate theories empirically derived from real-world circumstances to 
avoid theories which are abstract and impossible to empirically test in real life. GT aims to 
contribute both to theoretical development but also to indicate how practitioners can apply 
the theory derived to improve social practices (Oktay, 2012). 
Over time, three branches of GT have been formed: the “classic grounded theory” initiated 
by Glaser with the aim of establishing systematic positivist methodology; Strauss’s 
“programmed grounded theory” which focuses on the procedures of the qualitative analysis 
methods; and Charmaz’s constructivist GT (Charmaz, 2011).   
Among the different branches of GT, this thesis’ approach is informed by the approach of 
Charmaz which takes a constructivist perspective of GT which recognises the interactions 
among the author’s interpretations, the theories preoccupying readers’ minds and the 
empirical data itself (Charmaz, 2006a, 2008). Unlike Glaser’s positivist standpoint in GT, 
Charmaz promotes a constructivist approach (Glaser, 1978). She contends that researchers’ 
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interpretations have a constructive force (Charmaz, 2006a, 2008; Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). 
Similarly, Strauss and Corbin claim that they are taking a relativist epistemological stance 
which rejects the position that truth is enacted (Mills, Bonner & Francis, 2006). This thesis 
takes this approach as it contends that the interpretation of the discursive data can never be 
completely enacted from the author’s backgrounds and values which will inevitably influence 
the analysis of the data, the findings as well as the ways concepts are constructed and 
related to each other.  
One possible process of GT is to read and re-read a textual database, for example, a 
corpus, discover and label categories, concepts and properties as well as their 
interrelationships. The ability to discover the themes, or categories, as well as their 
relationship, represents the “theoretical sensitivity” GT values. One way to carry out the data 
analysis with a GT approach is to follow the steps open coding, axial coding and selective 
coding (Glaser & Strauss, 2009). For Charmaz, the procedure is referred to as initial coding, 
focused coding, axial coding, and theoretical coding. Coding means to categorise the data 
with labels so that data are sorted and selected. It is the link between gathering data and 
developing the theory emerging from the codes. Initial coding should stay open and stay 
close to the data with comparative methods involved. Focused coding is based on the 
frequent codes emerging from initial coding, and it involves selecting the most relevant and 
significant categories of data so that further coding can be done to these categories. Axial 
coding links categories to subcategories, pins down the properties and reorganises the data 
based on initial coding for more coherence and further analysis. The last step is theoretical 
coding which aims to relate the codes to each other so that they can be integrated into a 
theory (Charmaz, 2006b).  
The data gathering and analysis for this research are inspired by Charmaz’s approach to GT. 
However, the opening coding of this research is not done in a word-by-word and line-by-line 
manner. This step, in this research, is done through human reading of the discourse in the 
document in combination with literature reading on China-EU relations. In other words, the 
open coding and focused coding are merged in this research. Therefore, the data collection 
and analysis in this research are inspired by GT but use a customised approach which 
integrates this author’s understanding of the themes regarding the challenges in China-EU 
relations. 
3.4.2 Corpus-driven Discourse Analysis 
Corpus linguistics analysis (CLA) assists the qualitative analysis by providing quantitative 
data for large amounts of texts. CLA views the discourse, first and foremost, from a top-down 
perspective, drawing out the features of word frequency, collocations, and colligations.  
CL started to develop on a large scale in the 1980s. In 1967, the Brown Corpus was 




corpus, there was no machine-readable corpus, and CL was referred to as Quantitative 
Linguistics, Statistical Linguistics which takes language use as Chance, or Stylostatistics, 
which takes language as Choice. Since the establishment of the Brown Corpus, CL entered 
the age of computer-assisted analysis and was developed with new technologies and 
perspectives (Gui, 2014).  
CL has revolutionised the study and research of language-related areas. Similar to discourse 
analysis, there has always been discussion on whether CL is a theory, as it contributes 
specifically to other applications, or a method to be applied in different areas (Tognini-
Bonelli, 2001). Tognini Bonelli put forward the concept of “pre-application methodology” 
(Tognini-Bonelli, 2001), which sets the foundation for further efforts on the theoretical 
implications of corpus linguist research (Gatto, 2014). Nowadays, CL is often seen as not 
only a methodology but also an approach, or a discipline, with its own theoretical 
assumptions (Mahlberg, 2005).  
CL, in this sense, focuses more on the quantitative features of the language. It could be said 
that corpus linguistic essentially focuses on what is very likely to happen in language, while 
Generative Linguistics focuses on what is grammatically possible. Noam Chomsky is against 
structuralist and behaviourist approaches in linguistics. He regards the core of linguistic 
research to be “linguistic competence” instead of “linguistic performance”. His generative 
linguistic approach had a large influence in North America as well as Europe and has, 
therefore, led to stagnation in the development of CL. CL, together with Pragmatics, Social 
and Historical linguistics, follows the functionalist approach. Functionalist thinking focuses on 
the question “What is probable?” instead of the core question of generative linguistics “What 
is possible?” (Gui, 2014).  
The notion of what constitutes a corpus also depends on the form and purpose of the 
corpus. Gatto defines CL as an “exploration of language based on a set of authentic texts in 
a machine-readable format” (Gatto, 2014: 7). Corpus, according to him, is  
usually of a size which would not allow manual investigation but 
requires the use of specific tools to perform a quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of the data, through such tasks as producing 
frequency lists of all the words appearing in the corpus, providing 
data concerning recurring patterns, and computing statistics about 
relative frequency by comparing different data sets (Gatto, 2014: 
7).  
This definition describes the process of corpus linguistic analysis and defines a corpus 
through what could, or should, be done to it. Sinclair, on the other hand, offers a broader 
version of the definition of the corpus. For him, a corpus is “a collection of naturally-occurring 
language chosen to characterize a state or variety of a language” (Sinclair, 1991: 171).  
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With the development of CL in recent years, a consensus has been reached that the core 
features of a corpus should be the authenticity of language and a machine-readable format 
(Gatto, 2014). Another criterion for making a corpus is representativeness, or as Biber puts 
it: 
A corpus is not simply a collection of texts. Rather, a corpus seeks 
to represent a language or some part of a language. (...) The 
representativeness of the corpus, in turn, determines the kinds of 
research questions that can be addressed and the generalizability 
of the results of the research (Biber, Conrad & Reppen, 1998: 
246).  
The value of a corpus, therefore, depends on elements including the genre of texts, the 
number and length of the texts, the selection of samples from within the texts and the length 
of the selected samples (Biber, Conrad & Reppen, 1998: 11). 
Strictly speaking, the main discourse analysis method of this thesis should be called a 
corpus-driven discourse analysis (CDCA) instead of corpus linguistic analysis as the 
technique incorporates other discourse analysis techniques and that of CLA partially informs 
the procedure. CLA provides the guidance for establishing the specialised corpora and 
exploring the corpora’s potential in providing quantitative data and the changes in the data 
over the years.  This method of content analysis is sometimes referred to as computer 
assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) (Schreier, 2012: 241).  
3.4.2.1 Word Frequency 
The steps of corpus analysis, although they can have various forms, generally include Word 
Frequency, sometimes referred to as wordlists,8 collocation and colligation,9 and semantic 
associations. Word Frequency and Collocations will be the two aspects this thesis applies. 
Colligation and semantic associations have not been largely applied10 as the thesis focuses 
on the meaning and implications instead of the grammatical patterns of the discourse and 
their role in forming ideas and values.   
Word Frequency is applied in the thesis in two ways. The first way is that lists of all the 
words that occur in a corpus with the frequency of each word shown are generated. For 
example, the first one hundred words from the corpus of the EU’s policy papers on China 
from 1994 to 2019 would be a wordlist, ordered according to the raw frequency of the words. 
This is applied in Chapter 4 in the form of the Top Frequency Meaningful Words. This is 
named so because words without a solid meaning or which are not helpful to understand the 
 
8 For consistency, Word Frequency will be used as it is closest to the methods used in the analysis. 
9 Colligation is another aspect CL looks at. Colligation is “the occurrence of a grammatical class or structural pattern with 
another one, or with a word or phrase” (Sterkenburg, 2003: 173). Colligational relations require more human reading and 
investigation of the concordance lines as it is as obvious as the word frequency or concordance. 
10 Although Chapter 7 on the normative shift in China-EU relations does involve the study of sentence patterns with 




themes in China-EU relations, such as prepositions, pronouns and articles, will be removed 
manually from the list. The second method does not involve the simple generation of top 
frequency words but involves designing multiple words to be searched at the same time—the 
searches containing multiple terms or criteria to be searched for a query. For example, a 
search for every word close to the meaning “economy” will be designed as searching for 
“economy OR economic OR trade OR business OR commercial OR financial OR tax OR 
tariff OR investment OR deficit OR budget OR investment OR finance”. The design of the 
query is decided based on consideration of both coverage of the words as well as avoiding 
overlap although text searches will never generate a precise coverage of a topic due to the 
nature of the searches. A list of the queries designed in the thesis is attached in the 
Appendix.  
3.4.2.2 Collocations and Concordance 
In this thesis, collocations refer to the “habitual co-occurrence of individual lexical items” 
(Crystal, 2008: 86). A collocation is “a combination of two or more words which occur 
together or in close proximity to each other in both written and spoken discourse” (Walker, 
2011: 292). More specifically, a word’s collocates are words that frequently appear within five 
words, left or right, to its side (Wynne, 2008).  
A vertical list of the collocations of a word is called a concordance. Concordance shows “the 
tendency of words to co-occur” (Wynne, 2008: 26). Concordance makes a difference 
between reading a text and reading a corpus as the text is read horizontally while the corpus, 
with the assistance of machine reading, is to be read vertically, scanning for the reoccurring 
patterns near the node.11 The meaning of concordance is that it reveals features of texts 
which are otherwise invisible, or only intuitively sensed but not evidenced empirically 
(Wynne, 2008). 
Collocations offer a way to see how keywords are connected to other words. In this way, the 
cluster of themes, or what themes usually appear together, can be found out. Both 
collocations and concordance in this thesis are carried out with the assistance of Lancsbox.  
Collocations are presented through the tool GraphColl. The purpose is to see how the 
keywords in China and the EU’s discourse on each other are connected to other words, or 
what the context is in which they have appeared.  
As each chapter applies the techniques of CL with different emphasis, although Word 
Frequency and Collocations are the main methods used, the designs of Word Frequency 
searches, collocations as well as other text searches will be described in detail in the 
chapters.  
 
11 A node is a word, phrase, or any defined features, acting as a root, a tag, or a starting point, to search for or categorise 
related features. In the case of a concordance, a node is usually a word or phrase 
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3.4.3 Content Analysis 
Content analysis is a quantitative analysis of message characteristics (Neuendorf, 2017). It 
“entails a systematic reading of texts and symbolic matter not necessarily from an author’s or 
user’s perspective” (Krippendorff, 2012: 3). Neuendorf provides a version of the definition 
with fuller details. He states that: 
Content analysis is a summarizing, quantitative analysis of 
messages that relies on the scientific method (including attention to 
objectivity-intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, 
generalizability, replicability, and hypothesis testing) and is not 
limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the 
context in which the messages are created or presented 
(Neuendorf, 2017: 10).  
Two main types of content analysis are human coding, which is based on codebooks and 
computer coding. This thesis integrates human coding with computer coding through the 
assistance of Nvivo 12 and Lancsbox. Content analysis provides a bottom-up approach for 
discourse analysis in terms of organising, categorising, thematising and comparing the 
official discourse between China and the EU. The bottom-up approach here refers to the 
process that discourse on a theme, for example, the discourse on “multilateralism” of China 
and the EU are searched for within and beyond the established corpora in order to get the 
most relevant pieces of discourse on a certain theme for the sake of comparing the contents 
attached to that theme from China and the EU respectively. Meanwhile, the top-down 
discourse analysis is mainly done through applying the CL tools, Nvivo and Lancsbox, to 
offer “bird views” of the word frequencies, topic priorities and concordances of the certain 
themes. Content analysis is applied throughout the thesis but is used most in Chapters 5 to 8 
as Chapter 4 applies primarily Corpus-based analysis, especially Word Frequency, to 
compare the topic priorities of China and the EU.  
3.4.4 Critical Discourse Analysis 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) seeks to reveal the unequal relations and prejudices 
behind the language (Maingueneau & O’regan, 2006: 229). It is also a combination of 
qualitative analysis based on human understanding and quantitative data analysis. The 
emphasis and aim of CDA are to discover how ideologies are formulated, enhanced and 
reproduced through discourse and what kind of social relations the discourse entails 
(Paltridge, 2012: 194).  
There are two approaches within CDA: one is Fairclough’s analytical framework which 
investigates text from three levels: the textual level, the discursive practice, and the social 
practice (Titscher et al., 2000). The other is the discourse-historical method as taken by Ruth 
Wodak (Titscher et al., 2000). The approach taken in this thesis is closer to Fairclough’s 




According to Fairclough, there are two types of textual analysis which are complementary to 
each other: linguistic analysis and intertextual analysis. The linguistic analysis covers the 
analysis on the lexical, semantic, phonological, and grammatical and other linguistic features 
of the text, as well as the “textual organization above the sentence”, such as cohesion and 
structure. The intertextual analysis focuses on how and why orders of discourse such as 
genres, discourses, narratives are selected by text producers and interpreters in certain 
social contexts (Fairclough, 1995: 188).  
CDA is applied in this thesis to take into account the historical contexts, the audience and 
the publishers and translators of the official discourse. More specifically, this thesis will 
compare China and the EU’s foreign publicity discourse with their domestic discourse to find 
out how the differences in audience influence the content of the discourse. There is no fixed 
procedure in CDA. However, there are some traditional ways to carry out the analysis. Table 
3-2 is adapted from the steps of CDA summarised by Brian Paltridge:  
Table 3-2 Steps of Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
(Paltridge, 2012: 194) 
As Table 3-2 shows, the first step of analysis is to view the historical context in which the 
discourse was generated. This step aims to answer the questions including when, where, 
under what occasion, and by whom the discourse was produced, publicised, or spread. In 
addition, attention should be paid to what has been emphasised or foregrounded and what 
has been downplayed. The second step is to seek out the lexical features, or the use of the 
words in the texts including the connotations of the words, the emotions and attitudes of the 
words and, in this thesis, the collocations and concordances. The last step is to observe and 
spot the sentence features including topics, authority and power behind the relations as well 
as other features. The discourse analysis in this thesis has drawn upon these steps. In the 
analysis, CDA is mainly applied in analysing the differences in contents between corpora 
with different groups of target audiences. For example, the application of the terms 
“multipolarity” in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus China Domestic will be compared in 
Chapter 5.  
 
96   
3.4.5 Processing the Data 
As the synthesised theoretical assumptions underpin the analysis, the data analysis consists 
of a combination of quantitative and qualitative, deductive and inductive approaches.   
There are four stages involved in processing the data.  
The first stage involves document collection and corpora establishment. Documents in both 
the Chinese language and their official English translations, if available, are included to the 
corpora on China. For the EU, the English versions of the issued documents are used.  
The second stage, open coding, has an important role in deciding which themes the 
chapters focus on for further, in-depth analysis. The aim of open coding and data collection, 
as suggested by the GT approach, is to discover categories or themes which occur 
repeatedly and are relevant to the topic or the research question (Scott, 2009). As several 
theories including ROC and critical discourse analysis have exerted influence on the 
category spotting in the thesis, the open coding stage of this research was affected through 
a comparative reading of China and the EU’s official discourse until themes and categories 
emerged naturally. The topics and debates in the existing literature and core aspects of the 
relevant theories have also assisted in spotting the core categories in China-EU discourse. 
Through the comparative reading, categories or topics which frequently occur in the 
discourse of both sides arise. The emergence of core categories was also derived from the 
topics and debates in the existing literature. This forms the second step of data analysis.  
In the third stage, selective coding and data organising were done based on the categories 
that emerged. This means a constant review of the literature to determine what themes in 
China-EU relations have been prominently discussed. A theme was chosen if it closely 
connects to the existing debates in China-EU studies and if the discursive data can 
contribute to puzzling out the debated areas.  
The last stage focuses on conducting the corpus-driven content analysis of the discourse 
data. More specifically, the analysis compares the official discourse of China and the EU in 
the key themes arising from the open coding and literature review and then explores the 
differences in the understanding and approaches of China and the EU in these aspects and 
discusses how these differences relate to the challenges in China-EU relations. Techniques 
of CL, including Word Frequency and Collocations, will be the main methods applied in the 
analysis of the chapters. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) will be applied when it comes to 
analysing the historical contexts, the target audience, authors and translation-related issues 
as well as other backgrounds and information of the selected discourse which could 




3.5 Corpora Establishment and Application 
Specialised corpora focusing on China-EU relations are established as the database for this 
thesis. Although the larger a corpus is, the higher the chance that it will output data with 
more accurate probability, the length and the numbers of the texts in a corpus do not have to 
exceed a strict number. On this, Bower and Pearson argue that “well-designed corpora that 
are anywhere from about ten thousand to several hundreds of thousands of words in size 
have proved to be exceptionally useful in LSP (Language for Specific Purpose) studies” 
(Bowker & Pearson, 2002: 205).  
3.5.1 Material Selection 
The discourse selection for this thesis aims to establish a specialised corpus on the key 
official discourse on China-EU relations from 1994 to 2019. The materials applied in this 
thesis include two major categories: Chinese official documents and the English versions of 
the EU’s official documents.   
Discourse materials selected in this thesis are based on accessible and available on-line 
resources. More specifically, most of the EU policy papers on China are issued by the 
European Commission (EC)12 and are available from EUR-Lex which is an official website of 
EU law and other EU public documents are available in the EU’s twenty-four official 
languages.13 The EU’s internal official discourse on the EU’s foreign policies in general, 
which are also included in the corpora, are mostly available from the European Union and its 
institutions’ websites including Europa.eu14 and EU Publications.15 The Chinese official 
documents are available from the website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Relations, the 
website of the Mission of the People’s Republic of China16 to the European Union17 and 
other state media such as Chinanews, CPC News and Xinhua News. The specific 
organisation of the discourse will be introduced in Section 3.3.3.  
The corpora established in this thesis are not as large as some web-based corpora, but it is 
focused and only contains relevant materials. This thesis applies a series of the criteria to 
select the relevant documents for making the corpus or the discursive database: 
First, the document should be about the long-term, overarching policies and strategies 
between China and the EU instead of a specific aspect, for example, trade and the economy 
only. The document should be a key document with the potential to exert long-term, strategic 
 
12 The former name (until 1993): Commission of the European Communities. 
13 Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html. Last accessed on 11/12/2020  
14 A list for the EU official documents database is available at https://europa.eu/european-union/documents-
publications/official-documents_en. 
15 Available at https://publications.europa.eu/en/home.  Last accessed on 11/12/2020 
16 Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn. Last accessed on 11/12/2020 
17 Available at http://www.chinamission.be/chn/. Last accessed on 11/12/2020 
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impact on China-EU relations. A key document should be either policy papers, or keynote 
speeches made by high-level officials (ambassadors, ministers and above) on or delivered at 
important events or meetings. By specifying “long term” and “strategic”, I am excluding 
documents with a narrow focus not relevant to policymaking, although I am aware these 
criteria involve my limited personal understanding. 
Second, the document should be either issued by official institutions of the Chinese 
government or the EU or delivered by Chinese or EU high-level officials.  
Last, the translations, where accessible, should be carried out by qualified, authorised 
agencies or governmental bodies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China International 
Publishing Group (CIPG) and the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the CPC Central 
Committee. The way to verify this is to check the source of the translations. Valid official 
translations are extracted from official institutions’ websites or top state media such as 
Xinhua News, China-daily or CPC China as these websites do not publish unauthorised 
translations. Translations done by individuals or unofficial channels are not applied in this 
thesis. When translations are not available or accessible, or a different translation would be 
more accurate, the author provides her own translations.  
These criteria have been designed and applied for the sake of narrowing down the numbers 
and types of documents so that the most relevant and overarching ones can be included. 
This makes a combination of human-reading and computer-assisted, comparative analysis 
feasible.  
3.5.2 Translations and Versions 
The translated English versions of the Chinese documents released by relevant Chinese 
authorities are applied in some content analysis with the original Chinese texts attached 
when these translated versions are accessible and regarded as identical to the original 
version. 
The official English versions of these Chinese documents are sometimes also available on 
these websites or on the websites from the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau 
(CCTB), or China International Publishing Group (CIPG). Occasionally the officially 
translated versions are only available on the website English Tips, a section page of the 
China Daily or other websites with the audience being mostly English learners. In these 
cases, the authority or affiliations of the translators are not certain although most likely they 
were done by the interpreters of the Foreign Ministry, CIPG or CCTB. For all these cases my 
own translations are offered whenever I regard the translations available as not precise. 
However, as this research is based on machine-readable texts, the goal is to develop, 
potentially, a framework which paves the way for future methodological developments 
incorporating techniques of CL, machine-based text retrieval and big data analysis; my own 




electronic versions are available online as human translations are not practical for use with 
larger corpora. Translations do play an important role, however, in critical discourse analysis, 
as meaning can be lost in translation. Therefore, I will provide my own translations when it 
makes a difference for the sake of making the parts reliable where critical discourse analysis 
techniques are applied in this thesis. If not noted otherwise, the translations of the Chinese 
quotations are translated by the official source.  
The EU normally offers its documents in all its twenty-four official languages. As comparing 
each version of the EU’s documents in different languages is not relevant to the focus of the 
thesis, only the English versions will be applied. The EU’s official documents applied in this 
thesis include the EU’s China policy papers, the EU’s Global Strategy papers, the EU’s 
officials’ keynote speeches and other EU proposals on China issued between 1994 and 
2019.  
3.5.3 Corpora Structure 
The discourse is organised into written, machine-readable specialised corpora and imported 
into Nvivo (version 12) and Lancsbox for data analysis.  
Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP contain the key policy papers and keynote 
speeches of China and the EU on each other between 1994 and 2019 as well as other key 
documents including review ports, action plans, etc. Here PP stands for Policy Papers while 
SP stands for keynote speeches. PPSP is used for the sake of identifying and addressing 
the corpora in a simple manner.  
Corpus EU PPSP contains the EU’s six policy papers towards China, the EU’s policy 
implementation paper and mid-term policy reviews on China, the EU’s country strategy 
towards China, the keynote speeches made by the president of the European Council, the 
European Commission as well as High Representatives18 of the EU for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. Corpus China PPSP includes China’s three policy papers on the EU issued 
in 2003, 2014 and 2018, the keynote speeches made at a presidential, prime ministerial, 
ministerial or ambassadorial level and also, the presidential and prime ministerial speeches 
during summits and state visits to Europe.  
Although documents in the corpus EU PPSP and corpus EU internal consist of different 
types of discourse issued by multiple institutions of the EU and for different purposes, they 
are treated overall as parts of the corpus, and their individual purposes are not discussed in-
depth. In cases where some contents in a document are helpful for illustrating the features or 
themes shown based on the corpora, their issuers, audience, and purpose will be analysed. 
However, it is necessary to discuss the different issuers and purpose of the documents of 
 
18 The chief co-ordinator and representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
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the EU corpora due to the complexity of the institutions as well as their functions for the EU. 
Corpus EU PPSP contains several document types, including:  
• Commission working document  
• Communication from the commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament 
• Commission policy paper national indicative programme  
• Remarks of the president of the EC  
• Remarks of HR/VP 
• Report on EU-China Relations Committee on Foreign Affairs  
• Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council  
• The opinion of the Committee  
 
Corpus EU PPSP contains documents about the EU’s policies, plans, relationship reviews as 
well as reports on China and EU-China relations. Most of the documents in corpus EU PPSP 
were issued by the European Commission. They were guiding policy papers and were 
issued for communicating with the European Council and the European Parliament, for 
example, the policy paper “EU – China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities” issued in 
2006 (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b). These policy papers, although not 
directly issued for the Chinese audience, contain guiding, or trendsetting overarching policies 
of the EU to China for the next few years. Working documents are sometimes issued to 
accompany the implementation of these policies defined in the major policy papers. Although 
working documents are not as fundamental as the policy papers, their contents are relevant, 
and they expand the corpus.  
Some papers regarding the implementation of external relations policies are issued by the 
Common Security and Defence Policy Committee on Foreign Affairs. These are included as 
these discuss China-EU relations on the level of the EU’s external policies with strategies 
stated and the EU’s approaches to other regions and the world as the context.  
Others are speeches of the President of the European Council, President of the European 
Commission, or High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(HR/VP). The speeches are less formal, in most cases, but contain more personal 
interpretations of the officials on the EU’s approaches to China.  
There are also a few documents (for example, “Belt and Road Forum- EU Common 
Messages 2017”) in which the topic is specific, but it contains key policy or relevant guiding 
information on the EU’s attitudes to China. In these cases, they will be included, but they 
only happen in exceptional cases.   
Although documents are issued from different institutions, the criteria for document selection 
for the corpora are that they are key EU documents or keynote speeches towards China with 
a comprehensive focus instead of specific topics. The choices of documents are made with a 




comprehensive, guiding papers as well as the need for an appropriate corpora size to 
guarantee the reliability of the corpus-driven data output.  
Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP are designed and applied as the core corpora of 
this thesis based on two considerations. First, one may already notice in Table Apx 3 
(Appendix) that China so far has only two policy papers on the EU, and the numbers of 
documents are therefore not balanced. This lack of policy papers on the Chinese side is 
complemented by the speeches of high-ranking leaders in China. The number of documents 
and the overall text length of the corpora is beneficial to accurate, meaningful data output. 
Second, in China, the leaders’ speeches, especially those of the Secretary-General, the 
Premier and Ministers, are, in some ways, as important as policy papers. Meanwhile, official 
speeches made by the EU’s top-level officials such as the speeches of the President of the 
EU Commission, the President of the EU Council, and the High Representative for Foreign 
and Security Policy are also essential for understanding the EU’s approaches on China.   
Corpus China Domestic includes China’s Five-Year Plans, Reports on the Government’s 
Work on National Congress, and China’s official white papers on its foreign policies and its 
developmental path. Corpus EU Internal includes the EU’s Global Strategies as its internal 
official discourse on its external policies to the rest of the world. Table Apx 5 and Table Apx 
7 (Appendix) are the lists of the documents contained in these two corpora. The documents 
are selected based on their level of importance and relevance to the chapters in this thesis.  
It is necessary to mention that the document selection process for Corpus China PPSP and 
Corpus EU PPSP is different from that of Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Internal. 
The documents in the Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Internal are collected through 
searching and filtering of documents relevant to the themes which have arisen from the 
texts: identity, developmental goals, strategies and approaches in foreign relations. This is 
because Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP contain definite numbers of policy 
papers and keynote speeches as the number of China and the EU’s issued policy papers 
and high-level discourse each makes about the other is large but humanly countable. 
However, the amount of China and the EU’s domestic discourse, even within the time span 
of 1994 to 2019, is humanly uncountable, or indefinite. Therefore, it is worth mentioning that 
the principle of Representativeness is applied here in the selection of documents for the 
domestic discourse. Only representative and relevant domestic discourse is included for the 
sake of making the analysis and comparison possible.   
The corpora are structured in this way in order to make possible comparisons on two levels: 
the first is to make possible the comparison between the EU’s values, policy priorities and 
strategies in its official discourse on China and China’s values, policy priorities and strategies 
in its official discourse on the EU; the second is to make possible the comparison between 
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China and the EU’s external action policies to each other and their domestic19 discourse on 
their visions for the future world and their own development. Overall, there is a balanced 
quantity of Chinese official documents and EU official documents, although the types of 
sources differ between China and the EU, to make comparisons possible and increase the 
reliability of the corpus.  
Through the empirical chapters, Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP are the core 
corpora applied. In Chapter 5, Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Internal are involved 
in analysing China and the EU’s self-perception.  
3.5.4 Software Selection 
The data are retrieved, organised, and coded through Nvivo (version 12) and Lancsbox. 
Nvivo is a qualitative analysis assistance tool which can store, organise, and code texts. It 
supports processing both Chinese and English texts. It includes the main corpus analysis 
tools such as a word frequency search, word lists, and shows the references in a narrow or 
broad context for the searched words or expressions.  
However, as a general qualitative data analysis tool, Nvivo does not specialise in processing 
corpora. It cannot tag the figures of speech of the corpora, nor does it come with any meta-
corpora, while these features are useful when discovering distinct language features of self-
designed corpora. Therefore, a specialised corpus linguist analysis tool, Lancsbox, is used to 
extend the data processing in this thesis.  
Lancsbox is a text analysis tool made by the research team of Lancaster University (Brezina, 
McEnery & Wattam, 2015). There are a few reasons behind the application of Lancsbox 
even though quite a few similar tools exist.20 The first reason is that Lancsbox is an open-
access tool for corpus linguistic analysis. Second, it is one of the few existing tools which can 
process both English and Chinese data. Third, Lancsbox includes some meta-corpora, 
including the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen (LOB)21 and corpus Chinese Mandarin, which is used 
as a source for corpora comparison to explore the distinct language features of the corpora 
designed in this thesis.  
 
 
19 For the EU, this refers to the EU’s global strategies and external actions policies. 
20 A list of available CL analysis tools can be viewed at https://corpus-analysis.com/. Last accessed on 11/12/2020.  
21 LOB is one of the first modern corpora designed and processed by computer. It contains one million running words 





Chapter 4 Shared Topics, Mismatched 
Priorities and Connotations 
This chapter aims to explore the convergence and divergence in China and the EU’s 
priorities and emphases in their shared topics through analysing the coverage of the topics 
representing key policy areas and their changes over the years as well as the topics’ 
collocations and concordance in China and the EU’s official discourse on each other. 
Methodologically, the chapter’s goal is to explore the effectiveness of involving wordlists, 
longitudinal word frequency searches, as well as collocations and concordance in examining 
the differences in priorities and emphasis between entities.  
The analysis of this chapter is based on the data derived from Corpus China PPSP and 
Corpus EU PPSP derived from the qualitative analysis tool Nvivo 12 and the text parsing and 
retrieving tool Lancsbox (version 2019). Word Frequency searches and Collocation searches 
are two main methods applied. Word Frequency was applied in two types of searches: first, 
the top frequency meaningful22 wordlist for Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP; 
second, the hot topics’ coverage in the two corpora. Collocations of the selected keywords 
representing the hot topics were conducted as this offers a way to look into the different 
emphases between China and the EU in terms of their shared topics.  
As the purpose of this chapter is to explore whether China’s priorities and emphases match 
those of the EU in the bilateral relationship as manifest in the official discourse on each 
other, keywords signifying the hot topics in contemporary China-EU relations need to be 
selected in order to undertake targeted topic coverage and connotation analysis. The 
selection criteria are primarily the main sectors of societies and relationships, including 
economy, politics, culture, and other major areas. More specifically, the criteria for a policy 
issue being regarded as a hot topic are that it should be: 
• Represented by the top fifty frequency for meaningful words in Corpus China PPSP 
and Corpus EU PPSP; or 
• The topics listed in the official introductory web-page China and the EU about the 
basic frameworks of China-EU relations; and 
• A frequent theme containing a significant amount of research in existing China-EU 
literature 
The criteria make sure that it is not only a topic that appears frequently in official documents 
but also a policy issue meaningful for research and debates. The last list serves as a final 
 
22 Here “meaningful” words refer to words which bear meaning helpful to understanding the associations of the 
keywords. This usually means most of the nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs but not the prepositions, articles, or 
pronouns unless they contribute to the purpose of analysis. In some cases, modal verbs such as “will” and “should” 
are included as they indicate normative discourse.    
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check of the hot topics to make sure they are among the officially recognised policy priorities 
as listed on China and the EU’s official websites.  
The topics are not exhaustive or complete but are narrowed down in such a way that the 
major parts are covered, and the topics are broad enough to cover one main policy area but 
specific enough to match with a policy area. The goal of topic selection is to guarantee a 
finite and reasonable number of the main policy areas in China-EU relations so that data 
retrieval and comparison of the coverage are feasible and major comparable policy areas 
are covered.  
One thing to note is that in cases when the same term may share different connotations as 
suggested in the existing literature, such as “human rights”, “sovereignty”, connotation 
instead of frequency comparison should be carried out since the difference in connotations 
will be more relevant and significant in these cases instead of pure coverage.  
In terms of the choice of tools, Word Frequency searches were done through Nvivo as Nvivo 
offers a tool to search for synonyms and same rooted words as well as the options to use 
wildcards in queries. Table Apx 10 and Table Apx 11  in the Appendix present the designs of 
the queries. Word Frequency searches with a part of speech (POS) attached to them, or 
“lemma” as defined in the searching tool, are done through Lancsbox as Lancsbox can tag 
words with POS and output the wordlist of certain types of words such as verbs, nouns, NPs 
(Noun Phrases) and VPs (Verb Phrases). Lancsbox was used to generate collocations of 
keywords as it can output visualised results of the collocations of words, phrases, or a group 
of words. 
The analysis in Section 4.3.4 also involves the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus (LOB). LOB is 
a British English corpus which is regarded as a counterpart for the American English corpus 
Brown Corpus. It contains five hundred pieces of text of two thousand words, covering fifteen 
text genres. The version applied in this thesis is the POS (Part of Speech) tagged version 
(Leech et al., 1978). LOB is used as a meta-corpus for comparison with the corpora in 
English in this thesis in order to explore the differences in language features in the English 
versions of the EU’s official discourse to China as compared to general British English. The 
meta-corpus used for the Chinese language in this thesis is LCMC (Lancaster Corpus of 
Mandarin Chinese). 
4.1 Word Clouds and Topic Selection 
There are a few reasons to apply top frequency wordlists searches as the first step in this 
research. First, it is a necessary step to narrow down top selections for further data output on 
topic coverage. Second, it can generate a quick impression about whether top frequency 
meaningful words are, overall, in line with the areas of interests for China and the EU as they 
stated in their official discourse stating their core interests and values. Last, it gives hints on 




and how China and the EU’s priorities in the bilateral relations might differ, paving the way 
for further analysis on this issue. This preliminary comparison gives a quick impression of the 
level of lexical features in these two corpora.  
Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 show the word clouds for the top fifty frequency words in Corpus 
China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP. The original wordlists are available in Table Apx 12 in 
the Appendix.  
Figure 4-1 Top Fifty Frequency Word Cloud of Corpus China PPSP 
 
Figure 4-2 Top Fifty Frequency Word Cloud of Corpus EU PPSP 
 
As Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 demonstrate, China and the EU’s top frequency words based 
on simple frequency search share quite a lot of similarity. A significant number of their top 
frequency words overlaps. Matching pairs of words include “development” and “发展”, 
“economic” and “经济”, “social” and “社会”, and “human/people” and “人民”, "cooperation" 
and “合作”, "dialogue" and “对话”, as well as “politics” and “政治”. This indicates that China 
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and the EU have shared interests on topics including economic, social and political 
development and share expectations regarding promoting mutual development, fostering 
cooperation, facilitating communication and improving political interactions. A few differences 
exist at the same time. Corpus China PPSP contains the words “和平 (peace)" and “稳定
(stability)" and “文化(culture)” and “人民 (people/mass public/citizens)” in its top fifty 
frequency wordlist while Corpus EU PPSP has words including “energy (能源)”, “环境
environmental (环境)”, “law(法律)”, “WTO” and “sustainable (可持续)” and “rights (权力)" in its 
top fifty list. On the other hand, a list of China PPSP contains a group of actions words 
including “加强 (enhance)”, “推动 (push forward)”, “维护 (maintain)” and “支持 (support)” 
while Corpus EU PPSP has only one verb “support” on its list.  
To be selected as a hot topic, a word needs to be in the fifty top frequency meaningful word 
list and needs to be related to a policy area. After being filtered according to this criterion, the 
words standing out in the China PPSP include “economy”, “communication”, “dialogue”, 
“culture”, “trade”, “reform”, “society”, “civilisation”, “security and safety”, as well as 
“technology”. The verbs and adjectives such as “maintain”, “positive”, and “promote” do not 
signify specific policy areas and are therefore not selected as words representing hot topics. 
For Corpus EU PPSP, the words signifying a policy area and a potential top topic include 
“economic”, “trade”, “dialogue”, “social”, “human”, “rights”, “reform”, “environmental”, 
“energy”, “relations”, “investment”, “market”, “economy”, “security”, “environment”, “law”, and 
“society”. One may notice that some areas are repetitive in this list of words, such as 
“economic” and “economy”. This is because although they have the same word roots, they 
are regarded as two different words by the frequency count system. Similar situations apply 
to other words which refer to overlapping areas or issues belonging to the same topic in the 
broader sense. This includes words like “investment”, “market”, “economy”, as overall, they 
all belong to the topic “economy and trade”. 
The term or phrase representing a hot topic does not have to appear in both the top fifty lists 
of China PPSP and EU PPSP. However, in fact, the most meaningful keywords signifying a 
policy area in one list often appear in the list of the counterpart. If not, they often appear in 
the top 100 word frequency list of their counterpart corpus. 
It is necessary to note, however, that top fifty frequency wordlists contain only fifty words 
which is quite limited. If the searching criteria change to the top one hundred or top one 
hundred and fifty, words which do not show convergence in the current figures and lists may 
appear convergent. This also means that similarities and differences in the wordlists are 
useful for giving quick impressions of priorities, but data output is dependent on search 
criteria. The relations between words and policy areas should not be read and interpreted as 




Now the words representing topics are reviewed by comparing them to the most discussed 
policy issues in China-EU relations. As the numbers of the topics in the literature are 
indefinite, the focus of this step is to double-check that the topics arising from the first step 
are within the interest range of the current research on China-EU relations. At last, the 
current topics chosen are reviewed to see whether they echo with the policy areas listed on 
the introductory webpage of China’s EU policy and the EU’s China policy.  
According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ introductory article on China-EU 
relations, the main cooperation aspects between China and the EU include the economy and 
trade, energy, technology, climate, urbanisation, culture and education, youth as well as 
other areas such as industry, agriculture, environment, quality check and custom (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2017). 
The EU’s external action service has also listed several aspects of EU-China relations in 
introducing the basic framework of EU-China relations. These include political relations, 
human rights, economic relations, trade, research and innovation, environment, energy and 
climate change, food industry and consumer production, communication networks, content 
and technology, development cooperation as well as partnership instrument (EEAS, 2016). 
These basics frameworks in bilateral relations between China and the EU offer the initial 
topics on which textual analysis should focus.  
Combining these three sources, namely the top frequency meaningful words, the hot topics 
in the literature, and the stated areas by the official websites on bilateral relations on both 
sides, ten hot topics, which have appeared repeatedly in all three sources, have been 
chosen for comparison of topic coverage. These topics include:  
Economy and Trade (经济与贸易), Communication and Dialogue (交流与对话), Security and 
Defence (安全与国防), Reform (改革), Politics and Diplomacy (政治与外交), Society and 
Social Issues (社会), 环境与能源 (Environment and Energy), Laws and Regulations (法律和
法规), Culture and Art (文化与艺术), Education and Research (教育与科研), and Technology 
(科技).  
There are a few topics which emerged from one of the sources mentioned above but are not 
included in the top ten hot topics, including Reform, Human Rights, Primary Sector, 
Secondary Sector, and Service Sector. This is because Reform is a topic which could be 
categorised at a social, political or economic level. It is more of a hot word instead of a topic 
which covers a sector of society. Human Rights is an important topic for both China and the 
EU, but current research strongly suggests that human rights as a concept bears different 
connotations in China and in the West (Zhu & Zhang, 2002; Zhang, 2008a, 2012a; Men, 
2011; Liu & Heathcote, 2000; Dong, 2012). Therefore, in Section 4.2.2, the collocations of 
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human rights as a key concept will be explored and compared based on the established 
corpora.   
It should be mentioned that this method of combining synonyms into a phrase which signifies 
one hot topic is not perfect as some issues such as investment and reform could be 
overlapping if it is a reform in investment the text is referring to. However, the hot topics are 
selected in such a way that frequency is a factor, important policy issues are not missed out, 
and topics are not overlapping as far as possible. This selection of topic is a way to make 
corpus-driven discourse analysis possible, paving the way for a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative analysis on the potential mismatch of priorities and emphases as well as 
further themes coming up in later chapters.  
4.2 Comparing Coverage of Shared Topics  
The ontological assumption and the methodology link the presence of the topics in the 
corpora and the policy areas in China-EU relations. Although positivists may argue that 
topics’ coverage and connotations of keywords do not manifest policy priorities and 
emphases of policy areas, from a language-oriented constructivist perspective taken in this 
thesis, the former play a part in constructing the latter and vice versa as discourse and social 
interactions are mutually-constitutive. Coherent, sustainable official discourse should, in 
time, manifest in China and the EU’s policies towards each other and ultimately, the 
interactions between China and the EU. The corpus-driven discourse analysis offers an 
opportunity to engage with the coherent and sustainable parts of the official discourse 
between China and the EU as only the long-standing, prominent topics having a consistent 
presence in the corpora across the years were selected.  
A topic’s coverage is counted by the reference number for each query result divided by the 
total word length of each corpus. Word frequency searches output for the coverage23 of 
these topics over the years for China and the EU, respectively. The data show both the 
overall rankings of the topic coverage for both corpora and the changes in the topics’ 
coverage over the twenty-five-year time span. In the searches, the context, namely the 
words around the keywords which were targeted in the searches, are not counted. The 
reason that context, either narrow (such as a few words to the left and right of the words, or 
the paragraph which contains the keywords) were not counted is because neither narrow 
context nor broad context reflects the accurate coverage of the topic as situations arise when 
the surrounding paragraph or sentence does not talk about precisely the same topic as the 
keywords suggest or contains more other topics. It is methodologically impossible to get the 
perfect proportion for a topic’s coverage. To avoid the situation of overfitting, in this research, 
 
23 Here coverage refers to the frequency of words which meet the query design requirement. It does not mean that 
paragraphs talking about a certain topic count based on their length; it simply counts how many times the words 




the simplistic approach was adopted, which is to count coverage with no context, but the 
frequency of the keyword is applied throughout the thesis. This standard has been applied 
for both Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP. 
The specific queries for the design considerations are available in Section A.3 in the 
Appendix. The searching criteria presented in Table Apx 10 and Table Apx 11 in the 
Appendix (Query Design) generated the data in the following section. 
4.2.1 Topic Coverage  
Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 shows the coverage of the top eleven hot topics in Corpus China 
PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP: 
                     Table 4-1 Rankings of the Top Eleven Hot Topic Coverage in China PPSP 
 
Table 4-2 Rankings of the Top Eleven Hot Topics’ Coverage in EU PPSP 
 
Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 present the pie charts based on Table 4-1 and Table 4-2, showing 
the relative coverage of each topic. Relative coverage is counted as compared to other hot 
topics (assuming all hot topics form 100%). It is different from coverage applied in other 
places where the total length of the entire corpus is counted as 100%. A comparison of the 
top frequency topic distributions for Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP leads to 
several key findings in this chapter.  
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Figure 4-3 Ratio of Hot Topics’ Relative Coverage in Corpus China PPSP (source: own 
work) 
 
Figure 4-4 Ratio of Hot Topics’ Relative Coverage in Corpus EU PPSP (source: own work) 
 
 
We are going to look at Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 as well as Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 by 




reference topics belong to the first tier, the middle four belong to the second, and the last 
three belong to the third tier.  
For the first-tier topics, unsurprisingly, for both Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP, Economy 
and Trade, as a topic, has the highest coverage for both corpora. It has a coverage of 27% 
in Corpus China PPSP and 21% in Corpus EU PPSP. This implies that Economy and Trade 
has the utmost importance for both China and the EU, although the relative proportion of 
importance of the topic for China is slightly higher than the EU. 
Communication and Dialogue is the second-largest coverage topic for both corpora, at 12% 
and 15% in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP respectively. This suggests that 
Communication and Dialogue share a similar level of priority for China and the EU, 
surpassing that of Politics and Diplomacy and Security and Defence for both sides. 
Communication and Dialogue is a topic which focuses on the connections between China 
and the EU, where discourse plays a significant role. This indicates that discourse 
interactions play a large part in China-EU relations, which is also in line with the context of 
this research as introduced in Section 1.2 about the scope and scale of the official discourse 
between China and the EU. As here the keywords Communication and Dialogue were 
searched in a way that not only official dialogues but also other forms of communication are 
included, the indication of this extends beyond the volume of official discourse interaction to 
all forms of exchanges between China and the EU on all levels.  
Politics and Diplomacy are 4th in corpus China PPSP and 3rd in EU PPSP, at 8% and 13% 
respectively. For this topic, the differences in proportion are small. The more obvious trend is 
that the top three topics for both Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP are the same, which 
indicates strong compatibility in their priorities.  
A more outstanding difference is that Corpus China PPSP shows an emphasis on Security 
and Defence with its coverage ranking the 3rd, while this is a topic ranking 7th sitting in the 
second tier for EU PPSP. This is the only difference in the first-tier rankings between China 
PPSP and EU PPSP but indicates an important divergence: for China, Security and Defence 
has a higher priority than for the EU. The ranking difference between Security and Defence 
is one of the biggest divergences shown in this comparison. This is in line with China’s 
emphasis on national security. China is a nation-state and has a traumatic past of being 
colonised and taken apart. This identity of China is different from that of the EU. The EU is a 
supranational and intergovernmental organisation in which member states are bound 
together by shared norms and values, among other factors. Therefore the EU’s emphasis on 
Security and Defence isn’t as great as that of China although the EU has been increasingly 
attaching importance to developing its hard power along with soft power as well (European 
Union Global Strategy, 2016). These differences in history and identities will be further 
discussed in Section 5.2.1.1 about the EU’s increasing emphases on its hard power.  
 
112   
For Corpus EU PPSP, Law and Regulations come straight after Politics and Diplomacy, 
ranking 4th in coverage whereas for Corpus China PPSP the 4th position is taken by Politics 
and Diplomacy. This is in line with the fact that the EU is established upon a set of norms 
and is a conventional normative power. It places the rule of law as one of its core values and 
has a large number of laws and regulations in the EU, due to the nature and hierarchies 
among the institutions. This normative nature of the EU will be further discussed in Chapter 
7. The longitudinal changes in these topics will be further looked into in Section 4.2.2, which 
also feeds into the analysis on the dynamics of the normative nature of the EU and China’s 
normative potential will also be discussed in Chapter 7.  
In the second tier, two of the topics, Society and Social Issues as well as Environment and 
Energy appear in both corpora. This suggests that these areas share similar levels of priority 
for both China and the EU. Although China and the EU have different social and 
environmental concerns and challenges in the context of the bilateral relationship, the 
importance they attach to this area is shared. This indicates that China and the EU have a 
similar level of interest in these topics. Although the scope of this thesis does not cover 
social issues and environmental issues in China-EU relations, this does offer a piece of 
evidence from a discursive perspective that these areas could be a good place to start more 
cooperation in the China-EU context.  
The differences in the second tier are that for China PPSP, Reforms follows closely after 
Politics and Diplomacy, ranking 5th, while for the EU PPSP, it ranks 9th. This indicates that 
reform is a high-frequency topic for China and is what China emphasises in China-EU 
relations. However, the relatively lower ranking of Reform in EU PPSP does not seem to be 
contingent with the fact that the EU is an entity constantly facing challenges and reforms as 
well. This may be related to the fact that the EU focuses more on its normative approach to 
China in its official discourse on China and less on its internal reforms. If the database 
included the EU’s domestic discourse, the result could be different. Another possibility is that 
the EU’s emphases on reform have been high at points when the EU faced crises but low at 
other times. This will be further investigated in Section 4.2.2 on the longitudinal changes in 
the topics. 
Education and Research for Corpus EU PPSP ranks 8th, sitting in the second tier. Its 
proportion is 5%, the same as that of Education and Research for China PPSP. This 
indicates that this is an area where both share a similar level of interest.  
In the third tier, the two corpora share the topics Science and Technology as well as Culture 
and Art. Culture and Art take 6% of the total of selected topics’ coverage for China PPSP 
while for Corpus EU PPSP it is only 1%. In terms of Culture and Art, China attaches larger 
importance. This is consistent with China’s approach to foreign relations, which is largely 




Overall, Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP present a high degree of similarity when 
it comes to how they order their preferences or priorities. There is a consistency between the 
data with the goals and “pillars” of China-EU relations. As described in the 2020 agenda, 
China-EU relations are expected to be more intricate and comprehensive where the nexus of 
economy, politics, and culture intertwine (European Commission, 2013). With the three top 
coverage topics identical to each other, the indication is that the common ground between 
China and the EU is firm and similarities are predominant across the topic range. 
However, differences in the priorities also exist. China PPSP demonstrates a higher 
emphasis on Security and Defence while the EU emphasises Laws and Regulations. This 
difference is constituted by the different identities of China and the EU, as will be argued in 
Chapter 5. Plus, the EU emphases Laws and Regulations, which is in line with the EU’s 
normative nature. These two differences in priorities are shaped by the identities of China 
and the EU.  
4.2.2 Longitudinal Coverage  
Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 present the stacked line charts, categorised by years and by 
topics, to demonstrate the longitudinal trend and patterns of changes in the topics’ coverage.  
They offer an overview not only of the proportion but also the stability of the frequency of the 
topics over the years, which contributes to an understanding of how the topic priorities have 
changed over the years for China and the EU.   
Figure 4-5 Coverage of Hot Topics in Corpus China PPSP 1996-2019 (Categorised by 
Topics) (source: own work) 
As Figure 4-5 shows, Economy and Trade have been the top coverage topic across the 
years in Corpus China PPSP despite a brief period when it was surpassed by Security and 
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Defence, with Economy and Trade covering 0.41%, and Security and Defence covering 
0.43%, in 2015. The coverage of Economy and Trade is significantly more extensive than 
the rest of the topics in the rest of the years.  
The second prominent topic is Communication and Dialogue (shown by the dark blue 
section). In the year 2003, the coverage of Communication and Dialogue is close to that of 
Economy and Trade. In 2018, it spiked again, becoming the second-largest coverage topic 
among the eleven topics, only second to Economy and Trade.  
Other topics which stand out at certain points include Environment and Energy (shown by 
the light blue section), which experienced highs during periods including 2001-2004, 2008-
2010, and 2016-2018 although 2001-2004 shows the most obvious surge.  
Security and Defence experienced highs during 2003-2008 with a surge in 2006, 2012 as 
well as 2014-2018. Concordance analysis of Security and Defence (with the same criteria as 
for the topic coverage searching query) shows that most of the security and defence-related 
context in Corpus China PPSP is about the term “和平” (peace) before 2017 and “安全” 
(security) after 2017. Since 2004, there have been more contents on non-traditional security 
issues including “weapons proliferation, illegal migration, cross-border crimes and HIV/AIDS” 
(Wen, 2004) and preventing and managing avian influenza and other communicable 
diseases (Wen, 2006). 
In 2002, Laws and Regulations is the second topic coverage topic among the eleven 
selected hot topics and in 2018, it is the third-largest coverage topic of the year following 
Economy and Trade, and Communication and Dialogue.  
These findings indicate that Economy and Trade have been the most discussed topics in 
Corpus China PPSP across the years and its percentage largely outweighs the rest of the 
fourteen topics. This implies that Economy and Trade is a prioritised policy area in China’s 
policies to the EU, and its importance stands out. Communication is another critical area for 
China in its bilateral relations with the EU. Security issues, environmental and energy 
concerns, as well as issues regarding laws and regulations, from time to time, also stand out, 





Figure 4-6 Coverage of Hot Topics in Corpus EU PPSP 1994-2019 (Categorised by Topics) 
  
                                                                                                                   (source: own work) 
Figure 4-6 shows the changes in topic coverage for Corpus EU PPSP. For Corpus EU 
PPSP, Economy and Trade are predominant across the years as well. However, cases 
where the coverage of other topics surpasses Economy and Trade happen several times: 
Communication and Dialogue passes Economy and Trade in 2000, 2003, 2017, 2018 and 
2019. Environment and Energy passes Economy and Trade in 2010, and Politics and 
Diplomacy pass Economy and Trade in 2016. 
In terms of rule-related topics, the EU has been consistent. This indicates its normative 
nature as well as its determination to support China in regulations and standards. An 
emerging topic is Education in the EU’s documents towards China. This is due to the surge 
in educational cooperation, joint degree programmes between European countries and 
China in recent years. 
Overall, the topics’ coverage in Corpus EU PPSP has a more stable, or less fluctuated, 
coverage across the years especially for the topics Economy and Trade, Communication 
and Dialogue, Politics and Diplomacy, Laws and Regulations. This, on the one hand, 
indicates that the EU has a stable feature of keeping its norms emphasised. Although at 
different times the proportion of topics may change, it seems that its main topics, or policy 
areas, do not reduce or increase in terms of attention too much regardless of times and 
events. This could be connected to the EU’s normative nature as the EU’s external actions 
are rooted in its fundamental values and norms of which the contents and aspects stay 
stable. On the other hand, this could be related to the fact that the EU’s official documents 
on China are part of the EU’s official discourse system, which bears the features of being 
systematic and content rich. The structures and content arrangements of the EU documents 
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usually follow the patterns or traditions passed on from previous years. This institutional 
background assists the stability of the topics’ coverage.  
Apart from the overview of topic coverage in the two corpora, it is necessary to compare the 
changes of each topic’s coverage in order to get a more specific idea on how China and the 
EU’s preferences on topics have changed over the years. This section shows the 
longitudinal coverage of the key topics. The first comparison is between the coverage of 
Economy and Trade in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP, as shown in Figure 4-7 
and Figure 4-8.  
Figure 4-7 Longitudinal Coverage of Economy and Trade in Corpus China PPSP and EU 
PPSP (with Trend Lines) 
 
Figure 4-8 Longitudinal Coverage of Economy and Trade in Corpus China PPSP and EU 
PPSP (Normalised by Mean)24 
 
Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8 demonstrate the coverage of Economy and Trade in Corpus China 
PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP. The trendlines in Figure 4-7 show that overall, the coverage of 
Economy and Trade for both corpora are both consistent and stable over the years. The 
coverage of this topic for both corpora slightly dropped across the years. The differences 
between the coverage of Economy and Trade for the two corpora are small. This indicates 
 
24 The normalised data in this thesis, unless otherwise specified, are calculated with the mean referring to the 
overall average of a topic’s coverage in the combined total text length of Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU 




that although Economy and Trade is the main topic for China and the EU, in recent years, 
other topics start to play a greater part in the discourse.  
Despite the overall high frequency of economy-related topics in both corpora, we can see 
that both Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8 indicate that the frequency of economy and trade-related 
topics experienced a gentle drop in the year 2003 and 2004 respectively for Corpus China 
PPSP and EU PPSP. Relating to the background in China-EU relations, the year around 
2004 was the time when China-EU relations experienced a slightly cooled-down period after 
the honeymoon as the two sides had disputes on trade issues as well as human rights 
issues. Although it is hard to tell, just based on the figure, whether they are directly related to 
the specific events around those years, the general trend of change in the topic frequency is 
reliable and does indicate the preferences for the topic over the years as well as its slight 
shrinkage. 
CL can offer quantitative data which are otherwise unavailable, but one could only infer the 
relations between the discourse data and events in China-EU relations so much without 
assistance of other methodologies. Analysing, or sometimes “guessing” the factors in the big 
picture of China-EU relations offers insights into the context behind the data as well as 
creating a link between discourse and activities between China and the EU. However, it 
would be wrong to state that if the economy and trade-related discourse dropped, it must 
indicate that the role of the economy and role dropped as it could be that a discourse on 
other topics arose over the years, making the discourse on the economy less when in fact 
economic activities between China and the EU did not decrease. Other factors which can 
impact the data will be mentioned in the Discussion section of this chapter.  
Figure 4-9 Longitudinal Coverage of Communication and Dialogue in Corpus China PPSP 
and EU PPSP (with Trend Lines) 
 
 
118   
Figure 4-10 Coverage of Communication and Dialogue in Corpus China PPSP and EU 
PPSP (Normalised by Mean) 
 
In terms of Communication and Dialogue, corpus China PP+SP and corpus EU 
PP+SP both have a high frequency, as demonstrated in Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10. 
For the EU, the topic frequency gently rises over the years, meeting its highest point in 
2018, while for China, the highest point happened in 2003, and the year 2018 saw 
the second-highest point. The data point to the idea that both China and the EU attach 
high vale to culture and communication. However, the EU seems to have maintained a 
slightly more stable coverage, especially before 2008.  






Figure 4-12 Coverage of Politics and Diplomacy in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP 
(Normalised by Mean) 
 
There are more fluctuations over the years in the coverage of Politics and Diplomacy in 
Corpus China PPSP than in Corpus EU PPSP. In Corpus China PPSP, the year 1998 and 
2008 have a low percentage of politics-related topics.25 In relation to the background of 
China-EU interactions around the year 2008, this was during the relative “ice age” of China-
EU relations when disagreements related to human rights between the two took place as 
mentioned in the Introduction chapter. It was the year of the disturbance of the Olympic torch 
relay in Paris, and the EU-China summit was cancelled as German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel as well as then French President Nicolas Sarkozy arranged meetings with the Dalai 
Lama. Overall, in Corpus China PPSP, the frequency related to politics did not experience 
an apparent rise while that in the Corpus EU PPSP has a slight rise despite the drop around 
2004.  
In Corpus EU PPSP, from 1994 to 2019, the frequency of politics-related topics is overall 
stable. It met its lowest point in 2004, with a frequency of 0.35%, but bounced back to 1.09% 
in 2016. This shows that overall, the EU’s official discourse involving China contains large 
amounts of politics-related contents. Even though official discourse is political discourse in 
the first place, the proportion of the relatively narrow sense of politics-related contents in 
Corpus EU PPSP is higher than that of Corpus China PPSP.   
 
25 Politics-related topics here refer to the topics regarding a narrow sense for politics and diplomacy as defined in 
the query design, although the author is aware other topics not counted here may be classified as political. 
However, a narrow definition is applied to make searches feasible.  
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Figure 4-13 Longitudinal Coverage of Security and Defence in Corpus China PPSP and EU 
PPSP (with Trend Lines) 
 
Figure 4-14 Longitudinal Coverage of Security and Defence in Corpus China PPSP and EU 
PPSP (Normalised by Mean) 
  
On security, Corpus China PPSP has a sharper rise over the years on the topic frequency 
compared with that of the EU. However, the EU experiences a quick rise between the years 
2010 and 2016, which is consistent with the EU’s policy tendencies in recent years to 
improve its hard power, or military power, and revise the image of the EU as just a “soft 
power”, as it is stated in its Global Strategy that soft and hard power should go hand in hand 
(European Union Global Strategy, 2016). The EU’s increasing focus on defence and hard 
power since 2010 will be further discussed through the content analysis in Chapter 7. 
In 2014, due to the fact that it was the year President Xi Jinping visited Europe, there were 
five appearances of the term “peace, prosperity, reform, civilization” (和平, 增长, 改革, 文明)  
as shown in the concordance reference of the Security and Defence in Corpus China PPSP 
for the year 2014 in Table Apx 13 in the Appendix. Peaceful development is another high-
frequency theme represented in this concordance. For example, “peaceful development” (和
平发展) as a developmental plan has been mentioned seven times in Table Apx 13. 
Meanwhile, since 2014, the content about security further diversified to include more 
international security issues such as peacekeeping in Somali, prevention of the arm 
competitions in the outer space and controlling of the Ebola virus (Table Apx 13, Corpus 




In 2018, there are two references to the emphasis that China hopes the EU does not sell 
arms or other facilities serving a military purpose to Taiwan (Table Apx 13, Corpus China 
PPSP).  
Figure 4-15 Longitudinal Coverage of Society and Social Issues in Corpus China PPSP and 
Corpus EU PPSP (with Trend Lines) 
 
Figure 4-16 Longitudinal Coverage of Society and Social Issues in Corpus China PPSP and 
Corpus EU PPSP (Normalised by Mean) 
 
On Society and Social issues, Corpus EU PPSP has an overall consistent coverage, but the 
trend line shows that the coverage has dropped slightly over the years. For Corpus China 
PPSP, the coverage on this topic was less than that of the EU in general until after 2010.  
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Figure 4-17 Coverage of Laws and Regulations in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP 
 
 
 As Figure 4-17 shows, the topic related to laws and regulations has occupied an overall 
more stable percentage in Corpus EU PPSP than that of China PPSP, except for the plunge 
in 2012. The general trend is that contents relating to this topic have been gradually rising 
over the 12 years examined. This is consistent with the fact that the EU is rule-based. 
Potentially the percentage of law-related contents could be even higher than the data 
indicate given that some of the words and expressions related to law in a broader sense, 
such as Directives, Decisions, Recommendations and Opinions are not included in the query 
design. For China, the topic coverage met its peaks in 2002 and 2018. However, in the rest 
of the years, the coverage on Laws and Regulations is consistently below 0.20 % with the 
percentage dropping below 0.1% in some of the years until 2015 when the coverage surged 
to 0.71% in 2017 and 0.62% in 2019. Comparatively speaking, Corpus EU PPSP has a 
higher coverage rate on Laws and Regulations as compared to that of Corpus China PPSP. 
However, the topic coverage has been rising rapidly overall for six years in a row with the 
rate in 2019 dropping slightly but still reaching 0.18% which is relatively high compared to 





Figure 4-18 Coverage of Reforms in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP 
 
 
Reform is one of the key words which stands out in the word frequency list.  
Figure 4-18 shows that both China and the EU have been consistent in including the topic of 
reform over the years in their official discourse. However, China has two peaks in the 
coverage of reform: the year 1998 and the year 2004. The first period can be related to the 
blooming stage of the Chinese market after the adoption of reform and opening-up policy 
and the second one relates to the time when the current administration started in 2013.  
The EU has experienced a steadier coverage between 1998 and 2006, with the official 
discourse having around 0.2% coverage on Reforms every year. Since 2004, the coverage 
for Reforms reduced slightly.  
The data indicate that the topic of reform is essential to both China and the EU and the 
importance, or proportion, in their discourse shares a high degree of similarity. Reform has 
been a hot topic consistently for both, although it is not at the top of the favourite topics.  
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Figure 4-19 Longitudinal Coverage of Culture and Art in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU 
PPSP (Normalised by Mean) 
 
 
Figure 4-20 Coverage of Culture and Art in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP (with 
Trend Lines) 
 
In terms of Culture and Art, Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP both have a high 
frequency, as demonstrated in Figure 4-19 and Figure 4-20. For the EU, the topic frequency 
gently rises over the years, meeting its highest point in 2010 and 2015, while for China the 
highest point happened in 2004. Although in Corpus China PPSP, there has been a slight 
drop in the frequency over the years, the coverage of this topic in Corpus China PPSP 
outweighs that in Corpus EU PPSP in most years.  
Figure 4-21 Longitudinal Coverage of Technology in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU 





Figure 4-22 Longitudinal Coverage of Technology in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU 
PPSP (Normalised by Mean) 
 
Figure 4-21 and Figure 4-22 show the coverage of Technology in Corpus China PPSP and 
Corpus EU PPSP. Both China and the EU have mentioned topics on technology in an overall 
consistent manner over the years. Both lines experience a slight rising trend. However, the 
coverage of Technology in Corpus China PPSP has fluctuated more frequently than that of 
EU PPSP, although the fluctuations are not huge.   
 
Figure 4-23 Longitudinal Coverage of Environment and Energy in Corpus China PPSP and 
Corpus EU PPSP (with Trend Lines) 
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Figure 4-24 Longitudinal Coverage of Environment and Energy in Corpus China PPSP and 
Corpus EU PPSP (Normalised by Mean) 
 
Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-24 demonstrate the changes in the coverage of Energy and 
Environment in the discourse over the years. Overall, the coverage of Environment and 
Energy for both China PPSP and EU PPSP has increased over the years with the coverage 
in Corpus EU PPSP higher than that in Corpus China PPSP and a slightly higher rate of 
increase. As Figure 4-2 shows, China had a surge in the coverage of Environment and 
Energy in 2003 and 2017, respectively. From 2001-2004, the coverage in Corpus China 
PPSP experienced a rising period, as did 2015 to 2018. Looking at the time where these 
surges happened, some events happened which may have been relevant. In 2002, China 
had the fifth Conference on Environmental Protection during which it was proposed that 
“protecting the environment is one important duty of the government. The society should be 
motivated to fulfil the task of environmental protection in line with the requirements of the 
socialist market economy” (Wenhai, 2018: 2). In 2015, the revised version of the 
Environmental Protection Law was put into action (Wenhai, 2018). Plus, during the decade 
of 2010, China’s air quality issue has become a big concern worldwide. Although the data do 
not indicate direction relations between these events and the increase in environment-
related discourse in official documents, the association may be helpful in terms of 
understanding the overall social condition behind the discourse making.   
4.3 Collocations and Concordance of Shared Terms 
The current literature has suggested that China and the EU have talked past each other in 
policy areas of shared interest (Godement, Vasselier & European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2017; Gaenssmantel & Feng, 2016). This section carries out collocations’ analysis 
of the topics with the top coverage of keywords signifying hot topics when the findings are 
helpful for understanding the challenges and misunderstandings between China and the EU.  
This thesis has listed a range of challenges in China-EU relations. However, as economic 
cooperation is the area which stands out in the bilateral relations both in terms of history but 
also in terms of the scale of common interests involved, this section will focus on economic 




of these terms gives useful findings on the mismatches between China and the EU in these 
cases.  
4.3.1  Economy and Trade 
Figure 4-25 and Figure 4-26 present the collocations of the topic Economy and Trade.26 This 
search looks for the high-frequency words appearing to the left and right (within a distance of 
five words) of the core words related to the economy. The threshold of frequency is set at 60 
to include a reasonable amount of words. One note here is that the words appearing next to 
the searched term but without a helpful meaning (such as “a”, “is”, “and”), to understand the 
associations for the Economy in corpus EU PPSP, have been eliminated from the list. 
Getting the implications of collocations is a challenging task as one needs to stitch the words 
together for a bigger picture of the frequency associations of a term. 
As in Figure 4-25 and Figure 4-26, the word appearing to the left of the central dot in the 
circle are the ones located to the left of the economy-related words in the sentence and 
those to the right located to the right of the central words in the sentence. A small distance to 
the central word means strong collocation. Darker dots mean the words have higher 
frequency.  
 
26 This search involves the usage of a wild card. Specifically the searching criteria is: /(econom[a-zA-Z]*|trad[a-zA-
Z]*|commerc[a-zA-Z]*|financ[a-zA-Z]*|tax|tariff|invest[a-zA-Z]*|deficit|budget|savings)/i. This searches for words with 
the same roots as “economy”, “trade”, “commercial”, “finance” and other relevant words including tariff, invest, 
deficit, budget, savings. [a-zA-Z]*| searches for any letters more than one letter (the same as the function of wild 
cards in Nvivo) and “|” means OR. 
 

































Figure 4-26 Collocations of Economy and Trade in Corpus EU PPSP 




As Figure 4-25 and Figure 4-26 demonstrate, the term economy frequently collocates with 
the words “China”, “reform”, “growth”, “development”, “political”, “trade”, “world”, “global”, 
“market”, “rights” and “cooperation”. These collocated words give an idea of what appears 
together with economy-rooted words and offers a context for how the economy was talked 
about. 
One quick impression and assumption of the collocations of economy-related words in 
Corpus EU PPSP is that the EU focuses not only on the growth of the economy but also how 
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Table 4-3 Collocation of Economy and Trade in Corpus EU PPSP             Table 4-4 Collocation of Economy and Trade in Corpus China PPSP 
     
 
                                                                                       
Table 4-3 and Table 4-4 show the data behind Figure 4-25 and Figure 4-26. There are quite 
a lot of overlapping terms in the top 62 collocated words for Economy and Trade for the two 
corpora. These include trade, cooperation, globalisation, dialogue, connectivity and many 
others. There are also some collocated terms distinct for each. For the Corpus EU PPSP, 
the words “sustainable”, “environment(al)”, and “climate” stand out. Corpus EU PPSP also 
contains the words “will” and “should” which indicate normative contents. For Corpus China 
PPSP, the words “自由 (freedom)”, “自由化(liberalisation)”, “问题 (problems)”, “摩擦 
Corpus: Corpus China PPSP
Index Position Collocate Freq (coll.) Freq (corpus)
1 L 中欧 126 1486
2 L 贸易 95 197
3 R 合作 85 990
4 R 投资 80 181
5 L 中国 74 1017
6 L 促进 58 254
7 L 亚欧 52 473
8 R 发展 52 729
9 L 双方 50 364
10 L 欧盟 49 792
11 L 推动 47 302
12 R 协定 42 63
13 R 领域 37 290
14 R 便利 36 39
15 L 共同 36 293
16 R 对话 36 283
17 R 全球化 35 49
18 L 加强 34 342
19 L 自由 33 29
20 L 世界 31 255
21 R 增长 31 103
22 R 谈判 28 52
23 L 国际 27 236
24 L 欧洲 27 434
25 R 稳定 26 120
26 L 经济 26 175
27 R 伙伴 25 38
28 R 摩擦 24 24
29 R 积极 24 153
30 R 金融 24 47
31 R 问题 24 150
32 R 自由化 22 12
33 M 扩大 21 84
34 R 全球 20 152
35 L 关系 20 578
36 L 开放 20 100
37 R 政治 20 117
38 R 互利 19 111
39 R 保护主义 19 26
40 L 双向 18 15
41 R 推进 18 112
42 R 文化 18 87
43 L 社会 18 85
44 R 经贸 18 73
45 L 作用 17 128
46 L 市场 17 51
47 L 维护 17 166
48 L 互联互通 16 48
49 R 保持 16 57
50 L 社会发展 16 24
51 R 全面 15 214
52 R 公平 15 25
53 R 创新 15 49
54 L 国家 15 214
55 L 多边 15 74
56 R 重要 15 215
57 M 高层 15 46
58 L 共赢 14 107
59 L 实现 14 110
60 R 建设 14 121
61 L 机制 14 107
62 R 相互 14 65
63 L 科技 14 58
64 R 坚持 13 96
65 L 措施 13 26
66 L 进一步 13 106
67 L 通过 13 93
68 R 人文 12 37
69 R 体制 12 17
70 R 体系 12 48
71 M 反对 12 32
72 L 巨大 12 43
73 R 建立 12 95
74 M 环境 12 45
75 R 经贸合作 12 47
76 L 各国 11 76
77 R 对欧 11 26
78 R 改革 11 118
79 L 政策 11 155
80 M 鼓励 11 54
81 L 以及 10 71
82 L 双边 10 43
83 L 启动 10 22
84 L 多极化 10 25
85 L 妥善处理 10 25
86 R 尽快 10 10
87 L 希望 10 102
88 R 当前 10 85
89 L 我们 10 261
90 R 战略 10 238
91 R 持续 10 47
92 R 第一大 10 15
93 L 美元 10 36
94 规则 10 38
Corpus: Corpus EU PPSP
Index Position Collocate Freq (coll.) Freq (corpus)
1 L china 340 3094
2 R trade 293 839
3 L social 290 570
4 R eu 194 2304
5 L european 190 1124
6 L development 184 1047
7 L growth 174 389
8 R political 129 449
9 L cooperation 125 816
10 L foreign 112 333
11 R chinese 111 1034
12 R world 110 532
13 R asia 107 710
14 R sustainable 107 421
15 R global 98 630
16 R co-operation 94 718
17 L market 90 373
18 R china’s 88 455
19 L economic 87 1062
20 R will 82 1281
21 R support 81 602
22 R more 77 708
23 L china's 74 363
24 R process 74 303
25 R into 70 333
26 R agreement 69 385
27 L programme 69 739
28 L should 69 956
29 L investment 67 538
30 R relations 67 405
31 L eu-china 66 714
32 R europe 66 462
33 L issues 66 532
34 R international 64 625
35 L rights 62 664
36 R policy 60 771
37 L environmental 57 471
38 R bank 55 125
39 R countries 55 529
40 L further 54 406
41 L bilateral 53 265
42 R infrastructure 53 150
43 L we 53 703
44 R projects 51 368
45 R services 51 173
46 L financial 50 255
47 L reforms 50 148
48 L asian 49 265
49 R both 49 504
50 L dialogue 49 706
51 R direct 49 89
52 L towards 49 260
53 R well 49 332
54 R including 44 408
55 R public 44 209
56 L connectivity 43 267
57 R environment 43 333
58 R climate 41 276
59 R new 41 537
60 R all 40 491
61 R promote 40 231




(frictions)”, “保护主义(protectionism)”, “反对 (against)” and “双向 (mutual)” are distinct. These 
differences indicate that Corpus EU PPSP emphasises maintaining a sustainable 
developmental pattern when it comes to the economy and trade. China emphasises free 
trade, mutual respect, handling trade disputes and anti-protectionism. This indicates that 
although Economy and Trade is the biggest shared topic between China and the EU, the two 
still have differences in their priorities and emphases on this topic. This forms one source of 
misunderstandings as the two may have agreed on enhancing economic cooperation without 
clearly laying out each other’s priorities and interests in the area of economic and trading 
activities.   
4.3.2 Market Economy 
This section looks at the concordance of “Market Economy” as the recognition of China’s 
MES has been a persisting issue between China and the EU and has caused tension on 
both sides within and beyond the economic area.  
For these more specific terms, concordance searches, instead of collocation searches, have 
been applied. While collocation searches are more effective when an impression of related 
areas is needed and when the central term has a high quantity of frequency in the corpora, 
concordance searches provides more details of what is specifically mentioned together with 
the term instead of a general impression of topics linked as provided in collocations.  
Table 4-5 shows the concordance of the term “市场经济 (Market Economy)” in Corpus China 
PPSP:  
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Table 4-5 Concordance of 市场经济 (Market Economy) in Corpus China PPSP 
 
A few theme emerged from the concordance searches of 市场经济 (Market Economy) in 
Corpus China PPSP: 
First, China sees the EU’s refusal to grant MES as political discrimination (政治歧视) as 
shown in the concordance of 2003 and 2009. In this concordance search, the term 
“discrimination” appeared four times. Among them, in 2009, the activity of the EU was 
referred to as “political discrimination” and was compared to the EU’s granting MES to 
Russia.     
Second, China attaches great importance to its economic and social achievement being 
recognised (承认) and validated (肯定) as shown in the concordance of 2004 and 2009. This 
also means China respects the EU and WTO and have expectations to these organisations 
in terms of making justified decisions.  
Third, the MES issues, from the perspective of China, have hurt the mutual trust (信任) 
between China as shown in the concordance in 2011, including the Chinese public, and the 
EU.   
China’s main pursuit shown in the concordance text is that it hopes its achievements will be 
recognised and a justice response be given. The Chinese government and people think it 
unfair that Russia has been granted MES but not China. MES is not only about economic 
benefits, but also a symbol of respect and recognition of China’s respect of the WTO 
regulations as well as China’s reform, social development, and its trust in the fairness of the 




power which was reduced due to disappointment over the EU’s refusal to grant MES to 
China.  
China’s main disappointment in the case shown in the concordance text is that the EU’s 
supports are conditioned by the EU’s values, and these fundamental gaps have caused 
frustrations in China. Plus, it seems that one major disappointment comes from not being 
clearly communicated with about the EU’s decision before 2016, creating a shock when the 
decision came in 2016. This indicates a mix of fundamental gaps and lack of communication 
(could be the avoidance of communication).  
Although it is not the position of the thesis to suggest specific policies for the future, the 
textual analysis indicates that a clear explanation of the conditions is desired for future cases 
like this. China and the EU should also negotiate an alternative mechanism which can 
enhance trade between China and Europe within or beyond the sphere of MES.  
 
Table 4-6 Concordance of Market Economy in Corpus EU PPSP 
 
Table 4-6 shows the concordance of “Market Economy” in corpus EU PPSP. A few inferences 
can be drawn based on a reading of these concordances.  
First, The EU is aware of China’s plan to create a “Socialist Market Economy”. This shows 
that the EU, from the beginning of these issues, was clear that China plans to pursue a 
Corpus: Corpus EU PPSP| Search Term: Market Economy| Occurrences: 38 (1.31)| Texts: 11/15| 
IndexFile Left Node Right
1 1995 a long term policy.pdfin China’s Constitution, of creating a "Socialist Market Economy"by the turn of the century (see
2 1995 a long term policy.pdffa ls well short of having a full market economy,with adequate social protection including freedom of
3 1995 a long term policy.pdfof China’s ref rm process until a mature market economy is established, and for China it would
4 1995 a long term policy.pdfpr gress towards full integration in the world market economy,strengthening of civil society, poverty alleviation, environment
5 1995 a long term policy.pdfof clear commitments to create a fully-fledged market economy;-• to contribute to reform inside China
6 1995 a long term policy.pdffour coastal areas  Efforts towards creating a market economy b) Efforts towards creating a market economy(October
7 1995 a long term policy.pdfConstitution under the new formula of socialist market economy. Since the launching of reforms, China
8 1995 a long term policy.pdfmillion people. The making of a ''Socialis Market Economy"with Chinese characteristics The effects of over
9 1995 a long term policy.pdfterms of the degree to which the market economy has developed in China, both as a
10 1995 a long term policy.pdfclear indication of the development of a market economy.In 1978, 77.6% of industrial output and
11 1998 building a comprehensive partnerhisp with china.pdfare found to operat  within clearly defined market economy conditions, will be granted market economy treatment.
12 1998 building a comprehensive partnerhisp with china.pdfdefined market economy conditions, will be grantemarket economy treatment. This means that the domestic prices
13 1998 building a comprehensive partnerhisp with china.pdfin step with China's mo towards a market economy.China's WTO accession process, as well as
14 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdfperating in a market environment are granted market economy treatment. This new regime has already been
15 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdff cases, resulti g in the granting of market economy treatment to some Chinese firms. More and
16 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdfa d more Chinese companies will be efit from market economy treatment in the future, as the legislative
17 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdfthe future, as the legislative framework for market economy conditions in China develops, and awareness of
18 2001 ALL.pdfhighly centralised economy to that of a market economy through a number of reforms in the
19 2001 ALL.pdfchange to meet the demands of the market economy and the rule of law will need
20 2001 ALL.pdfbeen around 10%. The concept of a market economy,now incorporated in China’s constitution, has allowed
21 2001 ALL.pdffood supply, and establishment of a systematised market economy. are also now important
22 2001 ALL.pdfthe support to the transition towards a market economy.The reform of the SOEs and the
23 2001 ALL.pdfSupport to economic reform and promotion of market economy Biodiversity protection Human rights (civil and political,
24 2001 ALL.pdfresources • Support to transition to a market economy • Minimising social consequences of the reform
25 2001 ALL.pdffield. 5 Support to transition to a market economy The promotion of the market economy and
26 2001 ALL.pdfa market economy The promotion of the market economy and the integration into the WTO will
27 2003 a maturing partnership.pdf2004.Analyse China’s formal request for full ‘Market EconomyStatus’ for the entire Chinese economy under
28 2003 a maturing partnership.pdftaking account of C ina’s progress towards EU market economy criteria as documented in the request; continue
29 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfthe requests of individual Chinese companies for ‘market economy’treatment in anti-dumping investigations. 20! Make full
30 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfEnvironment and Accelerating the Transition to a Market EconomyTheme II: Addressing Needs of Poorer and
31 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfEnvironment nd Accelerating the Transition to a Market EconomyTheme II: Addressing Needs of Poorer and
32 2006 ALL.pdfjustified. At present, the conditions for granting Market EconomyStatus (MES) to China for anti-dumping investigations
33 2006 ALL.pdfchange and energy, illegal migration, human rights,Market EconomyStatus, market access, IPR, and the arms
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different kind of market economy. The EU has had unrealistic expectations of China not due 
to a shortage of knowledge but due to the EU’s perception of itself and the EU’s fundamental 
world view which involves a belief that it can, over time, impact China’s political choice.  
Second, one of the EU’s main pursuit regarding the issue of MES is to promote the 
European style rule of law and human rights in China. However, the difficult part is that rule 
of law and human rights bear different connotations for China and the EU. A concordance 
analysis was carried out for “human rights” for Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP in 
Section 4.3.4.  
Last, in recent years, the EU mentioned that it will facilitate protection from possible 
distortions of MES, which is basically closing the door for this issue for China. It seems like 
the issue has developed to a stage of hard stagnant until new alternative routes or solutions 
emerge.  
4.3.3 Politics and Diplomacy 









Table 4-8 Collocation of Politics and in Corpus EU PPSP27 
 
Politics and Diplomacy in Corpus EU PPSP has collocations with the term balanced, 
investment, comprehensive, and global. Corpus China PPSP on this topic has collocations 
with security, coordination, mutual trust, high-level and energy. Both collocate with economy 
and dialogues. This indicates that for both China and the EU, politics and diplomacy are 
connected to the smoothness of the economy and investment. The EU is inclined to 
emphasise a balanced, comprehensive approach in political communication while China 
 
27 Search Term: /politic[a-z].*|policy|diplomacy|diplomactic|international|affairs|relations[a-
z].*|foreign affair|international affairs|foreign relations|international relations|domestic 
affairs|foreign policy|/i|  threshold: 5. 
Corpus: Corpus EU PPSP
Index position Collocate Freq (coll.) Freq (corpus)
1 L eu-china 41 714
2 L our 34 679
3 L economic 21 1062
4 L bilateral 16 265
5 L trade 16 839
6 R china 15 3094
7 L more 14 708
8 R political 14 449
9 L reciprocal 14 34
10 R eu 12 2304
11 M this 12 1417
12 L important 11 318
13 R partnership 9 240
14 R policy 9 771
15 L balanced 8 63
16 M development 8 1047
17 M new 8 537
18 L investment 7 538
19 R these 7 452
20 R towards 7 260
21 R dialogue 6 706
22 L eu's 6 171
23 L relations 6 405
24 R action 5 371
25 L comprehensive 5 161
26 L discuss 5 38
27 L element 5 43
28 R global 5 630
29 L importance 5 207
30 R issues 5 532
31 R joint 5 318
32 L key 5 360
33 R level 5 337
34 R relationship 5 184
35 L strengthen 5 190
36 L strong 5 111
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emphasises maintaining security, high-level communications and potentially energy security 
concerns. China’s emphases on security are consistent with the findings in earlier sections of 
this chapter. Both corpora contain several action words indicating positively enhancing 
cooperation, which is a major similarity between the two corpora in this collocation 
comparison.  
4.3.4 Human Rights 
The topic of human rights is a heated topic in China-EU relations. As mentioned in the 
literature review, existing research has pointed out that China and the EU have different 
connotations and definitions of the concept of human rights (Liu & Heathcote, 2000; Men, 
2011; Freeman & Geeraerts, 2011; Zhang, 2012). Therefore, collocation analysis is done on 
this topic to explore whether this method offers any new findings on this issue.  
 




As Figure 4-27 shows, “Human Rights” in Corpus China PPSP collocates with dialogues, 
promotion, security, justice/fairness, objective, domestic politics, interfere, stability, internet. 
It indicates that China relates human rights issues to national security and stability. It hopes 




interference. There is also the word “in the name of (之名)” in the collocation, which indicates 
that China has expressed dissatisfaction about the EU interfering in China’s domestic issues 
in the name of human rights issues.  
Figure 4-28 Collocation of Human Rights in Corpus EU PPSP 
 
As Figure 4-28 shows “human rights” in Corpus EU PPSP collocates with law, rule, 
economic, democracy, protection, governance, freedoms, promotion, fundamental, 
standards. Mostly, human rights as a term is related to the founding values of the EU. It does 
not relate so much to state security as in Corpus China PPSP.  
The two corpora share collocations with “mutual respect (相互尊重)” and “cooperation (合作)” 
which shows that the two are open to improved understanding and cooperation in this area.  
Overall, the differences in the collocations for “human rights” between Corpus China PPSP 
and Corpus EU PPSP are consistent with the findings in the existing literature that China 
focuses more on economic and collective rights while the EU focuses more on individual 
rights. However, the collocations do not output data sufficient to establish whether the 
connotations of human rights should be universal (Liu & Heathcote, 2000; Men, 2011; 
Zhang, 2012). Findings in the collocation comparison are also in line with the previous 
findings that Security and Defence has a higher position on China’s priority list than that of 
the EU.  
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4.4 Top Verbs and Nouns 
Table 4-9 shows the top fifty frequency verbs in China and the EU’s policy papers on each 
other. 





As Table 4-9 shows, “will” and “should” rank high in the Corpus EU PPSP, indicating that the 
EU’s discourse includes a lot of commissive features. The modal verbs including “can”, 
“would’ and “could” also continue to stay at the top of the frequency list. Verbs bearing 
positive meanings related to development such as “develop”, “support”, “promote”, 
“enhance”, “contribute” are the largest group of verbs in this list. Also, “help” and 
“encourage”, which are words indicating assistant to others, or in some cases expectations 
of others, rank high in the list.  
The top fifty verbs in China’s official discourse on the EU are mostly verbs with a positive 
sentiment. Among these fifty verbs, a few themes can be seen: mutual respect and 
understanding, resolving problems with care, development and handling specific issues. The 
most prominent pattern is verbs which indicate mutual respect and efforts, including “相互尊
重 (to respect mutually), “相互了解” (to understand mutually), “互利互惠 (to benefit each 
other”) and “互鉴 (to learn from each other)”. Another category is to solve the problems well, 
which includes words like “妥善处理 (deal…well)”, “慎重处理 (deal…with prudence)” and “妥
善解决 (resolve-…well)”, “问题解决 (solve the problems) and “政治解决 (solve politically)”. A 
third group includes words which share similar meanings to working hard, or improving and 
enhancing, for example, “致力于 (dedicated to)”, “办好 (organise…well)”, “积极参与 (actively 
participate in)”, “扩至 (expand to)”, “取得成功 (gain success)”, “努力实现 (make efforts to 
realise)”, “认真执行 (implement with care)”, “逐步完善 (improve gradually)”, “建立健全 
(establish and improve)”, “稳定发展 (make…develop steadily)”, “继续进行 (continue to carry 
out)”, “持续发展 (develop sustainably)” and “抓住机遇 (seize the opportunity)”. 
This comparison shows that both China and the EU have been using positive verbs most of 
the time in terms of China-EU relations. Both have applied a high ratio of verbs which 
indicate development, cooperation, and implementation. A few differences are indicated from 
the results. First, China has the tendency to mention more mutual respect, the sense of 
learning from each other and about prudently handling disputes compared with the EU. 
Second, the EU applies more words indicating help and support as compared to China. This 
may be related to the EU’s normative values and will be further analysed according to the 
collocations of these words. A third notable difference is that the EU applies modal verbs, or 
auxiliary verbs expressing necessity and possibilities, such as “can”, “would”, “could” which 
also rank relatively high. This can be related to a feature of the English language as modal 
verbs rank high in Corpus LOB (Lancaster Oslo/Bergen) (see Table Apx 9 in Appendix for a 
wordlist of top verbs in LOB).  
4.5  Discussion 
This section reviews the findings, their implications for China-EU relations, and how they 
interact with the existing literature. It also takes a critical perspective in reviewing the 
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effectiveness of the corpus-driven analysis, especially the application of word frequency, 
connotations, and concordance in mapping policy priorities and emphases.   
4.5.1 Findings and Significance  
The findings of this empirical chapter contribute to several discussions and debates in the 
existing literature on contemporary China-EU studies.  
First, the topic coverage comparison shows that China and the EU share solid common 
ground and interests in several core policy areas but especially in economy and trade, 
communication, and dialogue as well as politics and diplomacy. This is consistent with both 
China and the EU's official statements and illustrations on their interests, visions and 
framework for the bilateral relationship (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of 
China, 2017; Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016). There has been a 
consensus in the existing literature, both in the Chinese and English language and official 
statements on the foundation of China-EU relations about there being no fundamental 
conflicts of interests between China and the EU (Shambaugh, 2004; Chen, 2006; Wang, 
2019; Yang, 2020). This finding on the shared three priority topics enhances this claim by 
providing empirical evidence from the official discourse on specific policy where the two have 
shared interests and preferences. The preference ranking comparison based on the two 
corpora also suggests that Economy and Trade is the top shared priority between China and 
the EU, followed by Communication and Dialogue, then Politics and Diplomacy.   
While the common interests in the economy are well known, their shared priority of politics 
and diplomacy provides new insights to the existing debate in the literature on whether the 
phenomenon of “strong economy, weak politics” exists in contemporary China-EU relations. 
The discourse evidence suggests that China and the EU have shared interests in politics 
and diplomacy. This implies that politics and diplomacy as a policy area include space for 
China and the EU to discover their converging interests. While the existing literature has 
pointed out that there are areas such as political systems and territorial issues which are 
core interests to China and cannot be compromised (Men, 2012), there are less divergent 
areas such as anti-corruption, environmental protection which may be areas where China 
and the EU have shared interests in terms of their political agenda (Hammond & Jing, 2016).  
The connotations on Politics and Diplomacy provide further details showing that a large part 
of the political interactions between China and the EU relate to the Economy and Dialogue. 
This indicates that there are strong correlations between economic cooperation and political 
interactions as well as communications in China-EU relations. Future cooperation in politics 
and diplomacy should seek out areas where the two have common interests to turn political 
interactions into economic benefits through communication and dialogue. This suggests that 
the argument of “strong economy, weak politics” is not comprehensive, as the two topics are 




evidence supplements the existing literature by specifying the different pursuits of China and 
the EU in political interactions. China emphasises mutual trust, enhancing communication 
between high-level officials and maintaining security while the EU emphasises keeping a 
balanced and comprehensive approach.   
The finding that the topics of society, environment and tertiary industry share similar ranks in 
China and the EU's interest lists indicates that these are the topics which have the potential 
for both sides to cooperate further beyond the strong links in Economy and Trade, 
Communication and Dialogue as well as Politics and Diplomacy.  
Second, differences in the topic preference between China and the EU exist despite the 
overall compatible priorities and equivalent top three priorities. As a part of China's traditional 
national core interests, Security and National Defence have a higher position in the coverage 
ranking for Corpus China PPSP than that for Corpus EU PPSP, indicating the importance of 
this area to China. Law and Regulation rank higher in Corpus EU PPSP, indicating the 
importance of the rule of law and normative power to the EU. Although existing literature has 
pointed out that China is a sovereign state and is, therefore, focusing more on state 
sovereignty and defence as compared to the EU's post-modern perceptions of sovereignty 
(Pan & Gao, 2011; Pan, 2010a; Men, 2011), the longitudinal changes in China and the EU's 
focus on these topics were not discussed.  
Although a historical view of the development of mismatches in China-EU relations exists in 
Men Jing’s work (Men, 2012), the longitudinal changes in their priorities have not been 
addressed. The approach of this thesis makes it possible to look at the changes in topic 
preferences and priorities over the years, which provide a way to investigate the interactions 
between discourse and events.  
Third, the chapter engages with the literature on the conceptual gaps between China and the 
EU. The current literature has pointed out that China and the EU have different 
understandings or, as they put it, cognitive gaps, in shared concepts including human rights, 
sovereignty, democracy and soft power (Zhu & Zhang, 2002; Pan, 2010a; Men, 2011; Zhou, 
2011a; Zhang, 2012a; Weil & Jing, 2012; Chen & Song, 2012). The findings of the 
connotation analysis in the chapter show that even in traditional sectors such as the 
economy, politics and communication, laws, and security, the two have different emphases. 
This complements the gap and explains why China-EU disputes also exist in the economy to 
which both attach utmost priority. This indicates that there could be cases in China-EU 
relations where the two achieve consensus but in fact, have different interpretations of the 
consensus. This happened in the case of recognising China’s MES, where China assumed it 
would be granted MES in 2016 when the EU held back.  
At the level of strategies and visions, this chapter also engages with the debate on whether 
the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the EU has been insufficient 
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(Michalski, 2017; Berkofsky, 2017; Cameron & Zheng, 2007; Caira, 2010; Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001; Men, 2014; Holslag, 2011; Scott, 2007a; Zhou, 2016). The 
findings of this chapter imply that on the one hand, China and the EU have a solid foundation 
of cooperation due to their highly compatible priorities in major policy areas. On the other 
hand, however, divergence exists in areas where China and the EU have different priorities, 
such as in Security and Defence and Politics and Diplomacy, but also in traditionally 
converging areas including Economy and Trade and Communications.  
4.5.2 Factors Impacting the Data  
Theoretically, this chapter applies ROC, especially in terms of the power of language in 
shaping rules and social interactions. The rationale behind studying the topic frequencies in 
China and the EU's official discourse on each other is based on the ontological approach 
illustrated in the previous chapter which adopts the view that language and social realities 
are mutually constructive, and language has a shaping power in constructing social realities. 
However, the process by which language shapes social realities, which in this case is China-
EU interactions, is not simple and the actual policies and actions of entities do not always 
synchronise with the discourse (Han, 2017).  
Methodologically, the chapter explores the strength and limits of corpus-driven discourse 
analysis in studying the priorities and emphases of entities. This approach of topic coverage 
analysis and connotation analysis is the first of its kind in terms of the scale of discourse, the 
time frame covered and the involvement of both Chinese discourse and EU discourse. One 
existing piece of literature has adopted Chinese official media discourse in analysing China’s 
expectations of the EU longitudinally (Zhang, 2016b), but adopting official discourse between 
China and the EU for longitudinal corpus-based analysis is a novelty of this research in 
terms of methodology in current China-EU studies.  
While this method and the findings offer a direct, visual output of the priorities in China's 
discourse towards the EU in the policy papers and related documents, the chapter 
recognises the limitations of Word Frequency as an indicator for policy priorities for China 
and the EU, but the aim is to explore the implications one can derive from the quantitative 
data and analyse them in the context of the interactions of China-EU relations and compare 
the data results with the arguments in the existing literature.   
First, not all discourse is sustainable and coherent. Some of the social events or interactions 
are not sustained. They pass as they are not in line with the stable, core meaning, and 
values embodied in the discourse and vice versa. Discourse which does not produce 
sustained realities will also be updated and changed. However, this could be viewed as a 
mixed view of the realist perspective and constructivist perspective. However, due to the 
limited scope of this thesis and its methodological ambition to explore the functionality of 




language creates and shapes realities. Based on this logic, the thesis argues that comparing 
discourse helps to understand the policy convergence and divergence between China and 
the EU. A large sum of discourse only appears for a short time or is updated and revised and 
therefore not manifest in the manner of social realities. Some of the discourse is revised and 
substituted before social realities show correspondence. There is a time lag between 
discourse and social realities. Sometimes discourse gives early signs of how things could 
develop in the future. This feature is useful when predictions are required, although it is not 
what this thesis will focus on.  
Second, several factors affect the extraction of discourse data. For example, this thesis only 
adopts Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP.28 When conducting collocation 
comparisons, documents on specific themes such as trade, cultural communications, and 
human rights, are not included, although China and the EU have sectoral dialogues and 
communications in these areas.29 Thus, when the collocations of the word “economy” are 
made, for example, only those collocations in the corpora applied can be seen and 
compared. Therefore, the topics' coverage and connotation of keywords are just a partial 
representation of their whole presentation in the discourse. This is setting aside the fact that 
the official discourse is part of the whole discourse of interactions between China and the 
EU. However, the corpus-driven analysis combined with human reading must be controlled 
in terms of scale and amount for the sake of feasibility; as a result, only official discourse 
which met the selection criteria are included in the corpora of this thesis.  
Another factor is the design of queries. While the queries were designed in such a way that 
most topics represent a distinct topic area, it is impossible to make queries completely 
independent of each other. Some of the queries have overlapping areas such as those 
between “economy and trade” and “social” or “social” and “environment”. These unavoidable 
overlaps make it unwise and incorrect to infer the relations between topic coverage and 
policy preferences as directly correspondent.  
The above reasons make it insufficient to rely merely on word frequencies to decide whether 
the priorities and interest areas between China and the EU align with each other.  The 
rankings of topic coverage over the years just offers a quick impression of the potential 
emphasis of shared topics between China and the EU but should not be viewed as an 
absolute representation of the policy emphases. Therefore, topic coverage is looked at in a 
more longitudinal manner instead of static and connotations and collocations are necessary 
to further investigate the potential differences regardless of shared terms.  
 
28 Document selection criteria are available in Section 3.3.3. 
29 Sectoral dialogue and communications are beyond the scope of this thesis but future research applying corpus-
driven methods could consider establishing corpora on these sectors.  
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However, with these limitations in mind, it is also important to note that the potential of this 
method goes beyond merely bilateral relations in international relations as the techniques 
are transferrable to other types of relationships in business, communication or other sectors 
of society. With further development, it can also contribute to triangle relationship analysis 
and multilateral analysis.  
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined what corpus-driven discourse analysis, especially with the 
assistance of word frequency searches, collocation, and concordance analysis, can reveal 
about convergence and divergence in China and the EU's priorities and emphases in terms 
of their shared topics.  
The chapter finds that while China and the EU share the top three priorities in the form of 
Economy and Trade, Dialogue and Communication and Politics and Diplomacy, their 
emphases for these three areas are different. Outside these top three topics, there are 
differences in the priorities between China and the EU. China stresses Security and 
Defence, and the EU emphasises Laws and Regulations. The reasons for these differences 
are connected to Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 about the identities and normative power of China 
and the EU. The chapter also presents the longitudinal changes of the topic coverage, which 
aims to explore the connections between the changes in topic coverage and policy 
emphases as well as the historical events.  
Plus, through concordance and connotation comparison, the chapter finds that on the shared 
topics and discourse of Economy and Trade, Market Economy, Politics and Diplomacy, as 
well as Human Rights, China and the EU have different stresses and emphases.  
The chapter engages with Men Jing’s discussions on mismatches in China-EU relations by 
providing empirical evidence of the mismatches and pins down the areas where mismatches 
exist. It also interacts with the literature on the conceptual gaps between China and the EU 
by extending the findings that conceptual gaps not only exist in the concept of sovereignty, 
human rights and democracy but also areas where China and the EU have shared interests 
and terms including Economy and Trade, Dialogue and Communications and Politics and 
Diplomacy. The different emphases of China and the EU in terms of Economy and Trade 
help to understand why China and the EU have frictions in the area of Economy and Trade, 
such as in the case of recognising China’s Market Economy Status, anti-dumping issues and 
issues relating to market assess. The different emphases of the two for Politics and 
Diplomacy contribute to the understanding of the political disputes between the two, such as 
the arms embargo issue.  
Methodology-wise, through a language-oriented constructivist interpretation of the findings 
on the shared topics' coverage and their longitudinal changes, the connotations of the 




topics' coverage over the years (1994-2019), the chapter engages with corpus-driven 
constructivist discourse analysis. It confirms the potential of word frequency and connotation 
analysis as methods linking IR studies and corpus-driven discourse analysis. Word 
frequency helps to review policy priorities. Connotation analysis allows an investigation of 
the different emphases of same terms, which is especially useful when analysing 
misunderstandings in IR. This particularly helps in examining cases where entities have 
shared interests and discourse but clashes or frictions in terms of actual interactions, 






Chapter 5 Identities and Perceptions of the 
Self and the Other  
Another aspect in the perceptions of China and the EU, despite their visions for the structure 
of the world of the future, is their views on their developmental goals, their expectations of 
the future of the other as well as China-EU relations. The social constructivist approach 
stresses the role of identity in shaping relationships. Identity is one aspect linking discourse 
analysis and the constructivist approach in IR studies. Identity and perceptions analysis 
through discourse analysis have been flourishing (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006; Dolón & Todolí, 
2008; Gregorio-Godeo, 2011; Agius & Keep, 2018), as has the study of identity in 
international relations from a constructivist perspective (Albert, Jacobson & Lapid, 2001).  
Research on the identity of the EU covers several aspects including the different 
explanations of European integration (Moravcsik, 1993, 2017; Parsons & Moravcsik, 1999; 
Čeperković, 2014), challenges regarding European Citizenship, immigration and the 
construction of the collective identity of the EU (Garcia, 1992; Jakobson, 2017; 
Kostakopoulou, 2001; Pan, 2012), the identity dilemma of the EU in terms of the deficit of 
democracy and European debt crises (Pan & Yang, 2013) as well as the shifting roles 
between China and the EU on the international arena (Zhdanova & Istomin, 2017; Zhang, 
2016a).  
China’s identity has also been discussed in an extensive manner especially in Chinese 
language literature (Li, 2009; Dong, 2013; Pang, 2013; Yang, 2013; Li & McKerrow, 2019). In 
terms of China-EU studies, there have been constructivist discussions on the role of identity 
(Wong, 2013; Song & Bian, 2016; Yiwei, 2010) as well. 
This chapter studies the EU’s identity in the context of China-EU relations and the gap 
between the EU’s self-identity and China’s perceptions of the EU. It seeks to explore what 
official discourse can reveal about the similarities and difference in China and the EU’s 
perceptions of the self and the other.  
The chapter generates findings in a few areas: 
In terms of common ground, China and the EU have established a consensus on some of 
the principles essential to both China and the EU, which constitutes a solid base for bilateral 
relations. China has been consistent in supporting European integration and recognising the 
impact of the EU as a major power. The EU has been consistent in is official discourse 
respecting China’s One China policy.  
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In terms of differences, despite the consensus, a few distinct themes have arisen from 
Corpus EU Domestic regarding the EU’s identity. Firstly, the EU’s increasing ability to and 
awareness of improving its hard power; secondly, the EU’s perseverance in sticking to and 
implementing its traditional normative power; and thirdly, the EU’s historical view on 
European Integration despite the challenges it has met.  
In terms of China and the EU’s perceptions on each other, while the EU attaches 
overarching emphasis to its normative nature represented by its founding values across 
time, China’s view of the EU is more state-oriented which results in it seeing the EU as 
representing Europe or a potential “pole” in the world which focuses more on integrity and its 
economic power. There are few discussions about the differentiated stances and positions of 
member states in China’s official discourse to the EU as these were addressed mostly in 
China’s discourse to individual member states.   
The EU’s perceptions of China have been changing, from viewing China as an emerging 
country in Asia in its early policy papers even before the Chinese official discourse showing 
this aspect, with an understanding of China’s emergence containing a high degree of 
simplicity mainly focusing on integrating China into the international market and with 
expectations China can be transformed in a way the EU expects which is highly connected 
to the EU’s values. In later years, the EU started to realise that China has its own path and 
plans, which are highly different from the EU’s early understanding of the country’s future.  
Some specific features or themes have emerged from the corpora (Corpus China PPSP, 
EUPPSP, China Domestic and EU Internal) applied in this chapter of which the relevant 
ones were selected, discussed, and expanded with content analysis. Features arising from 
the discourse on the EU’s perception of China are as follow: first, the EU shows an earlier 
recognition of the rise of China while the Chinese official discourse only addresses the 
emergence of China or a more proactive China in its discourse in the last five years; second, 
the EU has been holding reserved attitudes on recognising China’s market economy status 
while China has been striving for MES; third, while China states its national identity as a 
socialist country with Chinese characteristics for which the economy involves the 
coexistence of a market economy and state regulations, the EU regards the Chinese 
economy as state-dominated capitalism (European Commission, 2016b). This mismatch in 
perceiving China’s economic identity constitutes one source of misunderstandings in China-
EU relations.  
China’s self-perception, as evidenced by the discourse, is featured by framing China as a 
strong nation in the East with increasing confidence, especially in the last five years. China’s 
perceptions of the EU share the view that European integration is a historical trend. 
However, while the EU has doubts about the existence of “poles” as illustrated in the last 




has shown awareness of the EU as a big, impactful power in the world and sometimes 
regards EU as a special form of “big country” which indicates that China’s perceptions on the 
EU hold state-oriented understandings. 
In this chapter, data are derived from the corpora established (Corpus China PPSP, Corpus 
EU PPSP, Corpus China Domestic, and Corpus EU Domestics) as well as discourse 
relevant to the subject for content analysis. For example, in analysing, China’s identity, 
discourse outside the corpora were applied. The discourse block, or theme, about China and 
the EU’s self-perception, appeared from this author’s readings of their official discourse 
about their identities, from the documents inside the corpus but also from outside the corpus. 
This is because some official documents, for example, the ones on China’s Cultural Soft 
Power, contains some key descriptions about China’s identity, but the documents are not 
included in Corpus China Domestic due to the selection criteria for the corpus.  
The chapter consists of four sections:  
Section 5.1 discusses China’s self-perception in terms of China’s developmental goals to be 
a strong, confident nation regionally and globally and its outlook on its role in the future 
world, as shown in China’s domestic discourse. It also discusses the EU’s perceptions of 
China, especially the EU’s understanding and recognition of China’s rise, its market 
economy status as well as China’s social-political identity. These themes are selected as 
they emerged from the corpus-driven discourse analysis and constitute differences, and 
potential tension between China and the EU.    
Section 5.2 explores the EU’s self-perception and China’s perceptions of the EU. 
Specifically, it highlights the EU’s emphasis on its ambition to increase its hard power, 
expand its normative power and its vision for keeping European integration as the goal. On 
China’s perceptions of the EU, the section points out the themes that stand out: first, China 
sees the EU as a strategic partner and global power; second, China sees the EU as a 
contributor to the world of multipolarity and globalisation; third, China remains a strong 
supporter of European Integration regardless of the setbacks of Brexit and other crises of the 
EU.  
Section 5.3 analyses China and the EU’s expectations of China-EU relations. In this section, 
the differences or mismatches between China and the EU’s expectations in terms of the 
bilateral relations will be discussed based on the analyses of word clouds. The section also 
points out a few differences in their expectations, as evidenced by the different discourse 
styles between the two discourse makers.     
Section 5.4 discusses the main findings, their implications and significance, as well as the 
engagement of these findings with the existing literature on identity and perception issues in 
China-EU relations.  
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5.1 Identities and Perceptions of China 
This section compares China’s self-perception and the EU’s perception of China, as 
reflected in China’s domestic discourse relevant to China’s self-perception30 and the EU’s 
official discourse on China (Corpus EU PPSP). The purpose is to see whether differences 
exist between the EU’s perceptions and expectations of China and China’s self-perception.  
5.1.1 China’s Identity 
China’s perceptions of itself boil down to contents at two levels: China’s national identity and 
China’s role in the world. In terms of China’s national profile, the government has set the 
tone to build the national image of China as a confident and responsible big power in the 
world. In terms of China’s international position, it aspires to maintain the existing 
international order but not eliminate the chances to revise the parts it regards unfair or 
unfavourable to China and other developing countries. There are also signs that China aims 
to contribute to the current international order but also maintains the right to revise and 
update it where necessary so that the emerging market’s interests are better considered.    
5.1.1.1 A Strong Nation in the East 
One illustration of China’s goal of building its national identity was stated by President Xi in 
the twelfth group study of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on Cultural 
Soft Power in 2013. He put forward a clear definition of the goal of China’s national identity. 
He stated that China should construct its image to meet an identity consisting of four 
nexuses: 
We should pay more attention to building the national image of our 
country by focusing on the following aspects of our nation: China 
as a big country with a profound history, multi-ethnic groups with 
integration, harmonious coexistence of diverse cultures; a big 
country in the East with uncorrupted and transparent politics, 
developed economy, prosperous culture, stable society, united 
people and beautiful landscapes; a responsible big country which 
sticks to peaceful development, facilitates common development, 
maintains international justice and contributes to the human 
beings; a big socialist country which is increasingly open and 
friendly to the world and is full of hope and vibrancy (Xinhuanet, 
2013).31 
This provides a clear definition of China’s vision in its ideal national profile as well as its 
position in the current world system (Xinhuanet, 2013). In Chinese, the phrase “big country” 
has multiple levels of connotations. It refers to both being big in terms of tangible resources 
like size, population, and also being big in invisible aspects such as power, impact, 
 
30 The discourse material comes from sources not limited to Corpus China Domestic. 
31 This piece of text is translated by the author as no official translation is available.  




responsibilities, culture, confidence and national dignity. The “big country” discourse has also 
been illustrated in terms of the aspect of cultural development in China. In 2011, President Xi 
stated in the “Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on Some Major Issues 
Concerning Deepening the Reform of Cultural System” that China should aim to build a 
“strong nation” with a socialist culture:  
(We should) stick to the socialist cultural developmental path with 
Chinese characteristics and make efforts to construct a strong 
country with socialist culture (Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China, 2011).  
In this piece of text, “developmental path with Chinese characteristics” means that while 
China follows the reform and opening-up policy and strives for a more open market 
economy, it has decided to make these happen within the socialist system. “A strong country 
with socialist culture” stresses two aspects. First, China will develop itself so that the country 
stands firm and strong on the international arena. Second, a strong China will be 
accompanied with its social core features and beliefs. Although the discourse does not point 
them out, in other official discourse on China’s diplomatic approaches, there are Five 
Principles of Peaceful Development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2014), the principles of “亲,诚,惠,容 (Amiability, Honesty, Reciprocity and Tolerance)” 
(Kan, 2014) in dealing with neighbouring countries, among other manifestations of socialist 
culture.   
In the 2013 APEC CEO Summit, President Xi illustrated in more detail what a big country 
involves. He stated: 
China is a big country. We cannot afford any drastic mistake on 
issues of fundamental importance, as damage from such mistakes 
will be beyond remedy. Our position is that we must be both bold 
enough to explore and make adventures and also be prudent and 
stable and think triple times before actions (Xi, 2013a).  
In this piece of discourse, President Xi expanded the illustration of what being a big country 
means. The core message here is that China needs to be both prudent but confident in 
dealing with both domestic and international issues. From the constructivist perspective, this 
could be regarded as talking about the psychology or mentality of an entity which gives a 
deep understanding of an entity’s values. The Chinese approach of being a big country, 
according to President Xi, is about balancing the responsibility of setting examples and the 
trends and avoiding hasty decisions and mistakes. Overall, he stresses more being prudent 
and avoiding making mistakes as the consequences could be detrimental.  
5.1.1.2 A More Confident China 
The current Chinese government foresees China as a big country with increasing power. 
China is no longer shying away from the fact that it is a big country with strong impacts on 
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the region and in the world. Compared to the longstanding Chinese foreign strategy since 
1989 that China should “hide its capacity and bide its time” (韬光养晦 Tao Guang Yang Hui) 
(Yang, 2014),  the current setting for the national identity of China involves more confidence 
and responsibility. This indicates that China is adopting a more active foreign policy in order 
to shoulder its due responsibilities and make contributions to the world. As stated by Zhu, 
China is switching from “hide the shines” to “adjust according to the requirements of the 
international environment” (大局统筹 Da Ju Tong Chou) (Yang, 2014; Zhu, 2015).   
More assertive and commissive discourse, as defined in ROC, has appeared in China’s 
official discourse. In President Xi’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) speech in 
2013, for example, he applied the terms “we will” and “China will” instead of the traditional 
“we should” (Xi, 2013b) which indicates concrete plans with confidence (Guanchazhe, 2014). 
He also used a set of parallel sentences starting with “I am confident”:   
I am confident because first of all, China’s growth rate is within a 
reasonable and expected range. (…) 
I am confident because the quality and efficiency of China’s 
economic development are improving steadily. (…)  
I am confident because China has a strong home-grown driving 
force for growth. (…)  
I am confident because Asia Pacific enjoys sound development 
prospects (Xi, 2013b). 
The term ‘Awoken Lion’ was a term put forward by President Xi Jinping about China’s 
improving self-esteem. On 28th, March 2014, Xi Jinping delivered a speech on the Fifty 
Years Anniversary of China-French Ties. He mentioned that: 
The Chinese Dream is about peace. A peaceful global environment 
is a premise of realising the Chinese Dream. For a long time, 
Chinese people have longed for world peace and taken it as an 
obligation. We have been in wars and recessions, and we 
understand how precious peace is. China wishes to work with all 
countries in the world to bring peace to the globe, as well as 
protecting and enjoying it.  
According to history, realising the Chinese dream would bring 
opportunities rather than threats, peace rather than turmoil to the 
world. It will help the world make progress in various aspects.  
Napoleon Bonaparte once said that China is a sleeping lion, and 
when China wakes up, the world will shake. In fact, the lion of 
China has awoken, but what the world sees now, is a peaceful, 




The ‘Awoken Lion’ discourse conveys two essential messages: first, China sees itself as a 
strong country and is determined to be a strong country in the world. Second, China does 
not want to wage war and hopes to maintain peace. 
5.1.1.3 Discourse Blocks on China’s Identity and Its Role in the World of the Future 
Figure 5-1 shows some of the main Chinese domestic discourse blocks on China’s 
developmental goals. 
Figure 5-1 Hierarchy of Discourse Blocks on China’s Developmental Goals 
(Source: own work) 
At the top of this hierarchy is the concept “Community of Common Destiny for All Mankind” 
which had been mentioned sixty-two times in the two years up until President Xi’s speech at 
Moscow State Institute of International Relations in March 2013, according to Xi Jinping in 
different speeches (Xinhua, 2012; Chinanews, 2015). This concept depicts the vision of the 
ideal future world order for the current Chinese government. It pitches the tone for the rest of 
Chinese domestic political discourse. The rest of the domestic discourse is constructed in 
such a way as to align with this final goal. The second line of boxes lists the key concepts 
depicting the Chinese assumption of the key features in the ideal future world: it is a world of 
multipolarity and multilateralism. The New Type of International Relations, which focus on 
win-win cooperation instead of zero-sum game, namely the Cold War mentality where 
entities compete for hegemony, will rule (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic 
of China, 2016). Global governance will feature the participation of countries with more 
equality. At the third level is the Chinese foreign policy under reform. In order to translate 
China’s self-esteem into its position in the future world, China has to carry out a series of 
reforms in its foreign diplomacy. This refers to the Chinese efforts to take a more proactive, 
 
154   
engaging role in regional and international affairs. The last three lines show how China 
constructs its national identity through the official discourse of the China Dream and the 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.  
Figure 5-2 shows China’s goals and visions for its national, regional and global development. 
In other words, China’s visions on the ideal future world and China’s positions in it.   
Figure 5-2 China's Perception of China's Identity and China in the Future World 
(Source: own work) 
 
As Figure 5-2 shows, the sphere consists of four circles. In the core of the sphere is China’s 
national identity, which is where all the other identities of China derive from. Official 
discourse pitching China’s current national identity include the discourse of the China Dream 
and the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. Although these two include contents on 
improving China’s international status, they are primarily about China’s economic and social 
development. The circle above that presents the goal for China’s regional role, which can be 
summarised as an aspiration to become “A Big Responsible Country in the East”. This 
extends to China’s idea on the ideal world with New Types of International Relations, Multi-
polarity and Multilateralism, Global Governance and Democratisation of International 
Relations as the featuring international orders. The outer circle in the graph, finally, presents 
China’s idea of the ideal human society, which is ‘A Community of Common Destiny for All 
Mankind’ in the Chinese political discourse.  
Figure 5-2 presents a multi-layered and systematic structure to illustrate China’s domestic 
discourse blocks for its goal in national and international development. This helps to explain 




the future. The links between each level of identity goals are not automatic and explicit. In 
order to translate China’s self-esteem into its position in the future world, China has to carry 
out a series of reforms in its foreign diplomacy. To reach each higher-level goal requires 
China to take a more engaging, responsible and accountable role in regional and 
international affairs in the first place.   
5.1.2 EU’s Perceptions of China 
This section reviews the contents on the EU’s expectations of China based on text searches 
in Corpus EU PPSP.  
Figure 5-3 shows the query design for the EU’s perceptions and expectations of China. This 
text search is carried out for Corpus EU PPSP with the purpose of understanding the EU’s 
expectations of China’s development as well as China’s role in the world.  
Figure 5-3 Query Design for the EU’s Perceptions and Expectations of China 
 
A few themes in the EU’s expectations of China and China-EU relations have been found to 
be frequent and important in the official discourse. These are as follow: first, the EU shows 
earlier recognition of the rise of China while the Chinese official discourse has only 
addressed the emergence of China or a more proactive China in its discourse in the last five 
years; second, the EU has been holding reserved attitudes on recognising China’s market 
economy status while China has been striving for MES; third, while China states its national 
identity as a socialist country with Chinese characteristics with an economy which involves 
the coexistence of a market economy and state regulations, the EU regards the Chinese 
economy as “a state-dominated model of capitalism” (European Commission, 2016b: 17). 
This mismatch in perceiving China’s economic identity constitutes one source of 
misunderstandings in China-EU relations.  
5.1.2.1 Rising China 
The first theme of the EU’s perceptions of China with high coverage is the rise of China. The 
EU has recognised the rise of China since the late 1990s. The EU’s 1995 policy paper, “A 
Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations”32 stated that: 
 
32 This document is included as it is important in understanding the EU’s perceptions of and policies for China 
although strictly speaking, it is about China-Europe relations instead of China-EU relations. 
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The rise of China is unmatched amongst national experiences 
since the Second World War (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1995: 3).  
The EU has also shown its support for integrating China into the global market and its 
support for China to play a larger role in regional and global issues.  
Over recent years China has been forging a more coherent and 
outward-looking foreign policy to match its growing economic 
weight. The EU should build on this by encouraging China to play a 
proactive and responsible role in global issues33 (Commission of 
the European Communities 1998: 6).  
What is notable is that back in 1998, the EU already had quite a high expectation of China. 
The 1998 EU’s policy paper on China stated that:  
China has become at once more assertive and more responsible in 
its foreign policy, both regionally and globally. China’s role in 
promoting peace in Korea and Cambodia reflects its renewed 
commitment to the development of Asia as a whole (Commission 
of the European Communities, 1998: 4). 
These two pieces of discourse from the 1998 policy paper show that the EU has already 
pitched its policy to engage China more in global issues in the 1990s. Expectations of China 
have been high since then. However, the EU also showed some changes in its expectations, 
which focus more on the challenges China was facing. In the 2003 policy paper, the EU 
stated that: 
(…) China’s moves towards a more proactive and responsible 
foreign policy continue to be dominated by its focus on domestic 
stability and economic development (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2003: 6).  
From this discourse in 2003, the EU has shown reserved opinions about China’s rise. The 
tone has been toned down with reservations as compared to the positive reactions to the 
emergence of China in 1995 and 1998. Although the Chinese domestic discourse reflects a 
more proactive China, the more confident Chinese discourse starts after 2013 when the 
current leadership took over while the EU’s discourse on the rise of China started about ten 
years earlier, and then experienced changes in tone. That is to say that China has been 
more prudent in its self-evaluation than the EU both in terms of the tones it applies and in 
terms of the timing of when more confident discourse is made mainstream. Since the EU 
recognised the rise of China earlier than it was officially recognised by the Chinese 
government, China has experienced a certain degree of pressure, especially when the EU 
 





emphasises China’s responsibilities. However, the discourse on responsibility has been 
received better in China overall in recent years with China’s foreign policies becoming more 
confident, more active than defensive as discussed in the section on China’s self-perception.  
5.1.2.2 The Disputed Market Economy Status (MES) 
The EU’s refusal to grant China MES is one unresolved issue between China and the EU. As 
a Non-Market Economy (NME) country, a third country’s trading figure is used, instead of 
China’s actual figure, to judge anti-dumping cases under the current calculation methods of 
WTO. China would like to gain MES to reduce the impacts of this unfavourable calculation 
method to China. For the EU, it faces the dilemma that on the one hand, it has an obligation 
to abide by the WTO rules that individual members have to ensure their national laws are 
consistent with WTO rules, and according to Section 15 of the Protocol on the Accession of 
the People’s Republic of China (World Trade Organisation, 2001), the methods to calculate 
whether a NME country is dumping should expire after fifteen years once China has 
established the status of a market economy. On the other hand, granting China MES would 
mean the EU’s specific sectors, such as the steel sector, which relies heavily on trade 
defence instruments (TDI), could face challenges. Granting China MES will recognise China 
as a free market equal in terms of resolving trade disputes (EurActiv.com AFP, 2016).  In 
fact, only 0.5% of all Chinese exports to the EU are affected by anti-dumping which does not 
affect the value of trade between China and the EU greatly; however, granting China MES 
would reflect on more dimensions of certain industries at times. Therefore, there are 
arguments that granting China MES would involve triangle relations between China, the EU 
and the US (Rémond, 2007; European Commission, 2016c).  
This issue, as reflected in the EU’s policy papers on China, is not an independent case but 
generated from the overall context that the EU has been expecting China to develop a 
market with a Western style. If we look at the discourse on China’s market economy in 
Corpus EU PPSP, the contents reflect a change of attitudes regarding China’s market 
economy development although the EU has been showing a considerable extend of 
reserved attitudes on China’s MES throughout the years. The longitudinal analysis of the 
discourse shows that the EU has gone from being supportive of China’s market economy 
although recognising the challenges, to the stage of opening up more channels for Chinese 
companies in Europe due to the development of the Chinese market economy, to the stage 
in 2006 when it became very reserved again on China’s market economy status. In the EU’s 
1995 policy paper on China, it was stated that:  
The economic reform process launched by Deng Xiaoping sixteen 
years ago has dramatically changed the economic and social 
landscape in China. (...) It is in Europe’s interests that this trend is 
accepted as irreversible. (...) However, China still falls well short of 
having a full market economy, with adequate social protection, 
including freedom of association for employees. Reform of state-
owned industry and the creation of a social security system to cope 
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with its consequences remain as key challenges for the future. The 
establishment of an effective legal framework, properly enforced, is 
an essential element in the process (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1995: 9). 
This text confirms that the EU is supportive of China’s market economy development and 
regards it as an irreversible trend. Overall, the EU was supportive of China’s market 
economy development trend back then. This positivity continued to be reflected in the 2000 
report, the “Implementation of the Communication ‘Building a comprehensive partnership 
with China’”. In the 2000 document, the EU emphasised that the EC had been granting more 
Chinese exporters market economy treatment and anti-dumping regulations had been 
amended with the market-driven changes happening inside China  (European Commission, 
2000: 9). The documents stress overall progress of trade between China and the EU without 
mentioning too much about the “challenges” in China’s market economy.  
This attitude, however, became more critical, with a concerned tone in the EU’s 2016 China 
policy paper:  
The EU welcomes productive Chinese investment in Europe 
provided it is in line with EU law and regulations. In return, the EU 
expects improved market access for foreign companies in China 
and a level playing field for business and investment. China should 
reduce the number of protected sectors and minimise national 
security reviews (European Commission, 2016b: 8).  
Plus, this document addresses a couple of areas which the EU is not satisfied with, including 
the industrial overcapacity in China: 
The EU is seriously concerned about industrial over-capacity in a 
number of industrial sectors in China, notably steel production. If 
the problem is not properly remedied, trade defence measures 
may proliferate, spreading beyond steel to other sectors such as 
aluminium, ceramics and wood-based products (European 
Commission, 2016b: 7). 
Viewing the discourse in the context of 2016 makes it easier to understand why the EU was 
applying a more critical perspective to China’s market status. The year 2016 was the year 
China could have been granted MES as based on Section 15. That is to say that the tone 
and the focus in the discourse connect closely with the context of China-EU relations when 
the document was issued and reflect the interactions between China and the EU.  
5.1.2.3 China’s Social-political Identity 
Apart from the EU and China’s time difference in recognising China’s stages of development 
and China’s market economy, another aspect where the EU has shown a different 
understanding of China is about China’s social-political structure. In the EU’s 2016 policy 




The EU should seek to build trust and co-operation with China 
based on shared interests. However, EU-China relations must also 
deal with the reality that China is a one-party system with a state-
dominated model of capitalism (European Commission, 2016b: 
17).  
As compared to the Chinese discourse in describing China’s identity as a “socialist cultural 
developmental path with Chinese characteristics” and a “strong country with socialist culture” 
(Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2011: Section 2), the EU’s 
descriptions of China’s social-political system is different from that of Chinese official 
discourse.  
Before ending this section on perceptions of China, it should be mentioned that overall, the 
similarities between China’s self-perception and the EU’s perception of China outweigh the 
differences. A few core similarities are the foundation of China-EU relations including the 
EU’s support for the One China policy, the “One Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong and 
Macao, China and the EU’s shared interests in the economy, reform and innovation as well 
as other areas of cooperation (European Commission, 2016b). However, the differences 
have affected the resolution of disputes including the MES and trade disputes, the EU’s arms 
embargo on China, Europe’s perceived ambivalent mindset towards China’s rise as well as 
challenges from a more strategic perspective such as the relatively moderate political and 
security cooperation, as compared to the strong economic cooperation, between China and 
the EU.  
5.2 Identities and Perceptions of the EU 
This section focuses on the EU’s perceptions of the developmental goals of the EU and the 
role of the EU in the future globe in comparison with China’s expectations of the EU. The 
analysis is mainly based on Corpus EU Domestic, but the materials used also extend to 
relevant sources outside the corpus.  
On the EU’s developmental goals, a few aspects stand out. These include the EU’s will to 
improve its hard power hand in hand with its soft power and traditional normative power, as 
well as the EU’s vision of European integration despite the setbacks and challenges. The 
EU’s self-perception and its identity are largely bound to the EU’s understandings of these 
aspects. These departure points and developmental goals of the EU play a fundamental role 
in determining the EU’s approaches to China.  
5.2.1 EU’s Self-perception 
A few distinct themes have arisen from Corpus EU Domestic regarding the EU’s identity. 
Firstly, the EU’s increasing ability and awareness in improving its hard power; secondly, the 
EU’s perseverance in sticking to and implementing its traditional normative power; and 
thirdly, the EU’s historical view of European Integration despite the challenges it has met.  
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5.2.1.1 The EU’s Increasing Hard Power 
The first prominent theme about the EU’s development is that the EU is determined to 
improve its hard power alongside its traditional soft power and normative power. In the 
Global Strategy of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy titled “Shared Vision, Common 
Action: A Stronger Europe” issued in June 2016, the importance for the EU to improve its 
hard power, including military capabilities, appeared multiple times. The following are two 
instances:  
In this fragile world, soft power is not enough: we must enhance 
our credibility in security and defence (European Union Global 
Strategy, 2016: 44). 
The European Union has always prided itself on its soft power – 
and it will keep doing so because we are the best in this field. 
However, the idea that Europe is an exclusively “civilian power” 
does not do justice to an evolving reality. (…). For Europe, soft and 
hard power go hand in hand (European Union Global Strategy, 
2016: 4).  
The discourse on the EU as owning and needing a combination of soft and hard power 
shows that the EU regards itself not only as a soft power or civilian power but also one with 
increasing hard power. The EU has been promoting its hard power in this document by 
emphasising that it was deploying seventeen military as well as civilian operations at the 
moment the 2016 European Union Global Strategy was issued (European Union Global 
Strategy, 2016: 4). 
The EU’s increasing attention on its hard power also reflects its will to cooperate with China 
on a broader issue of security and peacekeeping in the world. For example, in the EU’s 2016 
policy paper, “Elements for a New EU Strategy on China”, the EU states that: 
The EU should seek a broader shared foreign policy agenda with 
China based on encouraging China’s constructive and active 
participation in providing security as a global public good. (…)  
Building on China’s constructive engagement during the 
negotiation of the Iran deal, the EU should seek active co-
operation with China in areas such as Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, 
the migration challenge, and the overall settlement in the Middle 
East (European Commission, 2016b: 11). 
This emphasis on hard power is one of the critical elements shown from the EU’s discourse 
on its development. However, it does not mean the EU will reduce its normative power. The 
EU is still a normative power at its core and, as it states in its official discourse, will continue 
to embody its normative power.  
5.2.1.2 The EU as a Normative Power 
Although the EU being a normative power is a tradition, it is still necessary to follow the EU’s 




normative power, as shown in the corpus-driven text searches, is still one of the most 
important themes in the EU’s official discourse. The following two examples reconfirm that 
the EU will not change its core values and will keep promoting them as they are defining 
within Europe, or as the discourse puts it is “what is peculiarly European”(Garcia, 1992: 8).  
The concepts of democracy, civil society, rule-based system and 
rights-oriented political culture which originated from Europe and 
spread to other parts of the world are essential for other entities in 
the world to understand what is peculiarly European (Garcia, 1992: 
8).  
This confirms the EU’s core values which consist of the dimensions of the EU’s normative 
power. The concepts of “democracy, civil society, rule-based system, and right-oriented 
culture” play a large part in the EU’s foreign policies. Apart from the value-based 
considerations, another aspect of the EU’s foreign policy is the EU’s interests:  
The European Union is entrusted with the task of developing a 
common foreign and security policy to enable it to protect its 
interests and values as well as playing a constructive role in world 
politics (Commission of the European Communities, 1994: 7). 
These two pieces of discourse confirm that the EU will protect not only its interests but also 
its values. These two aspects coexist in the EU’s policymaking and are indispensable and 
intertwined. This is essential for understanding China-EU relations and was especially 
apparent when we discussed China and the EU’s priorities in Chapter 4. The priorities based 
on the topic frequency search in Chapter 4 and the contents, or collocations on China and 
the EU’s priorities illustrated in expanded detail above are, overall, consistent with each 
other. It is helpful to understand what the bottom lines for China and the EU are, or in other 
words, what they will not, or are extremely unlikely to, compromise on. On this basis of 
mutual understanding and knowledge, improvements in areas where the two have common 
interests are more likely to be implemented without acute disputes.  
5.2.1.3 European Integration as the Goal  
European integration is another aspect essential to the understanding of the EU’s goals and 
its identity, which create one of the most important foundations for China-EU relations: the 
support and belief in European integration. European integration started when Robert 
Shuman proposed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (The European 
Union, 1950). The original and primary drive of European integration was to prevent wars 
after the catastrophe of World War I. In 1950, the Shuman Declaration was presented, 
envisioning an integrated Europe based on industrial cooperation and sharing resources. 
The declaration was presented by French foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950. 
It proposed the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), whose members 
would pool coal and steel production:  
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By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High 
Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other 
member countries, this proposal will lead to the realisation of the 
first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to 
the preservation of peace (Foundation Robert Shuman, 1950: 
para.11). 
From the Declaration of the Robert Shuman Foundation, we can see that the EU’s identity 
was initially bound to the coal and steel industry which is on the resource side of 
intergovernmental cooperation instead of the soft power side. The idea was that this would 
lead to spill-over effects in other areas so that a more unified European identity and 
recognition, as well as cooperation in social, political and cultural aspects, would take place 
over time. Back then, Shuman as well as the main drafter of the Shuman Declaration, 
another Father of the EU, Jean Monnet, were aware that European Integration was a long-
term process rather than a one-off task:  
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It 
will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de 
facto solidarity (Foundation Robert Shuman, 1950: para.4) 
As Shuman and Monnet predicted, European integrations have never been a single-direction 
process. EU integration has gone through a long historical process. The core principles of 
the EU, single market, freedom of capitals and freedom of people has brought the EU 
member states together. Among these three core principles, the single market is an essential 
part of European Integration. The move to the single market consists of a series of events 
and is an on-going process instead of a single event. The European Coal and Steel 
Community was created in 1951, and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 
based on the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty of Rome pitched the goal of setting a Common 
Market. In 1985, the European Council issued the White Paper Completing the Internal 
Market (European Commission, 1985). In 1986, the Single European Act was signed and 
pushed the single market forward and set the goal to make a single market in 1992 (Council 
of the European Union, 1986). The single market aimed to realise the Four Free Movements: 
the free movement of people, services, money and goods (the Member States, 1986). The 
single market started in 1993 with twelve countries participating but did not function as well 
as expected. In 2001, the Single Market Act One (European Commission, 2011) was issued, 
and in 2012 the Single Market Act Two (European Commission, 2012).  
The long-term historical vision of Shuman and Monnet has proved to be appropriate in 
hindsight considering multiple obstacles and setbacks in European integration, including the 
EU constitutional crisis in 2005 (Grosskopf, 2007) and the on-going Brexit. However, overall 
European integration, over the years, has still achieved the highest level of regional 
integration in the world. Since the European Community was established in 1957, the EU 




Croatia joined the EU. In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty was signed, which is the most recent 
ratification of the European Treaty and EN common treaty. This also provided the legal 
framework and tools for European citizens’ identity recognition (Moncada, 2010).   
5.2.2 China’s Perceptions of the EU 
5.2.2.1 The EU as a Strategic Power and Partner 
This section analyses China’s perceptions of the EU. More specifically, this section highlights 
the themes that stand out in Corpus China PPSP on China’s understandings of the EU and 
China-EU relations. The text search query designed for searching about relevant contents 
about China’s perceptions of the EU is “欧盟是 (the EU is)” OR “中欧关系是 (China-EU 
relationship is)” OR  “中国和欧盟是 (China and the EU are)” OR  “希望欧盟 (hope that the 
EU)” OR  “中国欧盟(China-EU)” OR “中国和欧盟 (China and the EU)”.  
 
Table 5-1 Query Results (Text Tree) on China’s View on the EU and China-EU Relations  
Based on the search result summary as shown in Table 5-1, this section will highlight some 
themes which appear frequently and are apparent in the generated results. Due to the 
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limited scope of the thesis, not all the references, or quotations related to the topic, have 
been included in the analysis. Only the representative ones are selected to support the 
themes found and the arguments around it.  
The first emergent theme is that China views the EU as a strategic partner and power and 
would like to establish a comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU around the themes 
of peace, prosperity, reforms, and civilization (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2014). In China’s 2014 policy paper on the EU, there is one dedicated 








欧关系的全球影响力 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2014, Section 2)。 
The EU is an important strategic partner for China in China’s 
peaceful development and its promotion of multipolarity in the 
world. It is also an important partner in cooperation for China to 
realise the “New Four Modernisations” and “Two Centenary 
Goals”. Enhancing and developing China-EU relations is an 
important issue for China to establish a new type of big country 
with long-term, stable, healthy development. China is dedicated to 
constructing a partnership with the EU in four aspects: “Peace, 
Growth, Reform and Civilization” and comprehensively 
implementing the “China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation” in the process of China’s comprehensive, in-depth 
reform and recovery stage of the European economy. China hopes 
to further improve the global impact of China-EU relations34 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
2014, Section 2).  
In this piece of text, China has provided its rationale in cooperating with the EU and has 
confirmed that China-EU relations are consistent with China’s development goals. It also 
implies that China-EU relations are equal to China’s relations with other major countries in 
the world. This indicates that although the EU is not a nation-state, China positions the EU 
as equal to a major power in the world. China’s 2014 policy paper on the EU is its second 
and China’s most recent policy paper on the EU which was published in 2018 (Xinhua, 
2018). Instead of issuing policy papers every year or every other year, China tends to have 
longer intervals between the issuing of each policy paper. This reflects the different 
approaches between China and the EU in terms of reporting their policies to each other. The 
 




reasons behind this may be related to the fact that the EU is an intergovernmental 
organisation. It, therefore, needs to align and update its policies frequently to offer guidance 
to the member states and EU institutions. China’s policy paper aims to state China’s 
perceptions of the EU and China-EU relations. It tends to focus only on the core, relatively 
stable principles for China-EU relations and is only updated when there are substantial 
contents added to the topic.  
5.2.2.2 The EU as a Contributor to Multipolarity and Globalisation 
In Corpus China PPSP, several collocations of the text searches related to China’s 
expectations on the EU and China-EU relations state that both China and the EU support 




合作伙伴 (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the 
European Union, 2013: para.1)。 
Premier Li Keqiang, in the 16th China-EU Summit with European 
Council President Van Rompuy and European Commission 
President Barroso in the Great Hall of the People, pointed out that 
the European Union is one important pole in the multipolar world 
as well as an important partner in cooperation in the process of 
China’s modernisation35 (Mission of the People’s Republic of China 
to the European Union, 2013: para.1). 
In this text, China regards the EU as a “pole” in the multipolar world. Relating to the previous 
discourse that China regards the EU as an important issue for China to establish new type 
relations with major countries in the world (European Commission, 2013), China’s tendency 
to understand the EU as a whole in terms of its foreign relations with China is evidenced. 
The following piece of text shows China’s perceptions of the EU in terms of the EU’s support 
of multipolarity and multilateralism as well: 
中欧都支持多边主义和多极化，中方一直坚定支持欧洲一体化，支
持欧洲经济和金融稳定 (Mission of the People’s Republic of China 
to the European Union, 2014b: para.2)。  
China always firmly supports European integration as well as the 
stability of the European economy and financial conditions36 
(Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 
2014b: para.2).  
 
35 Translated by the author. 
36 Translated by the author.  
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This text confirms that China and Europe37 both support multilateralism and multipolarity. 
The support for multipolarity and multilateralism, as argued in the previous chapter, are both 
focused on maintaining peace and diversity in the world. This, plus China’s supports of 
European integration, or China’s vision of European integration as an irreversible trend, 
stand at the core of China’s perceptions of the EU and China-EU relations.  
One related argument in Chinese literature is that the Chinese government sees the EU as a 
special form of big country in China’s foreign policies (Xiao, 2014). Since 2014 there have 
been signs that the Chinese government has been taking the EU increasingly as a unified 
entity as evidenced by China’s increasing dialogues with the EU and its second policy paper 
on the EU. Since the traditional Chinese diplomatic strategy takes “the big countries ties as 
the key, the neighbouring countries’ ties as the primary consideration, the developing 
countries as the basis and the multi-lateral relations as the stage”,38 if China does take the 
EU as a special kind of big country, it would mean that China-EU relations are on the first tier 
in China’s foreign diplomacy where China-US relations would be positioned as well.  
5.2.2.3  European Integration Remains the Direction for the Future 
The support from China on European integration is another foundation of China-EU relations 
which is connected to China’s perceptions of the EU as a major player in the world. The 
director of the mission of China to the EU, Ambassador Yang Yanyi, commented on China’s 








的成就是巨大的。(Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the 
European Union, 2014a: Section 4). 
Question: How does China view the role and functions of the EU in 
the current world? Will President Xi continue to express China’s 
support for European Integration? 
Answer: the EU is one important power in the multipolar world. As 
the most integrated Union of developed countries, the EU is in a 
relatively high stage of economic and social development. The EU 
enjoys a vast market, abundant capital and advanced technology. 
 
37 The text applies the word 中欧关系 (Zhong Ou Guanxi) which indicates China-Europe relations. 
However, as Herman Van Rompuy was the former president of the European Council, “中欧关系” 
(Zhong Ou Guanxi) in this context could refer to China-EU relations as well. 




It also has its own religions and culture. The EU plays an important 
role in international affairs. European integration is the 
manifestation of the dream of European people in their pursuit of 
peace and prosperity for centuries. The path the EU is following 
has not been followed by any others before. Unquestionably, the 
achievement of European integration is huge39 (Mission of the 
People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2014a: Section 
4). 
In this text, the EU’s economy, the market as well as its history and culture are regarded as 
both unique and developed. European integration has been understood as a common goal 
of European citizens to maintain peace. This confirms that China supports European 
integration, and the EU is regarded as an important pole in the world. One point worth 
discussing though is whether the co-occurrence of the discourse on European integration 
and the discourse on the EU as a pole in the world suggests that it is Europe as a whole that 
China views as an important pole of the world. Reflecting on the vagueness in the Chinese 
language, China-Europe relations are referred to as 中欧关系 (Zhong Ou Guanxi) while 
China-EU relations are referred to as 中国——欧盟关系 (China-EU relations) but in some 
cases, the two terms have been used interchangeably. For example, in the above question 
and answer session’s report, both the term “ European Integration” and the term “EU 
integration” appeared (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 
2014a).  
The ambiguity between the concept of the EU and Europe also exists in the non-Chinese 
literature in the sense that when the EU is addressed, more attention is given to the 
traditional, leading EU member states. For example, in Baker’s article, when “Europe” is 
addressed, the EU member states are the objects under discussion (Baker, 2002: 45). The 
Chinese literature contains more vagueness on this. Both “China-EU relations” and “China-
Europe relations” are translated into “中欧关系” (Zhong Ou Guanxi) in some cases for the 
sake of simplicity while the precise translation of “China-EU relations” should be “中国—欧盟
关系” (Zhongguo— Oumeng Guanxi). Therefore, it is sometimes hard to tell from the title of a 
Chinese article whether the author is talking about China-EU or China-Europe relations.  
This is partly because the Chinese language is a high context language which contains more 
vagueness, and the connotations of the words are highly based on the context. Meanwhile, 
this also has to do with the government’s approach to the EU and the Chinese public’s 
perception of the EU. The emphasis of China’s diplomacy includes its relations with 
peripheral countries, big powers, developing countries and multilateral organisations. On the 
other hand, there are two levels of the connotation of Europe for Chinese decision-makers 
and scholars. One is at the member states’ level, especially considering the member states’ 
 
39 Translated by the author. 
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important roles in international organisations such as the UN Security Council or G8. Another 
is the EU intergovernmental, or supranational level (Feng, 2009: 61). 
It is subject to discussion, therefore, whether there is a possibility that China is referring to 
the EU as a pole, or whether it is more referring to an integrated Europe with the EU as its 
intergovernmental organisation as a major power equal to a pole in a multipolarity instead of 
the European Union’s institutions on their own.  
China’s perceptions of European integration as an irreversible trend and the EU, or 
potentially the integrated EU, as a pole in the world, are connected to China’s own identity as 
a unified nation with sovereignty as its core interests. Therefore, China’s understanding of 
the EU and Europe are related to China’s state-oriented view of the world. In another 
example, the then director of the Mission of PRC to the EU, Ambassador Wu Hailong, 
commented in an article in People’s Daily that:  
欧盟是最大的发达国家集团，中国是最大的发展中国家 (Wu, 2013: 
para.3)。  
The EU is the biggest group of developed countries. China is the 
biggest developing country (Wu, 2013: para.3).  
This reflects that China’s view on both itself and the EU are state-oriented. More emphasis is 
given to the EU as the union of developed countries in the West. This suggests that it could 
be the intergovernmental features, instead of the “supranational” aspect that China is 
focusing on in its policy to the EU.  
5.3 Expectations for China-EU Relations 
This section compares China and the EU’s expectations for each other, and China-EU 
relations as embodied from the corpus-driven searches of Corpus China PPSP and Corpus 
EU PPSP. Specifically, word clouds are applied to compare the main topics attached to this 
theme by China and the EU.  
5.3.1 Word Clouds 
Figure 5-4 shows the word cloud of the file on China’s view on the EU and China-EU 
relations which include all the references generated from the same text search query 
mentioned in Section 5.2.2.1: “欧盟是 (the EU is)” OR “中欧关系是 (China-EU relationship 
is)” OR  “中国和欧盟是 (China and the EU are)” OR  “希望欧盟 (hope that the EU)” OR  “中国





Figure 5-4 Word Cloud for China’s Perceptions and Expectations of the EU 
 
 
As shown, apart from 中国 (China) and 欧盟 (EU), the top frequency words include 发展
(development), 关系(relationship), 合作(cooperate), 世界(the world), 伙伴(partnership), 和平 
(peace)，领导人(leaders)，政治(politics)，会晤(meetings)，加强(enhance)，积极(positive), 
among others. The overall tone is highly positive, and dialogue and politics appear to be 
quite frequent. This may relate to the fact that most contents about China’s exceptions of the 
EU and China-EU relations are expressed and delivered during speeches, summaries of 
meetings and summits as well as high-level leaders’ meetings.  
Figure 5-5 shows the top frequency meaningful words40 on the EU’s view of China and 
China-EU relations41 based on Corpus EU PPSP.  
 
 
40 In this word frequency search, words under 4 letters long are filtered out in order to make sure most of the words 
produced are meaningful words. 
41 Generated from text search on Corpus EU PPSP. 
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Figure 5-5 Word Cloud for the EU’s Perceptions and Expectations of China 
 
 
As we can see, the top frequency meaningful words in the data output file based on the text 
search for the EU’s perceptions and expectations of China, include “human policy”, 
“security”, “safety”, “education” and “environment”. The topics indicated by these words are 
highly consistent with the EU’s topic priorities, as found in Chapter 4. Compared with the 
word cloud figure of China’s expectations of the EU and China-EU relations, this word cloud 
shows more words focused on specific areas of cooperation while the word cloud for China’s 
expectations of the EU shows more words on overall developmental trends. This indicates 
that in terms of giving details and action plans in each area, the EU’s official discourse on 
China offers more information compared with China’s discourse on the EU. Meanwhile, 
words showing a positive attitude, including “support”, “agreement”, “partnership” and 
“development” are also among the top meaningful words in the list. This indicates that the 
general tone of the EU’s perceptions and expectations is positive. The positivity is consistent 
with China’s general tone on the EU and China-EU relations.  
5.3.2 Differences in the Level of Detail 
Despite the word clouds, the contents and discourse style of Corpus China PPSP and 
Corpus EU PPSP show differences. Corpus EU PPSP covers a wide range of policies of and 
conditions in China in detail and with more hierarchies (sections and subtitles) in the 
documents. For example, product safety, minority policies, China’s policies in relation to 
Africa, China’s population issues, migration, human trafficking as well as other economic, 
social-political situations in China have all been mentioned and discussed in the EU’s 
discourse.    
Comparatively speaking, China’s official discourse on the EU does not cover as many details 
about the specific problems the EU is facing within itself although general situations in 
Europe or the EU, such as integration challenges and debt crisis are addressed. Instead, the 




China-EU relations. This may be due to a few reasons. First, the belief in non-interference 
makes China comment less on the specific issues with the EU MS or the challenges of the 
EU as these would be considered “domestic” issues especially if China views the EU as 
equal to a big country. Second, EU PPSP has MS and other EU institutions as its audience 
while Corpus China PPSP has the EU when there are translated versions or the different 
levels of Chinese government as the audience. The audience of Corpus China PPSP does 
not have a high requirement as that of Corpus EU PPSP to know about specific action plans 
to coordinate the policies and actions of MS. This could also be related to the fact that China 
has a shorter history in issuing official discourse on its foreign policy.  
5.4 Discussion: Findings and Significance 
This section summarises the key findings of this chapter and discusses how the findings 
contribute to the existing literature on the role of identities and perceptions of China and the 
EU. The empirical findings cover three aspects: first, the mismatches in China and the EU’s 
expectations of each other; second, the identity features of China and the EU, respectively, 
which are not mismatches but not particularly understood or emphasised by the other; and 
lastly, the longitudinal changes in China and the EU’s views of themselves and the other.  
The section also reviews the methods applied in this chapter, especially in terms of 
combining foreign policy discourse (Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP) and 
domestic discourse (Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Domestic) for an integrated 
approach in corpus-driven content analysis.    
Methodologically, the chapter discusses both the mismatches between China's self-esteem 
and the EU's perception of China and vice versa and the mismatch between China's 
expectations of the EU and vice versa. In other words, it distinguishes the differences 
between gaps in perception and gaps in expectation. Expectations involve normative power 
and a future-oriented perspective, which is an area corpus-based discourse analysis can 
help to inform. Concordance searches on normative words such as “need to”, “should”, 
among other normative words indicating expectations, along with word clouds which 
visualise the output of aspects of normative contents, contribute to giving a quick impression 
of the actor's expectations and aspirations.  
Empirically, although the chapter focuses on discovering the differences between China and 
the EU’s perceptions on themselves and the other, the analysis shows that the shared 
understandings and similarities between the two stands at the core of China-EU relations. 
China and the EU have established consensus on some of the principles essential to both 
China and the EU, which constitutes a solid base for bilateral relations. China has been 
consistent in supporting European integration and recognising the impact of the EU as a 
major power. The EU has been consistent in is official discourse respecting China’s One 
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China policy, which sets the political foundation for China to retain its diplomatic relations 
with the EU. 
Despite the considerate level of mutual support and understanding, different emphases exist 
in China and the EU’s perceptions and expectations of each other. These mismatches can 
sometimes be covert instead of overt, namely difference emphases can exist even when the 
discourse is shared.  
The first group of findings is about the EU’s perceptions of China and the mismatches 
between these and China’s self-perception. China’s self-perception, as evidenced by the 
discourse, features framing China as a strong nation in the East with increasing confidence, 
especially in the last five years. While both China and the EU have a vision that China will 
and should play an important role in the South East Asia region but also across the globe in 
general, China emphasises national confidence, dignity and being respected while the EU 
expects China to lead in the resolution of regional issues such as the denuclearisation of the 
Korean Peninsula.   
The second group of findings is about the mismatches between China’s perceptions of the 
EU and the EU’s self-perception. 
Although European integration is the direction and future both China and the EU expect, 
China is more confident about European integration and considers there to be fewer 
complications in this matter than the EU. China’s perceptions of the EU include the view that 
European integration is an irreversible historical trend. There are fewer discussions about 
the differentiated stances and positions about member states in China’s official discourse on 
the EU, although these are addressed in China’s discourse on individual member states.   
Meanwhile, while the EU holds doubts about the existence of “poles” as illustrated in the last 
chapter. China regards the EU as a “pole” of the multipolar world. The Chinese government 
has shown awareness of the EU as a big, impactful power in the world and sometimes 
regards the EU as a special form of “big country” which indicates that China’s perceptions on 
the EU include more state-oriented understandings than the EU’s perception of itself. 
This chapter also indicates that Chinese official discourse on the EU tends to focus on 
general policy areas with positive aspirations but less specific, normative requirements on 
the EU while the EU's discourse on China has expectations and hopes pinned down more 
specifically.   
On top of that, the discourse blocks on China's ideal self and its perception of the ideal future 
of the world, as presented in Figure 5.1, is a novelty as such hierarchy of discourse blocks 
which provide a general picture of China's identity in the current literature.  
In terms of China and the EU’s expectations of the other, Zhang Li’s work on the Chinese 




reflexive and  impacted by China’s identity, interests and perceptions of the EU (Zhang, 
2016b). Zhang’s work uses the media discourse in China as the data source. This research 
shares a similarity in terms of its constructive theoretical approach and longitudinal 
perspective.  
Wong argues that it is the changing identities of China and the EU, respectively, which lead 
to the swing between cooperation and conflict in China-EU relations. He observed the 
changes in the identities of China and the EU and argued that these changes, as well as the 
EU’s normative nature, set China-EU relations on a collision course. He argues that only if 
China and the EU’s identity achieve more internal consolidation and are communicated to 
each other more clearly can further progress in China-EU relations be expected (Wong, 
2013).  
Tsuruoka argues that the ‘capability-expectations gap’ towards the EU, namely the gap 
between high expectations of the EU form other entities and the EU’s actual ability, hinders 
the EU’s foreign relations. He contends that in the case of EU-Japan relations, there is a 
reversed ‘capability-expectations gap’ as Tokyo has a low expectation of the EU as an 
international actor.  
Instead of the ‘Capability-Expectations Gap’ argued by Hill (Hill, 1993; Tsuruoka, 2008), the 
argument in this chapter sits in line with Zhang Li’s concept of “reflexive expectations”, 
namely China’s perceptions of the EU are impacted by China’s self-perception, identity, and 
development, as well as Wong’s argument on how the changing identities of China and the 
EU result in volatility in China-EU relations. This chapter argues that the mismatch of 
identities and perceptions exists due to China and the EU’s self-identities and the projection 
of these identities on the other. The expectations of the other are rooted in the intrinsic 
values and developmental stage of the self. In a different way to Japan, China has a high 
expectation of the EU. However, this expectation from China of the EU is, overall, realistic 
and based on the EU’s actual position and ability in the world. While the EU attaches 
overarching emphasis to its normative nature, represented by its founding values across 
time, China’s view of the EU is more state-oriented which results in it seeing the EU as 
representing Europe or being a potential “pole” in the world which focuses more on integrity 
and its economic power.  
The EU’s development in terms of striving to increase its hard power makes the EU more 
conscious about the rise of China. The EU’s identity as a normative power makes it hope for 
changes in China, which creates tensions as China is not ready to have European values 
imposed, especially when it has suffered from a colonised past.  
For China, the EU is a first-tier trading partner, political influencer, and normative power. 
However, when it comes to geopolitical interactions, the EU is in the second-tier due to its 
geographical position as well as the fact that it is not a nation-state but an organisation. In 
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other words, China recognises the EU’s strengths as a global impactor; it does not, however, 
dive into details about the EU’s complications and struggles as these aspects do not have 
direct, detrimental impacts on China. What directly impacts China’s perceptions of the EU, 
however, is China’s identity and its interests. China is a sovereign state and emphasises 
unity and dignity. China respects European integration in the first place, not only because an 
integrated Europe is beneficial for China, but also because the idea of unity and integration 
is deeply rooted in the country’s culture and conceptual framework.  
Longitudinally, the chapter also finds that the EU’s perceptions of China have been changing 
from viewing China as an emerging country in Asia in its early policy papers even before the 
Chinese official discourse showing this aspect. However, the understanding of China’s 
emergence contains a high degree of simplicity mainly focusing on integrating China into the 
international market and with expectations that China can be transformed in a way the EU 
expects, which is highly connected to the EU’s values. In later years, the EU started to 
realise that China has its own path and plans, which are very different from the EU’s early 
understanding of the country’s future. Research into China-EU relations has pointed out that 
the EU has intentions to influence China's social-political choices due to the EU's normative 
nature and Western democracy being one of the EU's core values (Men, 2012). However, 
existing research has not pointed out the time difference, or the longitudinal dynamics in 
China and the EU's recognitions of each other. The chapter finds that the Chinese 
governmental perception of the rise of China is lower key and lagged in time scope 
compared with the EU's recognition of “the rise of China”. This mismatch in time is not 
emphasised in existing literature but is evidenced from corpus-based discourse analysis. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The chapter finds that China, as manifested in its official discourse to the EU, has been 
coherently supportive and overall optimistic about European integration while the EU is more 
aware of the complications of the process and the setbacks involved. China and the EU 
converge in the way that the EU is seen as a power with the potential for global impact with 
both soft and hard power, which the EU has been increasingly emphasising in its discourse. 
The EU has also shown consistent support for the One China policy which constitutes a solid 
base for overall positive interactions between China and the EU.   
Some mismatches are shown, nevertheless. China's self-perception, as evidenced by the 
discourse, is featured by framing China as a strong nation in the East with increasing 
confidence, especially in the last five years but also with an emphasis on China's history of 
colonisation and its suffering in the last century. The EU has shown recognition of the 
emergence of China in its early policy papers back to 1994 and 1995, but its perceptions of 




according to a Western social, political and economic style although this has been adjusted 
in later stages of the discourse interactions.  
The mismatch in time on the perception of China's position and capability leads to some 
mismatches between the EU and China's expectations of China. When the EU wanted China 
to shoulder more international, multilateral responsibilities back in the 1990s, China was not 
yet at the stage of recognising itself as a strong country. When China began showing 
enhanced confidence and assurance in more recent years, the EU became ambivalent about 
the rise of China.  
The changes in the EU's expectations and perceptions of China are a factor behind setbacks 
in China-EU relations including the plunge in the relations around 2008 and the EU's 
ambivalent attitudes regarding recognising China's MES under the WTO system and 
regarding the lifting of the arms-embargo on China.  
China's perceptions of the EU are strongly connected to China's self-perceptions of China as 
a sovereign state and one with an important role in the world in terms of multipolarity. The 
EU's self-perception is highly attached to its normative nature and its founding values. Its 
discourse also contains more awareness of the divergence between member states and the 
nature of the EU as a supranational and intergovernmental organisation instead of a nation-
state. The perceptions of others in China-EU relations, in this sense, are strongly influenced 
by the perception of self. This enhances Li Zhang’s theoretical concept of ‘Reflexive 
Expectations’ in China-EU relations which argues that China’s expectations of the EU are 
influenced by China’s self-perception, interests and development.  
Although the mismatches are undesired, the empirical data show that these twenty-five 
years have witnessed an evolution in the EU's understanding of China from being 
incomplete and unrealistic, to a point where it has departed from the EU's single-sided wish 
based on European values, to a more rounded and comprehensive view which takes into 






Chapter 6 Visions for the World Structure of 
the Future—Shared Terms, Different 
Connotations? 
As this thesis takes a constructivist approach, this chapter takes the stance that visions, 
perceptions, and aspirations are important elements which influence the interactions 
between entities in the international arena. The Chinese government and the EU’s visions for 
the world of the future in terms of structure have fundamental impacts on the ways China 
and the EU interact with each other as well as the ways they generally behave in 
international affairs. 
The existing literature has pointed out that China places more emphasis on multi-polarity 
while the EU emphasises multilateralism (Narramore, 2008; Geeraerts, 2011; Baeck, 2013; 
Finamore, 2017). David Scott has also observed that China and the EU have applied both 
the terms multipolarity and multilateralism.   
This chapter, based on corpus-driven discourse analysis, expands the existing discussions 
on why both terms have existed in China and the EU’s official discourse, in what context 
these two terms have been used, and whether the application and implications of these 
terms have been changed over the years. Expanding the response to these questions is 
important in order to understand whether and to what extent the differences between China 
and EU’s visions for the world structure, as stated in the current literature, are reflected or 
consistent with the discursive evidence from the official discourse of China and the EU, 
whether these differences have experienced any changes over the last two decades and 
whether any misunderstandings exist between China and the EU in their knowledge of each 
other’s vision for the world of the future.  
This chapter, therefore, aims to offer a more comprehensive understanding of China and the 
EU’s expectations of the world of the future by investigating where and how the differences 
in China and the EU’s visions lie when it comes to their understandings of the world of the 
future, in terms of structure, through a comparative discourse analysis of their official 
discourse.  
Methodologically, the chapter also aims to achieve this goal by applying corpus-based 
discourse analysis with the hope that this method can offer details and findings which are 
otherwise unattainable. The chapter applies a combination of comparative corpus linguistic 
analysis, content analysis, and critical discourse analysis. For China, two corpora are used: 
Corpus China Domestic and Corpus China PPSP. Identically, for the EU, Corpus EU PPSP 
and Corpus EU Internal are used.  
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Corpus linguistic analysis offers word frequency searches and collocations for “multipolar”, 
“multipolarity”, “multilateral” and “multilateralism” so that comparisons of the frequency 
differences and the usage of the terms are possible. Content analysis of selected, relevant 
pieces of discourse in Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Internal on China and the 
EU’s view on multipolarity and multilateralism will be included. In addition, critical discourse 
analysis is applied in order to compare whether differences exist between the domestic 
official discourse and the discourse targeted at an international audience, or each other, on 
both sides. Techniques of CDA are drawn upon as the importance of target audiences, or to 
put in another way, the differences between domestic discourse and external discourse are 
discussed.  
Upon comparing the descriptions of China and the EU’s desired future world, a few findings 
are generated. First, “multipolarity” has a more dominant presence in the Chinese official 
discourse when it comes to the descriptions of the future world structure, but multilateralism 
is experiencing an evident rise in its frequencies in recent years in the Chinese official 
discourse on the EU. Meanwhile, “multipolarity” has appeared in the EU’s official discourse 
sporadically but “multilateralism” by far outweighs the presence and frequency of 
“multipolarity”. Second, China regards the structures of multipolarity and multilateralism to be 
concepts and structures that can coexist in a single world since both terms focus on 
maintaining peace and preventing hegemony, whereas the EU views a singularly multilateral 
world as preferable to another configuration including coexistence of multilateralism and 
multipolarity as multipolarity is a state-oriented concept and the EU, being a post-modern 
entity with member states pooling part of their sovereignty, sees more value in the 
functionality of organisations.   
Based on the findings, the chapter argues that there are differences and misunderstandings 
in terms of the Chinese government and the EU’s visions for the future world despite their 
shared usage of “multilateralism” and “multipolarity”. Although both China and the EU talk 
about the structures of multilateralism and multipolarity, China emphasises multipolarity 
more with an increasing emphasis on multilateralism with the understanding that the two 
structures can coexist. The EU shows a preference for multilateralism and an inclination to 
discard the concept of multipolarity due to the EU’s nature and its postmodern understanding 
of sovereignty. The misunderstanding this leads to is that the Chinese government assumes 
that the EU shares China’s visions of multipolarity while some voices in the EU doubt the 
future of multipolarity, especially in terms of the connotation of power politics among 
sovereign states. The Chinese government, as shown in China’s EU official discourse, has 
been emphasising the concept of multipolarity without showing evident awareness that the 
concept has various connotations for the EU. On the other hand, the EU takes the 
connotation of multilateralism in the Chinese official document as identical to the EU’s 




vision for the world structure which takes a more state-oriented perspective with multipolarity 
still playing an important role.   
The chapter consists of three sections: 
Section 6.1 reviews the concepts of multipolarity and multilateralism.  
Section 6.2 discusses China’s interpretations of multipolarity and multilateralism based on 
Corpus China Domestic. The content discourse analysis applies the documents on the 
theme of China’s vision for the international order.  
Section 6.3 discusses the EU’s understandings of multipolarity and multilateralism. It argues 
that overall, the EU attaches more weight to multilateralism. Content analysis provides 
insights about the EU’s understanding of the two forms of international order. The coverage 
searches of the terms show the changes in the frequency of use of these two terms over the 
years as evidence of the EU’s stress on multilateralism.  
Section 6.4 discusses the findings and their implications.  
Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.  
6.1 Defining Multipolarity and Multilateralism 
Although there are multiple ways to describe the structure of the world, the notions of 
“multipolarity” and “multilateralism” are at the centre of understanding the basic structures of 
the world desired by China and the EU. According to Huntington, a unipolar system “would 
have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers” (Huntington, 
1999: 35). In a unipolar system, the superpower has the capability to resolve key 
international issues alone, and the coalition of other powers would not be able to overcome 
the will of the superpower (Huntington, 1999). A multipolar world refers to a world with a 
number of great powers among which cooperation and competition continue in shifting 
patterns (Crossick, 2010). These poles should be major powers with comparable strength. 
Resolving the key international issues in a multipolar world requires the coalition of these 
major powers (Huntington, 1999: 35; Dee, 2015: 5). This is also the model which European 
politics approximated to for centuries  (Huntington, 1999). Huntington also argued that 
contemporary international politics does not fit into a unipolar, bipolar or a multipolar world. It 
is a uni-multipolar system with the US as the superpower coexisting with major powers 
(Huntington, 1999). Two decades later, the basic structure of the international system has 
not changed much in this sense.  
In a bipolar system, there are two large powers with equal capacities that dominate the focus 
of international politics (Mearsheimer, 2003: 69–70). In a unipolar system, a single great 
power with outstanding capabilities stands at the centre of world affairs (Wohlforth, 1999: 9).  
A multilateral world, instead, is one in which several interdependent countries are working 
together to seek a win-win relationship from cooperation instead of zero-sum interactions 
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(Crossick, 2010). Ruggie defined multilateralism as “an institutional form which coordinates 
relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalised’ principles of conduct (…) 
without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that 
may exist in any specific occurrence” (Ruggie, 1992: 571).  
Although Huntington and Ruggie have defined multipolarity and multilateralism as structures 
of the world, it does not mean different countries and entities in the world have attached the 
same connotations to these terms. China and the EU, although both have applied the terms 
multipolarity and multilateralism in describing the world and cooperation going on in the 
world, have different understandings of these world structures as shown from their official 
discourse.  
Multipolarity and multilateralism are both terms describing the types of international system. 
According to Scott, multipolarity is “a measurement of the distribution of power as 
concentrated in several poles of power, those poles being Great Powers”. Multilateralism, is 
“a process; a way of acting that involves several states (big, medium, or small) working 
together as a matter of practice”(Scott, 2013: 31).  
As previously mentioned in the Literature Review of the thesis, existing studies have pointed 
out that, in general, China emphasises multipolarity while the EU stresses multilateralism 
(Messner 2007; D. Scott 2007a; Narramore 2008; Clegg 2009; Hooft 2010; Van Langenhove 
2010; Geeraerts 2011; Makarychev and Morozov 2011; Wade 2011; D. Scott 2012; 
Xiaoming Zhang 2012; Baeck 2013; D.A. Scott 2013; Ngeow 2014; D. Scott 2014; Z. Chen 
2016) ; Finamore 2017). The reasoning the research offered is that China is a sovereign 
state so takes a realist-based view and is more state-oriented than the EU which is more 
bound by multilateralism due to it being a supranational and intergovernmental organisation 
(Baeck 2013; D.A. Scott 2013; D. Scott 2014; Z. Chen 2016).  
Scott notices that “the EU stresses multilateralism, the PRC remains explicit in its welcome 
of multipolarity”; he also recognises the shifts and mutual influences between the stressed 
systems of China and the EU and the supplementary usage, on both sides, of the terms 
referring to the “untidy multilevel international system” such as ‘interpolarity’, ‘asymmetrical 
multipolarity’, ‘multilateralism multipolarity’ and ‘multi-multilateralism’ (Scott, 2013: 30).  
Gustaaf argues that there has been a “shifting constellation of world power” which is 
“fundamentally altering the distribution of capabilities and identities” (Geeraerts, 2016: 233). 
He recognises this power shift and is aware of the divergences and convergence between 
China and the EU as two of the main entities in the world. In his more recent article, Gustaaf 
has been modestly optimistic about the convergence of China and the EU in terms of 
building a multilateral international order. In his article published in 2018, he argues that as 




the international order will become more diffused with China, the EU and the US being the 
strong trading poles (Geeraerts, 2018).  
Geeraerts also concludes that the changing constellation of powers in the world will lead to 
changes in the engagement style between China and the EU. The two will be moving in the 
direction of reciprocal socialisation (Terhalle, 2011), a process during which they try to reach 
consensus with pragmatic considerations and reconcile their differences in identities and 
developmental paths. They will also need to renegotiate about the world order, for which the 
development is correlated with China and the EU’s internal development (Geeraerts, 2016).  
In the following sections, both China and the EU’s understandings of both terms will be 
discussed with, firstly, a content analysis and, secondly, a corpus linguistic analysis so that 
the findings from both methods can be compared to each other, leading to more 
comprehensive findings and arguments.  
6.2 China’s Interpretations of Multipolarity and 
Multilateralism 
This section, through content analysis of the documents, specifically discusses China’s 
understanding of the world structure, and features findings on three aspects. 
First, it highlights multipolarity as a core concept in the Chinese government’s vision of the 
desired structure of the future world. 
Second, it highlights three outstanding themes related to multipolarity as shown in the 
Chinese official discourse on multipolarity. 
Third, it explores the relationship between multipolarity and multilateralism.  
6.2.1 Multipolarity is a Core Concept of China’s Vision  
One of the earliest Chinese official documents on the topic of multipolarity, the “Joint 
Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order” 
(China and Russian Federation, 2008; Crossick, 2010), was signed with Russia in 1997. This 
document was signed in the context of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when a unipolar 
structure with the United States as the single “pole” took the place of the bipolar world 
structure of the post-war (World War Two) world system with the Soviet Union and the 
United States representing the two world poles respectively. The main purpose of signing 
this document was to demonstrate the signing countries’ determination to counter the 
hegemonic world system or at least hegemonism (Crossick, 2010). The document states that 
“the trend towards a multi-polar world is irreversible” (China and Russian Federation, 2008: 
para.5). It pointed out that although peace and cooperation have been the general direction 
in which the world is going, “unilateralism and power politics still exist, as well as frequent 
regional conflicts due to ethnic and religious reasons. (…) the world is faced with more and 
more new threats and challenges” (China and Russian Federation, 2008: para.5).  
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The document features China and the Russian Federation’s determinations to cooperate in 
multiple respects including supporting the role of the UN in international relations, 
condemning terrorism, cooperation in regional organisations, a balanced global economy, 
North-South dialogue, peace, sustainable development, human rights protection, non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs as well as regional integration. The support for a 
world of multipolarity is strong and clear for China, as shown in this document. The fact that 
China and the Russian Federation are the signing countries also indicates that 
considerations on the balance of power in the world were one of the motivations behind this 
view of the world of the future.  
The notion of the multipolar world (多极世界 DuoJi ShiJie) was thereafter put forward by the 
Chinese government as the defining feature of the world’s development. As time went by, 
the unipolar system of the world developed into one with “one superpower and several 
strong powers” (一超多强 Yi Chao Duo Qiang) from the Chinese perspective. This depiction 
of the world stage has been commonly received in China for years and has been taught as 
such in standardised textbooks for public schools (Du, 2009). 
Since 2000, the Chinese government published two specially themed documents on 
multipolarity. The first is “China’s View on the Development of Multi-polarity” issued on the 
official website of the Foreign Ministry of China in English. The second is “中国对多极化发展
的看法” (“China’s View on the Development of Multipolarity”) issued in Chinese in 2003 
(Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in Sydney, 2000). The second 
document has the same title as the first one. However, the second document is not the 
identical translated version of the first one. It is a different document issued only in Chinese, 
but the English translations of the title would be the same as the first one. It is possible, 
based on the languages in which these two documents were issued, that the document in 
English is aimed at overseas readers while the second document in Chinese is aimed at 
domestic readers while both share similar themes. The original texts of these two documents 
are attached in Figure Apx 1 Two Documents on China's View of Multipolarity: the Chinese 
Version and the English Version. for reference to support the analysis of this section.  
Upon confirming that multipolarity is the Chinese government’s vision for the trend of the 
world, the document issued in the Chinese language illustrates further that multipolarity 




The nearly 200 countries in the world, with more than 6 billion 
population, differ greatly in national and ethnic traditions, religious 




systems among all other aspects. It is unimaginable to require all 
these countries to apply a single model, ideology or being “led” by 
one country (Minister of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic 
of China: para.1)42 
In this domestic version of the document, “China’s View on the Development of Multi-
polarity” issued in the Chinese language, the emphasis is laid on non-interference in 
international politics. It focuses primarily on the diversity of countries’ developmental modes 
and political structures as well as social, religious and cultural traditions, and secondly, on 
the function of curbing hegemonism of multipolarity as a structure of the world. The Chinese 
document also states that: 
我们推动世界向多极化方向发展，并非针对特定国家，也不是要重
演历史上列强争霸的旧剧，而是推动国际关系的民主化。 
We promote the world to development towards multipolarity. This is 
not pointing at a specific country; neither does it lead to repeating 
the old story in history that powers fight for hegemonism. The aim 
of this is to promote the democratisation of international relations 
(Minister of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, 
2000a: para.1). 
In the version issued in English, on the other hand, the emphasis is largely on multipolarity 
as a mechanism to prevent hegemonism in the world with a stronger tone to disagree with 
“an individual country”: 
At present, by virtue of its economic, technological and military 
advantages, an individual country is pursuing a new “gunboat 
policy” in contravention of the United Nations Charter and the 
universally acknowledged principles governing international 
relations in an attempt to establish a monopolar world under its 
guidance. This is against the tide of history and is doomed to 
failure (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2000b: para.3).  
This piece of text points out that multipolarity contributes to curbing US hegemonism. 
Overall, the tone of the document issued in English is stronger with a clear target to disagree 
with while the first document adopts a milder tone with an emphasis on explaining why 
multipolarity is beneficial for China.  
These differences in emphasis noticed through a comparative reading of these two 
documents indicate that in terms of the support for multipolarity, the Chinese government’s 
rationales from both domestic and international perspectives have similar reasons but a 
different emphasis. The Chinese document emphasises diversity and equality in international 
 
42 Translated by the thesis author. 
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relations more, especially in terms of the autonomy of each country’s right to decides its own 
political and social structures based on its domestic conditions. The document in the English 
language emphasises the world challenge of hegemonism more.  
These differences are related to the fact that although both documents share a similar 
theme, they are for different audiences. For the domestic audience, the emphasis is to 
introduce the Chinese government’s understanding of multipolarity to the domestic audience 
and to explain why multipolarity is good for China, stressing that China has to protect its 
autonomy when it comes to political and social structures. For the overseas audience, the 
purpose was to clearly state China’s stance to support a world with more balanced power 
distribution. There are more diplomatic considerations and foreign policy involved in the 
second version.  
6.2.2 Three Outstanding Themes Relating to Multipolarity 
Although the emphases are differently laid, the two documents issued by the Chinese 
government on multipolarity share a few common themes: first, multipolarity as an 
irreversible historical trend; second, multipolarity as a means to guarantee world peace and 
prevent hegemonism; and third, multipolarity as a means to achieve diversity and non-
interference in domestic issues.  
6.2.2.1 Irreversible Historical Trend 
The first similarity between these two short, keynote documents is that both, in the first 
sentence, confirm that multipolarity is the general direction where the world structure is 
heading and, although international situations change, the trend has not changed. The one 
published in the Chinese language states that: 
当前，国际形势正在发生复杂而深刻的变化，但世界走向多极化的
趋势并未改变。 
Currently, the international situation is undergoing complicated and 
profound changes. The trend that the world is going towards 
multipolarity, however, has not changed (Minister of Foreign 




The development of multipolarity is not without obstacles and 
struggles and can take a long time. However, multipolarity is a 
historical trend not subject to an individual’s preference (Minister of 





In these two pieces of texts, multipolarity, mentioned in line with economic globalisation, is 
regarded as a positive trend in the world’s development leading to equal relations among 
developed and developing, big and small countries in the world. 
The document issued in English also confirms that: 
Since the end of the Cold War, the world has moved towards multi-
polarity, and the international situation, on the whole, has become 
more relaxed. This is an objective tendency independent of 
people’s will, reflecting the trend of the development of the present 
era (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
2000b: para.1).  
For the Chinese government, the notion is that a world of multipolarity represents an 
unchangeable direction the world is moving in and the idea that this structure will not change 
due to any entity’s will or different understandings of the world. There is a deep and solid 
trust in the effectiveness and correctness of this world structure.  
6.2.2.2 Peace and Prevention of Hegemonism 
Although multipolarity is associated with the realist perspective on the balance of power, if 
we look at the contexts where multipolarity has been mentioned in Chinese official discourse, 
we can see that one of the major emphases on multipolarity in the Chinese official discourse 
has been on hegemony-prevention and reaching an international order which makes wars 
practically impossible: 
The document issued in English states that: 
Multi-polarization, on the whole, helps weaken and curb 
hegemonism and power politics, serves to bring about a just and 
equitable new international political and economic order and 
contributes to world peace and development (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2000b: para.1).   
The text above confirms the Chinese governmental vision of a multipolar world and the view 
that a multipolar world prevents hegemony and facilitates world peace. The document in 
Chinese also emphasises that the purpose of promoting multipolarity is “to promote the 
democratisation of international relations, promote all powers in the world to enhance 
coordination and dialogue, avoid confrontation and work together to maintain the peace, 
stability and development of the world” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic 
of China, 2000a: para. 2) 
6.2.2.3 Non-Interference and Diversity 
The third theme featured in the Chinese official documents on multipolarity is maintaining the 
diversity of social, cultural, and political features of countries in the world and sticking to the 
non-interference principle. The Chinese version of the document explains that multipolarity 
does not focus merely on constructing “poles” in the world. It focuses on promoting equality 
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among countries and the social, cultural and political diversity in the world by saying that 
requiring all countries to apply the same model, ideology or being “led” by one country is 
unimaginable (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2000a: para.1) 
These three aspects or themes mentioned above are the major beliefs and connotations 
behind the Chinese official understanding of a multipolar world based on a comparative 
content analysis of the two versions of the multipolarity documents.  
6.2.3 Coexistence of Multipolarity and Multilateralism 
Although the content analysis above argues that multipolarity stands in the core position of 
China’s understanding of a desired world of the future, multilateralism has received a high 
degree of recognition and attention in the Chinese official discourse as well, as evidenced by 
the document issued by China titled “中国有关国际秩序的主张 (China’s Stance on 
International Order)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2006).  
It is necessary to mention that these keynote documents listed on the page for Materials 
(Policy Documents, Regulations, Keynote Speeches) of the website of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in China have a high degree of importance as they are documents setting the 
keynote or stating China’s basic principles and understanding on certain aspects of 
international relations. In terms of foreign policies and general development policy in China, 
only a few concepts, including “peaceful development”, “new security concept”, 
“multipolarity” and “multilateralism” are showcased as themes of the keynote documents.  
Among these keynote articles, “中国有关国际秩序的主张 (China’s Stance on International 
Order)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2006), issued by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, illustrates Chinese understanding of its desired 
international order:  
中国倡导多边主义，主张促进国际关系民主化。 
China promotes multilateralism and takes the stance to facilitate 
the democratisation of international relations (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2006: para. 2). 
The complete Chinese original version of this article and its translated English version 
(translated by the author) document are available in Appendix Figure Apx 1. This document 
explains some of China’s fundamental stances in terms of its vision of the world order and 
offers an important context where multilateralism is emphasised. In the document, China 
emphasises respect for diversity in the world, the new security concept which promotes 
mutual trust, mutual benefits, equality and coordination among countries, the disagreement 




institutions and UN charter (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
2006).  
In this text, the Chinese government’s support for multilateralism stands at the top of the list 
of principles China would like to adhere to. The Chinese government has connected 
multilateralism with equality among countries and justice of the international order. 
Multilateralism is also considered as a major means to maintain world peace.  
The text shows that the Chinese government promotes both multilateralism and multipolarity 
and regards these two forms as able to coexist in the future. Both terms are applied in 
contexts relating to preventing hegemony and facilitating international equity.  
In 2015, when President Xi Jinping visited London on 19th October, he delivered a speech 
named “Promote Openness and Tolerance and Facilitate Peaceful Development Together” 
which stated that: 
China has always been a promoter of international cooperation and 
an active participator of international multilateralism (Xi, 2015). 
In this speech, President Xi confirmed that promoting multilateralism is on China’s agenda, 
and China will shoulder increasing responsibilities in international cooperation. This supports 
the argument that China claims to promote both multipolarity and multilateralism. 
There is a clear sign that China believes that multipolarity and multilateralism can co-exist in 
the desired world of the future; these structures lead to a world of similar features. Plus, 
there is not much difference in the main themes related to the discourse of multipolarity and 
multilateralism. Both terms are related to the themes of peace, prevention of power politics, 
equality and diversity in the world and respect for the role of the UN. The emphasis is on 
“multi”, or respect for diversity in the world, instead of the concepts of “poles” and “lateral” 
which, in some of the EU’s official discourse, relates to the connotations of nation-states and 
a post-modern understanding of the role of cooperation between international organisations.   
6.2.4 Coverage of “Multipolarity” and “Multilateralism” in 
Corpus China PPSP 
In this section, corpus linguistic analysis will be carried out to see whether a different method 
can lead to new findings, or whether the findings generated by content analysis and corpus 
linguistic analysis are consistent with each other. Specifically, the section investigates where 
and how multipolarity and multilateralism related discourse is used in Corpus China PPSP 
and Corpus EU PPSP.  
Before the data search results are shown and analysed, a brief explanation on how Nvivo 
works in terms of counting coverage in this section is provided. This is because the coverage 
counting in the data processing done for this section includes the broad context of the terms 
searched. This is different from the coverage count with no context presented in Chapter 4.  
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With Nvivo, text searches with no context generate outcomes where a certain term appears 
without any surrounding words shown with it. Text searches with narrow contexts show the 
terms one is searching for with the directly adjacent words. Text searches with broad 
contexts output the term and the whole paragraph where the term appears. The results of 
each search are coded, and coverage of the term(s) being searching are counted based on 
the areas coded. The lengths of these coded areas are divided by the length of the 
document for each year, resulting in the coverage of multipolarity with a broad context. The 
advantages of a text search with a broad context instead of frequency, which only shows the 
coverage of the words without counting the surrounding text, is that it takes into 
consideration a few details: first, one term could appear multiple times in one paragraph 
which should only count once in terms of its importance; second, if the coverage of a term 
with a broad context is high, it indicates that contents related to the term cover a big 
percentage of the document, which is a good indication of the importance of a topic.   
In the searches for “multipolarity” and “multilateralism”, their coverage with broad contexts, 
namely the paragraph they are in, are counted. This is different from the searches in the 
chapter on the priority differences between China and the EU which adopts coverage of 
words and their synonyms but with no contexts. This is because the searches are larger in 
number so simple frequencies would make the search faster and the comparison more 
straight-forward.  
Table 6-1 and Figure 6-1 show the coverage of the term “多极 (multipolar/multipolarity)” in 
Corpus China PPSP.  The coverage of the topic related to “多极” (multipolarity) in Corpus 
China PPSP is searched with a broad context count, meaning the paragraphs where the 




Table 6-1 Summary of References to Multipolarity in Corpus China PPSP 
 
 
Figure 6-1 Coverage of 多极 (Multipolarity) with Broad Context (Paragraph Count) in Corpus 
China PPSP 
 
As Table 6-1 shows, “多极” appeared once, twice, or three times in the documents for each 
year but appear twelve times in the year 2014. The coverage for “多极”, as Figure 6-1 
shows, experiences an overall steady rate but the years 2002, 2004 and 2012 saw more 
extensive coverage than other years. There is a slight drop in coverage of the term on a 
fourteen-year scale, but coverage exists for most of the years in the corpus except for 2001 
and 2008. These figures indicate that the emphasis on multipolarity in China’s official 
documents to the EU has been quite steady and consistent between the years from 1994 to 
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2018 with the years 2002, 2004 and 2012 showing extra emphasis on the topic. However, on 
the larger timescale, the coverage rate for “多极” is reduced post-2013. This could be related 
to the increase in new concepts promoted since the Xi-Li administration on international 
order, such as a new security concept, the democratisation of international relations, and the 
common destiny of humankind. This could also be related to the fact that the EU has been 
expressing different opinions on the connotations of “poles” and “multipolarity”.  
Meanwhile, Table 6-2 and Figure 6-2 show the searches on “multipolarity” in Corpus China 
Domestic for comparison.  
Table 6-2 Summary of References for Multipolarity in Corpus China Domestic 
 
Figure 6-2 Coverage of 多极 (Multipolarity) with Broad Context (Paragraph Count) in Corpus 
China Domestic 
 
The collocations of “multipolarity” and “multilateralism” provide more discourse evidence for 
China’s understanding of these two concepts. In the 2014 EU policy paper issued by China, 
the term “multipolarity” and “multilateralism” both appear. The term “multipolarity” was 
mentioned three times with each time referring to general global development:  
In the decade since China issued its first China EU Policy Paper, 
tremendous changes have taken place in China, the EU and the 
world as a whole. Multi-polarity and economic globalization have 
deepened; (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 




China and the EU, the world’s most representative emerging 
economy and a group of developed countries respectively, are two 
major forces for world peace as they share an important strategic 
consensus on building a multipolar world (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2014: pt.1, para. 4).  
China-EU partnership for peace: China stands ready to work with 
the EU to bring the two major forces closer to pursue peaceful 
development in a multi-polar world, respect and accommodate 
each other’s core interests and major concerns, make the 
international order and international system more just and 
equitable, advocate democracy in international relations and create 
a peaceful, stable, equitable and orderly development environment 
for all countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2014: pt.2, para. 2).  
Meanwhile, “multilateral” was mentioned twice, referring to China’s cooperation with the EU: 
Commit to jointly upholding the authority of the multilateral 
disarmament regime and support the adoption of a comprehensive 
and balanced program of work at the Conference on Disarmament 
at an early date to carry out substantive work as soon as possible.  
Revise and improve the China-EU Customs Agreement and the 
Strategic Framework for China-EU Customs Cooperation under the 
guidance of the China-EU Joint Customs Cooperation Committee 
(JCCC), and intensify bilateral cooperation and multilateral 
coordination between respective customs authorities on IPR 
enforcement, supply chain security and facilitation, fighting 
commercial fraud and promoting trade facilitation (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2014: pt.2, para. 
2).  
In the above texts, multilateralism was mentioned in terms of pushing forward multilateral 
disarmament regimes and in the context of enhancing the protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Customs cooperation and anti-fraud actions. The application of multilateralism is 
related to more specific international cooperation projects while multipolarity is mentioned 
with economic globalisation as a general trend and the form of the future world. The Chinese 
official discourse suggests that although these two terms emphasise different aspects of the 
future world, they can coexist and, together, they are the desired world order for China.  
While multipolarity has been applied by the Chinese government as a central term depicting 
the future world, the discourse on multilateralism has also increased in the last two decades. 
For example, in the 2003 policy paper on the EU, multilateralism appears within the context 
of enhancing the EU’s support to China in terms of personnel training:   
China also welcomes a stronger and more active role for the EU in 
human resource development, in particular, personnel training for 
China’s central and western regions and the build-up of China’s 
capacity for participation in multilateral trading regimes (People.cn, 
2003: pt.3, sect. 2, para. 5).  
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There is a clear message that China would like to engage more with the existing 
international community and participate in multilateral cooperation. This text also 
emphasises that China will not seek self-centred approaches but will, instead, seek common 
interests and development.  
Reflecting on the historical background of multilateralism in China, China entered the World 
Trade Organisation in 2000 and has, since then, become increasingly active in participating 
in multilateral cooperation and organisation. 
 In line with its actions, it has also included the discourse of multilateralism as its vision for 
the future world.  
The review of the collocations and the contexts of multipolarity and multilateralism in the 
Chinese official discourse and the discourse context indicate that both multipolarity and 
multilateralism in the Chinese context emphasise the implications of “multi-”: both 
multipolarity and multilateralism are regarded as being opposite to hegemony and unequal 
relations among countries in international society. The Chinese government takes the view 
that there is no problem with the structure of multipolarity coexisting with multilateralism. The 
Chinese discourse seems to take the position that the “multi” part is the real essence of 
these two terms whereas “polar” and “lateral” are just two levels at which equality among 
countries should be carried out.  
6.3 The EU’s Understandings of Multipolarity and 
Multilateralism 
While the Chinese government believes that multipolarity and multilateralism can coexist in 
the future world and a world of multipolarity is a shared goal between China and the EU, the 
EU has differing views when it comes to the question of whether the EU would still use the 
concept of multipolarity as their favoured version of international order.  
6.3.1 Multilateralism over Multipolarity  
Early in 2005, Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner, former European Commissioner for External 
Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, made a similar comment in her speech titled 
“The EU, China and the Quest for a Multilateral World”, saying that:  
China and the EU are obviously interested in the nature of global 
politics in the 21st century. Some have talked of building a 
‘multipolar world’. For the EU, however, it is not the number of 
poles which counts, but rather the basis on which they operate. 
Our vision is a world governed by rules created and monitored by 
multilateral institutions (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005: 3) 
Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner stressed that the focus of the EU is how the world will be 
operated instead of the number and status of the global powers. This voice in the EU is 




When the EU’s High Representative Federica Mogherini visited Beijing in 2016, she 
expressed a similar concern about the vision of the multipolar world:  
I know that China regards the European Union as one of the poles 
of the multipolar system and of the multipolar order. I have the 
impression sometimes that our time of complexity pushes us even 
further, and sometimes I doubt that we still have poles in the 
multipolar system. But we are those who believe in multilateralism 
and in a system that recognises the different roles for different 
actors worldwide and the need, as I said, to play by the rules 
(Mogherini, 2016: 5) 
These two statements by EU officials convey a similar message: the EU prefers a 
multilateral world which operates on the logic of the rule of law instead of a multipolar system 
which, in the eyes of the EU, is based on the logic of a balance of power.  
This is reconfirmed in the European Union Institute of Security Studies (EUISS) document on 
its global strategies titled “Strategy Matters 2015-2016”, one of the key documents issued by 
the EU on setting the direction of its global strategies for forthcoming years. In this 
document, the EU, once again, expresses concerns about the validity of the concept of 
multipolarity. Even the notion of the region, to the EU, should not be as rigid as it was in the 
traditional sense: 
Across regional theatres, there is no single set of powers with 
roughly equal influence everywhere – nor are regional hegemons 
determining dynamics on their own. Power configurations change 
across time and place, making regions themselves dynamic 
concepts. The world system is no longer bipolar, unipolar or even 
multipolar: the very notion of ‘polarity’ is in question (European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, 2016: 27). 
As stated in this piece of text, the EU regards the concept of multipolarity as a more or less 
outdated way to describe the world order as power configurations can be unstable. In the 
post-modern world, for the EU, the world no longer operates in the way that “poles” dominate 
international affairs. Instead, global, or regional institutions based on the rule of law should 
be the basic units through which international affairs are dealt with.  
Among the limited number (nine times) of times “multipolar” or “multipolarity” appear in 
Corpus EU PPSP, as shown in the concordance search results in Table Apx 15, the first was 
about the fact that the EU understands that China is supportive of building a world of 
multipolarity.   
Given China’s stake in a dynamic and liberal trading system and its 
political objective of promoting a multipolar world governed by 
multilateral rules, it has an interest in a successful and timely 
conclusion of the Doha Round, resulting in the further market 
opening, accommodation of developing countries interests, and 
improved WTO rules (Commission of the European Communities, 
2003: 595–598). 
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China’s geopolitical vision of a multipolar world, and the Chinese 
perception of the EU as a partner of growing importance, also 
provide a favourable context for increased EU visibility. 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2003: 894–895). 
This piece of discourse from Corpus EU PPSP, therefore, is not about the EU’s 
understanding of multipolarity but a confirmation that the EU understands that China 
supports a multipolar world. In fact, the references in 2003 and 2011 as shown in Table Apx 
15 are also about China’s positions instead of the EU. This shows that multipolarity is a 
concept which sits more firmly within the Chinese discourse instead of the EU’s.  
6.3.2 Coverage of “Multipolarity” and “Multilateralism” in 
Corpus China PPSP 
Table Apx 14 in the Appendix shows the collocations of the term “multilateral” and 
“multilateralism” in Corpus EU PPSP. As Table Apx 14 and Table Apx 15 show, the word 
frequency for “multilateral” and “multilateralism” largely outweighs that for “multipolar” or 
“multipolarity” in Corpus EU PPSP. This indicates that the notion of multilateralism or 
multilateral cooperation is more popular and well-received in EU policies.  
Another theme the EU expresses through the discourse on multilateralism is its respect for 
the existing international norms. The EU is aware of the fact that traditional multilateralism 
may need revisions and rising powers want to revise the existing order or even to create new 
ones, but it points out that revising an established system is not an easy task. In the EUISS 
document “Strategy Matters”, the EU expresses its preference for keeping the existing 
international norms by arguing that “opposing existing global governance mechanisms has 
been easier than creating new ones” especially for the emerging countries, although 
“Traditional multilateralism is losing steam” (European Union Institute for Security Studies, 
2016: 3). The EU favours the existing international order instead of emerging countries trying 
to create new orders.   
Reading relevant texts in China’s official discourse to the EU on multipolarity reveals that, 
when it comes to China-EU relations, the Chinese government holds the belief that the EU 
agrees on the vision of multipolarity. China’s first EU policy paper issued in 2003 begins as 
follows: “The international situation has been undergoing profound changes (…). The trend 
towards world multipolarity and economic globalisation is developing amid twists and turns” 
(People.cn, 2003: para.1). The EU, as indicated from both the officials’ speeches, such as 
the one quoted from Mogherini, or from its related institutes’ (e.g. EUISS) analysis, does not 
strongly attach itself to the idea of multipolarity or the concept of “poles” any more.  
In China’s EU policy paper in 2014, China also conveyed its belief that multipolarity is a 




China and the EU, the world’s most representative emerging 
economy and group of developed countries respectively, are two 
major forces for world peace as they share an important strategic 
consensus on building a multipolar world (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2014: para.4). 
Furthermore, China views the EU as a partner to achieve a multipolar world. In a further 
illustration in its 2014 policy paper, the government states that: 
To grow China-EU relations is an integral part of China’s efforts to 
build long-term, steady and healthy relations with major powers 
and a priority in its foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2014: para.5). 
This piece of the text shows that China sees the EU as a “major power” around the globe. 
This perspective on the EU takes the EU as a whole entity and regards its capability as 
equal to the big countries in the world. China-EU relations support China’s goal of enhancing 
its relations with major powers across the globe.  
6.4 Findings and Significance  
The findings of this chapter continue with the conclusions of Scott and Gustaaf on the visions 
of China and the EU in relation to the international order (Scott, 2007a, 2013; Geeraerts, 
2011). Scott argues that the EU stresses multilateralism, and China welcomes multipolarity. 
He also observes that there have been shifts where socialisation plays a role and transfers 
some of the EU’s multilateralism usage and normative underpinnings to China. He continues 
his observation by pointing out that both terms coexist in both entities with other concepts on 
the untidy multilevel international order including ‘multilateralism multipolarity’ and ‘multi-
multilateralism’, among many other orders (Scott, 2013).  
Based on concordance analysis and content analysis, the chapter generated some specific 
findings in terms of China and the EU’s visions for the future world.  
On China’s visions for the world of the future, the chapter finds that: 
First, multipolarity has been a core concept in the Chinese post-war vision of the desired 
future world, as shown in China’s official documents on multipolarity. It is a concept which 
has enjoyed historical consistency in Chinese official discourse.  
Second, China’s domestic document on multipolarity shows different emphases in the 
document with the same theme but which has overseas readers as the audience. The 
domestic document on multipolarity emphasises the diversity of countries’ cultures and 
social-political traditions while the one with overseas readers as an audience emphasises 
prevention of hegemonism with a strong tone, highlighting its disagreement with US 
hegemony.   
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Third, three themes can be drawn from China’s theme-specific official documents on 
multipolarity: multipolarity as the irreversible historical trend in the world’s development, 
multipolarity as a way to promote peace and prevent hegemonism, and multipolarity as 
helping to boost diversity and the principle of non-interference.  
Fourth, China regards that the structure of multipolarity can coexist with multilateralism. Both 
terms are confirmed in the Chinese documents to be forms of the world supported by the 
Chinese government while the former emphasises more the structure of power balance and 
the latter emphasises more the means of cooperation in specific respects.  
On the EU’s visions for the future world, the chapter has found that: 
First, the EU’s official discourse (Corpus EU PPSP) in China shows a greater frequency of 
the term “multilateralism” than “multipolarity”. Among the few times “multipolarity” was 
mentioned, they were referring to China’s stance.  
Second, the EU officials have expressed doubts about the validity of the existence of “poles” 
in the world as well as the concept of “multipolarity”. The EU takes a view which emphasises 
organisational cooperation instead of the balance of power between nation-states. This is 
related to the EU’s nature as an intergovernmental organisation with member states pooling 
part of their sovereignty.   
Overall, China and the EU's visions for the future world share a high degree of compatibility 
in terms of peacekeeping, prevention of hegemony and respect to diversity. However, the 
above differences are shown in their official discourse on each other.  
The findings in the section about China lead to the argument in this section that the concept 
of multipolarity has been received in China over a long period of time compared with 
multilateralism and is still crucial to understanding China's view of the structure of the world 
of the future. Multilateralism has received increasing attention and has been recognised as 
another core feature in terms of international order in the future world. Both concepts, for 
China, promote the value of peace, diversity, prevention of hegemonism and non-
interference.  
Two mismatches between China and the EU's vision for the future world have manifested so 
far. First, the Chinese government focused on the “multi” part of both multipolarity and 
multilateralism. It places emphasis on the coercion of hegemony and confrontation of these 
forms and regards these orders as coexisting in the future world. The EU includes different 
voices on this. While some still apply the term multipolarity, focusing on a balance of power 
in work, others draw a more distinct line between multipolarity and multilateralism and regard 




Second, China regards multipolarity as a shared vision between China and the EU, whilst 
the EU has doubts about multipolarity due to the connotation of power politics underlying the 
concept of multipolarity.  
The misunderstanding between China and the EU, therefore, is not merely that China 
prefers multipolarity and the EU prefers multilateralism. The first misunderstanding is that, in 
the eyes of the EU, China supports the future world as a world with multipolarity as China 
follows the realist logic of power balancing. However, the Chinese discourse evidence shows 
that China states that it promotes and enhances multilateralism as a basic order for the 
future as well and both multilateralism and multipolarity appear in the context of sustaining 
peace, equality and common development in the world. The Chinese government does not 
draw a clear distinction between multipolarity and multilateralism. Both terms promote 
multiple participators and methods to solve international issues, so both are accepted in the 
Chinese official vision for the future world. 
The second misunderstanding is that the Chinese government assumes that the EU agrees 
on multipolarity as a form for the future world and has therefore applied this term in China-
EU official discourse while the term is associated with power politics from the perspective of 
the EU. The problem between China and the EU is not that the two have a fundamental 
clash of world visions and perceptions, but that the EU thinks China has a fundamentally 
different world vision to that of the EU whereas China assumes the EU has attached the 
same associations and connotations to multipolarity and multilateralism as China has.   
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter responds to the research question of this thesis through a comparison of 
China’s and the EU’s visions for the future world and their future selves based on their 
official discourse between 1994 and 2019 which includes both their discourse on each other 
(Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP) and their domestic discourse (Corpus China 
Domestic and Corpus EU Domestic).  
It has been found that for China, although there is evidence from the corpus that China 
emphasises multipolarity, the frequency of the terms “multilateralism” and “multilateral” have 
increased significantly in recent years. Plus, multilateralism and multipolarity co-exist in the 
Chinese discourse and based on the content analysis, there is a large overlap in their 
connotations. These indicate that although there are differences in the emphases, there is a 
trend indicating that China has started a process of adopting the notion of multilateralism, 
which could be the result of China’s enhanced power and position across the globe which 
lead to the naturalisation of China’s acceptance of the multilateral international order. 
The chapter expands the understanding of the causes of China-EU political challenges. 
While previous studies have explained this problem by arguing that China and the EU have 
diverging world visions, this chapter, based on analysing and comparing China and the EU’s 
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discourse on multipolarity and multilateralism, argues that China and the EU’s visions for the 
future world, although without fundamental clashes, experience mismatches in terms of the 
historical acceptance and emphases of these world structures. This is because China 
basically agrees with the EU on moving towards a world where countries are coordinated 
with mutual respect and multilateral structures. However, as “multipolarity” has a long-
standing history of being accepted by the Chinese government and the Chinese public 
expectation for the future world while multilateralism is a relatively younger concept which is 
increasing in its frequency in Chinese official discourse, there has been a mismatch in terms 
of the time, the extent of acceptance as well as emphasis when it comes to multipolarity and 
multilateralism. China has been emphasising multipolarity for a long time and multipolarity is 
still a core expectation for the future world whereas multilateralism has been a long-standing 
notion for the EU and is the core of the EU’s understanding for the future world. In recent 
years, high importance has also been attached to multilateralism in China’s vision for the 
future world. The differences lie in that China believes that multipolarity and multilateralism 
can coexist since both terms focus on maintaining peace and preventing hegemony. The 
EU, on the other hand, regards multilateralism as the primary form of the future world order 
and holds differing viewpoints on the existence of “poles” in the future world. The 
misunderstandings between China and the EU on their world vision due to the different 
connotations China and the EU attach to multilateralism and multipolarity provide an 
explanation for the existing political tension in China-EU relations despite their economic and 
trade prosperity.  
In terms of methodology, this chapter applied the text searches with broad coverage. It also 
explains why coverage is important, how it is connected to frequency, and why it is helpful 





Chapter 7 The Dynamics of Normative Power  
This chapter explores the dynamics of the normative power between China and the EU in 
the studied period by comparing the normative discourse and practices between the two and 
their impact on China-EU relations. Based on content analysis and language-oriented 
constructivist analysis, this chapter argues that two drives are connected to the volatility in 
China-EU relations: the first is the mismatches in the normative goals, priorities and 
approaches between the Chinese government and the EU's normative efforts; the second is 
the economic and normative power shifts between China and the EU in the world system.  
The chapter consists of four sections. The first section discusses the EU's normative goals, 
priorities and the controversies and its normative discourse. The texts related to norms are 
selected and organised based on how norms are generated. Specifically, this part applies 
the categories of norm-formation in discourse identified in Nicolas Onuf's rule-oriented 
constructivism, namely assertive discourse, directive discourse and commissive discourse. 
The data are gathered, organised, and visualised with the assistance of Nvivo in combination 
with content analysis.  
The second section discusses China as a new normative power as well as the goals, 
priorities, and challenges related to the possible concept of Normative power China. The 
section also looks at the normative projects in progress between China and the EU and 
China's recent normative efforts in BRI, AIIB and other cooperation with international 
organisations. This leads to a comparative view of China and the EU's mismatched goals 
and priorities and the argument that the two have different aims and emphases in their 
normative efforts. 
The third section explores the differences in the Chinese government's and the EU's 
normative approaches and how this has impacted EU-China relations. It argues that the 
changing positions of China and the EU in the world system are one driving force behind the 
volatility in China-EU relations. China aims at and is in the process of entering into becoming 
a core state in the world economic system. The EU strives to maintain its position in the 
world system as a core state but is facing the risk of receding into peripheral status. As a 
result, there is a normative switch resulting from the repositioning of China and the EU in the 
world system. The different directions in terms of the movement of China and the EU in the 
world system create tensions between China and the EU in their trade and political 
interactions.  
The last section then highlights the changes in the EU's approach to interacting with China 
which is switching from a value-based approach to a pragmatic, interests-based approach. It 
also discusses the possible misunderstandings related to the translation of the term 
“pragmatism” in China-EU relations.  
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7.1 The EU as a Normative Power  
The EU's normative power to China is demonstrated in both its discourse and its practice. 
This section looks at the patterns and changes in the EU's normative discourse on China 
over the last two decades. Through this, the section also tests and makes critical reflections 
on the practicalities of applying rule-oriented constructivism (ROC) in analysing the power of 
language in shaping relations.  
ROC argues that language constructs rules and, through repetitive rules, forms certain 
hierarchies of power relations. Normative discourse is not exactly a type of rule-generating 
discourse in the original version of ROC as ROC only highlights the rule-shaping force of 
assertive discourse, directive discourse and commissive discourse which generates the rule 
of hegemony, hierarchy, and heteronomy. However, the concept of normative power does 
relate to the types of power relations Onuf categorised. Normative power emphasises the 
power of normalising values, norms and standards. Normative power distinguishes itself 
from soft power, therefore, on the basis that soft power lays emphasis on the power of 
attraction, but normative power could be realised through purposeful actions such as value-
promoting and directive discourse.  
On the other hand, normative discourse is not simply equal to directive discourse when it 
comes to the actual discourse material used in this thesis. Unlike the directive discourse 
patterns Onuf listed in his theory, in the actual official discourse, directive discourse often 
appears in a form way closer to the form of commissive discourse.  
7.1.1 Normative Discourse: Contents and Trends 
After reading the selected EU's official discourse on China, it is found that most normative 
discourse of the EU exists in the form of commissive discourse such as when the EU 
“encourages China to”, “hopes that China will”, “urges China to” and “supports China to” 
instead of simply saying “China should” or “China must”.  
For example, in the EU's 1998 Fresh Policy on China, it states that:   
The focal point of that vision must be to ensure the successful and 
lasting integration of China as an equal partner in the world 
economy, coupled with an active commitment to creating a strong 
and open civil society based on fundamental freedoms and human 
rights (European Commission, 1998: 1).43 
In this case, the EU's discourse is commissive on the surface. However, the rule it hoped to 
generate was normative. As the parts in italics show, the EU requires itself to push China 
towards an open market, civil society, fundamental freedoms, and human rights as they are 
 




in the European value framework. The underlying rule of this sentence in terms of bilateral 
relations is normative instead of commissive. Another statement in the document states:  
The aim of the EU must be to urge China to move forward in the 
creation of an open society based on the rule of law while 
sustaining economic growth and social cohesion (European 
Commission, 1998: 3).  
In this case, again, the sentence pattern is commissive for the EU itself, but it is directive and 
normative for China. The EU clarifies its goal in terms of China's development.  
The aspects of the EU's expectations of China have been discussed in the last chapter. 
These expectations are often delivered through normative discourse. For example, the last 
chapter discussed the EU's increasing attention to hard power and cooperation with China 
on security issues. The 2016 EU's policy paper to China states that: 
China should be encouraged to participate consistently in 
international conflict resolution processes in fulfilment of its 
responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council 
(European Commission, 2016b: 11) 
In this quote, “should be” and “encourage” are both normative discourses indicating the EU's 
expectations of China. These words and phrases showing the EU's normative language as 
well as normative values are consistent with the finding in Chapter 4 about the EU's top 
frequency verbs (see Table 4-9).  
A Nvivo query has been designed to review the changes in the EU's normative discourse. 
The query searches for phrases including “China should” OR “China need(s) to” OR “China 
must” OR “encourage(s) China to” OR “hope(s) that China will” OR “hope(s) China to” OR 
“urge(s) China to” OR “China ought to” OR “integrate(s) China” OR “support(s) China to” OR 
“help(s) China to” in the selected EU official document on China were designed.  
Figure 7-1 presents the coverage of the normative discourse pattern in the EU's key 
documents about China from 1994 to 2019. Where there are multiple key documents issued 
in one year, they are combined into one file so that annual coverage can be the output.  
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Figure 7-1 Coverage of Normative Discourse Pattern in the EU's Key Official Documents on 
China 
 
Figure 7-1 shows that from 1994 to 2019 when the key documents on China were issued, 
the EU showed a consistent level in terms of its normative discourse on China. In 1998, the 
word coverage for normative discourse reached its peak. There are no apparent increases 
and falls in the coverage for normative discourse over the last two decades.  
A reading of these normative sentences extracted from the EU’s discourse on China in the 
corpus leads to further discoveries on the EU’s expectations on China. The themes emerged 
from the sentences containing these normative words include the EU’s expectations in 
integrating China into the world economy and international community, increasing market 
access of China, localising international standards on product quality and labour rights as 
well as supporting the development of civil society and human rights, with the EU’s 
connotations of these terms, in China.   
The themes of this normative discourse offer important information on the EU's specific 
expectations of China which are also connected to the discussions in the last chapter. 
Examining these expectations reveals further reasons why the EU's normative approach to 
China has not been well-received in China. While some of the EU's expectations including 
social and economic growth and cohesion do match with China's preferences, some other 
expectations, especially the ones which bear different connotations in the Chinese context, 
do not match. This leads to one important argument of this chapter: the EU's normative 
efforts are most effective when they match with China's priorities, and least effective when 







7.1.2 Commissive Discourse: Self-binding Norms  
Another case of the EU's normative discourse is shown through its commissive discourse 
patterns. Along with the consistent level of normative discourse on China, the EU's 
documents contain large numbers of commitments and requirements and self-expectations. 
Below are a few excerpts of commissive discourse shown in the EU's documents:  
The EU's fundamental approach to China must remain one of 
engagement and partnership (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006a: 2). 
In this sample, the phrase “must remain” generates commissive rules. The EU is demanding 
of itself that it stick to an approach of engagement and partnership with China. A directive-
rule towards oneself is different from that towards another. If it is towards others, then the 
rule of the hierarchy is that there should be a yield between the producer and the audience. 
However, in this case, the producer and the audience are both the EU itself. This pattern 
indicates that the EU is under pressure on this occasion so that it is requiring, or even forcing 
itself to decide on an approach to enable it to get on with China.  
On another occasion, the EU states that: 
To tackle the key challenges facing Europe today—including 
climate change, employment migration, security—we need to 
leverage the potential of a dynamic relationship with China based 
on our values (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a). 
This is one of the key statements in the policy paper issued by the Commission of the 
European Communities in 2006, which sets the tone for the EU's approach to China. The 
underlined phrase “we need to” is again a commissive discourse. Based on the correlation of 
discourse, rules and rule, the rules generated by directive discourse are directive rules. This 
type of rule indicates an underlying chain of command or the rule of hierarchy. What is 
special about this type of text is that it presents a form of directive discourse of which the 
target of direction is the discourse producer itself. The real “commander” or “director” in this 
directive discourse is the EU itself. China becomes the one who takes the upper hand in the 
hierarchy relations in the context of this sentence.   
While the EU is the director in the most directive discourse, the above two cases indicate 
that the normative discourse makers are not always necessarily in the dominant position in 
the relationship. When the directive or normative discourse is targeted at itself, it indicates 
that the normative discourse maker could actually be the one who is being directed when 
there is pressure or power coming from an external body or the other side. In this piece of 
text, the external pressure of climate change, migration, security as well as China's huge but 
not-yet-fully-performed potential to cooperate with the EU have all led to this reflexive 
directive discourse. 
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In Corpus EU PPSP, directive discourse patterns, as defined by the criteria above, appeared 
more than eight hundred times. Among these references, most of the directive discourse 
indicates the EU's commands to itself instead of commands directly to China. This shows 
that instead of commanding China, the EU firstly bears a high commissive feature. It holds a 
high standard for itself and is, primarily being demanding of itself.  
A further data analysis of the normative nature of the EU leads to findings supporting this 
argument. Figure 7-2 shows the data results obtained by extracting, counting and grouping 
all the sentences containing the word “will” (as will indicates plans and commitments) in the 
EU's 1998 China policy paper “Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China”:  
Figure 7-2 EU's Normative Discourse: Targets of Requirements in Sentence Containing 
“Will” 
 
As Figure 7-2 indicates, the target of the rules mentioned by the EU in its policy papers is not 
always China. On the contrary, most of the “will” requirements and rules are raised for the 
EU. While the EU is conventionally regarded as a normative power and the Chinese side has 
raised concerns of the EU imposing rules and standards on China, this data suggests that 
despite its normative values, the EU has been quite normative toward itself, raising self-
discipline and expectations.  
Based on reading the EU's official discourse on China, it is found that the EU's normative 
discourse takes the forms of a mixture of commissive discourse and directive discourse. 
Manners argues that the EU's perceptions, strategies and actions are not separated 
(Manners, 2009b). In other words, what the EU says and thinks are part of what the EU is 
and what it does. The EU's commissive discourse supports the fact that the EU's aspiration 
and claims are translated into its efforts. This seems to fit with an explanation for the 
normative nature and the high commissive discourse of the EU. The EU's existence is a 
unique substance in international politics. Making wars materially impossible was the starting 
point of the EU. The values of promoting peace, human rights and freedom are what the EU 
established on. In this sense, the EU's normative approach is more based on its values and 
beliefs. As Manners puts it, “the most important factor shaping the international role of the 




problem of the idealist feature of the EU is that its values are put down in documents as 
either commitments or requirements for the other country. The gaps between the EU's words 
and what the other country can accept, agree to, or implement, are big. In the EU's external 
relations, or specifically in China-EU relations, this normative discourse of the EU does not 
eliminate the gaps between what the EU wants for China and what it has achieved in terms 
of EU-China relations.  
Another argument connected to the ineffectiveness of the EU's normative power over China 
is the close connections between norms and interests. Norms and interests are inseparable 
(Aggestam, 2009; Youngs, 2004). In fact, norms related to fair trade and the free market, for 
example, will be better adapted and accepted in China's interactions with each member state 
through their actual cooperation. It is not surprising to see the EU using its norms as 
leverage to bargain with China in economic and trade disputes. The problem with this 
approach, however, is that it is essentially a punitive method. For example, the EU tends to 
use sanctions, and denunciations to pressure China in the disputes on human rights and 
MES as observed by Smith (2014) and Waegemans (2014).  
The EU faces another major problem in the implementation of normative practice: the 
different interests of the EU as a whole and those of individual member states (MS). The EU 
and MS could follow different strategies in their foreign policies (Wissenbach, 2009). The 
EU's internal segmental nature makes it difficult for the EU to have a consistent approach to 
China. The EU's political system allows the member states to pursue their own interests. 
Each of the member states has its own interests which means the mission to spread the 
norms of the Union is often outweighed by more practical considerations. The EU would 
have to integrate the interest clashes among the member states as well as between the 
member states and the Union in order to carry out an integrated approach to China if it does 
not want to entirely give up its normative discourse on China (Mattlin, 2010; Freeman & 
Geeraerts, 2011; Holslag, 2010; Waegemans, 2014; Gerrits, 2009).  
Contradictions in four aspects, therefore, exist in the EU's normative approach to China, 
which has led to tension in China-EU relations. The first is the gap between what China 
wants and what the EU wants for China. The second is the EU's “punitive” way, namely 
using sanctions and punishments, in conducting its normative mission. The third is the 
inconsistency of policies between the EU, and the member states. The last is using norms as 
leverage to bargain for more economic benefits.   
7.2 China as a Normative Power  
Although normative power could be one defining feature of the EU, it does not mean other 
countries cannot be normative powers. China is showing features of becoming a normative 
power in its relations with the EU as well as the world. China may not be normative in the 
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way the EU is, but it does have normative capabilities manifested from its initiatives and 
projects.  
7.2.1 China's Normative Discourse  
If China can be viewed as a new normative power, what are the norms China is trying to 
promote? As Wang argues, after the Cold War, the US and Europe have been in the centre 
of the world's power, the values of the West including human rights and democracy have 
therefore become the mainstream international values whereas the values in favour of 
developing and emerging countries, including peaceful development and independence, are 
being pushed to a marginal position (Wang, 2015). Against this background, many hope that 
a non-Western country may revise the norms unfavourable for developing countries.  
Some hold the view that “rising China will, for sure, become a normative power” (Guo Qiong, 
Wang Cheng & Yang Jinshuo, 2016). They argue that China is becoming both an adopter of 
the existing rules and a maker of new norms. It is making efforts to shift its identity from a 
rule-taker to a rule-maker. China should pay more attention to balancing between identity, 
power and responsibilities (Guo Qiong, Wang Cheng & Yang Jinshuo, 2016).  
Norms are articulated and conveyed by discourses. Official discourse is also where an actor 
shows its first signs of the pursuit of normative power. The early normative discourse 
initiated by China is the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, namely the principles of 
“equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty”, which 
were promoted by China as the basic principles in international interactions (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 1995). These values, although revised 
later, have been the backbone of the Chinese guidelines in its foreign diplomacy.  
The Chinese government's tone towards contributing to international norms began to be 
proactive in the last decade. In 2010, in the Communiqué of the Fifth Plenum of the 17th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government stated its 
determination to stick to the “going global” strategy by engaging in and contributing to the 
international economic system: 
It is necessary to actively participate in global economic 
governance and regional cooperation, to push forward the 
development, deepen reform and promote innovation by opening 
up, and to vigorously create new advantages for participating in 
global economic cooperation and competition (Xinhua, 2010).  
Two years later, the report in the Eighteenth Party Congress by Hu Jintao provided a 
comprehensive description of the values China promotes as the norms of international 
relations. These include “equality, mutual trust, inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutually 




and these are expressed through commissive discourse phrases such as “we should” (Hu, 
2012).  
From the first ten years of this century, China's discourse has been increasingly confident 
both in terms of its domestic discourse and its foreign policy discourse. The current Xi-Li 
administration is known for walking away from the traditionally modest discourse style and 
switching to more confident tones in official documents and speeches. In President Xi 
Jinping's 2014 College of Europe speech, for example, he used several normative discourse 
patterns such as “we should not”, “we need to”, “China cannot” and “China is committed to” 
to indicate China's determination to create new norms:  
The Chinese people want peace. We do not want war. This is the 
reason why China follows an independent foreign policy of peace. 
China is committed to non-interference in other countries' internal 
affairs. And China will not allow others to interfere in its own affairs. 
This is the position that we have upheld in the past. It is what we 
will continue to uphold in the future (Xi, 2014b: para.12, 16–18). 
The second sentence of this piece of text, “China is committed to non-interference in other 
countries internal affairs” bears typical features of the commissive discourse pattern. Here 
China is making a promise about stepping away from other states’ internal affairs. This 
commissive discourse generates a commissive rule: China has committed itself to following 
its non-interference foreign policy and is subject to the judgements of the international 
society if it disobeys its promise. The rule generated by this sentence is one of heteronomy. 
This means that by making this promise, China positions itself in a net of relations where 
countries are checked and regulated by each other. This is in line with China's proposal to 
build a multi-polar world in which big powers are balanced by each other.     
Meanwhile, “China will not allow others to interfere in its own affairs” structures a self-
directive discourse pattern. A directive rule which demands China to take harsh actions 
towards others if other states try to interfere in China's internal affairs is generated. This 
once more illustrates the mobility of ruling patterns between countries: the rule of 
heteronomy between several countries can contain the rule of hierarchy between two or a 
few states. Heteronomy can also switch into a hierarchy when a country with power is 
threatened by external pressure. In this case, the country will take the controlling or 
dominant position in this relationship.  
We need to build a bridge of peace and stability, linking the two 
strong forces of China and the EU (Xi, 2014b: para.20, 21). 
We need to build a bridge of growth and prosperity, linking the two 
big markets of China and Europe (Xi, 2014b: para.21,  21). 
We need to build a bridge of reform and progress, linking the 
reform processes in China and the EU (Xi, 2014b: para.22, 21). 
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We need to build a bridge of common cultural prosperity linking the 
two major civilisations of China and Europe. (Xi, 2014b: para.23, 
21) 
This text demonstrates a parallel directive discourse pattern. This type of discourse often 
provides systematic information about the strategies, plans, or wishes of the speaker. In this 
sample, there are four rules generated by the four sentences, respectively, showing China's 
plan and wishes for relations between China and Europe. The demands for peace, 
prosperity, reforms, and cultural vitality form a nexus of rules through the parallel discourse 
structure. There is also a sequence demonstrated in this structure: the priority is to keep the 
stability and peace of both China and Europe from the Chinese government’s perspective. 
The development of the economy follows stability and peace. Then comes reform and 
cultural development. President Xi also stated that: 
Having said that, we should not forget that there is still great room 
for the growth of China-EU relations, and the potential is yet to be 
fully tapped. To move our relationship forward, China needs to 
know more about Europe, and Europe needs to know more about 
China (Xi, 2014b: para. 9, 1–3). 
This text demonstrates two cases of directive rules from the ROC perspective. The 
underlined phrase “we should not” forms a self-directive rule. In saying this, President Xi is 
implying that the current cooperation between China and the EU is still insufficient. 
Therefore, the underlying rule, at least from the Chinese perspective, is that the interactions 
between China and the EU need improvement. Self-directives happen when an agent itself 
is under pressure or is dissatisfied with something. In this case, it would be the latter.  
In another underlined phrase, China “needs to” generates another self-directive rule. 
However, following this self-directive rule, a demand was made to Europe that it should learn 
more about China. While directive rules normally generate the rule of hierarchy, this sample 
demonstrates the possibility that when a self-directive is followed by a directive rule towards 
the other agent, the rule generated between the two agents would be one of heteronomy. 
China has requirements for not only itself but also for Europe at the same time. This 
indicates the Chinese government's confidence and its notion of equality between China and 
Europe.  
To observe and understand China properly, one needs to bear in 
mind both China's past and present and draw reference to both 
China's accomplishments and the Chinese way of thinking (Xi, 
2014b: para.16, 11). 
In this sample, the phrase “one needs to” is the immediate marker of a directive discourse 
pattern. Here the pronoun “one” referring to both China and the rest of the world. On this 
specific occasion, it refers, particularly to Europe. The rule generated here is that Europe 




traditions while judging China's political system or making decisions about China. China 
expects Europe to form a more comprehensive understanding of China and discard bias and 
stereotypes. The deeper implication here is consistent with what was said in the following 
paragraph: “China cannot copy the political system or development model of other countries” 
(Xi, 2014b). The rules emerging from this sentence are also directive with the central 
message that Europe should keep away from any thoughts about changing or reforming 
China's political system and this is the precondition for further cooperation between China 
and Europe. This discourse also forms a hierarchical rule between China and Europe. China, 
as an agent, takes the dominating role on this occasion and demands Europe to behave as 
China expects. Although the hierarchical relationship is difficult to perceive, an analysis of 
the discourse pattern and the rules generated can bring hidden links to the surface:  
China's reform has entered a deep water zone, where problems 
crying to be resolved are all difficult ones. What we need is the 
courage to move the reform forward. To use a Chinese saying, we 
must "get ready to go into the mountain, being fully aware that 
there may be tigers to encounter" (Xi, 2014b: para.15).  
In the second sentence of this sample, the phrase “what we need is” and “we must” are two 
markers signifying self-directive discourse patterns. The rules generated by the “we need” 
indicate that China itself should be courageously facing the difficulties in reform. The rules 
yielded by “we must” indicate that China will have to push forward the reform regardless of 
upcoming pressures and problems. Through the self-directive discourse pattern, we realise 
that China is under great pressures in carrying out the reforms. These pressures come from 
several aspects: the expectation of international society, the expectation of the Chinese 
people, as well as the need to maintain the legitimacy of the government. However, China's 
determination is meanwhile demonstrated by the self-directive rules: it will take on the 
challenges and go for the reforms. In this way, the government shows its pressures and its 
resolutions at the same time.  
The rule yielded by these two self-directive rules is one of hierarchy. As mentioned 
previously, when this kind of rule is generated within an agent, the agent is under pressure 
and is, therefore, placing demands on itself.  
From the above samples of self-directive, we can see that self-directives are valuable hints 
in discourse for critical readers to realise that the agent is under pressure and they can 
speculate about the possible pressures the agents are facing. This is a way for other 
countries or agents in other forms to understand the speaker's deep needs and 
requirements, thus providing hints of what to offer in developing relations with the speaker-
agent.  
The norms shaped by these commissive discourse statements include the pursuit of peace, 
the urge to deepen mutual trust and understanding between China and the EU, the 
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promotion of stable and sustainable development, the pursuit of economic prosperity, reform 
and improvement, the integration of Asia and European civilisation, and the autonomy of a 
country to make decisions about its developmental path.  
7.2.2 China's Norms: Principles, Diffusion and External 
Validation 
The potential of normative power China (NPC) manifests in at least two aspects. First, NPC 
is possible as China attaches high importance to its traditional culture, which could be an 
essential substance for possible norms. Second, the concept of NPE is one which originated 
in European history, especially relating to the Second World War. Although China was also 
affected in that period of history, the situation China was in was fundamentally different from 
that of Europe. In this sense, it would be unrealistic to frame China as a normative power in 
the exact frame of Manners’ NPE is a concept which results from the special recipe of 
European political history and culture.  
However, this does not mean the notion of normative power China does not hold any validity. 
At least two elements of being a normative power exist in China's case: the first is the culture 
and values which drive the behaviour of all sectors of Chinese society. The second is the 
recognition China has received from other states and entities, especially in the central and 
east Asia region through some international organisations such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation.  
7.3 Economic and Normative Dynamics  
This section explores the changing positions of China and the EU in the world economic 
system as the driving force behind the volatility in China-EU relations. The dynamics of 
normative power in China-EU relations is closely connected to the changes in economic 
power in China and the EU. I have taken the position in this thesis that language has a 
constructive power in shaping realities. As mentioned in the theory chapter, the thesis takes 
a synthesised approach based on constructivism and realism as well as a liberal 
perspective. It believes that the relations between language and facts are interactive. 
Language is both a constructive force of reality and an early sign of what may happen in the 
future.  
7.3.1 Economic Power Changes  
The interactions in China-EU relations are connected to multiple factors. So far, the thesis 
has discussed the differences between China and the EU's perceptions and identities, their 
priorities, their world visions, their normative goals and discourse and how these factors 
have affected China-EU relations. This section incorporates the economic and structural 




We are going to look at some figures of investment between China and the EU to 
demonstrate the dynamics of economic changes between China and the EU. The main 
indicators of the economy include figures on trade, investment, technology transfer, service 
transfer, as well as cooperation projects.  
After 2004 when the EU expansion brought Poland, Hungry, and the Czech Republic, and 
the other seven countries into the EU, the EU became the biggest trading partner of China. 
Up till 2019, the EU was China's biggest trading partner and source of imports for fifteen 
consecutive years. China has been the EU's second-biggest trading partner and biggest 
source of imports since 2005 (Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of the 
People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2019). 
In recent years, the value of the trading goods between China and the MS has gone up to 
600 billion US dollars per year. The trading value between China and the EU exceeds 1 
million US dollars per minute on average (Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of 
the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2019). 
In 2018, the trade between China and the EU reached 682.16 billion US dollars, 10.6% 
higher than in 2017. China’s export figure was 408.63 billion US dollars, 9.8% higher than 
the previous year; China’s import figure was 273.53 billion US dollars, 11.7% higher than 
that of 2017 (Xinhua International, 2019). The EU is also the largest source of accumulated 
technology for China (Xinhua International, 2019). 
The main exports of China to the EU are industrial goods and consumer products. These 
include machinery, clothes and footwear, furniture, and toys. The main exports of the EU to 
China are machinery and equipment, vehicles, aircraft and chemicals (European 
Commission, 2016a). Traditionally China's industry is more labour-intensive. It exports raw 
materials and imports high-tech products. Nowadays, China's industry is experiencing 
profound changes: labour-intensive products have been substituted by high-tech production. 
China is also exporting high-tech products for the rest of the world.  
However, there has been a considerable trade deficit in the EU's trade with China in recent 
decades due to, on the one hand, the high competitiveness of Chinese products in the 
European market, and on the other hand,  restrictions in accessing the Chinese market for 
the EU (European Commission, 2016a).  
Figure 7-3 Trend in European Union GDP in Comparison with the Trend in China’s GDP 
2006-2016. (Source: Tradingeconomics.com) 
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As  
Figure 7-3 shows, in the last decade, China's GDP surged in a much sharper manner than 
that of the EU, although the general trend in the EU's GDP manifests a steady growth.   
Nonetheless, the main reason that a power shift is considered here is to emphasis the main 
change in the comparative economic power of China and the EU: over the last twenty years, 
there has been a distinct shortened distance between GDP in China and that in the EU; 
namely, China’s economy is catching up with the EU rapidly although its GDP per capita isn’t 
at the same level as that of the EU.  
Figure Apx 2 (in Appendix due to size) shows the changes in GDP in nominal numbers for 
China and the EU from 1990 to 2018. As the figure shows, in 1990, the EU’s GDP was 
already above 7000 billion while China’s GDP was just over 360 billion. Before 2005, the 
EU’s GDP growth rate had been generally higher than that of China. However, since 2008, 
China’s GDP growth has been higher than that of the EU.  
The drastic improvement in China’s economic standing in the world evidences the powerful 
change between China and the EU. If the current development pattern keeps going, it is 
possible that China’s GDP in nominal numbers will surpass that of the EU in the coming 
years.  
The power dynamics between China and the EU are multi-faceted. First, one cannot simply 
conclude that China is surpassing the EU in the economy as, until 2018, the EU is still the 
largest economy in the world based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). However, China, up 
to 2018, had become the third biggest economy in the world in terms of GDP in nominal 
numbers. Therefore, it is hard to conclude that either of them has more robust economic 
power than the other.  
Second, power should include multiple aspects of an entity’s development, such as the 
economy, social development, the environment, culture, sustainability etc. The economy is 




Lastly, the power shifts between China and the EU are an on-going dynamic process and 
indicate by no means movement in a single direction. Both China and the EU have 
experienced constant developments and changes. Meanwhile, the position of the EU in the 
world system also bears complications and uncertainties. There is a big gap in economic 
status among the EU member states. The earlier founding member states of the EU, such as 
Germany, France, and Italy, have a higher share of GDP in the EU.   
7.3.2 Normative Discourse Changes for China and the EU 
Overall, the corpus applied in this thesis shows that the EU has been normative across time 
while Chinese discourse does not include drastic changes in the case of normative 
discourse. The discourse data indicate that there is an increase in the normative discourse of 
China on the EU over the period studied by this research. The EU has demonstrated a 
consistent normative discourse on China. 
Why is this so? There could be several reasons. First, the research did not focus on Chinese 
domestic discourse. If we look at China's domestic discourse, we will find that it is becoming 
increasingly directive and commissive as well as assertive. However, as this thesis does not 
focus primarily on the domestic discourse of China, this part of the findings has to been left 
for further research. Based on comparing China's discourse to the EU and the EU's 
discourse on China, there is not a distinctive change in the Chinese discourse patterns on 
the EU. The most obvious changes are that the number of China's high official speeches on 
the EU and on Europe have significantly increased in the last five years. There is also a 
more systematic organisation of such official discourse as shown on the website of the 
Chinese delegation to the EU.  
Second, the Chinese language is a high context language and is also vague and implicit.  
Third, normative discourse is hard to define in the Chinese language. Also, the amount of 
Chinese discourse on the EU is still limited in terms of demonstrating a large change in this 
sense.  
7.4 Findings and Implications 
The chapter observes two mismatches, or source of clashes, in the normative dynamics 
between China and the EU. The first is the mismatched normative goals of the Chinese 
government and the EU's normative discourse and actions towards the other. While the EU 
aims to engage China in the international market based on the existing rules and promoting 
the EU's values, China's goal is to develop the country's economy and establish rules 
favourable for developing countries. The second is the economic power transition between 
China and the EU, and the normative shifts that go hand in hand with the power shifts.  
The more specific findings in this chapter include:  
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First, the EU's normative discourse stays strong across the years. Apart from the directive 
discourse, it also has a large amount of commissive discourse, indicating a high level of self-
normative, or reflexive normative features. This is related to the organisation, identity as well 
as the development phase of the EU.  
Second, China has an increasing amount of normative discourse, mostly in the form of 
assertive discourse and commissive discourse but less directive discourse unless in matters 
relating to high principles in China such as sovereignty issues, or security issues. The 
combination of assertive discourse and commissive discourse indicates a new form of non-
imposing norms which focuses more on respect for diverse political values. 
Third, China has values and norms, including non-interference, peaceful development, 
coexistence, despite the differences in political systems, resilience, and tolerance for risks 
and uncertainties as indicated in its international projects including the Belt and Road 
Initiative and Asian Investment Bank.  
Finally, there has been a parallel development between the increase in China's normative 
discourse and China's economic power. In the meantime, the EU's normative discourse 
stays strong as well as its economic power, although relatively speaking, its economic 
position in the world system has been diverging from the centre. This dynamic in their 
economic power shift has formed on the end of a double movement between China and the 
EU, with the other end being China's increasingly stronger normative discourse. This double 
movement provides the driving force leading to the enhancement of China's normative 
power.  
The findings in this chapter imply that China has the potential to become a normative power 
in China-EU relations as China has been developing its own normative principles in the 
world as well as their diffusion. The economic power shift between China and the EU also 
contributes to an increase in Chinese normative power through the movement between 
Chinese economic and norm development. However, this needs to be supplemented by the 
Chinese norms being accepted by the EU, which will be the last essential criteria for China to 
be normative in the bilateral relationship. So far, the EU has not taken China as being 
normative yet, but the trend towards China developing normative power is irreversible.  
The argument about the potential of China to become a normative power is in line a group of 
researchers’ opinion on recognising China as a potential normative power (Kavalski, 2013, 
2014, 2017; Guo Qiong, Wang Cheng & Yang Jinshuo, 2016; Peng & Tok, 2016; Zhang, 
2011; Wang, 2015). More specifically, the normative discourse of China and the increasing 
economic power shift between China and the EU enhance Clark's arguments that material 
power and normative power can be mutually constitutive and the economic power of China 




However, a few novelties make this chapter's findings helpful to the existing discussions on 
China as a normative power:   
First, research recognising China's normative power and evidencing it with cases applies to 
central Asia (Guo Qiong, Wang Cheng & Yang Jinshuo, 2016) or Southeast Asia (Han, 
2017) instead of the context of China-EU relations. This chapter situates China's normative 
power in the context of China-EU relations. This effort breaks with the current view that 
China's normative power only exist in Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Instead, the chapter 
departs from the manifestations of normative discourse and argues that China has got the 
driving force ready to become a normative power so its normative feature is not bound to 
regional boundaries and will be increasing in China-EU relations as well.  
Second, this is the first research focusing on China's normative discourse. Existing literature 
on Chinese languages has applied the framework of soft power in terms of the discourse 
studied. This fills the gap identified that normative power China has not been evaluated from 
the perspective of China's normative discourse development.  
Third, the chapter pushed forward theoretical framework development on China as a 
normative power by discussing the interactions with China and the EU's positions in the 
international order. So far, research comparing Normative China and Normative Europe has 
not considered the role of discourse and its interactions with the economic power transitions 
between the two (Kavalski, 2017).  
While Clark does consider the role of economic power, his focus was more on assessing 
whether and how China could meet the prerequisites of being a normative power and the 
theoretical elements behind this system of criteria (Clark, 2014). Clark has discussed the 
conceptual framework taking power, legitimacy and responsibility into consideration when 
assessing China's normative power potential. He focuses on the missing link in China's 
normative formation, which is a more defined “responsibility” to be accepted by international 
society (Clark, 2014). 
In other words, while Clark (2014) focuses on the theoretical elements of normative power 
and China's recognition of it, this thesis has focused on the driving forces of normative 
China. This chapter points out that, based on the double movement theory, the interactions 
between China's rising economic power will inevitably bring about social-cultural 
developments which entail normative power. The normative discourse evidences the 
movement from the language and culture towards the values, principles, and approach of 
China.  
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7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter applies a ROC perspective to content analysis to explore what the official 
discourse between China and the EU offers to review the normative power dynamics in 
China-EU relations.  
It argues that there is a normative power shift between China and the EU, as China expands 
its normative efforts. This is evidenced by both China's increasing normative efforts and the 
shifting normative discourse pattern between China and the EU in the past twenty years. The 
chapter reviewed both China and the EU’s normative discourse on the other as evidenced 
from the corpora. It also reviewed the economic power shifts between China and the EU 
overall in the last two decades, revealing the hand-in-hand development of normative power 
shifts and economic power shifts in the bilateral relationship. These discussions are in line 
with the theoretical framework of this thesis, which regards that normative power and 
discourse power are mutually constitutive.  
Methodologically, in the textual analysis of political discourse, this chapter pointed out the 
increase in normative discourse in Chinese official discourse over the years. It also finds that 
among the large amount of normative discourse from the EU, a large quantity is commissive 
discourse, featuring the self-regulating nature of the EU.  
The chapter also finds that normative roles or hierarchy of the relationship should not be 
decided upon merely by the number of examples of normative discourse pattern, as 
normative discourse could involve demands and requirements to the self instead of the 
other, especially in the case of the EU’s discourse. It is the amount of directive discourse 
targeted by each at the other which counts and indicates potential normative power towards 
the other. This, of course, should ideally be tested in terms of whether the discourse has 
been accepted by the other, as the core of being normative should be about acceptance. 
Although the chapter does not have the scope to explore the discourse at this level, further 




Chapter 8 The Dynamic Multidimensional 
Mismatches: Conceptualisation, 
Application and Assessment   
Each previous chapter has been focusing on one aspect of the mismatches between China 
and the EU. This chapter brings these aspects together and presents the framework of the 
multidimensional dynamic mismatches. However, it is not only the individual mismatches but 
the interrelations and interactions of these aspects which feed the challenges in China-EU 
relations. The chapter provides, tests, and assesses the framework for the sake of offering a 
possible tool to analyse bilateral relations based on corpus analysis. 
The chapter aims to consolidate the model of multi-levelled mismatches in China-EU 
relations derived from the findings and arguments of previous chapters, applying this model 
to the cases of challenges in China-EU relations and assessing the model. A few case 
analyses include the recognition of China's MES, as well as Europe's ambivalent attitude to 
China's projects and initiatives including BRI, 17+1 and AIIB.   
The findings and arguments of the previous chapters contribute to the conceptualisation in 
this chapter. The mismatch between China and the EU exist on multiple levels, including 
priorities, identity, and perception of the self and the other, the expectations of the other, the 
future world, and their strategies and approaches. While mismatches at one level can 
already lead to problems, the coexistence of mismatches at different levels and their 
variations and evolution over time lead to the volatility of contemporary China-EU relations. 
The model of multi-levelled mismatches in China-EU relations offers a tool to understand the 
dynamics of active factors behind the challenges in China-EU relations, helps to categorise 
the problems in China-EU relations according to their potential cause, and helps to 
understand the persistent and changing nature of some of the cases.   
The chapter contains five sections:  
Section 8.1 presents the analytical framework developed through the chapters, which links 
the elements discussed in the previous chapters together.  
Section 8.2 applies the analytical framework to a few cases in China-EU relations to explore 
the potential of the explanatory power of the framework. The cases are grouped into three 
categories, namely trade issues, including trade deficit, anti-dumping cases and trade 
protectionism, persisting issues, including the recognition of China's MES and the EU's arms 
embargo to China, and cross-continent projects, namely the EU and its member states' 
misunderstandings and questions about China's projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative 
and the 17+1 project.   
Section 8.3 assesses the applicability of the Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches 
framework to different types of cases.  
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Section 8.4 concludes the chapter.  
8.1 The Framework of the Dynamic Multidimensional 
Mismatches in China-EU Relations  
The mismatches between China and the EU exist in multiple aspects including priorities and 
preferences, identities and perceptions, visions of the future world as well as strategies and 
approaches to each other. These aspects belong to different dimensions in the relationship. 
Identities and perceptions and the values they represent are the internal drives of China and 
the EU behind their choices of policies, goals, and approaches. Priorities and preferences 
are manifestations of the internal drives of the entities. Visions for the future world are the 
goals of China and the EU in their bilateral relations, but these understandings and views of 
the future world are also part of their internal drives in their domestic development and 
external relations. Strategies and approaches are how China and the EU manifest their 
internal values, reach their goals in the relationship, and fulfil their visions for the world. 
Figure 8-1 Dynamic Multi-levelled Mismatches in China-EU Relations presents these 
multidimensional mismatches and the dimensions they sit in: 
 
Figure 8-1 Dynamic Multi-levelled Mismatches in China-EU Relations 
(Source: own work) 
Under this framework, the assumption is that, ideally, if mismatches do not exist on any 
level, the relationship between two entities should go smoothly with minimum difficulties in a 
bilateral context. If mismatches exist in one of the four aspects, the problems will manifest in 
a relatively contained scope. If mismatches exist in more than one aspect when it comes to 
some of the challenges, the complexity and fierceness will increase as there will be 




mismatches involved, the consistent, core mismatches across all cases should be related to 
at least one level presented in this model. 
Methodologically, each of these aspects is discussed through analysing features and 
contents of the selected official discourse between China and the EU. Priorities and 
preferences are manifested through word frequencies and connotations. Identities and 
perceptions, as well as visions for the future world order, are emergent themes from the 
discourse and are analysed upon content analysis.  
Apart from its multidimensional and comprehensive scope, and the anchoring points 
between themes in international relations and discourse features, the dynamics of the 
framework is another contribution to the current methodologies in explaining the challenges 
in China-EU studies.  
Several dynamics are going on within this framework: first, the proportions of these four 
aspects will be different in different cases. Second, within each aspect, the mismatches 
change all the time as the priorities, identities, visions, and strategies change. Lastly, there 
are interactions among these four aspects, and these interactions are factors behind the 
challenges as well and manifest their influence in the relationship across time.  
8.2 Application of the Framework  
This section will apply the framework of multidimensional mismatches developed in this 
chapter to examine some cases in China-EU relations. As the challenges in China-EU 
relations exist in multiple aspects and areas and it is not realistic to cover the full range of the 
issues between China and the EU, a few cases, especially concerning trade and economic 
cooperation, are selected and grouped to represent challenges of different types.  
Overall, the cases used to illustrate challenges are selected and categorised based on 
rationale so that they echo the challenges defined in the introduction chapter, and they are 
more relatable to the findings and arguments of the previous chapters. The introduction of 
this thesis categorises the challenges in China-EU relations into trade disputes, patterns of 
volatility, and other challenges involving multiple social, political, economic, or cultural 
aspects. As the challenges in China-EU relations cover a wide range, only a few are 
selected due to the limited length of this thesis. The cases are selected as they represent 
three kinds of clashes in China-EU relations: economic disputes, the long-standing issues 
which contain a high level of stickiness, as well as social-political clashes.  
The first group involves the trade issues between China and the EU, including the trade 
imbalance, the anti-dumping disputes on solar panels and protectionism in the trade 
environment. The trade issues are essential as this is where China-EU relations started, and 
trade remains one of central ground of the bilateral relations. China is the number one import 
source country for the EU and the second-largest export market. The average trade volume 
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between China and the EU stands at over €1 billion per day (European Commission, 2020). 
Plus, trade issues showcase that even if priorities match, mismatches in emphases and 
connotations of trade and other aspects in the four dimensions mentioned in the thesis 
impact the trade relations.  
The second group includes persisting issues, more specifically, the EU's recognition of 
China's MES and the EU's arms embargo on China. These two issues have both existed for 
a long time in China-EU relations but are still not resolved, and both cases share similarities 
in the sense that ups and downs have happened over the years. There is a certain stickiness 
in both issues. This group is included as the framework suggested in the thesis contains 
dimensions of longitudinal perspectives to address the volatility and stickiness of the issues 
across time.  
The third group includes challenges regarding the international projects involving China and 
the EU, including the EU’s questions about the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and 17+1 
cooperation. These issues are discussed as a group as they involve structural, cross-
continent factors. Plus, these challenges share a commonness which is that they have been 
received with different levels of trust in and outside China. It is, therefore, worthwhile to 
examine the factors behind the lack of trust with the assistance of the analytical framework. 
8.2.1 Trade Issues- Deficit, Anti-dumping Disputes and 
Protectionism  
This section addresses the trade issues in China-EU relations, especially the anti-dumping 
cases and issues regarding the trading environment between China and the EU such as the 
trade imbalances, market access as well as protectionism.  
8.2.1.1 Trade Deficit 
The trade deficit for the EU has been a long-term situation in China-EU relations and has 
always been one of the EU's primary concerns in trade with China. As Figure 8-2 shows, The 
EU has had a trade deficit with China for ten years in a row from 2009 to 2019. From 2009 to 
2019, the EU's trade deficit was $178.84 billion (Eurostat, 2019b). For China, although trade 
surplus is beneficial immediately, in the long-term, it brings risks of inflation and therefore is 
not healthy for the Chinese domestic economy. Figure 8-2 shows that the deficit decreased 




Figure 8-2  EU Trade in Goods with China, 2009-2019 (Eurostat, 2019b) 
 
Figure 8-3 EU-27 Trade with China by Types, 2009-2019 (Eurostat, 2019a) 
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As Figure 8-3 shows, although overall the EU has had a deficit with China from 2009 to 
2019, it has a trade surplus in chemicals, food and drink, raw materials, energy and other 
products. However, the EU's trade deficit in machinery and vehicles and other manufactured 
goods takes over and leads to an overall trade deficit (Eurostat, 2019a).   
The exported machinery and vehicles from the EU take 55% of the EU's core export, and the 
imported machinery and vehicles take 54% of the core imports. The EU exports more 
chemicals to China and imports more other manufactured products from China.  
Both China and the EU exported and imported high-value products. Although the EU still 
imports consumer goods, such as footwear and clothing from China which are relatively 
labour-intensive products, and sells motor vehicles, aircraft and chemicals to China, which 
are technology-intensive products, the ratio and types of high-value, non-labour-intensive 
products from China to the EU are increasing (European Commission, 2020). Research has 
also shown that in recent years, the price gap between made in China textile and clothing 
and made in Europe equivalents are shrinking since the Chinese industries and enterprises 
have gone through changes over the years, and the prices of labour have risen 
(Vandenbussche et al., 2011).  
The EU’s main imports from China are industrial and consumer goods, machinery and 
equipment, footwear, and clothing. The EU’s main exports to China include machinery and 
equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft, and chemicals (European Commission, 2020). 
According to data of the Economic and Commercial Offices of the Mission of PRC to the EU, 
in 2017, China became the EU's third-largest source of import and export markets for service 
trade (Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to 
the European Union, 2019). Trade in the service sector makes up more than 10% of the total 
trade in goods between China and the EU, and the EU's export of services makes up 19% of 
the EU's total exports of goods (European Commission, 2020) 
According to data from Eurostat, in 2017, the EU's export of services to China amounted to 
46.7 billion euros, accounting for only 5% of the total, far below the EU's 26% of exports to 
the United States and the European Free Trade Association (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein) which accounted for 16% of exports. Similarly, the EU's imports of 
China's service trade to China totalled 30.6 billion euros, making up only 4% of the total, far 
below the US's 31% and the European Free Trade Association's 12%. (Economic and 
Commercial Office of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 
2019).] 
Economic Power Shifts  
The trade deficit can be explained by the economic power shifts, as argued in Chapter 7. 




context of the world system theory. This can be evidenced by the fact that the EU has been 
importing a large volume of manufactured and high-tech electronics instead of only raw 
materials from China. 
Figure 8-4 Type of Goods in EU-China Trade (Source: Eurostat, 2019a) 
 
Figure 8-4 shows the top types of goods that the EU imported and exported in trade with 
China in 2019. It shows that manufactured goods have a higher share than primary goods in 
terms of both the EU's exports and imports. Machinery and vehicles stand at the centre of 
the manufactured goods in terms of both exports and imports (Eurostat, 2019a).  
Identities and Perceptions 
Another perspective form which to understand the trade imbalances is in terms of 
perceptions and expectations. As the Chinese report states, “China is the biggest developing 
country and emerging economy while the EU is the biggest developed countries' group. Both 
China and the EU are poles on the international arena” (Economic and Commercial Office of 
the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2019: Preface). This 
description of China and the EU being two of the poles in the world as well as the reference 
to the EU as the biggest group of countries (Guojia Jituan) echoes the findings in Chapter 5 
that the EU is quite often viewed as an equal to a unique type of a country, or significant 
power, in the Chinese discourse which does not concern the same level of the complexity 
about the EU's nature and identity as that which the EU recognises in itself. Plus, the 
Chinese discourse often sees the EU as moving towards being a pole of the future world of 
multipolarity while the EU has doubts about the popularity of the concept of “poles” in the 
post-modern world.   
This differences in perceptions of each other set a potential clash between China and the EU 
in their economic interactions as the EU emphasises its identity as a rule-based 
supranational organisation while China does not dive as deep as the EU into the 
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complications of the internal discrepancies in the EU. This leads to an awkward situation; 
since China views the EU as, in a way, equivalent to a “big country”, the underlying 
expectation is that the EU will act in an integrated manner. This is a double-edged sword for 
the EU. On the one hand, it demonstrates China's confidence and trust in the integrity of the 
EU, which simplifies the bilateral relations so that projects and cooperation can be carried 
out more efficiently. On the other hand, however, this could underestimate the complications 
within the EU, especially regarding the discrepancies of MS. Since MS may have different 
positions and opinions when it comes to their relations with China, the actual policies 
towards China from the EU will take that into full account. This leads to a situation whereby, 
while China would like to talk directly to the EU for the sake of simplicity and directness, the 
actual situation is that China has to talk to individual MS for cooperation projects as the 
integration of the EU's policies takes much longer than China can afford, especially when 
projects require immediate attention.  
8.2.1.2 Anti-dumping Disputes: Mismatched Norms and Identities 
Disputes in the photovoltaic (PV) industry are some of the most significant trade disputes in 
the contemporary trade history of China the EU. The disputes were significantly resolved 
through negotiations and deal-making in 2013, which provide an example for similar issues 
to be resolved in the future. In June 2013, the European Commission (EC) imposed anti-
dumping duties and anti-subsidies on solar panels imported from China, claiming that 
Chinese solar panels were exported with a price lower than their production cost. It enforced 
11.8% duty on the imports of Chinese PV products and intended to raise it to 47.6% until the 
solution of a 'floor price' was introduced which refers to a minimum price for 
Chinese PV products in European markets; this was proposed and passed (Schroeder, 
2013; Morris, 2013). On 2nd August 2013, after hard negotiations, the two sides reached an 
agreement that a 'floor price' should be applied to Chinese solar panel products, which caps 
module imports to 7 GW per year at a minimum price of €0.56/watt (Voituriez & Wang, 
2015). The deal was regarded as officially resolved by negotiations led by officials and 
commerce leaders on both sides (Steinhauser & Patnaude, 2013).  
A few mismatches discussed in the previous chapters are related to this case. Regarding 
priorities and preferences, China's preference is to guarantee China's economic prosperity 
and trade success. Although the EU has the same priority, the two sides would, of course, 
put domestic or internal benefits first. Apart from that, China emphasises fair treatment more. 
As previously, China's anti-dumping cases had been calculated with a third country being the 
substitution country, but this is unfavourable to China and unfair from China’s perspective. 
The EU emphasises protecting employment and protecting EU industries.  
Regarding the means of resolution, the two focused on the commonness: both sides would 




provide. A floor price is imposed in this case to enhance the fair trade competition. This sets 
an example for the resolution of disputes in China-EU trade disputes.  
However, a further problem one should remember is that China has prioritised restructuring 
China's economy. Due to the world economic crises, there has been a global over-
productivity of steel capacity. In 2016, the Chinese government proposed to proactively 
reduce this over capacity with the goal of reducing raw steel productivity by 100 million to 
150 million tons. Up to 2018, within just three years, China also met this goal. However, to 
meet this goal, China had to pay a large price: 500 thousand people had to lose their jobs. 
They had to be re-employed in other industries (Economic and Commercial Office of the 
Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2019). 
8.2.1.3 Market Accessibility: Power Shift Dynamics and Mismatched Expectations 
The Chinese market holds massive attraction for EU enterprises. China has a population of 
nearly 1.4 billion and is the second-largest economy, importer and consumer in the world 
(Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the 
European Union, 2019).  
One of the trade challenges is that EU MS have been raising questions about the 
accessibility of the Chinese market. This, on the one hand, is driven by the fact that Chinese 
markets have a massive attraction for the EU. In this sense, China is in a favourable position 
or has the upper hand in the relationship as the EU is more dependent on the Chinese 
market rather than vice versa. However, that is not to say that China does not need the EU 
market. As mentioned before, China and the EU are each other's main trading partners. The 
economic power shifts and the political impact shifts which come with them mean that China 
is becoming a rising norm-maker and a potential normative power. This is a clash with the 
EU's expectations as traditionally, the EU had the upper hand in terms of both normative 
discourse and normative practices in China-EU relations.  
On the other hand, this indicates that substantial discrepancies of expectations exist, as 
found in Chapter 5, between China and the EU. The EU has been expecting political impacts 
on China beyond China's 'red-lines', namely issues related to China’s core interests including 
its sovereignty and political security, since the start of its interactions with China. Its first 
earlier policy paper on Asia (Commission of the European Communities, 1994) already 
pointed out the EU’s normative ambitions in interacting with China. This has overall been 
consistent with the EU's policy against China but has also changed in recent years with the 
EU gradually realising and accepting that this part of the EU’s values will be hard to translate 
into China. The intention, however, is still there whether it is for political purposes, out of the 
core EU values and norms, or as a leverage for economic benefits. One thing is clear: the 
EU has also turned towards a more result-focused approach as an adjustment.  
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The third argument about the challenges around Chinese market accessibility is about the 
differences between Chinese social, political, and legal systems and those of the EU. Behind 
these differences also exist the discrepancies between the EU's interpretation of China in 
terms of 'state capitalism' and China's interpretation of the Chinese market as being socialist 
with Chinese characteristics.  
China's first FDI (foreign direct investment) regulation was put forward in 1979. Since then, 
European enterprises have been exploring and testing the waters of the Chinese market. In 
recent years, foreign enterprises' eagerness to enter and thrive in Chinese markets has 
rapidly risen. In 2018, the UK's investment in China had risen 150%, achieving a rise in an 
almost explosive manner. In the meantime, Germany's investment in China has also 
increased by 79.3%. The total in terms of enterprises of EU MS's foreign investment in China 
has increased by 22.6% compared to the previous year, which is far higher than the average 
foreign investment China receives from other countries. This indicates that the EU is 
confident about the Chinese market and has a strong willingness to expand their Chinese 
market (Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to 
the European Union, 2019). 
From the Chinese side, carefully monitoring the EU’s access to Chinese market has several 
reasons. First, China has been a victim of colonisation in the past, especially from major 
powers including the UK, Germany and France which are still leading powers in the EU 
despite the fact the UK is leaving the EU now. Second, the Chinese market is applying a 
dual system where both free market and governmental monitoring are going on. While the 
free market requires competition, regulations and laws about the markets are made through 
national administrations which will consider the political, security and economic risk of 
making China's market more accessible to other countries. The EU may phrase it as 
protectionism, but it is a precaution all governments must take to protect local interests in the 
age of globalisation.  
8.2.2 Persisting Issues: Recognition of China's Market 
Economy Status (MES)  
MES is important for China mainly because it affects the method of calculation for 
investigations and judgements on anti-dumping cases. The EU has been applying the 
method of the alternative country when it comes to calculating dumping. Because China 
does not have MES, the trading figures of Germany, Brazil, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and Mexico had to be used, according to the WTO practices, as references instead of the 
actual price from China, to judge whether the country had been violating WTO anti-dumping 
rules. Due to the extent of the randomness of the selection of an alternative country, the 




Part of the dispute on granting China MES is about the legal procedures. The law regulating 
this case is the addendum of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The 
WTO did not distinguish between a non-market economy and market economies before 
1955, when the second paragraph of the addendum to article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), referred to hereafter as the addendum, was put into effect 
(Puccio, European Parliament & Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services, 
2015). Section 15 (a) and (d) of the addendum are particularly relevant to the case of China. 
Section 15 (a) regulates that the importing country can use alternative methods to calculate 
the value of the goods instead of Chinese domestic prices unless Chinese enterprises prove 
that they are doing business in the market economy context. Section 15 (d) specifies the 
conditions under which MES has to be granted to China regardless of Section 15 (a): 
15(d) Once China has established, under the national law of the 
importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy, the 
provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that 
the importing Member's national law contains market economy 
criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of 
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of 
accession. In addition, should China establish, pursuant to the 
national law of the importing WTO Member, that market economy 
conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non-market 
economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to 
that industry or sector (World Trade Organisation, 2001a: 9).  
However, in practice, the judgement of whether a country has MES is not the responsibility 
of the WTO but regulated by the participating countries' internal laws. Under the EU's legal 
framework, five standards are used to make decisions on whether an entity is a market 
economy. These include: first, the government cannot intervene in aid allocation or 
enterprise decisions in the economy; second, the government cannot intervene in 
corporations in privatisation and cannot use non-marketplace forms in exchange for 
compensation; third, the country should use modern-day accounting finance standards; 
fourth, the country should comply with bankruptcy legal guidelines, highbrow belongings 
legal guidelines and property rights legal guidelines, protect all legal assets rights including 
intellectual property rights; fifth, the country needs to have a true financial device unbiased of 
the government (Cheng, 2016). 
Since the EU did not think China as met all the conditions, it refused to grant MES to China. 
These are the basic background details of the case. As Section 5.1.2.2 in Chapter 5 already 
touched upon the case of MES from the perspective of identity and perceptions, the following 
sections discuss the case mainly from the perspective of priorities and normative power 
shifts.  
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8.2.2.1 Priorities and Preferences  
In the case of recognising China's MES, China focuses primarily on China's economic rights 
but also on its national dignity, especially in terms of being perceived as an impactful power 
in the world, or an equal to key powers in the West, as argued in Chapter 5. The EU, on the 
other hand, focuses primarily on the EU's economy, and the adherence to relevant rules and 
norms. The EU, being a supranational organisation, stands close to existing norms of 
existing international institutions such as the WTO, in this case.  
However, obviously, in this case, both China and the EU attach great importance to WTO 
rules, but the two have different interpretations of the rules. This, apart from being 
understood from the EU-US-China triangle relations perspective, can be understood from the 
perspective of the changing normative dynamics between China and the EU. Before China 
joined the WTO, the EU had more discourse power over China in the international arena. 
However, with China's economic power increasing in the 1990s and the early 2000s, the EU 
started to realise that China might become a more impactful discourse maker in China-EU 
relations. Therefore, the EU was reluctant to interpret the rules in favour of China; instead, in 
interpreting the rules, it altered and revised the rules through giving amendments, so that the 
EU's discourse power, as well as the economic power, could be maintained.  
8.2.2.2 Economic and Normative Power Shifts 
Another useful part of applying the DMM framework in interpreting the case of MES is that it 
explains why this case persists over time. While a realist approach would interpret this as a 
clash in economic interests, the framework in this thesis sees that the changing normative 
power between China and the EU has complicated the situation. When China was 
significantly weaker in its discourse power, the EU helped China to enter the WTO, which, in 
the first place, guaranteed that China could enjoy the benefits promised by WTO rules. 
However, when China's normative power enhanced, it defended itself due to its increased 
understanding of the rule-based norms of the WTO, the EU started to avoid giving China 
MES. Since the EU was granted a role in judging whether China have met the conditions, 
plus the EU has advantages in interpreting and implementing the rules, it made the choice in 
favour of its own benefits. However, the case went on to a third stage where it remains to 
this day, that due to China's continuously increasing normative power in the world, the media 
pressure fell on the EU, claiming that the EU had avoiding recognising China's MES. Plus, 
due to China's enhanced economic power overall and its reduced trust for the EU's 
adherence to its promises, China's interests in getting MES started to decrease. Therefore, 
the EU has lost its advantage in using this as a leverage in China-EU relations. This case, in 
such a way, has become a persistent, long-standing case without a clear, definite result so 




8.2.3 Persisting Issues: Arms Embargo 
The EU's arms embargo on China started after the 1989 political incident in China when the 
EU started its ban on selling weapons and relevant technologies to China. This issue shares 
some similar features with MES in terms of the long time span it covers. Plus, both issues 
have been persistent: both went through several twists and turns and remain unresolved 
until today. Moreover, both issues have been pushed to a relatively less core status in the 
bilateral relationship now as economic corporation and trade, political and cultural 
communications as well as other mutually beneficial projects are in place. The fact that the 
cases remains makes it worthwhile to look at it through the analytical framework developed 
through this thesis to see whether the longitudinal and constructivist perspective can shed 
light on the stickiness of the case.  
For the arms embargo issue, the US is again an important factor as analysed by existing 
research (Liu, 2005; Zhai, 2020).  Others have noticed that there are discrepancies among 
the member states of the EU (Exartier, 2010). Under the framework of this thesis, a few 
perspectives can be given. First, as Chapter 4 argues, national safety and sovereignty are in 
a very high position in terms of China's priorities. This explains why China was trying to 
argue for lifting the arms embargo in the first place. However, for the EU, it attaches more 
importance to international norms and its identity and values in promoting Western-style 
democracy and freedom which emphasise that the individuals’ opinions should be respected 
regardless of whether they are in line with the official or governmental opinions. China 
attaches more importance to collective security and safety and stresses the benefits of an 
entity. This is the clash, or mismatch of values behind the issue of the arms embargo, which 
today perhaps has more of a symbolic meaning instead of any significant impact on China-
EU relations as the two have been trading in almost all the main sectors anyways, and China 
has been able to develop its own national defence without purchasing arms from the EU or 
the US.  
In terms of the dynamics, or changes in this case over the years, they experience several 
stages, including initial tension, then attempts at resolution and shelving policies nowadays. 
Looking from the longitudinal perspective especially as argued in Chapter 7, since the 
beginning, the EU wanted China to convert to Western values as stated in its earlier policy 
papers and the arms embargo, as a sanction to China, was implemented harshly. However, 
over time, the EU has realised that China is not interested in changing its values to bring it 
into line with traditional Western values, and the case reached deadlock with the EU in a 
dilemma. On the one hand, selling weapons to China is beneficial to the EU's economy and 
tightens relations between MS and China. On the other hand, it could be viewed as an 
offence to the US, and the EU would have a hard time arguing for itself in terms of sticking to 
the traditional core values of the EU. The next stage, which is where China and the EU are 
today, involved the case cooling off and being marginalised. Resolving it has been pushed to 
 
230   
the side although China still mentions and emphasises in its policy papers that the EU 
should lift its arms embargo on China.  
In recent years, the EU has shifted to a more pragmatic approach to China, focusing more 
on results and practical cooperation rather than primarily output of Western ideologies. As 
argued, this is also due to China's approach to being ‘Wushi’, which focuses on the 
efficiencies of corporations and results in problem-solving with a down-to-earth working style. 
This shift in strategies or mindset in the EU is, of course, different from where the EU started 
in its relations with China in the 1970s, but this shift has shown more effectiveness in China-
EU relations regarding the arms embargo issue: at least the case today is not standing in the 
way of social-economic cooperation between China and the EU despite the unresolved 
issues. To sum up, the mismatches in priorities as argued in Chapter 4 and the changes in 
the EU's approaches to China help in understanding the involvement of the arms embargo 
case with both a comparative view and a time-sensitive perspective.  
For both these cases, the limitation of the framework in this thesis, however, is that it does 
not effectively involve the influence of third parties, which in both cases are primarily the 
impacts from the US. However, on a bright side, this does offer a chance to focus on the 
autonomy between China and the EU and its dynamics over the years which are often 
under-valued, if not neglected, in China-EU studies.   
8.2.4 Cross-continent Projects  
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) started in 2013 after Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to 
Central and Southeast Asia, and aims to improve the connectivity of Asia, Europe and 
Northeastern Africa through building transportation infrastructure, namely a 'Silk Road 
Economic Belt' and '21st Century Maritime Silk Road' (Zhao, 2016).    
Although OBOR is not primarily a project between China and the EU, it does cover a large 
area of Europe and Italy and Romania and Bulgaria have also signed the agreement. The 
16+1, nowadays 17+1 project is considered to be part of the initiative as well.   
In China, the initiative is a very important and grand project which has a lot of positive 
outlooks. For the world outside China, there have been challenges. Existing controversies 
about OBOR from Europe can be summarised in two aspects: the first is the overall concern 
that the project carries China's geopolitical ambition. For the 17+1 cooperation, for example, 
some EU officials have expressed concerns about whether this will divide Europe (Deutsche 
Welle, 2019). The second type involves specific concerns about the transfer of technology, 
market competition as well as the adaptation of local legal frameworks, including standards 
of production and environmental protection. As reported by Deutsche Welle, for example, 
Germany has concerns that China will learn the technologies and 'take' the infrastructures 




8.2.4.1 Priorities and Preferences  
Europe's areas of concern correspond with the findings in Chapter 4 in the way that Politics 
and Diplomacy and Laws and Regulations, rank higher in the top hot topics' coverage list of 
Corpus EU PPSP than in that of Corpus China PPSP. The major concerns and doubts from 
Europe about OBOR are the areas which matter most for the EU apart from the top two 
coverage topics, namely Economy and Trade, as well as Communication and Dialogues.  
About the first concern on the geopolitical impacts of the projects, there are two groups of 
arguments. Some argue that OBOR will have impacts extending beyond the economic realm 
including altering the relations between major powers including China, Europe, Russia and 
the United States as well as resulting in alternative regional cooperation models in the 
related areas (Zhao, 2016). Others, however, argue that in the context of OBOR, the impact 
of the initiative for China and the EU will remain focused on the economy; in particular, 
international trade in Europe has not “shown any interest to get involved in the global power 
struggles between Beijing and Washington” (Yu, 2018: 231). Yu Jie, for example, has 
noticed that there are a few some misunderstandings and mixed opinions outside China 
about OBOR (Yu, 2017). She mentions that some regard that OBOR is not only a way to 
expand China's international impact, but also a way to convert China's overcapacity of 
production as well as support for Chinese enterprises to 'go out'. She mentions that in the 
implementation of OBOR, it is inevitable and natural that the Chinese government will 
support Chinese enterprises financially and politically in terms of international competition 
(Yu, 2017).  
The argument in this section goes closer to the second group of opinions. Within the 
priorities suggested by the findings in Chapter 4, Economy and Trade is China's top concern. 
The initiative is made in this context as well. OBOR is a comprehensive project, but it is 
primarily an economic project. It is natural that economic cooperation will spill over to other 
aspects of social-political parts of the partner countries. However, this does not mean that 
the social-political impacts will be unhelpful for the participators, nor does it mean China's 
primary intention is to exert political impacts.  
A few arguments can be made to support the claim that BRI is primarily economic. First, it 
started from the context that countries, including EU MS, as well as other countries in the 
world, have urgent requirements for infrastructure building.  
Second, the economic cooperation of the initiative does not require the participators to 
change or revise their social-political system. The cooperation is not built on political 
conditions, and the participation is voluntary. The project does not interfere with the political 
structure or visions of the participators. Unlike the EU's ambitions in altering China's system 
at least in the 1990s, China does not require the participators to meet any requirements 
politically.  
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Third, the project meets the interests and needs of the participants' needs for infrastructure. 
The project has been started by China and is moving forward so far due to the support of 
both China and participating countries. China's priority is the mutual economic development 
of China and the participating countries. Although it is possible the economic project will 
have some spill-over effects on the societies of the participating countries, these effects are 
limited. This is also in line with China's preference for 'de-politicisation' (Xinhua, 2011) when 
it comes to its relations with Europe as the two have different political ideologies but common 
interests in the economy. BRI relates to the development strategies of relevant countries and 
regions, and it has important traction for economic globalisation in the process of promoting 
policy communication, facility connectivity, trade flow, capital, and financial connectivity.  
 
Lastly, the BRI indeed have met challenges in terms of adapting to local social, political, and 
economic contexts. These matters have been addressed by China adjusting its policies, 
incorporating more considerations of the local legal framework.   
 
There have been geopolitical concerns from Europe, especially Germany, about the 17+1 
cooperation, which is regarded as part of the BRI. In an interview with Cui Hongjian by 
Deutsche Welle, Director of the European Institute of the China Institute of International 
Studies, he commented on Europe’s questions and critiques of the 16+1 cooperation, 
especially regarding some European concerns that this cooperation would divide Europe. He 
recommended that China’s intentions of 16+1 should be understood from its departure point. 
China’s goal of cooperating with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries is in order 
for the Chinese enterprises to have better access to the European market and enhance the 
enterprise’s capabilities through international cooperation especially when China had 
invested in mostly developing countries before 16+1 (Cui, 2019). His main argument is that 
instead of having geopolitical purposes, 16+1 was primarily an economic project aimed at 
expanding trade with Europe and enhancing Chinese enterprises’ abilities and knowledge 
about the European market (Cui, 2019).  
One way to understand the future of OBOR is to look at whether it matches with China and 
the EU's priorities. In this case, based on the rankings of priorities in Chapter 4, if OBOR is 
primarily an economic project, and China manages to communicate effectively and maintain 
transparency of the project, OBOR should be able to have good results for both sides as it is 
in line with both sides’ interests. However, if it deviates from economic cooperation as its 
core and does not stick to effective communication, problems could arise due to the 
mismatched priorities between China and the EU after the top two: Economy and Trade, 




8.2.4.2 Identity, Perceptions, and Expectations  
The second aspect of the framework offered by this thesis is identities, perceptions, and 
expectations. The discussion on this aspect regarding the challenges BRI has met in the 
context of China-EU relations can continue from the last section based on the primary goal, 
or the nature of the initiative. It will both discuss China's identity embodied through BRI, and 
the mismatches between China and the EU on China's identities and their impacts on the 
implementation of the projects under or related to BRI.  
First, the BRI has become a part of contemporary Chinese identity, encompassing China's 
developmental visions and goals in the international arena under the current administration.  
On 24th October 2017, the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China passed 
the resolution of the “Articles of Association of the Communist Party of China (Amendment)”, 
which includes the “Belt and Road” in the Party Constitution. So far, BRI is included together 
with Reform and Opening up, Three Represents, Socialist Core Values (Xinhuanet, 2017) 
becoming one stage in China's developmental path. It demonstrates that the initiative not 
only stands for the actual projects going on with the world outside China but has also 
become a part of Chinese identity, especially in terms of China's relations with the world 
under globalisation.  
Second, the identity aspect of this project is in line with the discourse of the China Dream 
and the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, which focus primarily on making sure China's 
economy is robust, but equally importantly, that China's national dignity and esteem are 
revived so that it is respected and welcomed by the international society.  
When we compare the discourse blocks of the China Dream, the Rejuvenation of the 
Chinese Nation, as well as BRI, the core identities are similar: they all advocate reviving 
China's dignity and respect in the international world and boosting China's economy and 
overall development. In this sense, the core identity embodied by BRI is in line with the 
previous Chinese official discourse blocks, as demonstrated in Figure 5-1 in Chapter 5.  
Furthermore, in explaining China's intentions through the BRI, China did not shy away from 
responding to the questions of the EU. In response to the questions and challenges raised in 
Europe on BRI, the Chinese government has put forward an official response through the 
spokesman of the foreign ministry as well as official documents issued. The issues were 
addressed in the official discourse instead of being ignored or avoided.  
Now that I have discussed the identity of China as manifested through BRI, I would like to 
point out some mismatches between the EU's understanding of China's intentions as well as 
the mismatches in China's self-esteem. At least five mismatches exist between China's BRI 
and the EU: 
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First, the EU undermines China's confidence and support in European integration. As 
Section 5.2.1.3 and Section 5.2.2.3 argued, the EU values European integration and the 
prospects of the EU as a unified power. Although this process has been greatly undermined 
and challenged by Brexit as well as previous crises, especially France and the Netherland's 
disagreements on the EU Constitution (Startin & Krouwel, 2013), the vision of the EU on 
integration is not going to change as this is where the EU values stand as stated in the 
Treaty on the European Union (The European Union, 2008). In recent years, the EU has 
improved in terms of integration (Godement, Vasselier & European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2017), especially after the Lisbon Treaty, despite the challenges of Brexit.  
China supports European integration and has stated that in its official discourse consistently 
over the years. This is also in line with the Chinese values, which prefer unity rather than 
separation due to the Chinese history of being separated by European colonisers during 
World War Two. However, the EU has doubts and misunderstandings about China's 
intentions in this respect. For the 17+1 projects, some countries, especially Germany, have 
expressed concerns about whether 17+1 will divide Europe (Cui, 2019). The Chinese official 
discourse has responded to this saying that a unified Europe is better for Chinese benefits 
(Xinhua, 2019). There are also no reasons why China would divide Europe as Europe is 
China's largest trading partner and a stable and prosperous Europe would be important for 
China to maintain its economic gains as well as staying strong in the age of the China-US 
trade war. However, this mismatch in China's intentions does exist and has influenced the 
initiative.  
The reasons behind the EU's doubt is the lack of communication as well as lack of trust on 
this issue. However, another factor is the developmental imbalance within Europe. The EU 
tends to blame China for the division while in fact, the initiative is a chance for Eastern 
Europe to catch up with Western Europe in terms of infrastructure and economy. Blaming 
China for the internal problems of the EU may be an action of diverting the attention and 
frustration of European residents to the outside instead of to the core of the problem.  
Second, with the EU attaching more importance to hard power in recent years, it is becoming 
more sensitive about its defence mechanism and hard power as argued in Section 5.2.1.1. It 
is natural it will have concerns on the safety of the MS, especially when the globe has 
entered the age where technology and the economy have taken over traditional security 
matters to become the new competitive areas. Due to the rapid development of Chinese 
technology, it is natural that some challenges will occur during cooperation. For example, the 
development of 5G requires base stations to be built in partner countries, and there have 
been tensions due to different infrastructure standards and materials as well as shapes of 
different countries. In some cases, some of the stations have had to be demolished and 
rebuilt to suit the local standards. However, these mismatches have been addressed. In 




laws regarding the field and must pass the tests if they want to continue their professional 
careers.44 This standard and high awareness of the EU legal framework should be enhanced 
and encourage as, after all, it is a huge challenge for Chinese staff and enterprises to adapt 
to these despite language barriers.  
Third, the Chinese self-identity has a more historical perspective and involves complications, 
as argued in Section 5.1.1. On the one hand, China has a history of being humiliated by 
colonisers in World War One, and a long memory of being invaded by Western capitalised 
countries which are now the core countries of the MS of the EU. Also, China's GDP per 
capita is still relatively low compared with other countries in the world due to its large 
population. China still views itself as a developing country. On the other hand, China has the 
second-largest GDP in the world and is the initiator of BRI as well as many other 
international projects in the world. It is becoming more and more confident on the 
international stage. These two parts of Chinese identity are at the far edges of the pendulum 
swing of Chinese national identity and the national policies reflect both sides of these 
identities or are often a mix of the two. This has caused difficulties for the EU to position 
China's ability and impact correctly and comprehensively. The EU only started an official 
diplomatic relationship with PRC in 1975, so the EU policies towards China started when 
China entered the post-Mao era. So, in the EU policy papers, there are hardly any concerns 
about Chinese history. Instead, since the first EU policy paper on China, the focus has been 
more about how to start trading with China and, over time, how to impact China politically 
especially in terms of altering China so that it becomes similar to Western-style countries.  
The lack of taking Chinese history and the past into account leads to the EU's incorrect 
estimation and expectations of China's future, especially politically, in the EU's earlier 
approaches to China as argued in Chapter 5. It has also led to an overestimation of China's 
finance ability when it comes to BRI especially considering that the EU's concerns about  
China mostly still goes under the 'China Threat' thinking mode which started after the 2000s 
(Fish, 2011; Demirtepe & Ozertem, 2013).   
Fourth, the EU also has conflicted identities within itself. These not only exist in the 
imbalance between Western and Eastern Europe but also in the sense that the EU struggles 
to decide whether it should rely more on soft power and normative power or on hard power. 
Plus, the discrepancies among the MS who have more power in policymaking and those who 
have less is still big. There are also other divisions among well-off economic countries in 
terms of the development of the EU. The Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway and Denmark, 
for example, have different stances to that of Germany, as shown in the EU constitution 
crises (Startin & Krouwel, 2013).  
 
44 As introduced by Huawei company promotion presentations in the University of Edinburgh, winter 2019.    
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Finally, China's vision is about being an impactful, strong but not hegemonic big power in the 
world, as argued in Chapter 5. However, the EU's vision of the world is more based on a 
rule-based, international system with several international organisations becoming the 
organiser of the world system. China was not a part of the EU's rule but had its own set of 
rules and values. This is challenging for the EU as the EU regards that some of the rules and 
values should be universal. In the history of Western major powers, countries arise through 
conquering others in wars. This logic is applied by the EU to China, leading to the assertion 
that China will be hegemonic as well. This is also the logic behind the so-called China Threat 
Theory which arose in the beginning of 2000s and lasts until now (Grainger, 2010).  
Although the Chinese government and most Chinese people believe that China will not 
tolerate hegemony due to China's traditional values, it is understandable that the rest of the 
world, including the EU, wonder whether China can successfully balance being a big power 
and being non-dominating.  
One way forward is that both China and the EU improve awareness and clear 
communications of their self-identities and adjust expectations of the other. For China, there 
is a need to understand the complexity of the EU and have a more realistic expectation of 
how integrated EU policies are and keep track of the development of this integration, 
especially after Brexit.   
8.2.4.3  Economic and Normative Power Shifts 
Chapter 7 has argued that the Chinese discourse is becoming increasingly directive and 
confident. The projects China is promoting also facilitate new norms which are not included 
in the EU's existing norms. Meanwhile, the economic power shift between China and the EU 
is enhancing the normative power shift between the two as well.  
Regarding the challenges, China and the EU met in the context of international projects and 
initiatives, and economic and normative power shifts also exist. The economic-normative 
dynamics which are going on in the relations are one driving force behind the EU's doubts 
and questions on China's initiative. China is rising while the EU is, comparatively speaking, 
struggling to retain its position in the world. This power transition creates a lot of tension as 
rising power will meet resistance from traditional powers. This tension has translated into the 
EU's discourse on Chinese proposals and projects in the world.  
Economic-wise, BRI covers a wide range of industries. Normative-wise, the establishment of 
AIIB promotes new norms outside the current norms led by the EU. Although there has been 
no consensus on what exactly China’s new norms in the context of BRI are, the existing 
literature has mentioned that one of the potential norms promoted through BRI could include 
prioritising economic development and focusing on the basic needs of people as well as 
poverty alleviation (Belt & Road News, 2019). Apart from that, potential norms as manifested 




zero-sum style in cooperation, increased flexibility in the face of uncertain situations, and 
improved tolerance for delayed debt payback or debt reduction in special cases. 
In Ian Manners’ framework, the norms are the ones accepted in international society as 
'normal’.  As argued by Kavalski, recognition and acceptance by others are the keys to 
judging whether a power is normative (Kavalski, 2014). I have discussed whether this is a 
special phenomenon in the EU. If this concept can only be applied to the European Union, 
then a new concept is needed to summarise China's power and ability to make rules, as a 
norm-expander or a new type of norm-maker. Of course, we may as well call China a new 
normative power.  
Returning to the example of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has shown its determination 
to maintain international order. But OBOR also shows China's determination to improve the 
international order. Such contradictions also bring difficulties to the EU's evaluation of China. 
On the one hand, the EU is worried that China will not abide by the existing norms in the 
international system. On the other hand, China’s norms are more adaptive for developing 
countries. If the EU's normative power cannot be revised so that it considers the rights and 
historical background of developing countries, it could be an indicator of the limited 
applicability of this specific concept instead of a negative judgement on the potential of China 
being a normative power.  
8.2.4.4 Visions for the Future World  
Two main arguments of Chapter 6 help to analyse the mismatches behind the challenges 
regarding BRI in the China-EU context.  
First, China adopts and supports both multipolarity and multilateralism. Multipolarity is a 
traditional concept adopted in the modern Chinese view of the future of the world. This 
concept is well-tuned with the Chinese understanding of power politics in the early stage of 
PRC. In recent years, as Chapter 6 observes, Chinese has increasingly emphasised 
multilateralism. The coexistence of multipolarity and multilateralism stands at the core of the 
Chinese view of the future world order.  
The effect this leads to is that China attaches importance to both bilateral relations as well as 
multilateral relations. Chapter 5 has mentioned that China views the EU as a 'pole' in the 
world. In this sense, trade between China and Europe, as part of the BRI and 17+1, is 
helpful for the world to achieve a state of power balance and coerce the unilateralism of the 
US.  
However, from the EU's perspective, as it has a close alliance with the US with whom it has 
a lot of history and culture, as well as shared values, it is in a difficult position, especially 
considering that the US is not supportive of BRI. The EU would prefer to tackle the project 
within the EU's multilateral framework although bilateral projects between China and the MS 
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are the core activities of the initiatives in the first place since it is primarily economic, as I 
argued in the previous section.  
Second, BRI, as well as 17+1, can enhance and facilitate the internationalisation of 
multilateralism. The EU has impacted 17+1 projects, have been y EU rules by establishing a 
global partner centre to help 17+1 countries better understand EU rules and start 
cooperation under EU rules. This centre requires the participation of EU (Cui, 2019).  
The EU's multilateralism is only based on mutual political consultation between European 
countries, and a considerable number of European countries are developed countries. This 
does not fully apply to the actual situation, including China and Southeast Asia and Central 
Asia. In addition, there are serious development imbalances within the EU. Many of the 
problems revealed by the Belt and Road Initiative stem from development issues within 
Europe and within partner countries. In fact, EU countries have an advantage in terms of 
cooperation, because EU laws and regulations are complete and mature, and they have 
detailed regulations for many economic activities, which can help the sustainable 
development of cooperation itself. Therefore, China's Belt and Road Initiative is a chance to 
enhance both the current application of the EU's multilateral system and a chance to revise 
the weakness of the system.  
8.3 Assessing the Framework of Multidimensional 
Mismatches  
This section assesses the effectiveness and applicability of the framework of Multi-levelled 
Mismatches. It firstly addresses its contributions as well as the gap it fills regarding the 
existing analytical framework of China-EU relations. Then it goes on to point out how this 
framework applies best to what kind of cases in bilateral relations. Finally, it goes on to 
address some limitations of the framework.  
Many have argued that the reason for the challenges between China and the EU is mistrust 
and miscommunication. The existing literature has argued that mistrust and 
miscommunication exist behind the challenges between China and the EU (Scott, 2014b). 
The framework of this thesis helps to push this further and ask the question: in what areas 
do mistrust and miscommunications exist? What are the relations among these aspects? 
How does this mistrust affect China-EU relations?  
It categorises the challenges in China-EU relations according to their scopes and the 
possible causes so that analyses of the challenges can take these aspects into account. 
Plus, it does not only include aspects which are internal factors, such as identities, but also 
external factors such as the economic power shift as well as the world structure. The 
multidimensional mismatches are developed as a tool to examine and understand the 




the unresolved issue on China's MES, the challenges raised by OBOR, the doubts in Europe 
about China's 17+1 project, which are not only focused on specific cooperation areas 
between China and the EU but encompass wide economic, social-political as well as cultural 
scopes. 
In addition, it takes a longitudinal view and discusses the changes in strategic approaches as 
well as the normative power changes between China and the EU. This longitudinal aspect, 
along with the aspects on the interrelations among the different areas of mismatches, helps 
to explain the structural challenges, manifesting in the volatility of the relationship as well as 
some persisting, or sticky problems such as the recognition of MES.   
It takes full account of the autonomy of China-EU relations regardless of the influence of the 
third party. This is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the mismatches between China 
and the EU as well as the challenges which are closely connected to these mismatches are 
addressed with focus and without the distractions or external factors such as the influence of 
a third country. On the other hand, the factor of third parties, for example, the impact of US 
and China-US relations, is not considered. This is a limitation of the current framework 
although further development of the framework, which focuses on the context of a triangle 
relationship, may be developed so that the limitation is worked on.  
From applying this framework in the three selected categories of cases, some conclusions 
can be drawn about the applicability of the framework:  
First, for trade issues, mostly one or two aspects of the four themes are sufficient in 
examining the main mismatches behind the cases. Analysing trade issues within the multi-
faceted and multi-level framework developed throughout this thesis is an interesting 
approach. Both have the economy as their primary interests. Then if only these factors are 
concerned, the two should not have major conflicts in the economy. However, if we are 
taking other aspects discussed in other chapters into consideration, the causes of the trade 
conflicts are more comprehensive. A lot of challenges in China-EU relations can be 
understood from the point of view of mismatches in priorities, as argued in Chapter 4. 
Although in a lot of areas, China and the EU have shared interests, this does not mean their 
preferences and priorities are the same.  
Second, a comprehensive project needs comprehensive analytical tools and frameworks 
which consider both political, economic as well as structural dynamics. For more 
comprehensive cases which involve economic, social-political, cultural, and structural 
factors, the framework helps to keeps a balance of taking account of comprehensive factors 
and addressing the structural factors as well.  
Third, for cases which are persisting or sticky and which have existed cross a long time span 
in the relationship, the framework has the advantage of helping with examining the factors 
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behind the stickiness as it includes a longitudinal view and address the changes of policies 
and approaches over the years as well as the interrelations among the aspects.   
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the framework of Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches (DMM) 
and explained the interrelations among the four aspects of the framework. This framework 
brings the findings of the previous chapter together and discusses the relationship among 
different aspects of these mismatches and how their interactions influence China-EU 
relations. 
The chapter has also applied the framework to three different categories of cases, namely 
the trade issues, persisting issues including the issues of the arms embargo and MES, and 
the EU's questions on China's international projects. Based on the application, the chapter 
has assessed the applicability of this framework by highlighting its contributions, pointing out 







Chapter 9 Conclusion  
This thesis adds to the existing debates and discussions on the challenges in contemporary 
China-EU studies by developing and applying the corpora of official discourse between 
China and the EU for twenty-five years (1994-2019). This conclusive chapter will, most 
importantly, review the main findings and arguments of this research and spell out their 
significance and implications for the existing literature on China-EU studies, thus responding 
to the research questions of this thesis. It will also reflect on the advantages and limitations 
of the research and its methodology and set the agenda for future research for the author 
and other researchers in the field.  
The chapter consists of six sections: 
Section 9.1 reviews the contents, key findings and arguments of the previous chapters. 
Section 9.1.1  responds to the research question of the thesis.  
Section 9.2  summarises the contributions of this thesis in terms of both methodology and 
China-EU scholarship. It also discusses the originality of the research and provides the 
implications of the findings for Chinese and English language literature.  
Section 9.3 reviews the advantages and limitations of the methodological approach of this 
thesis.  
Section 9.4 lists the limitations of this research.  
Section 9.6 lays out the possible research agenda for the future.  
9.1 Reviewing Chapter Contents, Main Findings and 
Arguments  
The thesis begins by introducing the official discourse interactions and their development 
between China and the EU alongside the general development of China-EU relations since 
the establishment of their diplomatic relations but especially after 1994, when the EU issued 
its first policy paper on Asia with a large emphasis on China, up to 2019 when the thesis was 
completed. 
Each chapter covers an aspect of the background and development of the official discourse 
interactions in China-EU relations and the ups and downs of the general China-EU relations 
as well as the linkage between the two. 
The theme of each chapter constitutes one level or aspect where the divergence of China 
and the EU exist. The themes of the core chapters of this thesis were decided by joint 
consideration of the themes emerging in the discourse data and the on-going debates in 
China-EU studies in order to engage closely with the current discussions in the field.  
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Chapter 1 provided an overview of China-EU relations since their establishment. The core 
task done in the introductory chapter it was to narrow down, or categorise the challenges in 
contemporary China-EU relations into three aspects: first, the imbalanced development 
between economic cooperation and political cooperation between China and the EU; 
second, the volatility of the relationship, or the reoccurring cycles of ups and downs; and 
third, the specific disputes between China and the EU on trade, the arms embargo, China’s 
Market Economy Status, along with other specific disputes. This set the basis for the 
discussion of this thesis as the analysis of each chapter tackles one element behind the 
challenges in China-EU relations.  
Apart from this, Chapter 1 also aimed to highlight one assumption of this thesis: official 
discourse matters in international relations and in studying international relations. It presents 
an overview of the official discourse in China-EU relations, how it developed alongside the 
interactions in China-EU relations, and the fact that it is undervalued due to the fact that it is 
not designed to attract readers so is hard to read and under-researched in the current 
literature.   
Chapter 2 presented the theoretical framework. It introduced the application of two main 
branches of theoretical approaches in this thesis: first, the language-oriented constructivist 
approach; second, the mutual interactions between discourse, society and the economy. The 
first theoretical school includes theories on the relativity of languages, the associations 
between language, thoughts and realities. The second group is informed by the constructivist 
theory, especially language-oriented, or rule-oriented constructivism and norm-oriented 
constructivism in IR. The third is Karl Polanyi’s theory on Double Movements between 
economy and society, which informs the dialectic relationship between economic power and 
normative power as argued in the synthesised theoretical framework put forward through this 
thesis.  
Chapter 3 introduced the methodology adopted in this thesis. The thesis adopted an 
innovative methodological approach which takes the official discourse as the resource and 
platform from which to research China-EU relations over a long period. It contributes, 
methodologically, to applying corpus-driven discourse analysis and content analysis in 
combination with theoretical frameworks in IR. The thesis pushes the interdisciplinary 
methodology to the newest frontier, paving the way for future research adopting or improving 
the synthesised methodological model shown in Section 3.3.3, Figure 3-1 Correlations 
between Chapter Aspects and Discourse Levels, in this thesis.  
Chapter 4 conducted a comparative corpus-driven content analysis on Corpus China PPSP 
and Corpus EU PPSP, which contains China and the EU’s policy papers, reviews, and 
leaders’ speeches from 1994 to 2019. Through searching the top frequency meaningful 




and the hot topics in the literature, the chapter finds that mismatches of topic priorities exist 
between Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP which suggests that China and the EU, 
although sharing topics, have different preferences and priorities.  
Chapter 4 finds that China and the EU share solid common ground and interest in several 
core policy areas but especially the economy and trade, communication, and dialogue as 
well as politics and diplomacy. There are, however, differences in the topic preferences 
between China and the EU. The topic Security and National Defence has a higher position in 
the coverage ranking of Corpus China PPSP than that of Corpus EU PPSP, indicating the 
importance of this area to China. Law and Regulation ranks higher in Corpus EU PPSP, 
indicating the importance of the rule of law and normative power for the EU. 
Chapter 4 also points out that even in traditional sectors such as the economy, politics and 
communication, laws, and security, the two have different emphases. This fills the gap and 
explains why China-EU problems do not only happen when it comes to human rights or 
sovereignty issues but also in the economy to which both attach utmost priority. 
In addition, Chapter 4 also finds that the most frequently used verbs and nouns in the official 
discourse of China and the EU on each other show differences. China applies words related 
to mutual respect, learning from each other and prudently handling disputes more, such as 
“相互了解”, “相互尊重”, “妥善处理” while the EU uses more normative words and words 
related to plans such as “will”, “should”, “help” and “encourage”.  
Chapter 5 discusses the differences between China and the EU’s developmental goals and 
their expectations of the other as well as China-EU relations. It shows that China and the 
EU’s self-perceptions are each different. China sees itself as a big country in the East with a 
critical role in the world with a socialist system. The EU recognises China’s strong 
international status but expected China, especially in the early years of its interactions with 
China, to adopt some of the Western social-political features. China sees the EU as the 
institution of an integrated Europe and expects Europe to keep being integrated.  
Chapter 5 finds that in terms of perceptions on the self and the other, China and the EU 
share several agreements including their support for diversity and peace, their visions for 
European integration as the historical trend and their shared support for “One China” and the 
“One Country, Two Systems” policies. However, differences and mismatches in their self-
perceptions and expectations of the other do exist. First, the EU started to emphasise the 
rise of China and the responsibilities of China as a major power earlier than the Chinese 
official discourse and with more expectations attached, which is one source of tension 
between China and the EU. Second, the EU expected China’s economy to change into a 
Western-style one while the Chinese economy developed into one combining state 
regulation and a market economy. Over the years, the EU has shown overall support for 
 
244   
China’s market economy development, but when it came to the time when China’s Market 
Economy Status could be officially recognised according to the WTO rules, the EU voiced 
more critiques of the economy of China so as to protect European industry. On the EU’s 
identity, the content analysis based on Corpus EU reveals that a few themes stand out in 
terms of the EU’s self-perception: the EU’s will to improve its hard power; the EU will stick to 
its normative values; and the EU’s historical view on European integration. China views the 
EU as an important power in the world and sees the EU as a “pole” in the multipolar world, or 
in a sense, a special form of “big country”. China’s view on the EU is state-oriented, whereas 
the EU’s self-perception is more rooted in a multilateral perspective. Apart from that, 
however, there is a high degree of shared vision on European integration and the support for 
a world of diversity and peace. The chapter also finds that Corpus EU PPSP shows more 
focus on specific policy areas; Corpus China PPSP tends to focus on key policies and 
strategic visions.  
Chapter 6 studied China and the EU’s vision for the ideal future world. Based on comparing 
their official discourse on the future world and their positions in the future world, it argues 
that China’s world vision is more state-oriented. The current framework of Chinese foreign 
policy envisions a world of humankind sharing a common destiny with countries more 
interdependent on each other. The EU’s world vision is institutional-oriented. It emphasises 
keeping the established norms and rules in the current world system, whereas China 
emphasises adjusting the rules so that it meets developing countries’ needs better. China’s 
world vision focuses on promoting a world of multipolarity and multilateralism while the EU 
stresses multilateralism and holding diverse opinions on the existence of “poles” and the 
structure of “multipolarity”.  
Chapter 6 concluded that China and the EU’s visions for the future world share a high 
degree of compatibility, as shown in their shared theme on peacekeeping, prevention of 
hegemony and respect for diversity. Difference emphases, however, do exist. China takes 
multipolarity as the core of the future world structure and believes that multipolarity and 
multilateralism can coexist as both stress “multi” which indicate the balance of power and 
diversity. The EU, on the other hand, holds doubts about the existence of “poles” and 
emphasises “multilateralism” much more than “multipolarity”.  
Chapter 7 investigates the differences between China and the EU’s normative discourse and 
their normative approaches along with the normative power shift between the two and 
argues that this normative power shift, together with the economic power shift in the world 
system, form the structural reasons behind the tension in China-EU relations. The chapter 
also discusses the current trend in China-EU relations, where both claim to take a pragmatic 
approach to the other. It discusses the possible misunderstandings caused by the 
translations of the term “pragmatism”. It suggests that further understanding and examination 




achieve more balanced interests with brotherhood and benevolence in daily practices in 
China-EU relations.   
Chapter 7 finds that first, the EU’s official discourse to China contains a significant number of 
normative discourses. Second, the EU’s normative discourse not only implies the EU’s 
expectations of China but also the EU’s self-expectations, as demonstrated by the proportion 
of commissive discourse in the EU’s official policy papers on China. Third, China has shown 
tendencies to become a new normative power. The Chinese normative power starts with 
economic cooperation while the norms, namely equality among countries and more flexibility 
and resilient considerations for developing countries manifest through economic projects. 
Last, there is a normative power shift alongside the economic power shift between China 
and the EU in the world system. While economically, China is going from the semi-peripheral 
zone, which features labour-intensive industries and exporting raw materials, to the core 
area, which features knowledge-intensive industries and the exporting of high-tech products, 
normative power also improves. This change in normative power challenges the part in the 
existing norms which does not fit developing and emerging countries needs whereas the EU 
tends to protect the existing norms and regards that revisions of the norms are easier said 
than done. The tension between China and the EU is that between a traditional normative 
power and a new normative power as well.  
Chapter 8 combines the aspects of mismatches discussed in the previous chapter together 
and presents the analytical framework of Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches in China-
EU relations. This provides a possible analytical tool for not only bilateral relations but also 
potentially multilateral relations, with further extensions in the future, in IR studies. This 
framework combines the aspects of priorities, identities and perception, visions for the world 
order, and normative power dynamics through the developmental path of China and the EU 
as two entities with self-esteem, visions for their destinations and their proposed means to 
reach their destinations. In this way, the interrelations among the elements are demonstrated 
through the roles they play in the developmental paths of both entities. The dynamic nature 
of this model also correlates with the longitudinal perspectives offered by the corpus-driven 
discourse analysis.  
Chapter 8 also applies the framework to analyse a few cases in China-EU relations, 
including the trade issues, the recognition of China’s MES, the arms embargo issue as well 
as the misunderstanding and challenges regarding China’s Belt and Road Initiative and other 
global projects such as the 17+1 summit.  
9.1.1 Responding to the Research Questions  
This research has three aims: first and foremost, it seeks to contribute to understanding the 
challenges between China and the EU including disputes in specific areas, the volatility, or 
the re-occurrence of ups and downs, as well as the imbalanced cooperation in different 
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“pillars” which is under debate, or aspects of the comprehensive partnership between China 
and the EU; second, it strives to achieve the first aim via a synthesis of the constructivist 
approach and Corpus-Driven discourse analysis of the official discourse between China and 
the EU from 1994 to 2019; third, it aims to propose the analytical framework of ‘Dynamic 
Multidimensional Mismatch’ to analyse and understand the challenges in China-EU relations 
and potentially other bilateral relationships.    
The research question raised in the Introduction is: 
• How does a corpus-driven discourse analysis, underpinned by constructivist 
assumptions and based on the corpora of the official discourse between 
China and the EU (1994 to 2019) help to examine and explain the challenges in 
contemporary China-EU relations?  
Several sub-questions have been designed to guide the analyses throughout the thesis, 
responding to the main research question step by step. In this section, I will also respond to 
the sub-questions first, leading to an integrated response to the main question.  
Questions in terms of understanding and categorising the challenges in China-EU relations 
include:  
• What characterises the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations?  
 
• What role does official discourse play in contemporary China-EU relations? 
 
These have been addressed in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 and Section 1.2, respectively. The 
thesis has observed three categories of challenges in China-EU relations. These include, 
first, the volatility of the relationship, or the reoccurring cycles of ups and downs despite the 
general positive developmental trend of the relationship; second, there are specific disputes 
in China-EU relations in different policy areas, including trade issues, political issues such as 
the arms embargo, economic-political issues such as recognition of China’s MES, human 
rights disputes, and frictions in other areas; third, there are structural challenges in the 
bilateral relations, including the imbalances between economic and political interactions, 
though whether this is problematic is debatable, and the power shifts between China and the 
EU economically, politically and normatively in the international arena. These feature the 
contemporary challenges in China-EU relations.  
The thesis discusses the role of official discourse at both an ontological level and practical 
level. At the ontological level, the thesis has taken the stance of that of ROC and LR that 
language has a shaping power for constructing social realities and is also, in turn, constituted 
by social realities. At the practical level and in the context of China-EU relations, official 
discourse frames and envisions the direction of the relationship, sets the agenda and 
regulates the communication between the two entities through establishing the mechanism 




discourse, which then contributes to the next round of mutual constitution between discourse 
and social realities. Official discourse also provides a systematic, continuous and longitudinal 
resource which, with the assistance of corpus-driven discourse analysis, offers the 
opportunity to generate both quantitative and qualitative information, comparing the thoughts 
of China and the EU on an equal basis with the external bias and variants under control.  
The sub-questions responded to through the empirical chapters include: 
 
• In what aspects do misunderstandings and mismatches exist in China-EU 
relations? How do these mismatches and misunderstandings relate to each 
other? 
 
• How and to what extent do these mismatches explain the challenges in China-
EU relations? 
Through the corpus-driven content analysis with a comparative and longitudinal perspective, 
the thesis finds that although China and the EU share a large volume of topics, visions and 
goals, mismatches do exist in their priorities, visions for the future world structure, 
perceptions of the self and the other and their normative goals and approaches. These 
mismatches, together with the context that China is emerging into the core area in the world 
economy and has been proactive on the international stage with the potential of becoming a 
new normative power, lead to tension and the challenges in contemporary China-EU 
relations. 
Regarding the second sub-question above, the thesis address this by discussing the 
similarities and differences between China and the EU in each of the aspects mentioned in 
the paragraph above, with evidence emerging from the corpora. Specifically, the thesis finds 
that while China and the EU have overall matching priorities, they do have different 
preferences in some of the shared policy areas and topics. While both focus on Economy 
and Trade, Politics and Diplomacy and Culture, China stresses Security and Defence, and 
the EU emphasises Laws and Regulations. These differences play a role in actual cases, 
including the case of Market Economy Status, market accessibility and the EU’s questions 
on China’s cross-continent initiatives.  
Differences also exists between China and the EU in terms of their identities and perceptions 
of the self and the other, their visions for the future international order, and their normative 
approaches. In other words, apart from the differences of their priorities as manifested in 
their discourse, their goals, and the means, values, and manners to achieve their goals and 
destinations also contain differences.  
In particular, China’s perceptions of the EU are strongly connected to China's self-
perceptions of China as a sovereign state. Its priorities in foreign relations are to protect the 
safety of the nation and ensure economic prosperity. The EU's self-perception is highly 
attached to its normative nature and its founding values, which led to its early expectations 
that it would impact China’s social-political environment. This approach of the EU led to 
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tension in the bilateral relations, especially in the form of political disputes, as manifested in 
the case of MES. Although the EU has shifted its approach to a more pragmatic one, the 
normative nature of it remains, forming one source of tension.  
The thesis also argues that there is a normative power shift between China and the EU, as 
China expands its normative efforts evidenced by both China's increasing normative efforts 
and the shifting normative discourse pattern between China and the EU in the past twenty 
years. This normative clash forms another source of tension, as demonstrated in the case of 
the trade deficit and the EU’s reserved attitudes on China’s global economic projects.  
The uniqueness of the explanatory power of this thesis also sits in the analytical framework it 
offers. The Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatch (DMM) framework combines the aspects of 
mismatches in one system. Each case of tension may apply one or multiple aspects of the 
system. This provides guidance for future analysis of the challenges in China-EU relations. 
The analytical framework is also supported by the theoretical framework, namely the mutual 
construction between discourse power, normative power and economic power developed in 
the thesis, making the analytical tool both well-founded theoretically and applicable 
methodologically.  
 
In terms of its methodology, the thesis aims to respond to the questions including: 
 
• What does the corpora established in this thesis (Corpus China PPSP, Corpus 
EU PPSP, Corpus EU Internal, Corpus China Domestic) offer to understand the 
levels and aspects where challenges exist in China-EU relations?  
 
The thesis explores this resource through establishing a specialised corpus of the official 
discourse between China and the EU from 1994 to 2019 which consists of seven sub-
corpora: Corpus China PP (policy papers), Corpus EU PP, Corpus China PPSP (policy 
papers and speeches), Corpus EU PPSP, Corpus China Domestic, and Corpus EU Internal. 
Among them, Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP contain the official policy papers 
and keynote speeches of China and the EU on each other. Corpus China Domestic contains 
China’s domestic official discourse relevant to China’s developmental goals. Corpus EU 
contains the EU’s global strategies and their external action policies. These corpora provide 
the materials for carrying out corpus-driven discourse analysis throughout the thesis. This 
also makes it possible to compare the contents between different corpora to see whether 
China and the EU have different understandings of the same word, concept, theme, or topic.  
• What aspects of corpus-linguistic techniques contribute to analysing China-EU 
relations, and potentially other bilateral relations in IR studies?  
 
• How could the constructivist approach in IR be combined with the ontological 
and epistemological approaches behind corpus-driven discourse analysis? What 





For the question on methodology, the thesis argues that a synthesis of a constructivist 
perspective and corpus-driven discourse analysis, as well as considerations of the 
international political economy, help to expand the existing understanding of the challenges 
in China-EU relations especially in explaining the re-occurrence of down periods following 
successful economic interactions between China and the EU. What’s more, corpus-driven 
discourse analysis offers a top-down approach to discourse information complemented by 
bottom-up approaches which involve more human reading and organising of key thematic 
discourse blocks arising from the existing literature, and preliminary findings of corpus 
linguistic analysis have been effective in offering more comprehensive explanations for the 
ups and downs in China-EU relations. Further practitioners of discourse analysis in IR 
studies can apply and develop the methods of specific bilateral relations.  
Regarding the second question, the ontological stance of both constructivism and linguistic 
relativity support mutual construction between discourse and thoughts as well as ideas. This 
common ground makes it possible to combine these two approaches. The advantages of 
combining a constructivist approach with corpus-linguistics is that it offers IR studies a vast 
source of corpora-driven analytical techniques, material and tools, plus the chance to look at 
the changes in discourse over a long time span in a relatively quick way. The disadvantages 
are that, in practice, the considerations regarding technical problems in dealing with corpora 
sometimes consume the strategic understanding of the factors beyond language. This is why 
the analytical framework put forward in this thesis contains actual aspects of whether the 
mismatches exist instead of only the methodological framework.  
Theoretically, the sub-question is:  
 
• What elements of constructivist theories contribute to a corpus-driven discourse 
analysis approach to China-EU relations?  
As presented in Chapter 2, the thesis combines the elements of mutual construction 
between language and thoughts as promoted in linguistic relativity, especially Sapir-Whorf 
Theory, mutual construction between material power and thoughts/ideas in CIPE, especially 
Coxian Critical Theory and the relationship between normative power and discourse power 
in rule and norm-oriented constructivism. This is the first effort to combine these elements 
from multiple disciplines and put forward a synthesised theoretical framework. This 
framework offers a strong, simplified tool for future research involving discourse in China-EU 
studies.   
Finally, the integrated response to the main research question: 
• How does a corpus-driven discourse analysis, underpinned by constructivist 
assumptions and based on the corpora of the official discourse between 
China and the EU (1994 to 2019) help to examine and explain the challenges in 
contemporary China-EU relations?  
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In terms of understanding the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations, this thesis 
reveals the mismatches and misunderstandings in five aspects: their priorities, world visions, 
perceptions of self and the other, strategies as well as the normative approaches between 
China and the EU between 1994 and 2019. This thesis points out that while there is solid 
common ground and there are shared interest areas between China and the EU, among 
these shared interests, the two have differences in priorities. Their view of self and their 
expectations of the other, as well as China-EU relations, do not always match, both in terms 
of content and in terms of time. Their visions for the order of the future world, despite the 
similarities, hold divergences as well. Their strategies and engagement style have 
discrepancies in terms of content and time. Their normative approaches, intertwined with the 
power transitions in the world, hold differences. The interrelations of these mismatches and 
misunderstandings explain the dynamics behind the challenges in China-EU relations.  
The findings on the mismatches of each aspect are interconnected to the rest of the aspects. 
For example, the findings on the differences in topic priorities, especially the EU’s emphasis 
on Laws and Regulations, suggest that, compared with China, the EU focuses more on 
policy areas which embody its normative nature. This is in line with the analysis in Chapter 7 
on the EU as a normative power. Chapter 4 finds that China emphasises Security and 
Defence. Most of the content related to this topic concentrates on keeping the peaceful 
environment international and domestically with recent years’ references increasingly about 
dealing with peacekeeping and new forms of security issues in the international arena. The 
driving force of China’s focus on security is further explored in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, 
especially in terms of China’s self-esteem and its visions for the future world. The findings 
assist the understanding of the volatility in China-EU relations despite the generally positive 
trend and vast common ground between the two.  
Through the corpus-driven content analysis with a comparative and longitudinal perspective, 
the thesis finds that although China and the EU share a large volume of topics, visions and 
goals, mismatches do exist in their priorities, vision for the future world structure, perceptions 
of the self and the other and their normative goals and approaches. These mismatches, 
together with the context that China is emerging into the core area in the world economy and 
has been proactive on the international stage with the potential to become a new normative 
power, lead to tension and the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations.  
Although the word mismatch has been used in the title of the thesis, I would like to stress 
that mismatch does not equal or suggest incompatibility. Nor does it imply that in the aspects 
discussed in the thesis, China and the EU differ in every way. Mismatches suggest the 
coexistence of similarities and differences. Mismatches in these aspects discussed in the 
themes mean that in terms of the shared topics and common ground, China and the EU 
have different emphases or different priorities. These differences, depending on the specific 




policymaking of China and the EU. Therefore China-EU relations enjoy a highly positive 
developmental trend overall but they are not free of problems and challenges. Overlooking 
the challenges reduces the opportunities for China and the EU to expand the current scope 
and depth of their interactions, which is against the aims and purpose of both sides. It is the 
challenges and problems this thesis focuses on in the first place with the aim to increase the 
understanding of these problems and provide a basis for understanding for both sides to 
understand each other and think of ways to address each other’s interests while protecting 
their own priorities.  
The point of stressing this is that the mismatches in topic priorities are based on the common 
topic interests between China and the EU. The mismatches exist in the context of China and 
the EU sharing a long list of common topics which indicate the large amount of common 
ground between China and the EU. The differences in the topic rankings should not be 
understood in a dogmatic way as the data generated by Nvivo based on the corpus, and the 
search queries will inevitably bear inaccuracies in itself although efforts have been made as 
far as possible to make sure the data are generated from clear, consistent and sensible 
designs of text searches. Rather, the difference between China and the EU’s priorities 
should be viewed as helping to understand each other’s priorities when it comes to their 
disputes. For example, in the case of the arms embargo, for China, this case is most 
relevant to security and economy, which are among China’s top priorities. For the EU, this 
issue is relevant mostly to the topics of politics, society and human rights with the EU’s 
definitions, and regulations which are also high on the EU’s list. However, it is interesting to 
frame it in such a way as to see that the EU and China still have a shared interest in lifting 
the arms embargo. From the perspective of the autonomy between China and the EU, 
therefore, it is entirely possible to resolve this issue. This indicates that a third party, possibly 
the US, could have played an important role in this issue, influencing the dynamics between 
China and the EU. Another possibility is that, at different times, in a different international 
environment, China and the EU’s priorities could change.   
9.1.2 Value and Features of the Analytical Framework 
The Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches (DMM) framework has been developed 
throughout the thesis to understand the challenges in these bilateral relations in a 
comprehensive way. What this analytical framework offers is not a mere combination of the 
aspects but one which stresses the interrelations among these aspects with a historical, 
longitudinal and structural perspective.  
Growth/Developmental Path  
In terms of the interrelations among the aspects, a developmental or growth path will help to 
explain it. If China and the EU are seen as two developing entities working towards their 
goals, their visions for their future position in the future world will be their developmental 
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goal. Their identities and perceptions are where they are now internally and conceptually 
from the rule and norm-oriented constructivist perspective; their identities and perceptions of 
the self and the other set the rules and norms as well as patterns or hierarchies between 
China and the EU. These patterns and norms manifest in their strategic approaches to each 
other.  
The Autonomy between China and the EU 
While different approaches exist, including the China-EU-US approach, the arguments on 
the conceptual gaps and strategic mismatches have been effective in explaining the 
challenges in China-EU relations, the autonomy between China and the EU, especially the 
economic power shifts between them and how this shift interacts with the normative power 
changes, is not given due attention in the existing literature. The reason why this is important 
is that a large number of the problems and issues are economic, although social-political 
disputes also exist at all levels. 
9.2 Research Contribution  
This research is original, especially in terms of the materials and methodology it applies, the 
theoretical and analytical frameworks it has developed, and the new findings it has 
generated, although the contributions add to and expanded upon the existing literature and 
work on China-EU relations.  
9.2.1 Corpora Development  
Official discourse has been under-studied in existing China-EU studies as argued in Section 
1.3.6. Despite the volume and complexities of the China-EU official discourse, this research 
takes the challenging task of developing specialised corpora on contemporary China-EU 
relations for analytical purposes and is the first research of its kind systematically based on 
corpora. This extends Synder’s efforts in compiling and commenting on the official discourse 
between China and the EU in his book The European Union and China, 1949-2008, Basic 
Documents and Commentary, a pioneering effort in collecting the official discourse on the 
bilateral relationship. The machine-readable corpora established in this thesis covers the 
length of twenty-five years between 1994 and 2019, including the comprehensive policy 
papers, key strategy documents and official speeches between China and the EU over these 
years. The significance of this is that it offers a first attempt at developing corpora of the 
period for the purpose of corpus-driven discourse analysis. This offers an example for future 
research taking a similar approach. The corpora between China and the EU can be 
extended as the discourse and documents cover wide areas. The research pushes the 
frontier of this aspect by keeping in mind the analytical value, the machine readability, the 
scope and comparability of the documents so that future corpora-establishment can follow 




9.2.2 Empirical Contributions  
Empirically, the thesis fills gaps in existing analyses on the understanding of the challenges 
in China-EU relations. The thesis engages with a few key discussions on the challenges in 
China-EU relations including the mismatched priorities between China and the EU as 
discussed by Men Jing (Men, 2012, 2014), the differences in China and the EU’s visions of 
the international order as discussed by Scott (Scott, 2012), the debatable imbalances 
between economic and political cooperation (Hammond & Jing, 2016; Jan van der Harst & 
Tjalling Halbertsma, 2017), and especially all levels of conceptual gaps between China and 
the EU (Zhu & Zhang, 2002; Pan, 2010; Men, 2011; Zhou, 2011a; Zhang, 2012a; Weil & 
Jing, 2012; Chen & Song, 2012).  
The thesis argues that the current explanations, including triangle analysis of China-EU-US 
relations, the conceptual gaps between China and the EU, the mismatched visions and 
perceptions and the mismatched approaches could offer more comprehensive, systematic 
insights about the challenges in China-EU relations if the aspects are put together with a 
supporting theoretical framework. To achieve this purpose, this thesis takes the combined 
approach of corpus-driven discourse analysis of China-EU relations, and develops the 
synthesised theoretical framework, namely the mutual construction between normative, 
discourse and economic power. With these supporting methodological and theoretical 
approaches, the thesis extends the current scholarship on contemporary China-EU studies 
by offering a rounded and comprehensive perspective to examine and explain the 
challenges in contemporary China-EU studies. The thesis, apart from its original 
methodological and theoretical frameworks, puts forwards an original analytical framework, 
which is the Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches (DMM) between China the EU as 
demonstrated in Section 8.1. Through developing this analytical framework, the thesis offers 
a tool and perspective, which includes systematic and longitudinal perspectives for 
understanding the challenges and mismatches between China and the EU.  
The thesis also applies the framework of DMM in explaining a few cases in China-EU 
relations, including the trade issues in China-EU relations, especially relating to trade 
protectionism and market accessibility, the persisting issues such as MES, the arms 
embargo, and the EU and the MS’ ambivalence and reserved perceptions about China’s 
initiatives such as the 17+1 cooperation and Belt and Road Initiative. The thesis argues that 
the framework of DMM offers a unique chance to look at the challenges with a 
comprehensive framework which considers the commonness behind these challenges and 
discusses the relationship among the different aspects of the mismatches. Stickiness of 
some of the issues is apparent as the framework considers the longitudinal factors and 
changes of priorities and strategies in the relationship. Although the framework does cover 
the whole scope of China-EU challenges, it shows strong potential in explaining cases which 
cover multiple aspects of China-EU relations such as the EU’s misunderstandings about 
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China’s international cooperation initiatives and projects and cases which covers a long time 
span thanks to the involvement of longitudinal corpora.  
9.2.3 Theoretical Contributions  
Theoretically, it expands the constructivist theoretical framework, especially ROC, in the way 
that it incorporates corpus-linguistic techniques and considerations of IPE. It combines Rule 
and norm-oriented constructivism, a constructivist approach which was considered distinct 
from realism, with realist frameworks on the power transitions as well as traditional 
constructivist focuses such as identities and perceptions.  
This is the first effort in the field to develop an original theoretical framework for mutual 
construction between normative, discourse and economic power. The theoretical framework 
was developed through theories in Language Philosophy, IR, and IPE. The relationship 
between discourse and ideas was developed through the discussion of linguistic relativity on 
language and thoughts. The relationship between economic power and ideas is based on 
the Coxian theory of IPE on the relationship between material power, ideas, and institutions. 
It also discusses the relations between normative power and discourse based on rule and 
norm-oriented constructivism. The thesis synthesises these relationships and puts forward a 
mutual construction between normative power, discourse, and economic power. This is the 
first effort to combine these approaches and apply this theoretical framework to understand 
China-EU relations. This framework combines the nexuses of realist, constructivist factors 
and a longitudinal, systematic perspective.  
This paves the way for future research in IR studies which combines a discussion of the 
constructivist factors such as the linguistic, and conceptual differences, differences in visions 
and understandings about the future world and future identity of China and the EU, with 
consideration of the realist structural causes, structures, and more specifically, China and 
the EU’s changing positions in the world economic system through the official discourse. 
In terms of the analytical scope, the thesis brings a more macro-perspective which considers 
the influence of the normative power shift between China and the EU in the world system. 
This thesis has developed a framework of Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches (DMM) to 
explain the challenges in China-EU relations. Instead of focusing on a specific issue in 
China-EU relations, it takes a macro-perspective. It looks at the commonalities, including the 
ideological, structural, systematic factors behind the problems in China-EU relations rather 
than factors for specific, individual cases. It argues that the interrelated and multilevel 
mismatches and misunderstandings of priorities, perceptions, strategies, and approaches 
are the common factors behind the challenges in China-EU relations. The DMM framework 
provides a way to show where the discrepancies in China-EU relations exist, what are they 




9.2.4 Methodological Contributions  
Methodologically, this thesis develops the machine-readable corpora on the official discourse 
on China-EU relations between 1994 and 2019 and, more importantly, carries out a corpus-
driven discourse analysis to examine the challenges between China and the EU.  
This thesis contributes to the existing methodology in China-EU studies in that it designs, 
applies, tests and reviews an alternative approach to interpreting the problems in 
understanding the issues in China-EU relations; it combines a constructivist perspective with 
corpus-based, comparative discourse analysis. At the time of writing, no interpretations of 
China-EU challenges based on a systematic examination of the development of China and 
the EU’s official discourse exists. The thesis establishes a specialised corpus of the key 
official discourse between China and the EU from 1994 to 2019. The corpus consists of 
China’s EU policy papers and the Chinese presidential and prime ministerial, foreign 
ministers’, and ambassadors keynote speeches to the EU, the EU’s China policy papers, 
mid-term review and national strategies to China, the EU officials’ keynotes speeches to 
China, the joint statements and press releases between China and the EU. For the sake of 
comparing domestic priorities and foreign policy priorities, China’s Five-Year Plans and the 
EU’s Global Strategies are included as a sub-corpus. In addition, the official documents on 
some specialised topics such as human rights, intellectual property rights, agriculture, 
education and communication are included as a sub-corpus.  
It demonstrates the value of corpus-based discourse analysis in analysing China-EU 
relations and international relations in general with the application of both Chinese and 
English language materials on an equal basis. This helps bridge the gap between corpus 
linguistics and IR studies by applying the established specialised corpora, analysing the 
corpora features and contents, categorising empirical findings and discovering the 
relationship between the categories, thus creating the framework for examining and 
explaining the challenges in China-EU relations. The framework has the potential to be 
applied to other bilateral, or even multilateral cases in IR studies.  
The discourse analysis of this thesis combines two perspectives of the official discourse 
between China and the EU. The first is a longitudinal view of the development of their 
discourse, on, for example, the changes in top topics, key terms and normative discourse 
patterns in order to study the dynamics in China-EU relations during the last twenty-two 
years. The second is snapshots of the discourse of China and the EU at various points 
arranged into several topic discourse blocks to reveal the central themes of China and the 
EU over the years. In this way, the thesis hopes to give a more comprehensive insight into 
the development of China-EU discourse along with the ups and downs of the bilateral 
relationship, whether they be the result of conscious policy decisions or a reflection of 
changing perceptions of the self and the other. Through this, the thesis strives to push 
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forward the existing understanding of the importance of official documents in terms of the 
amount and range of information and implications they contain despite the common view that 
official discourse can be dry and void.  
9.2.5 Implications for Chinese and English language 
Literature  
For literature in the Chinese language, the thesis provides work applying rule and Norm-
oriented constructivist theories. This is so far the first work which applies these branches of 
constructivist approach in China-EU relations, and the application with a corpus makes the 
approach even more unique. As mentioned in Section 1.3.6, a large part of Chinese 
literature on China-EU relations does not explicitly mention the theoretical framework being 
applied. This research pushes forward the development of the theoretical and 
methodological development in Chinese language literature by offering a comprehensive 
theoretical, methodological and analytical framework for China-EU relations and potentially 
other bilateral relations to fill a missing link in the Chinese literature that represents a 
systematic approach combining economic, structural and longitudinal perspective. This also 
responds to the proposal promoted by Professor Zhu Liqun (Zhu, 2007) on the methodology 
of China-EU studies mentioned in the literature review of this thesis.  
For literature in the English language, the thesis offers more knowledge about official 
discourse in the Chinese language, especially when a lot of the Chinese official discourse 
has not been translated into English and is only assessable on websites in the Chinese 
language.  
9.3 Reflections on the Methodology 
The findings of the thesis are generated by analysing the official discourse between China 
and the EU from 1994 to 2019. More specifically, the discourse materials are selected and 
organised into the format for a specialised corpora of policy papers, official keynote 
speeches, discourse on China’s domestic development, the EU’s discourse on its global 
strategies and external action policies. Relevant special-themed documents have also been 
applied for content analysis to supplement the analysis. 
corpus-driven comparative discourse analysis, in combination with content analysis, forms 
the main research method of this thesis. The content analysis has a weakness in that the 
researcher can “cherry-pick” (Ryan & Wray, 1997) in terms of the approach in discourse 
analysis, namely only choosing the discourse that supports the argument they want and 
ignoring or disregarding any material which has a different meaning. Therefore, this thesis 
breaks new ground by introducing a corpus-based analysis in China-EU relations. Corpus-
based linguistic analysis is a subject which has met with rapid growth in recent decades. 
With the development of machine learning and big data in computer science, the application 




from a large volume of documents in a few seconds while traditionally this would take an 
expert a considerable amount of time. This trend in the development of computer science set 
the basis for the interdisciplinary approach of this thesis, with the hope that governments of 
different entities could process and understand each other’s policies in a more efficient way 
but with fewer misunderstandings. The thesis seeks to establish a methodological framework 
which combines human reading and machine reading when it comes to official policy 
analysis of official documents.  
A few reasons lie behind the usage of word frequency in analysing the official discourse on 
China-EU relations. First, for most linguistic analysis, lexical features are usually the first 
step. It expands from lexical analysis to the analysis of semantic features, sentence patterns, 
coherence, rhetoric and figures of speeches. Second, top frequency word searches offer 
quick information about the topics in a large text database. Word frequency offers a way to 
look at the hot topics in the discourse on China and the EU on each other. This is 
particularity useful when the discourse is larger than the capability of an individual’s reading 
capacity. The larger the corpus is, the more meaningful word frequency is as the likelihood of 
a connection between preferred topics and word frequency will increase with the amount of 
data. Second, word frequency offers not only the preferred words and topics but also offers 
how these preferred topics are ordered. In this way, it is possible to compare China and the 
EU’s preferred topics not only in the sense of what topics are preferred by each other but 
also how their preferences differ. It is important to remember preferences can differ in two 
ways: first, one topic which appears in the top 10 topic list for China, for example, may not 
appear in the top 10 for the EU. Second, one topic appearing in the top ten for both China 
and the EU, may have different positions in the two lists, indicating that although this topic is 
a shared hot topic, it has relatively different degrees of importance for China and the EU 
respectively.  
9.3.1 Advantages of Corpus-driven Discourse Analysis 
The advantages of corpus-driven content analysis manifest in the volume and quality of the 
findings in the thesis. A few aspects of the advantages of this method stand out during the 
research:     
First, it offers a database where the use of words, sentence patterns, figures of speech, 
coherent devices as well as general tones can be searched for in minutes. Once the corpora 
are established, textual analysis has a good basis and vast possibilities; this makes top-
down discourse analysis possible (by top-down I refer to the quantitative aspects of the 
discourse), for example the frequency of a word in discourse and the possible positivity and 
negativity in the discourse. This reduces the weakness of cherry picking by supplementing it 
with a more objective source on a large scale. Findings are more reliable and valid if shown 
to occur across a large discursive dataset. A corpus approach to discourse analysis guards 
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against the possibility that discourse analysis in general, could “cherry-pick”, either 
intentionally or unconsciously (Ryan & Wray, 1997), data or linguistic features which are 
helpful to prove a preconceived argument.      
Second, corpus analysis is data-driven without hypotheses or expectations of what will be 
found; the patterns emerge through coding of the texts and are accounted for in the analysis. 
It might lead to hugely different findings compared to the “bottom-up” approach of discourse 
analysis, which starts with hypotheses. This is also why Chapter 3 has a greater emphasis 
on corpus analysis while the other chapters have a greater emphasis on comparative 
discourse analysis.  
9.3.2 Limitations of Corpus-Driven Discourse Analysis 
The disadvantages of this approach, however, are that data outputs can never be “precise”; 
this is caused by searching criteria never being perfect as they are designed by humans. If 
one is searching for synonyms for the economy, each person may generate a different list. In 
addition, although a text search with customised contexts exist in software such as Nvivo, a 
machine can never tell the real proportion or coverage of a topic in a certain document as 
this is largely dependent on the calculation method of coverage. Therefore, there is a risk of 
a researcher taking a dogmatic approach to the results of the data in analysing the 
discourse. 
For example, queries cannot be designed to count the exact proportion of a theme or topic 
as in the actual text, the sentences and phrases related to the topic are highly diverse. A 
long paragraph could be talking about one single but important topic while in the synonym 
query searching system, this is counted as the topic appearing only once. Similarly, there are 
cases where a short paragraph, or even sentence, contains topic words multiples times and 
these are therefore counted as multiple frequencies for a certain topic.  
The data collection and analyses, as mostly showcased in Chapter 4, involve a process to 
adjust the original plan, validate part of the feasibility of the interdisciplinary methodology but 
also to eliminate gradually the parts which are infeasible at this stage due to the author’s 
limitations in knowledge regarding computer science and especially, natural language 
processing.  
While it's still not definitive whether a text-based data analysis of official documents can 
bring substantial benefits to understanding international actors, it is this author’s opinion that 
by utilising the data analysis, research can be greatly aided, whether traditional or not, in 
gaining a large amount of material to aid future research endeavours or justify claims made.  
There are a couple of methods for gathering documents to create a corpus, none more 
legitimate than the others, but they have different emphases. One way is the naive gather 




method and eases the researchers' burden of frustration and the selection process. The 
downside to this approach is that it leaves the collective corpora subject to imbalances in the 
data.  
Other methods take a more curated approach to document collection; such approaches 
require a more finely tuned and more defined selection process, naturally resulting in a much 
higher burden on the researcher to maintain corpus integrity along the required lines as well 
as well-founded domain knowledge for the targeted research area which is more in line with 
this thesis. 
9.4 Limitations of the Research 
There were several limitations, including the restricted focus on autonomic interactions 
between China and the EU without consideration of the factors of the third actors such as US 
influence, the decision-making in merging multidisciplinary research methods, defining and 
narrowing down the scope of analysis, the limited efforts in longitudinal data derivation and 
analyses, as well as the implementation of GT, and these will be discussed for the aim of 
improved future research and as a reference for other researchers.  
One weakness of this research is that the role of third parties is not considered due to the 
limited range and scope. In this case, for example, the US plays an important role and 
should ideally be discussed in the analysis. One possible way to do this is to conduct 
discourse analysis for three discourse-makers: China, the EU and the US. This could be 
realised by establishing corpora on the US’s official discourse to China (Corpus US-China), 
the US’s official discourse to the EU (corpus US-EU), and a comparison between Corpus 
US-China and Corpus EU PPSP, for example. This would involve effort beyond the scope of 
this research and should be explored in future research.  
Decision-making regarding the nature of this research, especially because it is 
multidisciplinary, has been another challenging aspect. The research has three aims: to 
understand the challenges in China-EU relations and ultimately contribute to the sustainable 
development of the bilateral relationship; to explore the potential of applying corpus-driven 
discourse analysis in IR studies, and to propose an analytical framework for analysing the 
mismatches in China-EU relations and potentially other bilateral relationships. It has been 
challenging for this author to decide which focus should be primary as the merge of 
methodological approaches crosses disciplines and requires a large focus and effort on 
discussing the compatibility of the ontological, epistemological, theoretical stance and the 
specific links between IR approaches and corpus-driven linguistics. Within the scope of one 
thesis, it has been hard to address multiple aims. This leads to limitations in that efforts on 
the case-based analysis of the specific challenges in China-EU relations have been limited 
and conceptualisation or theorisation based on the themes emerging from the data could 
also have been developed further. In other words, the completeness and depth of both the 
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scope of the application of corpus-driven analysis and China-EU studies in this research had 
to be compromised due to shared attention for both research questions and aims. However, 
this author has realised that this is, in a way, unavoidable in multidisciplinary research if 
corpus-driven discourse analysis is not a conventional approach in China-EU scholarship 
and issues are addressed in an exploratory manner, paving the way for future research 
endeavours.  
One issue related to this cross-disciplinary endeavour is that during the open coding of 
discourse data and the emergence of themes, the scopes of analysis expanded in all ways 
and became hard to control and narrow down. This is helpful for realising the complexity of 
the study but was extremely challenging for individual research within a limited scope. 
Further studies applying this approach could be carried out in a more controlled manner with 
a focus limited to one specific case in bilateral relations.  
A relative limitation is that corpora consisting of comprehensive, general guiding documents 
can assist in the comparison of topics’ coverage across corpora. This is beneficial for giving 
a quick, rough impression of the speaker’s discourse emphases and priorities. However, as 
these comparisons are based on word frequency searches, the design of queries and the 
quantity of the corpora,45 the disregard of theme-specific discourse could lead to 
inaccuracies in data output. This kind of corpora of general policy papers seems to 
contribute to giving a fuller range of potential factors besides the challenges as well as 
opportunities in a bilateral relationship but this is not the best type of corpora to contribute to 
understanding specific cases in a bilateral relationship. For case-specific analysis, for 
example, the trade disputes between China and the EU, discourses which are focused on 
the theme, including trade documents and dialogue on the economic forum between China 
and the EU should be applied instead. Further research, if aiming at specific cases in China-
EU relations, should consider establishing specialised corpora on specific themes and be 
concentrated on a limited number of cases.  
Regarding the longitudinal perspective of the analysis, which is supported by corpus-driven 
discourse analysis, the thesis applies data across the twenty-five years and discusses the 
changes in the discourse over the period. The longitudinal perspective of this thesis 
manifests in two ways. The first is corpus-based searches, which lead to trend lines of word 
coverage across the years. The other is the content analysis which contains both earlier 
discourse and more recent discourse based on the corpus. However, the chronicle analysis 
in some of the chapters may seem to be focusing more on recent years. This is potentially 
due to a few factors including the larger amount discourse in more recent years due to the 
 
45 Although the size of corpora does not theoretically affect the word coverage, the bigger the corpora, the more it 
contributes to impartial data but, as in specialised corpora, the size of corpora might be too small or incomplete for 




availability of more organised official discourse from China on the EU in recent years and on 
China’s delegation to the EU, and the author’s subconscious focus on more recent trends in 
the discourse. Future research incorporating corpus-driven analysis, especially for corpora 
holding a large amount of data, should be in a better position to carry out longitudinal 
analysis with equal attention paid to each episode of the researched period.  
The coding of the discourse data in this thesis is not only derived from constant comparison 
of the corpus and searching for items such as word frequency and collocations among other 
language features but also influenced by the topics and themes of China-EU scholarship. 
This is good in the sense that topics and themes were chosen in the thesis which are more 
engaged with the existing literature, but could lead to the problem that the selection, 
organisation of data and the themes derived from them are not entirely intact from the 
author’s existing understanding and knowledge of the field. If the grounded theory approach 
is carried out in a stricter manner, the open coding could have been done in a more 
unrestricted way so that the theme arising from the corpora was less bound to the existing 
debated topics regarding China-EU relations.  
Lastly, the thesis focuses on the European Union as a whole entity instead of focusing on 
the individual member states. This is not to say that member states are not relevant to 
China-EU relations, but the research was more interested in the produced policies of the EU 
instead of the process of policymaking. Further research could consider the divergence 
among member states and different institutions in the EU more.   
9.5 Policy Implications  
Before 2006, the EU did not realise that its objectives in engaging with China were bound to 
fail as China holds a firm stance about protecting its political style and values and this is 
China's bottom line. Any cooperation is considered with the condition that this bottom line is 
respected. One China is respected. When the EU, or MS, cross over the line, the economy 
and trade will be severely affected. In recent years, the EU has shifted gradually to a more 
realist approach with China, claiming that it will be more pragmatic with China. Compared to 
the past, this is a big improvement as it indicates that the EU is prepared to compromise its 
original goals of promoting its political values in China and has started to accept the fact that 
China will not, and has never intended to be impacted by the EU in that sense. Focusing on 
economic cooperation is welcomed by China.  
However, this does not mean the EU's approach has matured to the stage where opinions 
are integrated within the EU. Critiques about the EU being “pragmatic” have also arisen. The 
doubts from the European side indicate that understanding of what is a functional, or 
pragmatic approach are not clearly defined, and there is not necessarily consensus between 
China and the EU. While both hope to expand common economic interests, the EU should 
avoid understanding China's engagement style with the EU as an “economy only” style as 
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China's Wu Shi style has richer and multi-faceted connotations which go beyond a mere 
calculated approach. Perhaps the best official translation of China's Wu Shi approach is not 
Pragmatic, but down-to-earth, or mutual trust and win-win, focusing on implementation. 
Although there is not a perfect word to encompass the full range of connotations of Wu Shi 
as well as China's general diplomatic approach, efforts should be made to explain China's 
approach to the EU better and take account of China's understanding of international orders 
and China's top design of its foreign policy. The EU should avoid swinging from one extreme 
of attempting to change China as the EU wanted to another extreme which is to engage with 
China merely on a benefits-oriented style without mutual trust. The EU should be more open 
to engaging China comprehensively and mutually contributing to each other in terms of 
social development with respect for each other's bottom lines.  
Both sides should avoid having double standards. The EU, while promoting some of its 
values to the world, should be prepared to reform its own values according to the changes 
and needs of the society. China, while protecting itself from the EU's influence in unwanted 
areas, should also understand the history and nature of the EU as an organisation 
established on a certain set of rules and the fact that the EU's actions will be bounded by 
these values for rather a long time and it is unrealistic to expect the EU to transform its 
ideas.  
In the past, the EU's efforts in promoting its values in China did not work very well. The next 
step after a “pragmatic” engagement style is for both sides to be more open and trustful with 
each other and establish a rule-based, multilateral mechanism to protect the priorities and 
bottom lines of both sides.  
While the official Chinese discourse never attempts to promote Chinese values to the world, 
it is suggested that in some cases, stating China's values clearly and firmly does help clarify 
the misunderstandings. The less China explains itself, the harder it is for the EU to 
understand. Chinese values and understanding of the world could also complement the EU's 
values and norms and facilitate the EU's development in the next stage.  
China and the EU should also bear in mind their differences as one is a state, and the other 
is not. The cooperation between the two should be distinguished from that between countries 
and countries, and focus on areas where the two both desires to develop within the scope of 
the EU to avoid treating the EU as a country which is beyond the EU's scope of 
administration and affairs.  
China also needs to understand the demarcation between the EU and member states. On 
the one hand, issues directly related to MS should be negotiated with MS with reference to 
the EU regarding procedure and respect to the multilateral system. Issues regarding 




EU with due respect as the existence of the EU in Europe is one of the main features of 
China-Europe diplomacy that no one can avoid and deny.  
Looking to the future, the development of the engagement styles between China and the EU 
requires enhanced communication from both sides. While enormous efforts and progress 
have already been made in human rights, sustainable development, anti-corruption, anti-
poverty, and protection of disadvantaged groups such as women and children, both sides 
should work on expanding common interests and focusing on the shared values and norms 
with a more targeted, clear communication based on the attitudes of mutual respect and 
acceptance of differences.   
Finally, the uncertainties and the changes in international relations have created vast 
opportunities but also challenges during the research. In the last few years, the EU has 
experienced Brexit, which created changes in the EU's identities and its policies. Potentially 
it also influences the EU's general external action policies as well as its relations with China 
due to its internal change. Overall, as China supports European integration and China is 
experienced in terms of unifying the country, there is a good base for the two to explore a 
constructive structure for the future of the EU. China has also experienced more 
uncertainties in the international environment alone with China becoming increasingly 
impactful in the world. The research covers the years from 1994 to 2019. During the years 
2017 and 2018, new official discourse between China and the EU has been issued, including 
the joint statement of the eighth High-Level Dialogue between China and the EU. China has 
also issued one document titled “Sticking to Multilateralism in the New Era” (Wang, 2018), 
which relates a lot to the discussion in Chapter 5 of this thesis. The research is based on 
official discourse and offers a chance to follow the changes in China-EU relations through 
the attitudes and statements of the official institutions; it paves the way, both content-wise 
and methodology wise, for future research applying this approach.  
9.6 Possible Agenda for Future Research   
Several endeavours during this research can be further explored and expanded. For 
example, I have established the Corpus Joint, which includes the joint press release, joint 
statement as well as other high-level strategic dialogues between China and the EU. 
However, since this thesis mainly focuses on comparing China’s official discourse to the EU 
and vice versa, Corpus Joint isn’t involved in the analysis. Further research and analysis 
could be done with this corpus.   
In terms of discourse data collection, several archives and discourse resources could be 
applied in the future for research with similar methods. For example, the European 
Parliament offers the European Parliament proceedings parallel corpus 1996-2011.46 This 
 
46 More information available at https://www.statmt.org/europarl/. Last accessed on 11/12/2020. 
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offers several corpora of the European Parliaments’ discourse in the official languages of the 
EU. Unfortunately, the Chinese language corpora on the European parliament proceedings 
are not available at present. However, in the near future, there is hope that more and more 
EU discourse could be available in non-EU languages such as Chinese due to the 
improvement in functions of the locally-based delegation of the EU, such as the EU’s 
delegation to China in Beijing which is starting to offer information about the EU’s China 
policies and activities in the Chinese language in recent years.  
Scholars who are better equipped with computer techniques, especially in database and 
machine learning could try using a web-crawler and web scraper to gather discourse 
materials on a certain theme. This method can be more effective if one does not have a high 
requirement for accuracy but instead focuses on the abundant amount of discourse. 
As mentioned previously, corpora consisting of comprehensive policy papers and 
overarching, guiding discourse with multiple aspects of bilateral relations talked about is 
helpful for generating quick impressions of policy emphases which do not require too much 
accuracy. However, future research, especially that aiming to explain specific challenges in 
bilateral relationships, should consider establishing and applying corpora concentrating on 





A.1. The Framework of China-EU Political Dialogues  
Table Apx 1 Architecture of EU-China Political Dialogues 
 
Source: the EU-China Policy Dialogues Support Facility Results & Achievements 2007-2017 (The EU-China Policy 
Dialogues Support Facility, 2017) 
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A.2. Corpora and Document Lists  
Table Apx 3 is a list of the key policy papers of China and the EU on each other. Apart from 
this, this section includes the documents lists of the corpora developed for this thesis. Five 
corpora have been developed for this thesis: Corpus China PPSP, Corpus EU PPSP, Corpus 
Joint, Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Domestic. This section lists the documents 
included in each of the corpora47.  
 
Table Apx 4 shows the documents in Corpus China PPSP. Table Apx 5 shows the documents 
in Corpus China Domestic. Table Apx 6 shows the document list of Corpus EU PPSP, while 
Table Apx 7 is the document list of Corpus EU Internal. Plus, a corpus containing the key joint 
press release and statements is included, as shown in Table Apx 8. Although there was not 
enough scope to include Corpus Joint into the analysis, the establishment of the corpus 
contributes to further research. 
 
 
Table Apx 3 A List of the Key Policy Papers between China and the EU (1994-2019) 
 
47 Please contact the thesis author if you would like to apply the corpora for research or other purposes   
Year  The EU’s Policy Paper to China  China’s Policy Paper to the EU 
1994  Towards A New Asia Strategy (Commission of 
the European Communities, 1994) 
 
1995 A Long Term Policy for China-Europe 
Relations (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1995) 
 
1998 Building a Comprehensive Partnership with 
China (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1998) 
 
2000 Report from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament on the 
Implementation of the Communication 
``Building a Comprehensive Partnership with 
China'' (European Commission, 2000) 
 
2001 Commission Working Document Country 
Strategy Paper China (European Commission, 
2001) 
 
2001 EU Strategy towards China Implementation of 
the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for 
a More Effective EU Policy (Common Security 








2001 Communication from the Commission—
Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for 
Enhanced Partnerships (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001) 
 
2002 Commission Working Document— Country 
Strategy Paper China (European Commission, 
2001) 
 
2003 Commission Policy Paper for Transmission to 
the Council and the European Parliament— A 
Maturing Partnership-Shared Interests and 
Challenges in EU-China Relations 
(Commission of the European Communities, 
2003) 
China's EU Policy Paper  2003 
(People.cn, 2003) 
2003 National Indicative Programme 2005-2006 
China (European Commission, 2003) 
 
2006  Communication From the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament —EU–
China: Closer partners, growing 
responsibilities (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006b) 
 
2006 & Commission Working Document: Closer 
Partners, Growing Responsibilities—A policy 
paper on EU-China trade and investment: 




China Strategy Paper 2007-2013 (European 
Commission, 2006a) 
 
2010 Mid-term Review National Indicative 
Programme 2011-2013 (European 
Commission, 2010) 
 
2013 EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 




 China's EU Policy Paper 2014 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2014) 
2016 Elements for a new EU strategy on China  
(European Commission, 2016b) 
 
2018  China's EU Policy Paper 2018 
(Xinhua, 2018) 
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Table Apx 6 A list of the Documents in Corpus EU PPSP (1994-2019) 
 
Year Document Title
1994 A New Asia Strategy
1995 A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations
1998 Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
on the Implementation of the Communication "Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China"
2001 Commission Working Document Country Strategy Paper China
National Indicative Programme 2002-2004 China
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more 
Effective EU Policy
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced 
Partnerships
COMMISSION POLICY PAPER
FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT A maturing partnership - shared 
interests and challenges in EU-China relations
(Updating the European Commission’s Communications on EU-China relations of 1998 and 2001)
2004 NATIONAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME 2005-2006 CHINA
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT EU – China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities
COMMISSION WORKING DOCUMENT
Accompanying COM(2006) 631 final: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities A policy paper on EU-China 
trade and investment:
Competition and Partnership
CHINA Strategy Paper 2007-2013
Introductory remarks by Herman VAN ROMPUY
President of the European Council at the EU-China Summit
Opening remarks by President Barroso at the opening ceremony of the first EU-China High Level Cultural 
Forum
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION INSTRUMENT PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
MID-TERM REVIEW
NATIONAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME 2011-2013
Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, and José Manuel Barroso,
President of the European Commission, following the EU-China summit
Speech by President Barroso at the EU China Business Summit
Peoples of yesterday, peoples of tomorrow: 35 years of EU/China relations
2012 Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council Speech to the EU-CHINA Business Summit 2012
High Representative Catherine Ashton meets the Defence Minister of China
Opening remarks by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy
at the 15th EU-China Summit
NDRIS PIEBALGS European Commissioner for Development
Opening remarks at the 1st EU-China Mayors' Forum / Brussels
Catherine Ashton meets the Defence Minister of China
Speech by President Barroso: "A story of European endurance and perseverance"
Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton following the third High Level Strategic Dialogue 
with China
Statement by President Barroso following the 14th EU-China Summit
REPORT
on EU-China relations (2015/2003(INI)) Committee on Foreign Affairs
JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL
Elements for a new EU strategy on China
2017 Remarks by the High Representative Mogherini following the 7th EU-China Strategic Dialogue
"Europe and Asia - building a Cooperative Global Order". Speech by the HR/VP Federica Mogherini at 
Tsinghua University
Belt and Road Forum – EU common messages
EU-China Summit: moving forward with our global partnership
2018
Speech by EU Ambassador to China at Global Times Diplomats Forum on 40th Anniversary of Reform and 
Opening-Up
Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the joint press point with Wang Yi, 
State Councillor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China following the EU-China 
Strategic Dialogue
EU-China Summit: deepening the strategic global partnership
Press Statement by European Council President Donald Tusk following the 20th EU-China Summit
Joint statement of the 20th EU-China Summit
EU-CHINA LEADERS’ STATEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLEAN ENERGY
EU steps up its strategy for connecting Europe and Asia
Explaining the European Union's approach to connecting Europe and Asia
OINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS AND THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK
Connecting Europe and Asia - Building blocks for an EU Strategy
Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU strategy - Council conclusions (15 October 2018)
Remarks by President Donald Tusk at the opening ceremony of the 12th ASEM summit
Speech by President Donald Tusk at the gala dinner of the ASEM summit
Closing remarks by President Donald Tusk at the 12th ASEM summit
Official Journal of the European Union Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Joint 
Communication to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions 
and the European Investment Bank — Connecting Europe and Asia — Building blocks for an EU Strategy’
Report on the state of EU-China relations (2017/2274(INI)) Committee on Foreign Affairs
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH AND FOOD SAFETY
2019 EU-China Summit: Rebalancing the Strategic Partnership
EU-China Strategic Outlook: Commission Contribution to the European Council (21-22 March 2019)
European Commission and HR/VP Contribution to the European Council 
Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council 
EU-China- A Strategic Outlook
Remarks of President Juncker at the joint press conference with Mr Li Keqiang, 
Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, and Mr Donald Tusk, 
President of the European Council, following the EU-China Summit
HR/VP Federica Mogherini visits Beijing to discuss bilateral relations and foreign policy cooperation

















1994 A New Asia Strategy
1995 A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations
1998 Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
on the Implementation of the Communication "Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China"
2001 Commission Working Document Country Strategy Paper China
National Indicative Programme 2002-2004 China
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more 
Effective EU Policy
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced 
Partnerships
COMMISSION POLICY PAPER
FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT A maturing partnership - shared 
interests and challenges in EU-China relations
(Updating the European Commission’s Communications on EU-China relations of 1998 and 2001)
2004 NATIONAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME 2005-2006 CHINA
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT EU – China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities
COMMISSION WORKING DOCUMENT
Accompanying COM(2006) 631 final: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities A policy paper on EU-China 
trade and investment:
Competition and Partnership
CHINA Strategy Paper 2007-2013
Introductory remarks by Herman VAN ROMPUY
President of the European Council at the EU-China Summit
Opening remarks by President Barroso at the opening ceremony of the first EU-China High Level Cultural 
Forum
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION INSTRUMENT PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
MID-TERM REVIEW
NATIONAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME 2011-2013
Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, and José Manuel Barroso,
President of the European Commission, following the EU-China summit
Speech by President Barroso at the EU China Business Summit
Peoples of yesterday, peoples of tomorrow: 35 years of EU/China relations
2012 Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council Speech to the EU-CHINA Business Summit 2012
High Representative Catherine Ashton meets the Defence Minister of China
Opening remarks by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy
at the 15th EU-China Summit
NDRIS PIEBALGS European Commissioner for Development
Opening remarks at the 1st EU-China Mayors' Forum / Brussels
Catherine Ashton meets the Defence Minister of China
Speech by President Barroso: "A story of European endurance and perseverance"
Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton following the third High Level Strategic Dialogue 
with China
Statement by President Barroso following the 14th EU-China Summit
REPORT
on EU-China relations (2015/2003(INI)) Committee on Foreign Affairs
JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL
Elements for a new EU strategy on China
2017 Remarks by the High Representative Mogherini following the 7th EU-China Strategic Dialogue
"Europe and Asia - building a Cooperative Global Order". Speech by the HR/VP Federica Mogherini at 
Tsinghua University
Belt and Road Forum – EU common messages
EU-China Summit: moving forward with our global partnership
2018
Speech by EU Ambassador to China at Global Times Diplomats Forum on 40th Anniversary of Reform and 
Opening-Up
Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the joint press point with Wang Yi, 
State Councillor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China following the EU-China 
Strategic Dialogue
EU-China Summit: deepening the strategic global partnership
Press Statement by European Council President Donald Tusk following the 20th EU-China Summit
Joint statement of the 20th EU-China Summit
EU-CHINA LEADERS’ STATEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLEAN ENERGY
EU steps up its strategy for connecting Europe and Asia
Explaining the European Union's approach to connecting Europe and Asia
OINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS AND THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK
Connecting Europe and Asia - Building blocks for an EU Strategy
Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU strategy - Council conclusions (15 October 2018)
Remarks by President Donald Tusk at the opening ceremony of the 12th ASEM summit
Speech by President Donald Tusk at the gala dinner of the ASEM summit
Closing remarks by President Donald Tusk at the 12th ASEM summit
Official Journal of the European Union Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Joint 
Communication to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions 
and the European Investment Bank — Connecting Europe and Asia — Building blocks for an EU Strategy’
Report on the state of EU-China relations (2017/2274(INI)) Committee on Foreign Affairs
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH AND FOOD SAFETY
2019 EU-China Summit: Rebalancing the Strategic Partnership
EU-China Strategic Outlook: Commission Contribution to the European Council (21-22 March 2019)
European Commission and HR/VP Contribution to the European Council 
Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council 
EU-China- A Strategic Outlook
Remarks of President Juncker at the joint press conference with Mr Li Keqiang, 
Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, and Mr Donald Tusk, 
President of the European Council, following the EU-China Summit
HR/VP Federica Mogherini visits Beijing to discuss bilateral relations and foreign policy cooperation
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Table Apx 7 A Document List of Corpus EU Internal 
 
Corpus Joint includes the inexhaustive joint press release and statements made by both 




1997 Treaty of Amsterdam
2001 Treaty of Nice
2003 The European Union and the United Nations The choice of multilateralism
2007 Treaty of Lisbon
2010  2009 Annual Report from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices
2010 A Twelve-point EU Action Plan in Support of the Millennium Development Goals
2010 Europe 2020 A European Strategy for smart sustainable and inclusive growth
2011 EU Cohension Policy 2014- 2020 Investing in Growth and Jobs
2011 Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP 2010
2012 Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP 2011
2013 Council Desion on 2013755 EU of 25 November 2013 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Union
2013 Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP 2012
2014 EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the European Year for Development
2014 Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP 2013
2015 Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP 2014
2015 Sustainable Development Goals and the Agenda2030
2015 The EU’s Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals
2016 0709 Speech of the HR and VP Mogherini at the Warsaw Summit Experts' Forum
2016 1010 Speech by Federica Mogherini at the Public Seminar EU as A Global Actor
2016 1017 Council Conclusions on the Global Strategy on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy
2016 1021 European Council meeting 20 and 21 October 2016 Conclusions
2016 Shared Vision Common Action A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy
2016 Speech by HR and VP Mogherini at the EUISS Annual Conference Towards an EU Global Stategy Final Stage
2016 Speech by HRVP Mogherini at the EUISS Annual EU Global Strategy Towards the Final Stage
2016 Speech by the HR and VP Federica Mogherini at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
2017 0913 The State of the Union 2017 Catching the Wind in our Sails
2017 60 Years of EU in the World
2017 A Global Strategy for the European Union
2017 European Consensus on Development One World Our Dignity Our Future
2017 Future of Europe European Parliamnet sets out its vision
2017 Implementng the EU Global Strategy Year 1
2018 Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year Two
2019 EU Action to Strengthen Rules-based Multilateralism Council Conclusions
2019 Speech by High Representative VicePresident Federica Mogherini at the Conference Walking the Strategic Talk A Progressive EU Foreign Policy Agenda for the Future
2019 Speech by High Representative VicePresident Federica Mogherini on Implementing the EU Global Strategy Challenges and Opportunities at the College of Europe
2019 Statement on the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace
2019 The EU's Global Strategy Three Years On Looking Forward
20190620 A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024




Table Apx 8 List of Documents in Corpus Joint (Joint Statement, Press Release and Other 




2001 Joint Press Statement of the Fourth EU-China Summit
2002 Joint Statement of the Fifth EU-China Summit
2003 Joint Statement of the Sixth EU-China Summit
2004 Joint Statement of the Seventh EU-China Summit
2005 Joint Statement of the Eighth EU-China Summit
2006 Joint statement of the Nineth EU-China summit
2007 Joint Statement of the Tenth China-EU Summit Beijing
2009 Eleventh EU-China Summit Prague Joint Press Commnique
2009 Joint Statement of the Twelveth EU-China Summit Nanjing
2010 Thirteenth EU-China Summit Joint Press Communique
2012
Joint Declaration on the First Round of the EU-China High Level 
People to People Dialogue
2012
Joint Press Communique 15th EU-China Summit Towards a 
Stronger EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
2012 Joint Press Communique of the 14th EU-China Summit
2012
Joint Press Release after the 3rd EU-China High-level Strategic 
Dialogue
2012
Press Statement by President of the European Council Herman 
Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission Jose 
Manuel Barroso Following the 15th EU-China Summit
2013 Joint Declaration on EU-China Cultural Copperation
2014
Joint Communique of the Second Meeting fo the EU-China High-
Level People-to-People Dialogue
2014
Joint Statement Deepening the EU-China Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership for mutual benefit
2015
China-EU Summit Joint Statement The Wau Forward After Forty 
Years of China-EU Cooperation
2015
Joint Statement on The Third Round of The EU-China High Level 
People-to-People Dialogue
2017 List of Outcomes of the 19th China
2018 Joint Statement of the 20th EU-China Summit
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A.3. Query Designs for the Topic Coverage Searches 
The text search for topic coverages in Chapter four could contain terms which are partially 
overlapping. For example, one could argue that energy in the topic of Environment and 
Energy could contain some overlapping contents with the topic Security. However, the 
searches are designed so that they reflect the hot topics in literature and the official 
statements of China and the EU on their priorities, or aspects of interests on the introductory 
pages of their official website. It is not possible for topics not to overlap each other. 
Therefore, the coverage counted by text searching should be viewed as references for the 
importance of the topic instead of absolute figures measuring the importance of the topics. 
However, the changes of the coverage of one topic of the years, as well as the overall 
ranking of one topic among the top topic list are valid because searching criteria stay the 
same for each year and are identically written for Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU 
PPSP.  
Once the topics are set, the next question this chapter will look at is that among these 
common interests represented by the sixteen most frequency topics, which ones are the 
more important ones for each side? What are China and the EU’s preference among their 
favourite topics? In order to get data for this, the first step is to define the searching criteria 
for the topic coverages. Each attempt of keywords searches based on designed selection 
criteria through Nvivo is called a query. The design of queries is crucial for reliable and 
meaningful data output. The goal is to extract the texts related to these sixteen topics, 
avoiding double counts or miss counts as much as possible.  
The following two tables show the queries designed and applied for searching topic 
coverages in Corpus EU PPSP and Corpus China PPSP. Taking the query for Economy and 
Trade in EU PPSP for example, in order to retrieve all the related texts to this topic, the 
keywords set “econom* OR trad* OR business OR commerce* OR finance* OR tax OR tariff 
OR invest* OR deficit OR budget OR savings” were searched for in Corpus EU PPSP 
through Nvivo. Wildcards are applied to search for words with the same stems and in 
different tenses and forms. Running this query leads to the output of a frequency of economy 
and trade-related topics in the applied document. Queries are designed in similar ways for 
the rest fourteen most discussed topics in EU-China relations.  
A few details were considered in designing the queries: 
The first is the choice of the synonyms: the synonyms are selected based on Oxford 
Thesaurus Online. Although words other than synonyms are included in the queries, 
synonyms are the first groups of words to go for when designing the queries.  
The second is the usage of wildcards. Nvivo (updated to version 12) does not allow searches 
for stemmed words while wild cards are used. When wildcards are involved, only searches 
for “exact matches” are allowed. Plus, wildcards are not permitted when phrases are 
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involved in the queries (“Sciences and Technology”, for example, includes the phrases 
“artificial intelligence”). In these cases, words with the same stemmed were searched for to 
compensate for the potential loss of relevant words.  
Third, Wildcards does not work for Chinese corpus in Nvivo. Therefore, queries for China 
PPSP do not involve wildcards. Compensations for potential loss of words were done 
through manually putting in as many synonyms as possible.  
Last, Nvivo has to be re-set to different language mode in “project language” as the parsing 
for Chinese and English requires different modes.  
Other than these difference in details for the designing of the queries, the queries for China 
PPSP are basically translations of the queries designed for EU PPSP in order to make the 
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A.4. Wordlists, Words in Context and Collocations 
 
Table Apx 12 Top fifty Frequency Words in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP 
 









1 中国 1466 1.91 china 4710 2.56
2 合作 1323 1.72 european 1162 0.63
3 发展 1245 1.62 economic 1092 0.59
4 关系 934 1.22 development 1064 0.58
5 欧盟 811 1.06 chinese 1044 0.57
6 世界 554 0.72 cooperation 894 0.49
7 中欧 552 0.72 trade 861 0.47
8 国际 526 0.69 also 827 0.45
9 双方 520 0.68 asia 809 0.44
10 经济 516 0.67 policy 802 0.44
11 共同 502 0.65 programme 760 0.41
12 欧洲 480 0.63 operation 734 0.40
13 加强 426 0.55 dialogue 707 0.38
14 战略 346 0.45 rights 684 0.37
15 领域 345 0.45 human 639 0.35
16 推动 342 0.45 global 638 0.35
17 交流 338 0.44 international 627 0.34
18 和平 324 0.42 support 613 0.33
19 对话 323 0.42 world 593 0.32
20 问题 312 0.41 social 585 0.32
21 重要 294 0.38 commission 563 0.31
22 促进 292 0.38 investment 547 0.30
23 会议 274 0.36 new 539 0.29
24 贸易 274 0.36 europe 537 0.29
25 伙伴 272 0.35 issues 533 0.29
26 全面 262 0.34 countries 523 0.28
27 国家 253 0.33 reform 507 0.28
28 积极 240 0.31 areas 503 0.27
29 相互 232 0.30 environmental 475 0.26
30 投资 231 0.30 energy 469 0.26
31 政策 217 0.28 political 456 0.25
32 社会 215 0.28 union 450 0.24
33 改革 214 0.28 security 445 0.24
34 稳定 211 0.27 sustainable 426 0.23
35 主席 208 0.27 market 417 0.23
36 维护 208 0.27 level 416 0.23
37 支持 204 0.27 implementation 412 0.22
38 中方 193 0.25 including 409 0.22
39 地区 181 0.24 relations 399 0.22
40 使团 177 0.23 growth 396 0.22
41 全球 175 0.23 law 392 0.21
42 政治 175 0.23 agreement 381 0.21
43 安全 169 0.22 projects 380 0.21
44 文化 167 0.22 action 377 0.21
45 深化 165 0.21 key 360 0.20
46 不断 164 0.21 people 352 0.19
47 开放 163 0.21 economy 351 0.19
48 人民 161 0.21 well 351 0.19
49 表示 160 0.21 regional 349 0.19
50 领导人 158 0.21 wto 347 0.19
Searching Criteria:  
Minimum length: words with 3 letters and 
above for Corpus EU PPSP; words with 2 
Chinese characters for Corpus China 
PPSP so that words are meaningful  
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Table Apx 14 Multilateral/Multilaterally/Multilateralism in Corpus EU PPSP 
 
1 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdft  play a more ctive role in multilateral actions with a view to maintaining international
2 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdfT  st ength n links with Asian countries in multilateral fora, and further encourage Asian participation in
3 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdff ra, and further encourage Asian participation in multilateral organisations. • To pursue all actions necessary
4 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdf(see Annex III, Table 1 for list). Multilateral Co-operation The Union is engaged in a
5 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdfactive commitment to trade liberalisation within the multilateral system with respect for all of the
6 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdfUruguay Round and other actions at the multilateral level. The Union has also sought to
7 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdfThese are i  conformi y with the Union's multilateral obligations and commitments which limit their use
8 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdflarge regio  and the we kness of the multilateral organisations for political consultation are all factors
9 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdfand in appropri te fora both bilateral and multilateral, such as the UN Commission on Human
10 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdfthe path for ork u de taken at the multilateral level, for example concerning the post Uruguay
11 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdfthe post Uruguay Round agenda. Regionalism and multilateralism. The EU has a long-standing relation with
12 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdfthey are consistent wi h the GATT- based multilateral trade system. 2. 1 ·• 1 Raising
13 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdfincluding in the field; and co-ordination in multilateral fora. With regard to economic co-operation, the
14 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdfb th bilaterally nd in he framework of multilateral organisations. • The Union should, in particular,
15 1995 a long term policy.pdfthe internati nal community in the dialogue through multilateral fora such as the United Nations. The
16 1995 a long term policy.pdfenvironment in China, have focused on the multilateral negotiations for China’s WTO membership and on
17 1995 a long term policy.pdfmembershi , but some could be implemented under multilateral surveillance over a specified period of time
18 1995 a long term policy.pdfand trade ref rms, helping China into the multilateral trade system, and achieving better market access
19 1995 a long term policy.pdf• bilateral ties, and international dialogue in multilateral fora using cooperation to pursue the goals
20 1995 a long term policy.pdfby China’s trad ng artners, both bilaterally, and multilaterally in the GATT accession discussions, some improvements
21 1998 building a comprehensive partnerhisp with china.pdfinvolvement of C ina n both regional and multilateral initiatives of global interest. A. 1 Upgrading
22 1998 building a comprehensive partnerhisp with china.pdfe given to Beijing's greater involvemen  in multilateral negotiations on such issues. Europe should also
23 1998 building a comprehensive partnerhisp with china.pdfof them. The growing d m nd for a multilateral security dialogue in East Asia provides opportunities
24 1998 building a comprehensive partnerhisp with china.pdfin the pace and scope of further multilateral trade Rounds. Financial turbulence in Asia has
25 1998 building a comprehensive partnerhisp with china.pdfEU should back up its bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations with concrete assistance to China
26 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdfi volve ent of China in both regional and multilateral initiatives of global interest.” COM (1998) 181,
27 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdfhas been reluctant t  advance the ARF multilateral process any further, putting its traditional emphasis
28 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdfthe EU has bee  eager to us multilateral fora to advance the cause of human
29 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdfto WTO, both dialogues, bilateral and multilateral will be used to resolve trade issues
30 2001 ALL.pdf1999 and the EU in May 2000, multilateral negotiations were concluded in September 2001. WTO
31 2001 ALL.pdfreci ient from 1992 to 1997. Other important multilateral donors are the Asian Development Bank and
32 2001 ALL.pdfwith the new approaches developed by most multilateral agencies. The analyses of the challenges and
33 2001 ALL.pdfand the EU are signatories to several multilateral environmental agreements and have a mutual interest
34 2001 ALL.pdfaccount. China, as a party to several multilateral environmental agreements (e.g. Climate Change, Biodiversity, Desertification)
35 2001 ALL.pdfall issues of concern, in support of multilateral problem-solving wherever this applies on international and
36 2001 ALL.pdfdegradation. Co-operation with China, bilaterally and withinmultilateral structures such as the UN, is crucial
37 2001 ALL.pdfTaiwan issue resolved peacefully through dialogue, – supportingmultilateral efforts to limit arms proliferation, exports and
38 2001 ALL.pdflandmines), – identifying ways of promoting engagement in multilateral security dialogues for conflict prevention on regional
39 2001 ALL.pdffundamental shared interest in strengthening the rules-basedmultilateral trading system. In this regard, the importance
40 2001 ALL.pdffruitful partnerships to promote common interests within multilateral environmental agreements, where feasible. • Assist China
41 2001 ALL.pdfsia to play a greater role in multilateral fora, ensuring open markets and a non-discriminatory
42 2001 ALL.pdfthe success of the open and rules-based multilateral trading system established under the GATT and
43 2001 ALL.pdfearly launch of a new Round of multilateral trade negotiations. These negotiations, on the basis
44 2001 ALL.pdfthe region. The further strengthening of the multilateral trading system is even more important for
45 2001 ALL.pdffrom any possible shift of emphasis from multilateralism towards plurilateral or bilateral trading arrangements– particularly
46 2001 ALL.pdfpolitical, economic or social field, both in multilateral institutions and in our bilateral relations. We
47 2001 ALL.pdfredouble our efforts to enhance the open multilateral framework for trade and investment, to remove
48 2001 ALL.pdfdialogue with China), and in regional and multilateral fora, notably in the UN and its
49 2001 ALL.pdfrights we should strengthen our bilateral and multilateral dialogue with our Asian partners, encourage civil
50 2001 ALL.pdfcompletion of a comprehensive new Round of multilateral trade negotiations, and through working for the
51 2001 ALL.pdfwho have yet to become members. A multilateral approach is the only realistic way forward
52 2001 ALL.pdfinstance in the continued health of the multilateral system, common challenges such as environmental degradation
53 2001 ALL.pdf12.11.1999). 24 – deepening EU/Japan cooperation at the multilateral level, both in the WTO with the
54 2001 ALL.pdfin the broader Asia-Pacific region. At the multilateral level too, there is scope for the
55 2001 ALL.pdfrelationship further. – building stronger alliances at the multilateral level, most particularly in the WTO, with
56 2001 ALL.pdfits ability to promote regional stability, support multilateralism, raise mutual awareness, and strengthen the position
57 2001 ALL.pdfwith respect to our bilateral, regional and multilateral relations with Asia. More specific priorities have
58 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfincreasi ly involved in world affairs, especially in multilateral fora, and is rapidly emerging as a
59 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfeng ged in bo h the new round of multilateral negotiations under the WTO Doha Development Agenda
60 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfwhich are proliferating, can be complementary to multilateral liberalisation and rule-making, but only if they
61 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfpartic lar as rega ds the key role of multilateral organisations and systems. Through a further reinforcement
62 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfweight, both in the b lateral and the multilateral context. Given its particular position as a
63 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfChina share views on the importance of multilateral systems and rules for global governance, which
64 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfpolitical dialogu  has also followed up on multilateral efforts to limit arms proliferation, arms exports,
65 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfwith Ta wan in on-political fields, including in multilateral contexts, in line with the EU’s ‘One-China’
66 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfcommo  inte est both in the bilateral and multilateral context. ! Enhance co-operation to promote multilateral systems
67 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfand multilate al context. ! Enhance co-operation to promotemultilateral systems and rules for global governance, particularly
68 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfon Disarmame t, and to sign and ratify multilateral treaties and conventions such as the Comprehensive
69 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfof promoting a multi olar world governed by multilateral rules, it has an interest in a
70 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfco-ordination related to the new round of multilateral negotiations under the WTO Doha Development Agenda,
 




71 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfmore balanced international order based on effective multilateralism, and wants to engage China as a
72 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfrights and peaceful resolution of conflicts through multilateral mechanisms at the core of it. Its
73 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfconsidered more appro riate for coverage in the multilateral framework. The CSP and NIP are thus
74 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfX Norway X X X X X Multilateral Donors ADB X X X X X
75 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfconsidere  more a propriate for coverage in the multilateral framework. The CSP and NIP are thus
76 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfX N rway X X X X X Multilateral Donors ADB X X X X X
77 2006 ALL.pdfand contributing to a strong and effective multilateral system. The goal should be a situation
78 2006 ALL.pdfto see an EN 4 EN effective multilateral system. But there remain divergences in values,
79 2006 ALL.pdfChina’s integration into world energy markets and multilateral governance mechanisms and institutions, and to encourage
80 2006 ALL.pdfdispute settlement system to ensure compliance with multilaterally agreed rules and obligations. Trade defence measures
81 2006 ALL.pdfand security through a reformed and effective multilateral system. They should co-operate closely in the
82 2006 ALL.pdfframework of the UN, working to find multilateral solutions to emerging crises, and to combat
83 2006 ALL.pdfEN structures. This common interest, in strong multilateralism, peace and security should also be reflected
84 2006 ALL.pdfits procurement market and acceding to the multilateral Government Procurement Agreement as soon as possible
85 2006 ALL.pdfwith China and to ensure compliance with multilaterally agreed rules and obligations. This is not
86 2006 ALL.pdfrelationship based on objective application of agreed multilateral rules. Using anti- dumping and anti-subsidy instruments
87 2006 ALL.pdfhealth standards. Increasing China’s engagement with the multilateral system China is already a major beneficiary
88 2006 ALL.pdfwith the benefits it derives from the multilateral trading system and to make a substantial
89 2006 ALL.pdfcoo eration in the WTO and in other multilateral rule- making organisations. Addressing macro- economic challenges
90 2006 ALL.pdfDelegation also has regular contacts with important multilateral donor organisations such as the World Bank,
91 2006 ALL.pdfjustice and the EU's commitment to effective multilateralism. 19 3.5 REVIEW OF PREVIOUS CO-OPERATION In
92 2006 ALL.pdfMember States, and between the EC and multilateral aid organisations, is strong in form but
93 2006 ALL.pdfthe olitical arena, in areas such as multilateralism and global sustainable development, further evidence is
94 2006 ALL.pdf(GMES). Trade policy dialogue This dialogue covers multilateral issues of strategic interest such as the
95 2006 ALL.pdfChina has subscribed to all the major Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) which, with international encouragement
96 2006 ALL.pdfthat signed international treaties on labour and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (ME As) be respected. Future
97 2010 ALL.pdfthe leitmotiv of China’s priorities for receiving multilateral assistance, which over the past 30 years
98 2015 Report on EU-China Relations Committee on Foreign Affairs.pdfChina should play  stronger role in multilateral financial institutions that better reflects the size
99 2015 Report on EU-China Relations Committee on Foreign Affairs.pdfengage as a responsible actor in the multilateral order; encourages the new institution to depart
100 2015 Report on EU-China Relations Committee on Foreign Affairs.pdfthe Chinese Governm nt t  build up new multilateral institutions; urges the EU institutions and Member
101 2015 Report on EU-China Relations Committee on Foreign Affairs.pdfto ILO core labour standards and key Multilateral Environmental Agreements; underlines the increasing tendency of
102 2015 Report on EU-China Relations Committee on Foreign Affairs.pdfinitiative it should be pursued in a multilateral way; believes that it is of the
103 2015 Report on EU-China Relations Committee on Foreign Affairs.pdfand regional conflicts and to attaining a multilateral world order that respects international law, universal
104 2015 Report on EU-China Relations Committee on Foreign Affairs.pdfthe EU should rely on bilateral and multilateral cooperation in order to effectively contribute to
105 2016 ALL 2.pdffor a better global governance based on multilateralism and on international law. Beijing is a
106 2016 ALL 2.pdfis a crucial interlocutor towards a more multilateral and cooperative world order. We see it
107 2016 ALL 2.pdfcooperate towards the same goal, within a multilateral framework, within the international norms and rules,
108 2016 ALL 2.pdfdeepen such cooperation at international level and multilateralism. To do so, it is crucial that
109 2016 ALL 2.pdfinterest in being partners for a strengthened multilateral system. And we cannot be conservative in
110 2016 ALL 2.pdfthat rather than unilateral approaches it is multilateral frameworks we need to strengthen. In a
111 2016 ALL 2.pdfits engagement with China towards a more multilateral and cooperative global order. And I know
112 2016 ALL 2.pdfBut we are those who believe in multilateralism and in a system that recognises the
113 2016 ALL 2.pdfand other tools at both bilateral and multilateral level. The EU should also continue to
114 2016 ALL 2.pdfcrisis settlement (be it locally or in multilateral fora such as the UNSC), building African
115 2016 ALL 2.pdfGLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND WORKING TOGETHER IN THE MULTILATERAL CONTEXT China wants a say in global
116 2016 ALL 2.pdfEU should build on this, while promoting multilateralism and encouraging China to support global standards
117 2016 ALL 2.pdfexperience with China's resources. V.I Promoting effective multilateralism The EU is committed to supporting effective
118 2016 ALL 2.pdfThe EU is committed to supporting effective multilateralism, with the United Nations at its core.
119 2016 ALL 2.pdfare complementary to the existing international institutions.Multilateral decision-making should be inclusive and involve all
120 2016 ALL 2.pdfthe World Trade Organisation (WTO) and in multilateral and plurilateral trade and investment initiatives, assuming
121 2016 ALL 2.pdfin particular the work towards creating a multilateral investment court. Additional areas where the EU
122 2016 ALL 2.pdfChina share a common interest in supporting multilateralism. The EU should work with China towards
123 2016 ALL 2.pdfengage  role in the WTO and in multilateral and plurilateral trade and investment initiatives, assuming
124 2016 ALL 2.pdfcountries. The EU should advance bilateral and multilateral cooperation on development to support the implementation
125 2016 ALL 2.pdfco-ordination, and promote practical engagement both in multilateral fora and on the ground, for example
126 2016 ALL 2.pdfas to strengthen good governance and the multilateral system. In addition, the EU should seek
127 2016 ALL 2.pdfin this field at both bilateral and multilateral level. The environment is now a top
128 2016 ALL 2.pdfaddress global and regional challenges within the multilateral system. 3. The EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda
129 2016 ALL 2.pdfat the World Trade Organisation and in multilateral and plurilateral trade and investment initiatives, assuming
130 2017 combined.pdfon behalf of China to free trade, multilateralism and sustainable development. More than ever, we
131 2017 combined.pdfthe worl  managed to achieve, meaning the multilateral agreements in Paris on climate change and
132 2017 combined.pdfmost powerful forces to push towards a multilateral system, a rules-based global governance, where we
133 2017 combined.pdfcli ate and environment-friendly and social sustainability. 14.Multilateral banks, like the European Investment Bank, the
134 2017 combined.pdfchange, common security threats, the promotion of multilateralism, peacekeeping and peace-building. Comprehensive discussions took place
135 2017 combined.pdfchange, common security threats, the promotion of multilateralism, peacekeeping and peace-building. Comprehensive discussions took place
136 2018 2.pdfaftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, both multilaterally, e.g. in the framework of the G20,
137 2018 2.pdfOrganisation] as the centre of the rules-based multilateral trading system, and commitment to co-operate on
138 2018 2.pdfremains at the centre of the rules-based multilateral trading system which we want to preserve
139 2018 2.pdfchange, common security threats, the promotion of multilateralism, and the promotion of open and fair





141 2018 2.pdfthe era of globalisation and of interdependence, multilateralism must be at the heart of what
142 2018 2.pdfthe bathwater, we must all preserve the multilateral system and improve it from within." President
143 2018 2.pdfrules-based, transparent, non- discriminatory, open and inclusivemultilateral trading system with the WTO as its
144 2018 2.pdfas well as their joint commitment to multilateralism and the rules-based international order with the
145 2018 2.pdfdevelopment. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism and the rules-based international order with the
146 2018 2.pdfthe rules-based, transparent, non-discriminatory, open and inclusivemultilateral trading system with the WTO as its
147 2018 2.pdfon regulatory matters and through coordination in multilateral fora. Similarly, the EU and China will
148 2018 2.pdfMacroeconomic Dialogue as a basis for broader multilateral cooperation and for cooperation on issues related
149 2018 2.pdfan  to work together to reinforce the multilateral humanitarian system and its coordination mechanisms. 35.
150 2018 2.pdfpillars (political, economic and social/cultural), support rules-basedmultilateralism, and develop connectivity cooperation based on the
151 2018 2.pdffree trade and investment,1. and promoting the multilateral rule-based system to allow the full development
152 2018 2.pdfwith shared political will and mutual trust, multilateralism can succeed in building fair and effective
153 2018 2.pdfin the Paris Agreement. Collaborating in Other Multilateral Fora The EU and China emphasize the
154 2018 2.pdfof upfront collaboration and continued cooperation in multilateral energy fora, notably the G20 and the
155 2018 2.pdfan  scientific collaboration, underlining the benefit of multilateral cooperation. They reaffirm their commitment to Mission
156 2018 2.pdfcombine financial sources from international financial institutions,multilateral development banks and the private sector to
157 2018 2.pdfin the wider bilateral relationship, and in multilateral fora– to create synergies and to find
158 2018 2.pdfin finance International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are a central component
159 2018 2.pdfwomen and men, and defending international law, multilateralism, transparency and accountability. 13097/18 FCA/ik 3 ANNEX
160 2018 2.pdfpeople-to-people connections. It should reinforce a rules-based,multilateral international order, delivering quality infrastructure, a level
161 2018 2.pdftheir public and private financial institutions and Multilateral Development Banks. The Council also underscores the
162 2018 2.pdfstrengthening the EU's cooperation and coordination with Multilateral Development Banks, in close collaboration with the
163 2018 2.pdfjobs at risk, the growing distrust in multilateral institutions, undermining the stability of our societies,
164 2018 2.pdfuniversal, rules- based, open, non-discriminatory and equitablemultilateral trading system under the WTO’. As its
165 2018 2.pdfwould be far harder without an effective multilateral trade mechanism. 6. Empowerment of civil society
166 2018 2.pdfcommon security threats and the promotion of multilateralism; whereas there are many areas where constructive
167 2018 2.pdfEU’s ETS; whereas the EU’s vision for multilateral governance is one of a rules- based
168 2018 2.pdfis more important than ever to promote multilateralism and a rules-based system; whereas the EU
169 2018 2.pdf2015; whereas the EU insists on a multilateral governance structure and on non-discriminatory implementation of
170 2018 2.pdfother areas of joint interest while promoting multilateralism and a global governance based on respect
171 2018 2.pdfdefend EU values and principles; stresses that multilateralism is one of the core EU values
172 2018 2.pdfsix overarching challenges of the BRI: a multilateral approach to BRI governance; very little local
173 2018 2.pdfmitigation of climate change, in line with multilateral governance and international standards; 28. Supports the
174 2018 2.pdfby lending its active support to the multilateral rules-based trading system and the WTO; believes,
175 2018 2.pdfnegotiations, while reiterating the need to pursue multilateral solutions; calls, in RR\1158776EN.docx 17/45 PE619.387v02-00 EN
176 2018 2.pdfan  definition of respective industrial standards in multilateral fora; recalls the importance of reducing government
177 2018 2.pdfprotectionist trade measures, and continues to urge multilateral cooperation in order to address the structural
178 2018 2.pdfmitigation of climate change, in line with multilateral governance and international standards; 11. Supports the
179 2018 2.pdfby lending its active support to the multilateral rules-based trading system and the WTO; believes,
180 2018 2.pdfnegotiations, while reiterating the need to pursue multilateral solutions; calls, in this respect, for the
181 2018 2.pdfan  definition of respective industrial standards in multilateral fora; recalls the importance of reducing government
182 2018 2.pdfprotectionist trade measures and continues to urge multilateral cooperation in order to address the structural
183 2019 combined 2.pdftime pursue deeper engagement on global and multilateral issues, including reform of the World Trade
184 2019 combined 2.pdfrules-based, transparent, non- discriminatory, open and inclusivemultilateral trading system with the World Trade Organisation
185 2019 combined 2.pdfwhich can be ecisive for ensuring effective multilateral responses to global challenges. EU-China cooperation has
186 2019 combined 2.pdfII. Cooperating with China to support effective multilateralism and fight climate change The EU is
187 2019 combined 2.pdfsa e time, China's engagement in favour of multilateralism is sometimes selective and based on a
188 2019 combined 2.pdfThe EU is committed to supporting effective multilateralism with the United Nations at its core.
189 2019 combined 2.pdfSecurity Council and a beneficiary of the multilateral system, China has the responsibility to support
190 2019 combined 2.pdfDevelopment Assistance donor and a partner in multilateral fora. In this respect, we should establish
191 2019 combined 2.pdfTrade Organisation is the cornerstone of the multilateral trading system but its rules need to
192 2019 combined 2.pdfand their citizens. The EU will support multilateral efforts, notably in the G20 context, to
193 2019 combined 2.pdfEuropean Union. We pursue strong bilateral and multilateral cooperation on files where we share interests,
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Corpus: Corpus EU PPSP| Search Term: multipolar| Occurrences: 8 (0.28)| Texts: 4/15| 
IndexFile Left Node Right
1 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfnd its political objective of promoting a multipolar world governed by multilateral rules, it has
2 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfEU visibility. China’s geopolitical vision of a multipolar world, and the Chinese perception of the
3 2011 ALL.pdfThis reflects China's interests in supporting global multipolarity and resisting perceived US hegemony
4 2015 Report on EU-China Relations Committee on Foreign Affairs.pdfPartnership, which is so necessary in a multipolar and globalised world, and to speed up
5 2016 ALL 2.pdfas one o  the poles of the multipolar system and of the multipolar order. I
6 2016 ALL 2.pdfof the multipolar system and of the multipolar order. I have the impression sometimes that
7 2016 ALL 2.pdfthat we still have poles in the multipolar system. But we are those who believe
8 2016 ALL 2.pdfas a more balanced partner in a multipolar world, although regional security in the Asia-Pacific




Table Apx 16 Collocations of “China Should” in the Reference of “China Should” in Corpus 
EU PPSP (Full List) 
 
Index Stat (01 - Freq) Collocate Stat Freq (coll.) Freq (corpus)
1 L the 144 144 557
2 L and 122 122 408
3 R to 68 68 268
4 R of 64 64 249
5 R in 62 62 244
6 L a 37 37 155
7 L eu 37 37 130
8 R reference 29 29 68
9 R be 27 27 75
10 L coverage 27 27 78
11 R on 24 24 92
12 L with 24 24 98
13 L for 21 21 71
14 R its 21 21 66
15 L as 20 20 61
16 L that 20 20 54
17 L china 19 19 205
18 L should 17 17 113
19 L global 13 13 45
20 L development 12 12 39
21 R issues 12 12 21
22 L policy 11 11 26
23 L international 10 10 39
24 M • 10 10 17
25 R at 9 9 22
26 R by 9 9 45
27 L economic 9 9 39
28 R economy 9 9 19
29 L from 9 9 34
30 L more 9 9 33
31 L world 9 9 22
32 R co-operation 8 8 26
33 R key 8 8 15
34 R work 8 8 19
35 L all 7 7 21
36 L an 7 7 26
37 L chinese 7 7 27
38 R cooperation 7 7 31
39 L dialogue 7 7 12
40 L eu's 7 7 14
41 L investment 7 7 26
42 L is 7 7 69
43 R open 7 7 17
44 R sustainable 7 7 22
45 L trade 7 7 28
46 L 4 6 6 13
47 L approach 6 6 11
48 L engagement 6 6 14
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Corpus: Corpus 2| Search Term: China should| Statistic: 01 - Freq| Span: 20-20| 
Collocation freq. threshold: 5.0| Statistic value threshold: 5.0| 
CPN: 01 - Freq (5.0)/ L20-R20/ C: 5.0-NC: 5.0| 
49 L europe 6 6 24
50 L human 6 6 24
51 R including 6 6 12
52 L interests 6 6 13
53 R new 6 6 14
54 L other 6 6 25
55 M reform 6 6 15
56 R take 6 6 6
57 R together 6 6 11
58 R wto 6 6 21
59 L 6 6 13
60 L 2 5 5 20
61 R 5 5 5 8
62 R also 5 5 26
63 L climate 5 5 12
64 R ensure 5 5 12
65 R fair 5 5 7
66 L it 5 5 32
67 R markets 5 5 11
68 R migration 5 5 8
69 L order 5 5 15
70 R own 5 5 6
71 R security 5 5 19
72 R strengthen 5 5 7
73 R support 5 5 21
74 R these 5 5 10
75 R towards 5 5 15








Index Stat (01 - Freq) Collocate Stat Freq (coll.) Freq (corpus)
1 L eu 37 37 130
2 R reference 29 29 68
3 L coverage 27 27 78
4 L china 19 19 205
5 L should 17 17 113
6 L global 13 13 45
7 L development 12 12 39
8 R issues 12 12 21
9 L policy 11 11 26
10 L international 10 10 39
11 L economic 9 9 39
12 R economy 9 9 19
13 L world 9 9 22
14 R co-operation 8 8 26
15 R key 8 8 15
16 R work 8 8 19
17 L chinese 7 7 27
18 R cooperation 7 7 31
19 L dialogue 7 7 12
20 L eu's 7 7 14
21 L investment 7 7 26
22 R open 7 7 17
23 R sustainable 7 7 22
24 L trade 7 7 28
25 L approach 6 6 11
26 L engagement 6 6 14
27 L europe 6 6 24
28 L human 6 6 24
29 R including 6 6 12
30 L interests 6 6 13
31 R new 6 6 14
32 M reform 6 6 15
33 R take 6 6 6
34 R together 6 6 11
35 R wto 6 6 21
36 L climate 5 5 12
37 R ensure 5 5 12
38 R fair 5 5 7
39 R markets 5 5 11
40 R migration 5 5 8
41 L order 5 5 15
42 R security 5 5 19
43 R strengthen 5 5 7
44 R support 5 5 21
45 R values 5 5 7
Table Apx 17 Collocations of "China Should" in the Reference of 
"China Should" in Corpus EU PPSP (Revised List) 
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              Table Apx 18 Concordance of “need to” (要) in Corpus China PPSP 
 
Index File Left Node
1 1994.pdf 和 技术转让 的 重点 可 持续发展 不仅 要
2 1994.pdf 之三 十六 下 降到 百分之 二十三 最终 要
3 1998.pdf 新月 月异 经济 全球化 趋势 不断发展 各国人民 要
4 1998.pdf 扩大 共同利益 的 汇合 点 总之 我们 要
5 1998.pdf 物价 稳定 和 人民币 汇率 稳定 我们 要
6 1998.pdf 贸易 提 高 利用外资 的 水平 我们 要
7 2001.pdf 贫富差距 和 数字 鸿沟 拉大 亚欧 国家 要
8 2001.pdf 存在 巨大 潜力 和 广阔 前景 我们 要
9 2002.pdf 也 有利于 维护 世界和平 促进 共同发展 我们 要
10 2004.pdf 突出 面对 新的 机遇 和 挑战 我们 要
11 2004.pdf 会议 更 紧密 经济 伙伴关系 宣言 我们 要
12 2004.pdf 继续 致力于 消除 贸 壁垒 改善 投资环境 要
13 2008.pdf 促进 世界经济 增长 的 重要 力量 我们 要
14 2008.pdf 公正 有效 的 国际 金融体系 我 认为一 要
15 2008.pdf 合理 的 全球 金融 救助 机制 我们 要
16 2008.pdf 是 金融 创新 与 金融监管 的 关系 要
17 2008.pdf 虚拟 经济 与 实体 经济 的 关系 要
18 2008.pdf 一个 大陆 的 亚欧 国家 更是如此 我们 要
19 2008.pdf 在 当前 金融 危机 的 形势 下 要
20 2008.pdf 创造 良好条件 坚持 以人为本 推动 可 持续发展 要
21 2008.pdf 的理 念 维护 粮食安全 促进 救灾 合作 要
22 2008.pdf 才能 富强 亚欧 大陆 才能 兴旺 我们 要
23 2008.pdf 就 是 政治 互信 和 互利 合作 要
24 2009.pdf 提高 业务水平 但更 重要 的是 媒体 记者 要
25 2009.pdf 单方面 强调 自己 的 感受 想法 也 要
26 2009.pdf 应 成为 全球 新秩序 的 支柱 之一 要
27 2009.pdf 其美 美人 之美 意思 是说 人们 不仅 要
28 2009.pdf 中国驻 欧盟 使 团团长 宋哲 日前 表示 要
29 2009.pdf 加 强 合作 伙伴 关 系指 中欧 要
30 2009.pdf 仍然 大成 就 是 一个 发展中 国家 要
31 2010.pdf 欧洲 一体化 进程 高度重视 对欧 关系 中欧 要
32 2010.pdf 新的 内涵 和 体现 一方面 我们 强调 要
33 2010.pdf 监督权 还 有 一方面 我们 在 国际上 要
34 2010.pdf 摩擦 双 方应 保持 理智 的 心态 要
35 2010.pdf 中欧 关系 的 发展 发挥 独特 的重 要
36 2010.pdf 习近平 当日 在 欧洲 学院 发表 了重 要
37 2010.pdf 将为 世界 带来 新的 发展 机遇 中欧 要
38 2010.pdf 的 空间 和 前景 更加 广阔 我们 要
39 2010.pdf 的 成果 促进 世界 经济稳定 复苏 同时 要
40 2010.pdf 的 结果 共同 应对 重大 全球性 挑战 要
41 2010.pdf 环保 领域 合作 推动 发展 绿色 经济 要
42 2010.pdf 各国 特别 是 发展中 国家 的 能源需求 要
43 2010.pdf 促进了 欧亚 文 明的 共同 繁荣 进步 要
44 2010.pdf 在 世界经济 复苏 的 道路 上 我们 要
45 2010.pdf 其 最初 的 目的 之一 也 正是 要
46 2010.pdf 还 有 １ 亿 .5 贫困人口 中国 要
47 2011.pdf 存在 一些 疑虑 和 担忧 宋哲 认为 要
48 2011.pdf 努力 把握 好 以 下 六点一 登高望远 要
49 2012.pdf 问题 的 努力 欧 洲 有关 国家 要
50 2012.pdf 握住 世界 科技 和 产业革命 的 脉动 要
51 2012.pdf 起来 实现 共赢 科技 创新 没有 国界 要
52 2012.pdf 包容 有序 的 国际 经济秩序 依然 任重道远 要
53 2013.pdf 做出 更 贡献 习近平 强调 中欧 双方 要
54 2013.pdf 世界 和 地区 安全 与 稳定 双方 要
55 2013.pdf 宏伟蓝图 下一个 十年 在 政治 领域 双方 要
56 2013.pdf 下一个 十年 的 合作 绘制 宏伟蓝图 双方 要
57 2013.pdf 三个 目标 努力一 是 做到 相互支持 中欧 要
58 2013.pdf 欧中 关系 发展 带来 新的 机遇 双方 要
59 2014.pdf 当前 中欧 关系 和 今年 双边 重 要
60 2014.pdf 最 鲜明 的 特色 是 改革开放 中国 要
61 2014.pdf 和 世界各国 一道 证明 国强 并不 必然 要
62 2014.pdf 出席 还将 在 欧洲 学院 发表 重 要
63 2014.pdf 中欧 关系 合作 共赢 赢是 关键 双方 要
64 2014.pdf 高端 的多 引擎 合 作 中欧 双方 要
65 2014.pdf 共赢 理念 贯穿 中欧 合作 始终 双方 要
66 2014.pdf 中欧 战略 合作 前景 广阔 新形势下 我们 要
67 2014.pdf 多极世界 格局 具有 重要 战略 共识 双方 要
68 2014.pdf 要做 增长 伙伴 相互 提供 发展 机遇 要
69 2014.pdf 大市场 为 目标 加强 基础设施 来 互联互通 要
70 2014.pdf 具有 文明 属性 和 历史 纵深 双方 要
71 2014.pdf 全面 战略 伙伴关系 实现 首个 十年 的重 要
72 2014.pdf 推动 二 十国集团 作为 国际经济 合 作主 要
73 2014.pdf 国家 发展 道路 形成了 中国特色 社会主义 提出 要
74 2014.pdf 行健 君子 以 自强不息 的 思想 强调 要
75 2014.pdf 架起 一座 友谊 和 合作 之桥 我们 要
76 2014.pdf 的 中欧 全面 战略 伙 关系-- 我们 要
77 2014.pdf 安理会 拥有 3 个 常任 理事国 席位 要
78 2014.pdf 常任 理事国 席位 要 和平 不要 战争 要
79 2014.pdf 和平 不要 战争 要 多边 不要 单边 要
80 2014.pdf 和平 发展 合作 共赢 赢的 道路-- 我们 要
81 2014.pdf 世界 最 重要 的 两大 经济体 我们 要
82 2014.pdf 来 为 世界经济 增长 的双 引擎-- 我们 要
83 2014.pdf 自身 改革 带动 世界 发展 进步-- 我们 要
84 2014.pdf 同 而 欧盟 强调 多元 一体 中欧 要
85 2014.pdf 盗等 等问 题上 进行了 有效 合作 我们 要
86 2014.pdf 国内 生产总值 达到 16.7 万亿 美元 中欧 要
87 2014.pdf 代表 几千年 来 相互促进 相映 生辉 我们 要
88 2014.pdf 未有 未有 智者 求同 愚者 求异 中欧 要
89 2014.pdf 有 制度 安排 这个 软件 支撑 我们 要
90 2014.pdf 动 2020 战略规划 中欧 合作 迈上 新台阶 要
91 2015.pdf 必须 加以 珍惜 维护 另 一方面 我们 要
92 2015.pdf 方 达成 重要 共识 中欧 两大 力量 要
93 2015.pdf 协定 所有 要素 内容 的 重要性 包括 要
94 2015.pdf 缅怀 先烈 珍视 和平 开创 未来 中欧 要
95 2017.pdf 也会 带来 这样 那样 的 问题 我们 要
96 2017.pdf 正确看待 相互竞争 有 市场 就会 有 竞争 要
97 2017.pdf 符合事实 只会 误导 认知 贻误 合作 机遇 要
98 2017.pdf 欧盟 作为 世界上 的 两支 重要 力量 要
99 2017.pdf 世界 贸易组织 的 重要 成员 中欧 双方 要
100 2018 combined.pdf倡 对 外 转嫁 矛盾 更不 得人心 要
101 2018 combined.pdf共享 应 坚持以 秩序 规则 为 基础 要
102 2018 combined.pdf开放 透明 包容 共建 一带 一路 当然 要
103 2018 combined.pdf成果 文 件也 也都 明确提出 开展 合作 要
104 2018 combined.pdf需求 相结合 共同 开展 具体 项目 合作 要
105 2019 combined new.pdf发展 机遇 共同利益 远 远大于 分歧 双方 要
106 2019 combined new.pdf势头 推动 它 不断 迈上 新台阶 我们 要
107 2019 combined new.pdf习近平 主席 访问 欧洲 期间 中欧 双方同意 要
108 2019 combined new.pdf外长 会议 上 指出 践行 多边 主义 要
全面落实 中欧 合作 战略规划 打造 和平 增长
坚持以 维护和平 促进 发展为 目标 多边 主义
捍卫 联合国 宪章 的 宗旨 和 原则
遵循 国际 规则 和 市场规律 也 追求
遵守 欧盟 法规 欧盟 代表 也 多次
合作 形成 争取 早 落地 早 实施
不断 拓展 深化 战略 合作 并 本着
努力 增进 中欧 之间 的 政治 互信
正视 这些 问题 采取措施 加以解决 减少 负面影响
抛弃 所谓 一国 成功 必然 意 味着
鼓励 良性 竞争 而非 恶性竞争 良性 竞争
肩负 维护 世界 和 平 促进 共同发展
高举 维护 贸易 自由化 和 投资 便利
实现 世界 的 持续 和平 与 共同发展
高举 贸 易 投资 自由化 便利 化的
全面落实 好 中欧 合作 加紧 推动 投资
平衡 推进 亚欧 三大 支柱 领域 合作
共建 和平 增长 改革 文明 四大 伙伴关系
确保 世界 贸易组织 第十 次 部长级 会议
共同 推动 国 社会 捍卫 二战 胜利
建设 文明 共荣 荣之 之桥 把 中欧
共同努力 促进 人类 各种 文明 之花 竞相
携起手来 同 全世界 所有 爱好和平 的 人们
共同 坚持 互利 共赢 坚持 市场 开放
共同 坚持 文明 多样性 引领 文明 互容
本着 相互尊重 平等 相待 求同存异 合作 共赢
和平 不要 战争 要 多边 不要 单边
多边 不要 单边 要 对话 不要 对抗
对话 不要 对抗 是 双方 的 共识
建设 增长 繁荣 之桥 把 中欧 两
共同 坚持 市场 开放 加快 投资 协定
建设 改革 进步 之桥 把 中欧 两大
发展 中国 与 欧盟 以 年度 领导人
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坚持 市场 开放 携手 维护 多边 贸易
通过 平等 对话 交流 增进 相互了解 加强
交往 交换 看法 杨 大使 表示 中
实现 现代化 目标 需要 通过 争 和平
称霸 中国 和 欧盟 作为 最大 的
演讲 中 方 期待 同欧 欧方 领导人
牢牢 把握 中国 发展 和 欧洲经济 复苏
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加大 交流 不断 增进 战略 互信 与
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推动 中 欧美 关系 稳步 健康发展 要使
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消除 技术 贸易壁垒 健全 知识产权 保 护
深入 推进 国际 金融体系 改革 当务之急 是
树立 和 落实 互利 合作 多元 发展
携手 打击 恐怖 主义 和 海盗 袭击
充分 尊重 文明 和 宗教信仰 的 多样性
和衷共济 携 手 并进 让我们 共同努力 开创
有效 防范一 国家 的 崛起 打破 均势
达到 欧洲 的 水平 发展 道路 还很
作用 张立 荣 表示 欧洲 学院 选择
演讲 并 成功 结束 访欧 之行 习近平
建设 改革 进步 之桥 把 中欧 两大
把握 机遇 顺应 形 势 从 战略
着眼 长远 推动 经济 结构性 改革 逐步
坚持 共同 但 有 区别 的 责任
相互尊重 平等互利 照 顾 彼此 重大 关切
解决 好 中国 国内 的 问题 实现
相向 而行 加强 政治 对话 增进 战略
实现 人与 与自 然的 和谐 相处 减少
推动 建设 和谐 世界 中国 是 24
着眼于 立足于 整体 追求 系统 整体 的
相互促进 战略性 就 是 双方 要从 全局
走入 对 方 社会 同 各界人士 进行
更多 地 了解 对方 的 情况 聆听
着眼 有益 于欧 系 欧中 关系 发展
懂得 欣赏 自己 创造 的美 还要 会
实现 中欧 关系 长期 健康 稳定发展 须
始终 重视 实体 经济 的 发展 使
坚持 对话 合作 互利 共赢 赢的 正确方向
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坚持 相互尊重 平等互利 互不 干涉内政 的 原则
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懂得 欣赏 自己 创造 的美 还要 会
实现 中欧 关系 长期 健康 稳定发展 须
始终 重视 实体 经济 的 发展 使
坚持 对话 合作 互利 共赢 赢的 正确方向
特别 防止 贸易 和 投资 保护主义 亚欧
积极 推进 国际 发展 合作 加大 减贫
高度重视 农业 发展 将 粮食安全 放在 发展
继承 和 发扬 亚欧 文化交流 的 传统
充分 利用 亚欧 会议 现有 对 话
充分发挥 亚欧 工商 论坛 作用 加强 政府
齐心协力 向 世界 展示 信心 团结 与
增加 发展中 国家 在 国际金融 组织 中的
认真吸取 金融危机 的 教训 处 理好 三个
根据需要 和 可能 稳步 推进 金融 创新
适当 扩大 国内 需求 充分发挥 国内 市场潜力
加大 改革 力度 加快 建立 社会主义 市场
顺应 世界 发展 的 潮流 积极 应对
加强对 国际 和 地区 问题 以及 联合国
采取 更 实质性 的 步骤 携手 共创
坚持 相互尊重 平等互利 互不 干涉内政 的 原则
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考虑 当前 发展 的 需要 也 应为
降到 发展中 国家 的 一般 水 平
和平 谋 稳定 促 合作 求发展 的呼
面向 未来 建立 和 发展 跨世纪 的
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9 1994 Towards a new asian stratey.pdfon the environment with countries in Asia need to be reinforced. Strong relations already exist with
10 1995 a long term policy.pdfand Macau each have distinctive characteristics which need to be respected. Both territories already run their
11 1995 a long term policy.pdfscourg  for millions of Chinese and the need to feed such a huge population is at
12 1995 a long term policy.pdflack of appropriate skills in China. We need to identify a coherent European contribution in education
13 1995 a long term policy.pdfpolicy-making and programme development, to China. We need to identify partners in other provinces for initiatives
14 1995 a long term policy.pdfenvironmental stan ards. Of critical importance is the need to integrate environmental considerations into other areas of
15 1995 a long term policy.pdfEU can best help Chinese efforts. We need to identify a coherent European contribution in a
16 1995 a long term policy.pdfto the development of local economies. Initiatives need to be in tune with the needs
17 1995 a long term policy.pdfon Chinese studies in Europe. We also need to review the usefulness of European Documentation Centres
18 1998 building a comprehensive partnerhisp with china.pdfrapid econ ic growth, far-reaching reforms and the need to preserve social cohesion. This process has potential
19 1998 building a comprehensive partnerhisp with china.pdfgoal to be achieved, sustained fforts still need to
20 1998 building a comprehensive partnerhisp with china.pdfaccession negotiations. The Commission and Member States need to
21 1998 building a comprehensive partnerhisp with china.pdfth s Communication i  that EU-funded cooperation programmes need to
22 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdfto “one Chi a” principle, underlini g the need to
23 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdfground. Th  EU has repeat dly e phasised the need to
24 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdfthis Co munica ion is that EU-funded o- peration programmes need to
25 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdfno  a source of confronta ion, and will need to
26 2000 on the Implementation of the Communication.pdfchall nges Chi a faces, t  ission will also need to
27 2001 ALL.pdfgovernment reform should continue. The government will need to
28 2001 ALL.pdfeconomy and the rule of law will need to
29 2001 ALL.pdfcriminal law where reforms are pending. The need to
30 2001 ALL.pdfChina provide the best evidence of the need to
31 2001 ALL.pdfEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the need to
32 2001 ALL.pdfChina provide the best evidence of the need to
33 2001 ALL.pdfaroun  large-scale national initiatives. These programmes will need to
34 2001 ALL.pdfhave been significant developments in China which need to
35 2001 ALL.pdfstronger, reflecting a mutual recognition of the need to
36 2001 ALL.pdfProdi and Prime Minister Zhu on the need to
37 2001 ALL.pdfpollution and climate change. Having detected the need to
38 2001 ALL.pdfthe size of the country and the need to
39 2001 ALL.pdfregion over the previous decades, and the need to
40 2001 ALL.pdfbetween India and Pakistan (and the imperative need to
41 2001 ALL.pdfglobal partnerships, as well as to the need to
42 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfChina, and in global affairs– create the need to
43 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfdevelopment, and evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), need to
44 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfChina policy. China, on its side, will need to
45 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfat the U ited Nations, while stressing the need to
46 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfweighed down in the short-term by the need to
47 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfand in the long t m by the need to
48 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfdialogue across the board has shown the need to
49 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfto be addressed, and there is a need to
50 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfthe medium to long-term perspective. • The need to
51 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfto maximise proj ct im act, and • The need to
52 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfThe Governme t i  increasingly conscious of the need to
53 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfhad he same effect. New development concepts need to
54 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfimproved significantly and efforts in this regard need to
55 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfbe cont ued. However, there is also a need to
56 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfinvested in environmental improvement but the resources need to
57 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfWe should also take account of the need to
58 2003 a maturing partnership.pdfneed for a focus d a proach, and the need to
59 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfto be ddressed, and there is a need to
60 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfthe med um to long-term perspective. • The need to
61 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfto maximise proj ct impact, and • The need to
62 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfThe Government is increasingly conscious of the need to
63 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfhad the same effect. New development concepts need to
64 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfimproved s gnificantly and efforts in this regard need to
65 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfbe continued. Howeve , ther is also a need to
66 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfinvested in environmental i provement but the resources need to
67 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfWe shoul  also take account of the need to
68 2004 national indicative programme 2005-2006 china.pdfneed for a focus d approach, and the need to
69 2006 ALL.pdfincluding climate change, employment, migration, security– we need to
70 2006 ALL.pdfsides’ interests and the EU and China need to
71 2006 ALL.pdfchallenges. For growth to continue, China will need to
72 2006 ALL.pdfIn order to succeed, EU operators will need to
73 2006 ALL.pdfraw materials and energy, illegal logging, China’s need to
74 2006 ALL.pdfbest be achieved through capacity-building, where China's need to
75 2006 ALL.pdfsocial safety nets, and there is a need to
76 2006 ALL.pdf11th Five Year Plan, which acknowledges the need to
77 2006 ALL.pdfsolidly on mutual gains, there is a need to
78 2006 ALL.pdfNovember 2006 in Brussels. Civil aviation The need to
79 2006 ALL.pdfas key global economic players and the need to
80 2006 ALL.pdfa level playing field in business taxation need to
81 2006 ALL.pdfcertain operational deficiencies requiring rectification: a) judges need to
82 2010 ALL.pdfareas of the CSP and affirmed the need to
83 2010 ALL.pdfof DCI and ALA projects include the need to
84 2010 ALL.pdfwages. Debates have been aired on the need to
85 2010 ALL.pdfissues, including environmental issues and gender equality, need to
86 2010 ALL.pdfConcentration– Projects under the current CSP projects need to
87 2010 ALL.pdfof decisions. iii) Expected results Recalling the need to
88 2012 ALL.pdfinternal macroeconomic imbalances within the euro zone need to
89 2012 ALL.pdfus. We have also learned that we need to
90 2012 ALL.pdfWith Premier Wen we agreed on the need to
91 2012 ALL.pdfIn this context I will stress the need to
92 2012 ALL.pdfarea into the world economy, and the need to
93 2012 ALL.pdfwe must not lose from sight the need to
94 2012 ALL.pdfthe global economy, and all leading economies need to
95 2012 ALL.pdfboth face in the medium term. We need to
96 2015 Report on EU-China Relations Committee on Foreign Affairs.pdfinfras ructure investm nts i  Europe, and u derlines the need to
97 2015 Report on EU-China Relations Committee on Foreign Affairs.pdfand US-China clim te change state ents; stresses the need to
98 2016 ALL 2.pdfand opportunities, it is clear that we need to
99 2016 ALL 2.pdfengine o  development and resilience. But we need to
100 2016 ALL 2.pdfit was also implemented. So we only need to
101 2016 ALL 2.pdfwhy our European Union insists on the need to
102 2016 ALL 2.pdfunilateral approaches it is multilateral frameworks we need to
103 2016 ALL 2.pdfand other kinds of infrastructure. China will need to
104 2016 ALL 2.pdfof the global economic crisis demonstrates the need to
105 2016 ALL 2.pdfStates are made aware when EU interests need to
106 2016 ALL 2.pdfStates are made aware when EU interests need to
107 2017 combined.pdfof global issues where we see the need to
108 2017 combined.pdfguara tee the world order is sustained: the need to
109 2017 combined.pdfthe Paris climate change agreement; and the need to
110 2017 combined.pdfa third lement: we both recognise the need to
111 2017 combined.pdfin world affairs. The second, is the need to
112 2017 combined.pdfwhere conflicts arise. In other cases, we need to
113 2017 combined.pdfother partners in the world. And we need to
114 2017 combined.pdfparts of the world. And we also need to
115 2017 combined.pdfor within Asia than towards Europe. We need to
116 2017 combined.pdfmove in the world as today. We need to
117 2017 combined.pdfIn order to promote productive investment we need to
118 2017 combined.pdfthe risk of misappropriation of funds. We need to
119 2017 combined.pdflending isciplines. At the same time, we need to
120 2017 combined.pdfbusiness— and for their daily lives— people need to
121 2017 combined.pdfbusiness— and for their daily lives— people need to
122 2018 2.pdffacts are well known and do not need to
123 2018 2.pdfjoint projects in this field. We will need to
124 2018 2.pdfcomprehensive responses to displacement and recognise the need to
125 2018 2.pdfThe impact of climate change and the need to
126 2018 2.pdfFiscal and financial sustainability of infrastructure projects need to
127 2018 2.pdfan  create growth and jobs, connectivity investments need to
128 2018 2.pdfcompetitive neutrality of this rail connection would need to
129 2018 2.pdfcrowding in more private investment, stressing the need to
130 2018 2.pdfto their swift implementation. It underscores the need to
131 2018 2.pdfin this regard. It also underscores the need to
132 2018 2.pdfof energy connectivity, the Council highlights the need to
133 2018 2.pdftra e and investment agreements. It underlines the need to
134 2018 2.pdfPlan of Action on Iran. We also need to
135 2018 2.pdfan  opportunities posed by migration, and the need to
136 2018 2.pdfthe security environment in our regions, the need to
137 2018 2.pdfthere are issues of corruption here, these need to
138 2018 2.pdfan  the EU’s proposed trans- port corridors need to
139 2018 2.pdfglobal infrastructure, and finds that all SDGs need to
140 2018 2.pdfto be beneficial to both sides, they need to
141 2018 2.pdfmarine resources). 5.4.1. Many other SDGs also need to
142 2018 2.pdfpolicy and that EU public diplomacy efforts need to
143 2018 2.pdfbe resolved through negotiations, while reiterating the need to
144 2018 2.pdfChina 2025’ strategy, in view of the need to
145 2018 2.pdfPRC as the chief concern; reiterates the need to
146 2018 2.pdfeffective progress to this end; reiterates the need to
147 2018 2.pdfdoes not finance armed conflict; emphasises the need to
148 2018 2.pdfbe resolved through negotiations, while reiterating the need to
149 2018 2.pdfChina 2025’ strategy, in view of the need to
150 2018 2.pdfPRC as the chief concern; reiterates the need to
151 2018 2.pdfeffective progress to this end; reiterates the need to
152 2018 2.pdfdoes not finance armed conflict; emphasises the need to
153 2019 combined 2.pdfbe ho st with each other when we need to
154 2019 combined 2.pdfwe ca  o a lot better. We need to
155 2019 combined 2.pdfin third countries. There is a real need to
156 2019 combined 2.pdfthe clean energy transition, with whom we need to
157 2019 combined 2.pdfthe multilateral trading system but its rules need to
158 2019 combined 2.pdfwill e ssential for our future and need to
159 2019 combined 2.pdfbe ho st with each other when we need to
160 2019 combined 2.pdfwe ca  o a lot better. We need to
161 2019 combined 2.pdfimplementation of decisions taken and stressed the need to
be modernised and some gaps must be
be fully secure. 5G networks will provide
be or when progress is slower than
find a better balance and level of
step up common work on the joint
Right
cooperate further in the field of SPS
prevent conflict minerals from being processed in
be or when progress is slower than
find a better balance and level of
partner up and deliver the significant resources
continue developing a strong relationship, given the
ensure protection for the European knowledge-based economy;
cooperate further in the field of sanitary
prevent conflict minerals from being processed in
pursue multilateral solutions; calls, in this respect,
restructure our production sectors towards intelligent manufacturing,
ensure protection for the European knowledge-based economy;
be taken into consideration in the context
deliver mutual benefit and to be transparent,
be taken into account, notably Goal 5
be strengthened in the light of this
pursue multilateral solutions; calls, in RR\1158776EN.docx 17/45
restructure our production sectors towards intelligent manufacturing,
pursue better possibilities to allow business to
be determined in promoting and protecting key
work together in forging an effective global
uphold international law, the global non-proliferation regime
be tackled directly. 4.4.4. The EESC is
become fully aligned, not least where possible
ensure market efficiency and be fiscally viable.
be addressed. The EU is supporting the
make the most of existing instruments, starting
increase transport security and customs cooperation. Transport
move towards the long-term decarbonisation in air
address climate change, in line with the
be able to access free and independent
be repeated here. As was to be
create synergies between the China's Belt and
develop tools and institutional structures accordingly. The
speed up a global transition to low-carbon
be ensured to avoid the risk of
realise that this is a global phenomenon.
understand the scale, the magnitude of the
think holistically and take into account inter-continental
apply global standard lending disciplines. At the
bring in other financial institutions and a
be able to access free and independent
work on the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
support the WTO [World Trade Organisation] and
look for win-win solutions. And the third,
expand and enlarge the current system of
work on de-radicalisation of young people especially,
work seriously on cutting the financing of
fulfil its declared aim of making its
work effectively with emerging market economies to
be safeguarded. The Commission and the EEAS
be safeguarded. Annual EU-China summits and high-level
work closely together to guarantee the world
implement the Paris climate change agreement; and
cooperate in the field of energy in
engage with the world. But this does
keep in mind that resilience is not
strengthen and deepen such cooperation at international
address all maritime disputes in a peaceful
strengthen. In a more global and contested
implement the decisions taken last year in
make progress in the Middle East Peace
secure growth and job creation. Indeed, fiscal
contribute to redressing these. As the Confucian
work ever more closely together on a
cooperate with China and other countries in
be mainstreamed in the implementation of the
be streamlined, moving away from covering different
keep the design simple and focused, a
be addressed in order to guarantee financial
address together global challenges, if we want
promote more investment in both directions. But
further enhance bilateral economic relations, the European
be ensured in both the Chinese and
be better trained, b) costly evidence to
fine-tune the MIP in line with China’s
(a) align interventions closely with China’s own
increase domestic consumption, with the expectation that
improve environmental protection and statistics. When it
innovate in order to attain sustainable development
provide improved social protection in the form
address these issues, but at the same
look beyond the time when development co-operation
develop a new framework for China-EU civil
focus on a very limited number of
maximise programme impact. In response, I and
leverage the potential of a dynamic relationship
work together as they assume more active
maintain the momentum of domestic reform and
develop a more thorough knowledge of the
assist China to develop a regional Asian
involve civil society in the process of
be developed which take account of externalities,
be continued. However, there is also a
develop new policies and instruments to deal
be used more efficiently and effectively. Government
develop new policies and instruments to deal
be used more efficiently and effectively. Government
focus on a very limited number of
maximise programme impact. In response, I and
work towards balanced regional economic growth. An
develop a clearly targeted action. To this
work towards balanced regional economic growth. An
develop a clearly targeted action. To this
assist China to develop a regional Asian
involve civil society in the process of
be developed which take account of externalities,
be continued. However, there is also a
be addressed. Moreover, the sluggish state of
ensure that all branches and levels of
safeguard the human rights of ethnic minorities
maintain economic stimulus and in the long
improve social welfare. Economic and trade relations
streamline and further develop the current institutional
care for the natural environment in order
reach people at the regional, municipal and
ensure an effective and proactive EU presence
encourage progress towards nuclear disarmament, and the
further strengthen our relations with key ASEAN
take the partnership forward. In the EU,
ensure compliance of the Chinese legislation with
reconcile economic growth with overall sustainable development
fit into a clear national strategy, and
be taken account of in re-focusing EU
clarify differences and identify ways of moving
strengthen co-operation in this area, not least
involve members of the European business community
define further those areas that can benefit
change to meet the demands of the
be strengthened.⇤The government sees strengthening discipline among
establish a comprehensive legal framework is now
reconcile economic growth with overall sustainable development.
be made by China to respect the
be fully updated at all stages on
be even more closely linked with the
resolve the question of Taiwan peacefully through
make the dialogue more results-oriented and better
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85 2010 ALL.pdfissues, including environmental issues and gender equality, need to
86 2010 ALL.pdfConcentration– Projects under the current CSP projects need to
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121 2017 combined.pdfbusiness— and for their daily lives— people need to
122 2018 2.pdffacts are well known and do not need to
123 2018 2.pdfjoint projects in this field. We will need to
124 2018 2.pdfcomprehensive responses to displacement and recognise the need to
125 2018 2.pdfThe impact of climate change and the need to
126 2018 2.pdfFiscal and financial sustainability of infrastructure projects need to
127 2018 2.pdfan  create growth and jobs, connectivity investments need to
128 2018 2.pdfcompetitive neutrality of this rail connection would need to
129 2018 2.pdfcrowding in more private investment, stressing the need to
130 2018 2.pdfto their swift implementation. It underscores the need to
131 2018 2.pdfin this regard. It also underscores the need to
132 2018 2.pdfof energy connectivity, the Council highlights the need to
133 2018 2.pdftra e and investment agreements. It underlines the need to
134 2018 2.pdfPlan of Action on Iran. We also need to
135 2018 2.pdfan  opportunities posed by migration, and the need to
136 2018 2.pdfthe security environment in our regions, the need to
137 2018 2.pdfthere are issues of corruption here, these need to
138 2018 2.pdfan  the EU’s proposed trans- port corridors need to
139 2018 2.pdfglobal infrastructure, and finds that all SDGs need to
140 2018 2.pdfto be beneficial to both sides, they need to
141 2018 2.pdfmarine resources). 5.4.1. Many other SDGs also need to
142 2018 2.pdfpolicy and that EU public diplomacy efforts need to
143 2018 2.pdfbe resolved through negotiations, while reiterating the need to
144 2018 2.pdfChina 2025’ strategy, in view of the need to
145 2018 2.pdfPRC as the chief concern; reiterates the need to
146 2018 2.pdfeffective progress to this end; reiterates the need to
147 2018 2.pdfdoes not finance armed conflict; emphasises the need to
148 2018 2.pdfbe resolved through negotiations, while reiterating the need to
149 2018 2.pdfChina 2025’ strategy, in view of the need to
150 2018 2.pdfPRC as the chief concern; reiterates the need to
151 2018 2.pdfeffective progress to this end; reiterates the need to
152 2018 2.pdfdoes not finance armed conflict; emphasises the need to
153 2019 combined 2.pdfbe ho st with each other when we need to
154 2019 combined 2.pdfwe ca  o a lot better. We need to
155 2019 combined 2.pdfin third countries. There is a real need to
156 2019 combined 2.pdfthe clean energy transition, with whom we need to
157 2019 combined 2.pdfthe multilateral trading system but its rules need to
158 2019 combined 2.pdfwill e ssential for our future and need to
159 2019 combined 2.pdfbe ho st with each other when we need to
160 2019 combined 2.pdfwe ca  o a lot better. We need to
161 2019 combined 2.pdfimplementation of decisions taken and stressed the need to
be modernised and some gaps must be
be fully secure. 5G networks will provide
be or when progress is slower than
find a better balance and level of
step up common work on the joint
Right
cooperate further in the field of SPS
prevent conflict minerals from being processed in
be or when progress is slower than
find a better balance and level of
partner up and deliver the significant resources
continue developing a strong relationship, given the
ensure protection for the European knowledge-based economy;
cooperate further in the field of sanitary
prevent conflict minerals from being processed in
pursue multilateral solutions; calls, in this respect,
restructure our production sectors towards intelligent manufacturing,
ensure protection for the European knowledge-based economy;
be taken into consideration in the context
deliver mutual benefit and to be transparent,
be taken into account, notably Goal 5
be strengthened in the light of this
pursue multilateral solutions; calls, in RR\1158776EN.docx 17/45
restructure our production sectors towards intelligent manufacturing,
pursue better possibilities to allow business to
be determined in promoting and protecting key
work together in forging an effective global
uphold international law, the global non-proliferation regime
be tackled directly. 4.4.4. The EESC is
become fully aligned, not least where possible
ensure market efficiency and be fiscally viable.
be addressed. The EU is supporting the
make the most of existing instruments, starting
increase transport security and customs cooperation. Transport
move towards the long-term decarbonisation in air
address climate change, in line with the
be able to access free and independent
be repeated here. As was to be
create synergies between the China's Belt and
develop tools and institutional structures accordingly. The
speed up a global transition to low-carbon
be ensured to avoid the risk of
realise that this is a global phenomenon.
understand the scale, the magnitude of the
think holistically and take into account inter-continental
apply global standard lending disciplines. At the
bring in other financial institutions and a
be able to access free and independent
work on the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
support the WTO [World Trade Organisation] and
look for win-win solutions. And the third,
expand and enlarge the current system of
work on de-radicalisation of young people especially,
work seriously on cutting the financing of
fulfil its declared aim of making its
work effectively with emerging market economies to
be safeguarded. The Commission and the EEAS
be safeguarded. Annual EU-China summits and high-level
work closely together to guarantee the world
implement the Paris climate change agreement; and
cooperate in the field of energy in
engage with the world. But this does
keep in mind that resilience is not
strengthen and deepen such cooperation at international
address all maritime disputes in a peaceful
strengthen. In a more global and contested
implement the decisions taken last year in
make progress in the Middle East Peace
secure growth and job creation. Indeed, fiscal
contribute to redressing these. As the Confucian
work ever more closely together on a
cooperate with China and other countries in
be mainstreamed in the implementation of the
be streamlined, moving away from covering different
keep the design simple and focused, a
be addressed in order to guarantee financial
address together global challenges, if we want
promote more investment in both directions. But
further enhance bilateral economic relations, the European
be ensured in both the Chinese and
be better trained, b) costly evidence to
fine-tune the MIP in line with China’s
(a) align interventions closely with China’s own
increase domestic consumption, with the expectation that
improve environmental protection and statistics. When it
innovate in order to attain sustainable development
provide improved social protection in the form
address these issues, but at the same
look beyond the time when development co-operation
develop a new framework for China-EU civil
focus on a very limited number of
maximise programme impact. In response, I and
leverage the potential of a dynamic relationship
work together as they assume more active
maintain the momentum of domestic reform and
develop a more thorough knowledge of the
assist China to develop a regional Asian
involve civil society in the process of
be developed which take account of externalities,
be continued. However, there is also a
develop new policies and instruments to deal
be used more efficiently and effectively. Government
develop new policies and instruments to deal
be used more efficiently and effectively. Government
focus on a very limited number of
maximise programme impact. In response, I and
work towards balanced regional economic growth. An
develop a clearly targeted action. To this
work towards balanced regional economic growth. An
develop a clearly targeted action. To this
assist China to develop a regional Asian
involve civil society in the process of
be developed which take account of externalities,
be continued. However, there is also a
be addressed. Moreover, the sluggish state of
ensure that all branches and levels of
safeguard the human rights of ethnic minorities
maintain economic stimulus and in the long
improve social welfare. Economic and trade relations
streamline and further develop the current institutional
care for the natural environment in order
reach people at the regional, municipal and
ensure an effective and proactive EU presence
encourage progress towards nuclear disarmament, and the
further strengthen our relations with key ASEAN
take the partnership forward. In the EU,
ensure compliance of the Chinese legislation with
reconcile economic growth with overall sustainable development
fit into a clear national strategy, and
be taken account of in re-focusing EU
clarify differences and identify ways of moving
strengthen co-operation in this area, not least
involve members of the European business community
define further those areas that can benefit
change to meet the demands of the
be strengthened.⇤The government sees strengthening discipline among
establish a comprehensive legal framework is now
reconcile economic growth with overall sustainable development.
be made by China to respect the
be fully updated at all stages on
be even more closely linked with the
resolve the question of Taiwan peacefully through
make the dialogue more results-oriented and better
be even more closely linked with the
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Table Apx 20 Collocation of Human Rights in Corpus EU PPSP 
 
 
Corpus: Corpus EU PPSP 
Index Stat (01-Freq) Collocate Freq (coll.) Freq (corpus)
7 R china 79 3094
8 R dialogue 72 706
10 L law 70 394
11 L respect 46 173
12 M with 42 2602
14 L eu-china 34 714
16 R rule 31 217
17 R eu 30 2304
19 R situation 29 122
20 L democracy 28 67
21 L international 27 625
23 L rights 25 664
26 R issues 23 532
29 R economic 22 1062
31 L european 20 1124
32 R including 20 408
34 R development 18 1047
36 L protection 18 250
37 L governance 16 262
38 R freedoms 15 33
39 R human 15 625
40 R through 15 451
41 R defenders 14 18
42 L good 14 180
43 L promotion 14 83
45 R facility 13 46
46 R fundamental 13 47
47 L political 13 449
50 M standards 12 241
51 L support 12 602
52 L co-operation 11 718
54 R security 11 435
56 R dialogues 10 167
57 L initiative 10 91
58 R key 10 360




Table Apx 21 Collocation of Human Rights in Corpus China PPSP 
 
 
Corpus: Corpus China PPSP
Index Stat (01 - Freq) Collocate Freq (coll.) Freq (corpus)
1 L 对话 7 283
2 R 发展 6 729
4 L 问题 6 150
5 L 促进 5 254
6 R 开展 5 102
7 R 中国 4 1017
8 L 中欧 4 1486
9 L 亚欧 4 473
10 L 人权 4 25
11 M 安全 4 122
12 作用 3 128
13 L 公正 3 31
14 R 合作 3 990
15 L 基础上 3 59
16 R 客观 3 26
17 L 状况 3 4
18 L 看待 3 41
19 R 等 3 246
20 L 继续 3 107
21 R 不应 2 9
22 M 之名 2 1
23 M 交流 2 258
24 R 借 2 1
25 R 内政 2 7
26 M 和平 2 164
28 L 国际关系 2 23
29 M 地区 2 125
30 R 存在 2 45
32 M 干涉 2 4
33 M 欧洲 2 434
34 R 欧盟 2 792
35 M 相互尊重 2 56
36 L 相关 2 50
37 M 积极 2 153
38 M 稳定 2 120
39 M 繁荣 2 81
40 L 网络 2 33
41 L 重要 2 215
42 M 领域 2 290
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Figure Apx 2 GDP in Nominal Numbers of China and the EU 1990-2018 
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